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The GDR has been dead for ages, but it’s still quite alive in my family. Like a ghost that 
can’t find peace. Eventually, when it was all over, nothing more was said about those old 
struggles. Perhaps we hoped things would sort themselves out, that the new age would heal 
old wounds. But it wouldn’t leave me be. I went to archives, I rummaged old cupboards 
and boxes, I found old photographs and letters, a long-forgotten diary, secret files. I asked 
my family questions that I’d normally never have dared go near. I was allowed to do that, 
because I was a genealogist now. And all of a sudden our little GDR was there again, as 
if it had been waiting to emerge again, to show off from every angle, correct a few things and 
perhaps lose some of the rage and grief that were still here.  
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Abstract 
This thesis uses the secular coming-of-age ritual, Jugendweihe (‘youth consecration’), as a 
locus for exploring the ways kinship and politics in Germany are complexly intertwined. 
Although Jugendweihe emerged in the mid-19th century as a substitute for ecclesiastical 
coming-of-age rituals, and was adopted by various movements, it is closely associated with 
the former GDR (German Democratic Republic/East Germany). Under the GDR, young 
people aged thirteen to fourteen prepared for their Jugendweihe ceremony in ten ‘youth 
lessons’, which aimed to craft ‘socialist personalities’. Between 1955 and 1989 more than 
seven million adolescents pledged allegiance to the GDR state during the public 
ceremony, which was followed by a family celebration. With the demise of state socialism 
in 1989-90, western observers and the Churches assumed the ritual would vanish, but 
Jugendweihe continues to be celebrated in contemporary eastern Germany – without a 
pledge of allegiance. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between November 
2012 and January 2014 in Thuringia, this thesis investigates the changed social relations 
between individuals, families, and the state in eastern Germany after the political caesura 
of 1989-90. It explores the ritual’s abiding relevance within a different socio-political 
context, and considers how the ritual’s metamorphosis is mediated both through the local 
Jugendweihe Association and the grandparental and parental generations. The research 
examines what values grandparents and parents, who were socialised under the GDR, 
seek to transmit to their offspring born after the GDR state’s demise. It demonstrates the 
continued (and changing) salience of connections between kinship, ritual, and politics in 
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Introduction 
It was a bright Saturday morning in spring. A fourteen-year-old girl straightened herself 
as she stood in a row with her taller classmates, sensing the presence of their families and 
teachers sitting behind them in the solemnly decorated community hall. Somehow her 
clothes felt too big, despite having been tailored especially for her and for this important 
occasion. In front of them was a string quartet; on stage stood the guest speaker behind 
a lectern bearing the German Democratic Republic (GDR/East Germany) coat of arms: 
a hammer, a compass, and a garland of corn. The girl’s heart pounded as the speaker said 
the crucial words: ‘So answer: Yes, this we pledge!’ Her pastor’s advice rang in her head 
as she lip-synched the response: ‘Yes, this we pledge.’ A tremendous silence filled the hall, 
and with it came the realisation that everyone had lip-synched, rather than spoken, the 
vow. She longed to be invisible. The speaker, the headmaster and their class teachers 
looked from the stage down at the group of roughly forty adolescents, baffled. A slow, 
astonished murmur swelled up out of the silence; a voice from the back shouted: ‘Answer!’ 
Chaos broke out. 
 
As a teenager, I had imagined this scenario in the run-up to my own Jugendweihe (‘youth 
consecration’) in 1987.1 It was the reason that I never followed my pastor’s suggestion 
that I mouth – rather than say – the pledge to the state and our socialist future. I was far 
too afraid that my classmates might have had the same idea, plunging us into a sinister 
silence and triggering the breakdown of the whole ceremony, which we had all been 
feverishly anticipating for months. Instead, – standing on the stage I had imagined, with 
the same string quartet and coat of arms, my heart pounding as I had anticipated it would 
– I pronounced the words loudly while keeping my fingers crossed, thinking: ‘It does not 
count, I do not mean it.’ 
 
Almost exactly two and a half years later, on the evening of 9th November 1989, friends 
and I stood among hundreds of demonstrators in front of the Johannis Church in Gera, 
the third largest town in Thuringia – and my hometown. A voice, desperate to attract our 
                                                 
1 I follow previous scholarship on this ritual by using the German term ‘Jugendweihe’ (hereafter 
not italicized) instead of ‘youth consecration’ to distinguish the coming-of-age ceremony in 
eastern Germany, conventionally celebrated at the eighth grade, from the youth consecration of 
the Apostolic Church. 
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attention, shouted excitedly over the crowd telling us of the announcement just made on 
the TV news: that one of the main demands of the ongoing protests for more civil liberties 
had been granted. From now on we were free to travel anywhere. We looked at each other 
in disbelief. It was as unbelievable as the disappearance of the country – the country we 
grew up in and wanted to reform – would be, less than a year later. 
 
However, Jugendweihe – the secular coming-of-age ritual during which eighth-grade 
adolescents had pledged allegiance to this country’s future – did not disappear. It 
continues to be celebrated each spring as an alternative to ecclesiastic coming-of-age 
rituals – predominantly in eastern Germany.2 The public ceremony involves an 
approximately eighty minute festive programme during which adolescents take the stage 
and are welcomed into the ‘circle of adults’ (Kreis der Erwachsenen). This event – held in 
either a theatre or community hall – is followed by a large family celebration.  
 
This thesis investigates how and why this ritual survived the Wende (turning point) – the 
political rupture of 1989-90 – and continues to be celebrated in eastern Germany – a  
quarter of a century after the demise of the GDR state with which it was so closely 
associated. It uses the Jugendweihe ritual as a unique lens through which to view the 
changing social relations between individuals, families, and the state in eastern Germany. 
These changing social relations are the result of eastern Germans’ lives spanning two 
different socio-political contexts – socialist dictatorship and federal parliamentary 
republic – and which also stand in the shadow of a third – the Nazi dictatorship.  
 
This thesis is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted between November 2012 and 
January 2014 in my hometown, Gera. It was the first time that I lived there for a prolonged 
period of time since leaving in 1999, to travel abroad and then to live in Scotland. I 
conducted preliminary research in 2010 on Jugendweihe in Gera for my undergraduate 
dissertation, which focussed on the parental generation of Jugendweihe participants. Yet 
many new questions emerged in this process, which I could not satisfactorily answer – 
                                                 
2 Throughout this thesis I distinguish between the GDR (German Democratic Republic), East 
Germany, and East Germans and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany), West Germany, and 
West Germans when referring to the respective states or territories and people associated with 
them between 1949 and 1990. For the period after German unification, I use eastern federal 
states/Germans and western federal states/Germans respectively.  
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which led me to this project. I was particularly interested in illuminating the ways in which 
the ritual is a site where kinship and politics are intricately entangled, connecting the past 
not only with the present but also with the vision of a particular future.  
 
In what follows I briefly present the literature that has guided my thinking, then turn to 
my fieldsite and methodology, before outlining the chapters of my thesis.  
 
Theoretical Orientations: ‘Post-socialism’, Ritual, and Kinship  
Post-socialism 
 
The collapse of state socialism in 1989-90 heralded the end of the Cold War. ‘Post-
socialism’ originally emerged as a temporal category for a period in which ‘societies once 
referred to as constituting “actually existing socialism” had ceased to exist’ and were 
‘replaced by one or another form of putatively democratizing state’ (Chari and Verdery 
2009: 10). The presumptive designation of a ‘transition period’ was quickly called into 
doubt by anthropologists, who did not take the shift from a certain past to a certain future 
for granted but asked: ‘Transition from what, to what?’ (Bohlman in Berdahl 2000: 11; 
Hann 1994; Verdery 1991). The term ‘transition’ also raises the question of when such a 
process is complete or, put differently, when we can stop categorising a society and its 
people as ‘post-socialist’ (Hann, Humphrey, and Verdery 2002). I perceive ‘post-socialism’ 
to be useful as a conceptual category ‘to think with’ to an extent. Given similar experiences 
of a socialist past, marked by Marxist-Leninist doctrines, which led to particular social, 
economic and political commonalities, and given the shared experience of a point of 
political rupture, material from any post-socialist country can raise questions that might 
prove useful in the study of eastern Germany (Verdery 1996: 11). Yet there are certain 
spatial-temporal issues that limit the concept as a descriptive and transitory category, 
which have led scholars researching post-socialist contexts to question whether ‘post-
socialism’ is indeed a fruitful analytical concept (Boyer and Yurchak 2010; Hann, 
Humphrey, and Verdery 2002; Ringel 2013; Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008).  
 
In regards to the question of what post-socialist states might be transitioning from, many 
scholars have pointed out that socialism and socialist societies were not – and still are not 
– fully  understood in ‘the West’ (Verdery 1996, 2002; Hann 1994, 2002, 2006; Yurchak 
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2006).  The politics of the Cold War gave Western scholars very limited access to socialist 
societies, while native ‘scholars were under strict Party control’ (Verdery 2001: 14497). 
Western scholars thus frequently used a top-down approach in which socialist societies 
were commonly reduced to ‘totalitarianism’ (ibid).  While I will return to this issue and its 
particular relevance to eastern Germany in more detail in the kinship section below, for 
now it suffices to say that such top-down approaches are limiting because of their more 
or less pronounced reification of large-scale binaries – such as repression and resistance 
– that do not appropriately reflect actual social life under state socialism. Yet such 
analytical approaches continue, explicitly or implicitly, to define work in the post-Cold 
War period (Yurchak 2006: 4-10). 
 
In addition, categorising historically diverging countries under the umbrella of post-
socialism carries the risk that post-socialist scholars might over-emphasise the socialist 
legacy and deny people’s own historicity. An investigation of people’s motivations and 
behaviour can then be easily reduced to ‘the effects of socialism’ without acknowledging 
that post-socialist societies had a history and culture prior to the advent of socialism. 
Many post-socialist scholars have pointed out that the concept of post-socialism lends 
itself to the concealment of cultural continuity, because the collapse of state socialism is 
understood as a new beginning with a focus on change (Hann 2006; Hofman 2011; 
Stenning and Hörschelmann 2008). Indeed, these criticisms mirror critiques (Nugent 
2008; Ranger 1993; Spear 2003) within the postcolonial context of The Invention of Tradition 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) thesis. Furthermore, the categorisation of the eastern 
German region as ‘post-socialist’ can also conceal intra-regional differences (Peperkamp 
et al. 2009). Paying attention to regional differences is of particular import in the study of 
Jugendweihe as a ritual that emerged prior to the foundation of a German nation-state 
and in the Thuringian region, which – with its specific socio-political history – I suggest, 
has provided a fertile ground for the ritual’s uptake and spread.    
 
As for the question of what post-socialist states might be transitioning to, many economic 
and political scientists adopted a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach,  presuming that socialist 
societies would simply be transformed into ‘Western style’ free market economies and 
liberal democracies. However, post-socialist ethnographies were at the forefront of 
challenging neoliberal transition theories by showing that the change from a socialist 
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command economy to a capitalist market economy is not universally homogenous. This 
change was met at the micro-level by people’s innovative strategies; enmeshing new rules 
with old interests and values (Berdahl, Bunzl, and Lampland 2000; Bridger and Pine 1998; 
Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Hann 2002; Mandel and Humphrey 2002; Verdery 1996). 
Ethnographies of eastern Germany are largely concerned with these transformational 
processes, elucidating their impact on eastern Germans and strategies deployed in 
response, variously explored through a focus on retributive justice (Borneman 1997a), 
borders and identity (Berdahl 1999b), East Berlin companies (Müller 2007), military elites 
(Bickford 2011), material cultural (Veenis 2012), and architectural heritage (James 2012). 
These monographs are largely based on research conducted in the 1990s. More recent 
sociological and ethnographic studies have emerged on religion and secularity 
(Peperkamp and Ratjar 2010; Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009) and urban 
shrinkage (Ringel 2014). Yet most – with the exception of Wohlrab-Sahr et al. (2009) – 
have virtually overlooked families and intergenerational dynamics, which include a 
generation of eastern Germans that has no experience of state socialism. This oversight 
is what my thesis attempts to address.  
 
While anthropologists have thus refuted ‘transitology’, and largely have used the term 
‘transformation’ instead of ‘transition’, transitional thinking is still prevalent in the public 
and scholarly mainstream (Burawoy & Verdery 1999: 14-15). In other words, issues raised 
in this respect, such as ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’ – in which the (former) ‘Second 
World’ is required to catch up with the (former) ‘First World’ – remain prominent in their 
various economic, socio-religious and political manifestations.  
 
In the case of eastern Germany this is particularly pertinent due to its accession to West 
Germany on 3rd October 1990. This incorporation has led to a comparison that always 
rests on a contrast between the ‘new’ (eastern) and ‘old’ (western) federal states. Despite 
East Germany’s ‘reputation as one of the most prosperous and economically advanced 
countries of the socialist world’ (Hann 2006: 10), it was ‘underdeveloped’ compared to 
West Germany. East Germany’s absorption into the West German state in 1990 was led 
by the latter’s ‘hope that soon the East would, essentially, become like the West’ (Fulbrook 
1994: 211). But this turning of the former East Germany and its inhabitants into the 
spitting image of West Germany has not transpired. Instead studies have explored eastern 
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Germans’ sense of ‘second-class citizenship’ (Kolbe 2010) and whether East Germany 
was colonized by West Germany (Cooke 2005). More recent sociological studies in 
German employ discourse analysis to illustrate the continued stigmatization of eastern 
Germans (Kollmorgen, Koch, and Dienel 2011; Pates and Schochow 2012). Pates and 
Schochow have even received criticism in public media because of their edited volume’s 
title The Ossi: Micro-Political Studies about a Symbolic Foreigner.3 Although today the stigma 
attached to being from East Germany has perhaps decreased, in order to understand the 
continuation and adaptation of Jugendweihe in post-Wende Germany, I suggest, it is 
crucial to bear in mind that the treatment of eastern Germans in the immediate post-
unification years has shaped a mistrust toward western Germans and the (West) German 
state. Furthermore, eastern Germans remain viewed as ‘the other’ within Germany. The 
Wende was thus a political caesura that Veena Das (1995) describes as a ‘critical event’ – 
leading to transformations that impacted upon not just the state, but several institutions: 
family, community, bureaucracy, the law, and economic corporations. These changes 
required eastern Germans to adapt new forms in response to the ‘new modes of action’ 
that had redefined previous categories (Das 1995: 6). I explore these adaptations that go 
hand in hand with changing social relations in various ways, in which Jugendweihe as a 
ritual both binds people but also excludes others. I turn now to a discussion of ritual and 
its relation to society.    
 
Ritual   
Because ritual is a feature of all societies, its study has produced a wealth of theoretical 
and ethnographic contributions from the anthropological discipline to which I cannot do 
justice here. Rather I only provide a rough sketch relevant to my ethnographic context. 
The analysis of ritual has pertained largely to the study of religion, but this focus shifted 
in the mid-1970s with ritual receiving attention in its own right, leading also to an 
extension of the concept to the secular realm (Bell 1992: 3; Moore and Myerhoff 1977).4 
In the European context, the study of ritual has employed anthropological insights – 
largely derived from non-European cultures – to the analysis of rituals from the European 
                                                 
3 All translations of German texts are my own unless otherwise stated. 
4 Although Durkheim ([1915] 1964) arguably preceded such a shift by making the distinction 
between the ‘profane’ and the ‘sacred’, but viewing ritual as social and not as religious per se.  
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past, but not so much for contemporary Europe (Borneman 2010: 289). The reason for 
this, John Borneman holds, is due to the fact that the European present is  
 
seen either as deritualised (Berger 1967; Borch-Jacobsen 1994), at best 
mere ‘entertainment’ (Caillois 1961), or alternatively, the concept of ritual 
is applied to extremely diverse repetitive behaviours in large-scale events 
without asking the more rigorous questions that had been posed about its 
social significance for the lifecourse of individual subjects in non-
European contexts (ibid.; see also Boissevain 1992 on European ritual-
revitalisation).  
 
This thesis builds upon previous research on Jugendweihe, and seeks to address this gap 
in the analysis of European ritual, by exploring further its social significance for the 
lifecourse of individual subjects, both in relation to the domestic and socio-political 
aspects of kinship. Following the anthropologist Anselma Gallinat’s work (2002) – the 
first major study on Jugendweihe in English – I define Jugendweihe as a ‘secular coming-
of-age ritual’; in keeping with this definition, I will briefly address the literature on 
collective public rituals and life crisis rituals.  
 
The capacity of rituals to communicate through non-verbal action links them to power, 
and they have been investigated thus in their relation to the social structure (Mitchell 
2010). Here public rituals have been viewed either as conservative in nature and therefore 
maintaining a social order (Bloch 1992; Durkheim [1915] 1964; Rappaport 1999), or as 
fostering social change in which ritual and social structure mutually act upon each other 
(Cohen 1993; Kelly and Kaplan 1990; Kertzer 1988). Yet Jugendweihe, employed for 
various political ends, has acted in both capacities at different times (see Chapter 2). In 
this thesis I further explore this versatility by examining what the ritual does in 
contemporary Germany.  
 
Given that the GDR Jugendweihe was also a state ritual, it is noteworthy that state rituals 
are seen to create an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) and the idea of the state 
itself (Abrams 1988; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002). The GDR 
Jugendweihe served as a means of legitimising the socialist state self-referentially but also 
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in relation to others, such as to the Western Bloc. The intention of the GDR’s political 
elite was to produce ‘socialist personalities’ (ZAJ 1986) who pledged their allegiance to 
the state and future world socialism during the ritual ceremony, and thus Jugendweihe 
was an ‘instrument in the socialization of a GDR citizen’ (Wolbert 2011: 126).  
 
Christel Lane’s (1981) study of the Soviet ritual system – perhaps the most prominent – 
follows Clifford Geertz’s (1973) approach of ‘models of’ and ‘models for’ a world which, 
he holds, are reconciled in ritual action. Lane argues that the ‘models for’ aspect is 
emphasised in Soviet rituals because of the political elite’s attempt to employ rituals as a 
‘tool of cultural management’ (Lane 1981: 13). While the GDR political elite’s aim can 
certainly be categorised as social control, Quack & Töbelmann remind us that ‘the notion 
of ritual efficacy is – largely implicitly – constantly at work in the study of ritual’ (2010: 
23). Indeed, what is really of interest in the socialist ritual system is not just what state 
strategies were employed, but whether they were successful and why. Yet, a vague notion 
of ritual efficacy is inadequate as intentions and effects may vary from the respective 
agents: they are always relative. Thus we need to carefully establish ‘what or who affects 
what or whom and according to whom?’ (Quack and Töbelmann 2010: 17). Here the 
greater part of the substantial body of literature on Jugendweihe itself has not paid 
sufficient attention to the complexities of ritual efficacy. This literature can be roughly 
categorised as based on historical, theological, sociological and ethnographic research, to 
which I now turn.5  
 
Some publications investigate Jugendweihe’s origin and emphasise its historical 
importance for the labour movement (Isemeyer and Sühl 1989; Mohrmann 1999; ZAJ 
1988). By contrast, the Swedish author Bo Hallberg traces the origin of Jugendweihe to 
the German enlightenment, but with only five pages dedicated to the GDR Jugendweihe, 
pays very little heed to its role in socialist East Germany (Hallberg 1979). Theological 
studies focussed during the Cold War on comparisons between Jugendweihe and 
Confirmation and the role of Jugendweihe in GDR church-state relations (Albertin 1960; 
Gordon 1985; Jeremias 1959; Rabbow 1965; Urban and Weinzen 1984). Theologians have 
                                                 
5 There are also two works in educational studies (Illing 2000; Tolke 2006), which are both based 
on interviews with teenagers conducted in Saxony. While these authors provide a brief overview 
of the ritual’s history, their focus is on the significance of Jugendweihe for the adolescents’ 
development.   
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also been at the forefront of exploring the ritual’s survival after the political caesura 
(Gandow 1994; Hartmann 1992; Meier 1998; Neubert 2000; Pietsch 1991). These studies 
present, perhaps understandably, a largely antagonistic view of Jugendweihe due to its role 
as tool of secularisation in the GDR and as a direct competitor of confirmation. Yet they 
also struggle with the drawbacks prevalent in top-down approaches described above, 
since these scholars’ puzzlement about the ritual’s continuity resonates with Andreas 
Meier’s question: ‘Why do so many eastern Germans hold onto a celebration, although 
the GDR had it forced upon them since 1954?’ (Meier 1998: 8). They similarly ascribe the 
reasons for this continuity to ‘the sense-vacuum in the ex-GDR, in which one reaches for 
rituals and habits in an individualized, uprooted and disorganized society’ (Gandow 1994: 
91); alleviating the ‘Wendeschmerz’ – the pain associated with the transformation process 
(Neubert 2000: 175), and as eastern Germans’ ‘nostalgic longing for a vanished 
paternalistic state, that is retrospectively glorified’ (Meier 1998: 40). In contrast, 
Chowanski and Dreier, who both worked in the GDR’s Central Committee for 
Jugendweihe, provide interesting but largely uncritical insights into the GDR Jugendweihe 
and the immediate post-Wende years (Chowanski and Dreier 2000). Noticeably, many of 
these studies diverge on the role of Jugendweihe under fascism. Depending on whether 
they have a more positive or negative view of the ritual, they either emphasise its 
prohibition or employment by the Nazi regime respectively. I discuss the issue of the Nazi 
past further in Chapter 7.  
 
The German anthropologist Barbara Wolbert (1998; 2011) questions why the ritual could 
survive the collapse of the GDR state, given that ‘with the end of the socialist state the 
Jugendweihe itself became obsolete’ (Wolbert 1998: 200).6 She also draws our attention 
to ritual form, which, according to her, previous ritual theories – with their emphasis on 
function or meaning – have neglected. While I agree that ritual form itself requires 
investigation, her characterisation of Jugendweihe as an exceptional and therefore suitable 
case of ‘form-without-content’ is deduced from the fact that the ritual is no longer 
‘affirming state order’ (2011: 128, my emphasis). Hence, she argues, the ritual survived the 
political rupture of 1989 because ‘recognition and stirred emotions led the participants to 
overlook the fact that its ritual core – the oath – was missing’ (Wolbert 2011: 131). She 
                                                 
6 Wolbert’s 2011 chapter on Jugendweihe is essentially an updated English version of her 1998 
article in German. She appears not to have interviewed any ritual participants. 
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thus falls into the same heuristic trap of a top-down approach by only considering the 
GDR state’s aims but not ritual participants’ motivations for partaking in the socialist 
Jugendweihe – nor the extent to which the state might have achieved its goals.  
 
Diachronic approaches can shed more light on ritual form as, for example, Bloch’s (1986) 
historical examination of the Merina circumcision ritual reveals how the ritual entailed 
constant and inconstant aspects, allowing its adaptation to changing politico-economic 
circumstances. The inconstant aspects were, at different periods in time, either elaborated 
or reduced, whereas the constant aspects made up ‘the core of the ritual process’ (Bloch 
1992: 1). Similarly, Rappaport (1975; 1999) – addressing both the endurance and the 
adaptability of ritual – holds that ritual consists of, in his terms, indexical and canonical 
messages. While the former are the changing aspects of ritual, making it malleable 
according to (present) societal needs, the latter are the unchanging aspects. These make 
up the core of the ritual and make it recognisable through time as a tradition. Such a 
distinction between changing/indexical and unchanging/canonical aspects cannot be 
easily ascertained. Yet, the fact that the vow during the GDR Jugendweihe has in post-
Wende eastern Germany become redundant might suggest that it has been an indexical 
element. Indeed, the vow’s omission does not undermine the recognisability and 
importance of Jugendweihe to its participants.   
 
It is noteworthy that, while ritual can seemingly unify practitioners by concealing the 
different meanings they attach to it (Bell 1992; Cohen 1979), it can also be ‘an assertion 
of difference’ (Smith 1987: 109). The fact that the ritual is celebrated publicly also makes 
it observable by others. People who celebrate a particular (public) ritual are therefore also 
involved in a process of ‘othering’ in which people who participate belong to a social 
group, while people who do not participate are outsiders (Baumann 1992). The obvious 
‘outsiders’ are the people for whom the ritual bears no significance and who Wolbert 
categorises as ‘those from the West’ (2011: 230). Other empirical studies (Aechtner 2011; 
Gallinat 2002; Saunders 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2003) have – explicitly or implicitly – 
noted the ritual’s two aspects: the (social) coming-of-age aspect and the (political) aspect 
of initiation into a particular social group. They argue that present adolescents are initiated 
into an ‘evolving eastern German identity’ (Saunders 2002) that is based on parents’ 
biographic memories. Yet, while the ritual is celebrated predominately in eastern 
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Germany, these studies do not shed sufficient light on how such an eastern German 
identity is defined, by whom and for what reasons – all of which questions I explore in 
this thesis. Furthermore, none of these empirical studies have addressed the role of the 
Jugendweihe Association, which – I contend – was a key player in securing the continued 
prevalence of Jugendweihe after the political rupture (see especially Chapter 6). 
 
Lastly, scholars are divided on whether Jugendweihe is a rite de passage. Van Gennep 
([1909]1960), who coined the term, argued that these rituals belong to a special category 
associated with a change in social status.7 They consist of rites of separation (pre-liminal), 
transition (liminal), and reincorporation (post-liminal), and the liminal phase is particularly 
elaborated in initiation rituals (van Gennep 1960: 11). Scholars disagree in particular on 
whether an actual change of status is effected in adolescents who participate in 
Jugendweihe. Döhnert (2002) and Wolbert (1998, 2011) appear to agree that – unlike in 
the socialist GDR – adolescents no longer undergo a preparation period (liminal phase) 
during which they are not only educated in a particular worldview, but also change their 
membership from a children’s organisation (the Pioneers) to a youth organisation (the 
Free German Youth) and are acknowledged as citizens by the state through the receipt of 
an ID card. Others (Aechtner 2012; Gallinat 2002; Saunders 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 
2003) argue that the type of gifts, the change of terms of address from informal to formal 
‘you’, and the first public glass of alcohol during the family celebration, reflect such a 
change from childhood to adolescence. I agree with the latter scholars that a change of 
status – though no longer ceremonially acknowledged by the state – still occurs within the 
family, if not the neighbourhood or wider social circle. Indeed, I demonstrate in Chapter 
4 that additional aspects of the family celebration symbolically mark such a status change. 
While scholars have not addressed the family celebration in these terms (or only 
tangentially), they have also overlooked the fact that – although by German law fourteen-
year-olds are not adults – there are various legal changes that recognise that they are no 
longer children. This leads me to my main interest in the relationship between politics and 
kinship.  
                                                 
7 Coming-of-age rituals cannot be understood outwith the historico-political context in which 
they take place (see, for example, Alvarez 2008; Horowitz 1993; Pertierra 2015). I explore 






Anthropology’s past preoccupation with stateless societies focussed on the analysis of 
continuity and socio-structural organisation through the study of kinship, making kinship 
central to the discipline. In particular, Meyer Fortes’ (1969) dichotomy of the politico-
jural (public) and the domestic (private) spheres led to a focus on socio-political 
institutions in the anthropological study of kinship, whereas ‘the family’ was believed to 
be rather unimportant and universally constant (Carsten 2004; Yanagisako 1979; 
Yanagisako and Collier 1987). In the 1970s feminist anthropologists highlighted that the 
social position of women – though not missing entirely from anthropological scholarship 
– had been naturalised, and questions regarding their social roles, their crucial work in the 
socialization of offspring and, ultimately, a narrowly-defined power politics needed 
addressing (di Leonardo 1991; Peletz 1995; Yanagisako 1979). I follow contemporary 
kinship scholarship that views kinship as inextricably linked not only with gender (Pine 
2002; Yanagisako and Collier 1987) but also personhood (Bloch 1998; Carsten 2004). I 
address in this section first the public/private dichotomy, before turning my attention to 
gender and personhood. 
 
The unexamined dichotomy of the public (political)/private (domestic) sphere, partly 
causing anthropology’s previous disregard of kinship in state societies, is an issue 
intriguingly replicated in the ways scholars, mainly historians, have studied the ‘second 
German dictatorship’ after its demise. Here two influential schools of thought can be 
distinguished, and categorised as either adhering to totalitarian theory or as showing the 
limits of the dictatorship respectively (Ross 2002; Moranda 2010; Port 2015). The former 
is largely concerned with the study of the SED – the GDR’s ruling Socialist Unity Party 
of Germany – and its security apparatus, epitomised in the Stasi, East Germany’s State 
Security. The totalitarian school emphasises the ‘withering away’ of civil society and holds 
that ‘social politics centred exclusively on the control of – and resistance to – the Socialist 
Unity Party-dominated public sphere’ (Betts 2010: 2). Notably, the stability of the GDR, 
particularly after the People’s Uprising in 1953, is seen as having been aided by East 
Germans’ retreat into the Nischengesellschaft (‘niche society’) (Gaus 1983) – that is, the 
private sphere of the family. In contrast, the latter school of thought is closely linked to 
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Lüdtke’s concept of Eigen-Sinn (one’s own sense; spontaneous self-will)8 and 
Alltagsgeschichte (history of everyday life), and explores ‘how East Germans responded to 
SED dictates on their own terms’ (Moranda 2010: 332). Both of these schools have 
accordingly been criticized for either reducing life under socialism to a tyranny with little 
resemblance to actual life in East Germany, or for downplaying the terror of the 
dictatorship and thereby playing into the hands of a dangerous brand of Ostalgie – the 
nostalgia for the East (ibid).9  In this thesis, I have mainly drawn on historical studies in 
English, which engage critically with East German history and challenge clear dichotomies 
of repression/resistance, state/society, and public/private by paying attention to the 
everyday life of GDR citizens (Betts 2010; Fulbrook 2005; Fulbrook and Port 2015; 
Harsch 2007; McLellan 2011; Plum 2015; Vaizey 2014).  
 
The demise of state socialism, however, not only caused a revival of totalitarian theory, 
there was also an increasing interest in the study of memory – variously described as an 
‘obsession with memory’ or ‘memory boom’ (Antze and Lambek 1996; Berliner 2005; 
Hodgkin and Radstone 2003; Huyssen 1995; Radstone 2000). This was not least the case 
because the disappearance of state socialism ‘with its hegemonic hold on memory and 
history production has allowed and in fact generated an outpouring of counter memories 
and histories hidden, ‘forgotten’ and forbidden’ (Pine, Kaneff, and Haukanes 2004: 1). 
There has also been an emphasis on (postsocialist) nostalgia (Angé and Berliner 2014; 
Boym 2001; Todorova and Gille 2010) that is more closely linked to forgetting as an 
integral part of the processes of memory (Carsten 1995a; Connerton 2008; Connerton 
2009). Nostalgia has been viewed as ‘reactionary’, ‘escapist’ and ‘inauthentic’ which 
‘greatly simplifies if not falsifies the past’ (Hirsch and Spitzer 2003: 83). The danger of 
such selective memories, explains Luisa Passerini – following the political theorist Perez-
Diaz – lies in the ‘close link between the formation of a “democratic public sphere” and 
the memories of the individuals who give life to it: if memory of the past is trivialised, this 
leads to […] incomplete and forgetful individuals who can easily become prey of 
totalitarian movements’ (Passerini 2003: 246).  
 
                                                 
8 For a concise definitional history of Lüdtke’s concept see Lindenberger (2014).  
9 Port notes that these charged debates have become on both fronts ‘more meanspirited, 
marked by a disturbing tendency to mischaracterize the arguments of one’s adversaries, as well 
as engage in ad hominem attacks and self-righteous moral posturing’ (2015: 7) 
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In contrast, nostalgia can also be viewed more positively – ‘as a resistant relationship to 
the present, a ‘critical utopianism’ that envisions a better future’ (Hirsch and Spitzer 2003: 
83). In the 1990s and early 2000s, Ostalgie was viewed by some as a stigmatising term to 
refer to any symbol or positive memory of the socialist past as condemnable GDR 
nostalgia. This analysis, in turn, led to Ostalgie being re-interpreted as a particular form of 
eastern German self-assertion (Ahbe 2005; Berdahl 1999a; Boyer 2006; Dale 2007). 
However, I believe that nostalgia for the socialist past needs to be better contextualised, 
and in this thesis I attempt to pay attention to who performs nostalgia and why, what this 
nostalgia consists of, and in what spheres of life it is expressed (Todorova 2010: 7-8). 
Since kinship discourses are entangled in personal memory and wider politico-historical 
events (Pine 2007), I illustrate how a particular memory is transmitted to a generation that 
has no experience of the socialist past (see especially Chapters 2 and 7). 
 
It is noteworthy that Jugendweihe consists of both a public ceremony and a family 
celebration. Empirical studies of Jugendweihe (Aechtner 2011; Chauliac 2009; Gallinat 
2002; 2005; Saunders 2002) have shown that today’s parents – who celebrated the GDR 
ritual – stress the social/familial aspect over the socialist/political aspect of the ritual. 
Asking Thuringians about their ‘Jugendweihe’ may garner replies in reference to both the 
public ceremony and private celebrations; but the private family celebration is always 
emphasised. I argue that this distinction is less indicative of a neat split in East Germans’ 
lives between private and public spheres, than of the complex interdependence between 
those spheres, both in socialist East Germany and in contemporary eastern Germany. 
Borneman holds that the ritual was possibly ‘the best example [of] how parents and the 
state struggled for the control of children and youths’ (1992: 164) during the Cold War. 
He argues that ‘parents turned the Jugendweihe into a kinship festival, connected to the 
event but privately celebrated’, which ‘by the 1980s […] had become a symbiosis, where 
neither the state nor parents got exactly what they wanted, but both participated, though 
in a discordant rhythm, in a mutually advantageous relationship’ (Borneman 1992: 165).  
 
Empirical studies of Jugendweihe (Gallinat 2005; Saunders 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 
2003; Aechtner 2011) have somewhat too readily accepted the notion of a ‘family 
tradition’ and appear to view ‘family’ as politically neutral and homogenous across time 
and space. Throughout this thesis I pursue the line of inquiry in Vital Relations, arguing 
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that kinship in modern state societies has not been relegated to the domestic realm but is 
complexly entwined with the project of state-building, and an organizing force in political, 
economic and religious structures and processes (McKinnon and Cannell 2013). Similarly, 
in his comparative study of family life under five different dictatorships (Soviet Union, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey) between 1900 and 1950, Paul Ginsborg (2014) argues 
that these political regimes not only aimed at moulding families, but that families 
themselves proved to be political actors in historical processes. Each of the societies he 
investigated was at the time in a period of dramatic transformation meant to herald in a 
new and better future (Ginsborg 2014). This was the case for the GDR at its foundation, 
when – like the FRG – it needed to make a clean break with its Nazi past. Unlike West 
Germany, however, it pursued a path toward communism; and a crucial aspect of that 
pursuit was the adoption of the Soviet or socialist family model. The Soviet or socialist 
family model views patriarchy as an essential hindrance to achieving a communist utopia. 
Because of this, women’s role as mothers and workers was a political issue, and women 
under socialism were often more closely associated with the state – or at least with ‘its 
redistributive, social support aspects’ (Gal 2002: 90; Pine 2002). In particular, women’s 
relation to the (new) state changed, and as will be evident throughout this thesis, it is 
especially women that promote and insist on the public ceremony as an integral part of 
the contemporary Jugendweihe.  
 
The current generation of eastern German parents, I argue, plays a crucial role in gluing 
the family together, but also in Vergangenheitsbewältigung (managing/coming to terms with 
the past). In the early 2000s, childhood memoirs emerged from the so-called ‘Wende 
generation’ or ‘Wende children’ – East Germans who were children or young adults at 
the time of the political rupture in 1989-90 – in an attempt to recuperate their own 
memories of everyday life in the GDR (see, for example, Hensel 2002; Rusch 2003; 
Tetzlaff 2004). Although these accounts varied, they were united by each dedicating a 
chapter to their Jugendweihe celebration, and by having been branded ‘nostalgic’ within 
the public discourse about the East German past – for their supposed lack of criticism of 
the GDR’s political regime. Yet the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Wall also marked a 
shift in how this generation dealt with the GDR past and the Wende period. For example, 
the formation of the network ‘Third Generation East’ in 2009 united various ‘Wende 
children’ from East and West Germany with the explicit aim of opening a different and 
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more frank ‘dialogue between old and young and between East and West’ (Hacker et al. 
2012: 9).10  
 
In literary accounts, too, eastern Germans took a more critical stance towards their origins 
and socialization, and investigated the Wende period in terms of loss and chaos, but also 
political and moral disorientation, especially in light of the rise of neo-fascism in eastern 
Germany (Rennefanz 2013; Richter 2015). These ventures share the project of unearthing 
the ‘quiet rage of the Wende generation’ – the subtitle of Sabine Rennefanz’ book – and 
they make visible how these larger generational tensions are also replicated and produced 
within the nuclear family (see Prochnow and Rohde 2011). In this sense, the Wende – 
with its dramatic economic, social and political changes – needs to be understood as a 
caesura in Stephan Feuchtwang’s sense, that is, a before/after event that also maps familial 
generations onto it (Feuchtwang 2011). Recent family memoirs (Leo 2011; Ruge 2012; 
Brasch 2012) – largely about privileged families under the GDR – highlight the complexity 
of eastern German kinship across three generations that also span three different socio-
political contexts and two caesurae. Here family tensions are of a political nature, that is, 
when kin and political loyalties diverge (Feuchtwang 2007). In this thesis, I explore the 
relations between the contemporary teenage generation born in unified Germany, and 
their parental and grandparental generations – not to overstate the difference between 
socialist generations and the post-unification generation, but to illustrate the generational 
differences that also exist between the grandparental and parental generations. Each 
generation, of course, experienced the GDR differently, in part because it was differently 
exposed to the social manipulations of its political elite – which were not only about 
constructing a socialist family model. Rather, because the SED knew that ‘to have the 
young is to hold the future’ (Saunders 2007: 11), it aimed at creating a new generation of 
‘socialist personalities’. In the mid-1970s, this ‘socialist personality’ was officially defined 
as someone  
 
                                                 
10 The Third Generation East (TGE) narrowly defined its ‘generation’ as Germans who were born 
between 1975 and 1985 and has been – externally and internally – criticized for somewhat 
arbitrarily limiting its members to a decade by birth and/or applying both ‘generation’ and ‘third’ 
incorrectly. Yet this debate also highlights that ‘generation’ is a rather volatile concept, especially 
in relation to political rupture. A year’s age difference at the time of the caesura can make a crucial 
difference to a subject’s perception and lifecourse choices.  
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who has a comprehensive command of political, specialist and general 
knowledge, possesses a firm class outlook rooted in the Marxist-Leninist 
worldview, is notable for excellent mental, physical and moral qualities, is 
thoroughly imbued with collective thoughts and deeds, and actively, 
consciously and creatively contributes to the shaping of socialism 
(Fulbrook 2005: 115; her translation). 
 
As social institution in the GDR, Jugendweihe was designed to ‘contribute to cultivate 
and educate all children of the people to become all-round developed socialist 
personalities’ (ZAJ 1986: 177).  However, Borneman argues that the focus on the 
collective, encouraging people to think beyond the individual, was difficult for East 
Germans to consolidate with the state’s over-bearing paternalistic role, in which ‘the 
individual was to be a loyal Kleinbürger dependent on the state for goods and services, 
financially secure from cradle to grave, and hesitant to use his/her own initiative’ (1992: 
200). Anna Saunders’ (2007) study of youth and patriotism in eastern Germany from 
1979-2002 suggests that the official state rhetoric often failed to yield loyalty from youths, 
but that ‘the death of the GDR clearly did not imply the death of young people’s loyalty 
to an eastern set of values, but in many ways its rebirth’ (ibid: 225). In this thesis I explore 
what these ‘eastern values’ are that the grandparental and parental generations intend to 






Fieldsite: Gera, Thuringia 
 
Almost all other tribes attempted to seize political power – never the Thuringians. Our [German] 
culture owes them unspeakably much, our state precisely nothing. 
 
– German Historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1882 cited in Rassloff 2010: 7-8) 
 
 
Thuringia has been of great significance to Germany’s cultural history – a significance 
reflected in its many nicknames, such as ‘heartland of German culture’, ‘stronghold of the 
Reformation’, ‘land of classicism’ or ‘home of the Bach family’. But it was also the epitome 
of Germany’s Kleinstaaterei – scattered regionalism (Rassloff 2010). While the German 
nation state was founded in 1871, Thuringia – ruled by various dynasties – only united in 
1920 as the Free State of Thuringia, with Weimar as its capital. Often poetically referred 
to as the ‘green heart of Germany’ due to its fairly dense forestation and its location in 
the centre of the country (Map 1), its cities with their textile, optical and car-manufacturing 
industries grew rapidly during the Industrial Revolution. However, even today the region 
resonates with a 1947 report, which noted: ‘despite heavy industrialisation, Thuringia has 
a distinctly agricultural character’ (cited in Allinson 2000: 17). 
There are several reasons for why I chose Thuringia, and in particular Gera as a fieldsite. 
Firstly, I wanted to make use of pre-established good relations with the local Jugendweihe 
Association. Secondly, the Association has a monopoly on conducting Jugendweihe in 
East Thuringia, whereas in most other regions various associations compete over ritual 
participants, which in turn renders it extremely difficult to establish any meaningful 
participation figures. Thirdly, during my previous research I learnt that Jugendweihe 
originated in Thuringia, yet the region itself had been neglected by previous research on 
this ritual. Last but not least, there were considerations pertaining to both finances and 
kinship that made me decide to return to my hometown and stay with my family. 
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Map 1: Location of Thuringia in Germany 
Source: http://www.petersingerlinks.com/das-gruene-band.htm; amended by author 
Legend: red – ‘green strip’ border between East Germany (light green) and West 
Germany (cream) during the Cold War. 
 
 
Röpsen, the village of 300 people in which I was raised, and in which I lived again during 
my fieldwork, became part of the city of Gera in 1993. Like Gera and its other 
incorporated villages, it has transformed in a variety of visible and audible ways since 
unification. For visitors the village presents itself – like many other Thuringian villages – 
in a picture postcard-like fashion, pretty and clean. Still, I was also aware of the process 
of beautification it had undergone. Most houses had been refurbished, because now the 
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materials to do so were available; the village square in front of the church had been newly 
cobbled, and there was yet another lovely square for village gatherings below it; most of 
the streets were now properly tarmacked, instead of the much re-patched potholes I was 
used to from the 1970s and 1980s. Some parts of the village, with their traditionally half-
timbered houses and barnyards, could have passed easily as places right out of Grimm’s 
fairy tales, if it were not for the many cars parked on the streets. The persistent swoosh 
from the nearby Autobahn, clearly audible when I lay in bed at night, remained for me a 
marker of difference from my childhood years when the motorway’s proximity had been 
almost unnoticed because it had had so little traffic.  
 
Whereas to an outsider it might have seemed that there were only improvements, I was 
also conscious of the village’s losses: there was no longer a KONSUM (the GDR’s chain 
store), nor a Tante-Emma-Laden (corner shop), no pub nor voluntary fire brigade, and even 
the sports club had become somewhat redundant. Once a week a bakery van would stop 
in the village, but only a few immobile pensioners would buy some bread or cake. There 
were some events organized by the Heimatverein (local heritage society), formed post-
unification, and social gatherings for pensioners. Yet all the regular social meeting places, 
where people would exchange greetings, the latest gossip, share sociality and 
commensality beyond the family, had vanished. There were rarely people at the bus stop 
across the street, because – unlike in GDR times – most villagers owned a car. It was not 
uncommon for me to be the only person using the comfortable public transport to the 
city, which had been modernized in 2005.  
 
Gera, situated in East Thuringia along the river Weisse Elster, had roughly 100,800 
inhabitants in 2013, and is Thuringia’s third-largest city (see Map 2). Since 2005, Gera has 
carried the byname ‘Otto-Dix-city’ after its honorary citizen, the famous painter who was 
born there. During my fieldwork, proposals were made for a new arthouse, which was 
hoped to draw more tourists, not least in an attempt to alleviate the city’s financial 
difficulties. Yet when I discussed this topic with Jutta, a Jugendweihe Association 
member, she dryly responded: 
 
Well, art and Otto Dix – that’s all well and good, but I doubt it’ll attract 
more tourists. I mean an arthouse for Gera – what’s all this good for? 
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Gera is and always has been an Arbeiterstadt (worker’s city). They don’t 
care for art. 
 
The arthouse project was also aimed at revitalizing the cultural scene, since Gera often 
felt ‘deserted’. Inhabitants of all ages commonly noted that there ‘is nothing happening’ 
in Gera, or that ‘the pavements are folded up straight after 6 pm’ (die Bürgersteige werden 
gleich nach 18 Uhr hochgeklappt). 
 
 
           
Map 2: East Thuringian Region 
Source: www.thueringen.de; amended by author 
 
This unattractiveness was frequently contrasted by its inhabitants with Gera’s heyday 
during the Industrial Revolution, when it grew rapidly due to its booming textile industry. 
Today, many Geraer – as people from the city are known – appear to reminisce more 
nostalgically about the prosperity of their Heimatstadt (hometown) at the turn of the 
century than about socialist times. They often proudly pointed out to me the many 
prosperous Art Nouveau villas that scatter its cityscape, which have been beautifully 
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restored in the post-Wende years; or they noted that the first forerunner of the Hertie 
department store – which was to become one of the leading chain stores in Germany – 
opened in their city in 1882, and that in 1892 Gera became the second city in Germany 
with a functioning electric tram. However, these visible architectural or infrastructural 
remainders of a more distant past whitewash the significant social disparities of their time. 
A study of Gera’s housing situation in the early 1910s, conducted by a local teacher, 
disclosed that many of Gera’s working populace lived in squalor, with poor health and 
high infant and child mortality (Uhl 1913). Undeniably, these intertwined factors of 
industrial growth and simultaneously terrible working and living conditions among 
workers contributed to making Gera – as one twenty-something-year-old pointed out to 
me – ‘a socialist city’.  
 
Thuringia, too, can be categorised as a stronghold of the labour movement, having hosted 
three major conferences of German socialism: Eisenach (1869), Gotha (1875) and Erfurt 
(1891) (Allinson 2000: 17; Grebing 1969). The historian Mark Allinson summarizes that 
‘the region’s most striking political feature, however, is its tendency to lean towards 
extremism and/or exaggerate national trends’ (Allinson 2000: 18). Indeed, the fairly equal 
proportions of an industrial and a non-industrial working populace may have been one of 
the reasons for ‘a very close balance between the parties of the left and the right’, with 
‘the absence of any moderating centre forces of consequence’ leading to an ‘exaggerated 
importance for minority parties, and a high degree of political polarization’ (Tracey 1975: 
24). Traditionally socialist, the support for the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 
Thuringia was always higher than the national average; but so was the support of national 
socialism in its different forms in the 1920s and during the Third Reich (Allinson 2000: 
18; Tracey 1975). Under the Nazi regime, Thuringia became not only a celebrated centre 
of great German culture but also one of horror, with Buchenwald – one of the largest 
concentration camps on German soil – located just 10 km outside Weimar.  
 
The US Army conquered Thuringia in April 1945 but in July of the same year, the territory 
was taken over by the Soviet Union, as agreed among the allied forces. Thuringia became 
part of the Soviet Occupying Zone (SBZ), and political parties began quickly to form: 
first the Communist Party (KPD), followed by the Socialists (SPD) and later the Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and Liberal Democrats (LDPD). Later, the DBD (Democratic 
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Farmers Party of Germany) was founded in order to weaken the CDU and the LDPD, 
while the NDPD (National-Democratic Party of Germany) sought to provide a political 
outlet for former NSDAP (National-Socialist German Worker’s Party) and Wehrmacht 
members.  In 1946, the KPD and SPD merged to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED) – 
a merger that the Soviet Union enforced. However, it also reflected the will of many 
socialists and communists, who believed the disunity of the labour movement to have 
been a contributing factor to Hitler’s rise (Grebing 1969: 184; Thomaneck and Niven 
2001: 24). In Thuringia, this merger was supported by many of the socialist and 
communist political prisoners who had survived Buchenwald and who became key 
political players in the region (Allinson 2000: 21; Kachel 2011: 16, 122). Increasing Cold 
War tensions between the western Allies and the Soviet Union led, in May 1949, to the 
foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG/West Germany) with Bonn as its 
capital. In October, the SBZ followed suit, and the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR/East Germany) was founded, with East Berlin as capital (see Map 1; white former 
FRG; green former GDR). While the political elite simulated political pluralism through 
the variety of parties, it ensured the SED’s rule by ‘synchronizing’ (gleichschalten) them all, 
and an electoral system of voting for the Nationale Front that consisted of the SED and all 
its bloc parties (see Allinson 2000: 23-38). 
 
In 1952, an administrative reform – part of the GDR’s adoption of the Soviet Union’s 
‘democratic centralism’ – dissolved all the states of the federal system and restructured 
them into 14 Bezirke (counties). Thuringia was split into three new counties named after 
their administrative capitals – Erfurt, Suhl, and Gera. The county of Gera is congruent 
with what is described today as East Thuringia, the region that also marks the catchment 
area of the local Jugendweihe Ostthüringen e.V. (Jugendweihe East Thuringia, registered 
association; hereafter (Jugendweihe) Association). 
 
During socialist times, Gera’s growing main industries (textile, machine tools, and 
electronic equipment) and the Soviet-German uranium mining company SDAG Wismut 
led to a steadily increasing population. The high-rise blocks of flats in Gera’s city centre 
erected to accommodate this increasing population – like those in Lusan and Bieblach-
Ost, districts newly created in the 1970s and 1980s – were highly sought after at the time, 
as comfortable and inexpensive dwellings with central heating. In contrast, villages were 
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generally regarded as ‘backward’ because of both their traditional – often religious – views 
and their lower living standards. Yet with the Wende, Gera suffered high unemployment 
and outward migration that went hand in hand with a reversal in preference for and 
affordability of housing space. Many high-rises were abandoned in the 1990s, some were 
destroyed, and others refurbished. These parts of the city are now predominantly 
inhabited by people with lower incomes, while many others – those who could afford to 
do so – have moved outside the city centre into single-family or two-family detached 
houses in the sprawling villages that were incorporated into Gera in 1993 (see Map 3). 
Only one of the families in this thesis lived in the city centre, while all others lived in the 
village-like areas of Gera. Yet only three people of the parental generation had lived in 




Map 3: Gera City and its districts (incorporated villages) 
                        Source: www.gera.de 
 
With German unification in 1990, the free state of Thuringia was re-established, and 
Erfurt became its capital in 1991. Belonging in both population and territory to the smaller 
federal states of Germany, it nevertheless has seven regional dialects. Two of these, the 
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East-Thuringian and South-East-Thuringian dialects, are spoken in the area with which 
this thesis is concerned. These dialects developed with the Upper Saxon dialect and are 
today often conflated or perceived to be (Upper) Saxon dialects. Notably, because many 
of the East German political elite spoke Saxon dialects, including the first head of state 
Walter Ulbricht, West Germans often associate this dialect with East Germans per se.11 
Contemporary films on East Germany reify this notion by commonly featuring East 
Germans with a Saxon dialect when they represent some sort of – usually incompetent – 
GDR state authority, such as border guards, Stasi agents, or policemen. 
 
The distinctive character of the region, resonating through time and reflected in its 
intertwined social, economic and political particularities – and also mirrored in the city of 
Gera – may account for why the Jugendweihe ritual emerged here, and was adopted by 
so many different movements (see Chapter 2). This political polarisation remains today, 
at both the local and the regional level. Gera’s cityscape, for example, sports antifascist 
graffiti, but the city has hosted the annual Neo-Nazi music concert, ‘Rock for Germany’, 
since 2003. Thuringia has been ruled since 1990 by Conservative governments, yet it 
became the first federal state in post-unification Germany with a coalition government 




The Jugendweihe Association 
‘Hey, you foreigner!’, quipped Sonja, a part-time staff member of the local Jugendweihe 
Association, when our paths crossed in November 2012. She was a slim, dark-haired 
woman in her sixties with brown warm eyes and a contagious smile, and asked, ‘Are you 
already here? Did you want to come to this or are you here just by accident?’, while 
simultaneously hugging me tightly. I explained to her that I had arrived in Gera the night 
before, and wanted to see the laying of at least one of the twelve new Stolpersteine 
(stumbling stones) that commemorated local victims of the Nazi regime. There were a 
few familiar faces among the roughly 25 people that had gathered on Karl Liebknecht 
                                                 
11 In German it is referred to simply as Sächsisch (Saxon, i.e. without the Upper) or sächseln (to 
speak/sound Saxon) – yet it is unconnected to the Niedersächsisch (Lower Saxon) dialect. 
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Street that crisp Friday afternoon. Among them were party members of Die Linke (The 
Left), holding seats in either Gera’s city council or the Thuringian parliament. I recognized 
some of them, like Sonja, from my research on the Jugendweihe ritual in 2010. Sonja and 
I chatted briefly, and she inquired whether I would continue to the last two locations 
where stumbling stones would be laid for Helene Fleischer and Erwin Panndorf. Both 
communists, born in Gera, their names were familiar to me; under state socialism, a street 
and retirement home had already been named after the former, and the local Sporthalle 
(gymnasium) carried the name of the latter. As darkness was already creeping in, I 
explained that I was too tired and had to catch one of the infrequent busses home. Sonja 
admitted that she herself felt like going home, but added, ‘I really need to go to the Erwin 
Panndorf one, because we made this information board on him and I feel…’ she paused. 
Instead of continuing her sentence, she tapped with her right hand on the left side of her 
chest, signalling that the matter was close to her heart. She smiled at me gently. 
  
A week later, I was at the Association’s office to discuss my research project with Sonja, 
Dagmar – the sixty-year-old vice chairwoman of the Association – and Jutta, another full-
time staff member in her mid-fifties. We had first met in 2010 when I conducted seven 
weeks of field research for my honours dissertation on Jugendweihe, which had focussed 
on the parental generation of Jugendweihe participants. I explained to the Association 
members the change in focus and the wider scope of my new research project: my interest 
in the family and in Jugendweihe as ‘family tradition’, and my intention to understand the 
motivations for celebrating Jugendweihe across all three generations: teenagers, parents, 
and grandparents. At the same time, I elaborated, I wanted to gain an insight into the 
Association’s work, and how they related to both adolescents and families. They agreed 
that they would support me as much as they could in my research.  
 
Working with the Association enabled me to observe the public Jugendweihe ceremonies, 
which are ticketed events, and also allowed me to gain insights into what was going on 
‘behind the stage’. Because of my links to the Association, I was able to speak with a wide 
range of different people who would have been inaccessible to me otherwise, including 
teenage volunteers of the Association, performing artists, photographers, ritual guest 
speakers, and members of other ritual associations. But my main interest was in 
understanding the motivations behind the Association and its members’ work, which has 
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continued to enable East Thuringians to celebrate a public Jugendweihe ceremony after 
the political caesura of 1989-90. Working through the Association, I felt, would add a 
different perspective to the academic literature on Jugendweihe, which has neglected 
research on the role local associations have played in the ritual’s continuity across the 
territory of the former East Germany.  
 
I arranged with the Association members to work in the office twice a week on Tuesdays 
and Thursdays, mainly because the Association’s Sprechzeiten – open consultation days – 
fell on Tuesdays. This schedule enabled me to observe more closely who would enrol 
teenagers for Jugendweihe, and how Association members and their ‘customers’ 
interacted. Despite my offer to do ‘proper work’ in the office, members seemed reluctant 
to let me fully work-shadow, or to train me in the whole range of tasks involved in their 
work. The reasons for this reluctance, I believe, were due largely to the fact that it was 
not worthwhile to train someone who would not work with them for good; but it also 
involved a process of distinction-making in which I was ‘the academic’. They offered 
significant support to my project and provided the use of a computer in Sonja’s office so 
that ‘you can read your books and write your thesis’. Especially at the beginning, but also 
throughout my fieldwork, I explained that I was less interested in what had been written 
in books than in what was currently happening within the Association and beyond. Over 
time, Association members appeared to understand this, and I was not only invited to 
local and regional Jugendweihe Association meetings but also on work outings. My 
‘hanging out in the office’ was limited to simple tasks, such as opening the doors, 
welcoming parents, stuffing envelopes, and double-checking names or tickets. The only 
benefits for them in having me were restricted to my consulting role – providing feedback 
as an outsider, for example, on marketing issues – and to reaffirm their Association’s 
importance by way of almost always introducing me proudly as ‘unsere Doktorandin’ (our 
PhD candidate). Indeed, Dagmar once made a comment that ‘there are people who are 
theoretically minded, and then there are people, like me [her], who are just pragmatic and 
good at organizing’. This assessment was bizarre to me; I did not view myself as a 
particularly ‘theoretical person’, and I had many years of work experience in 
administration and finance that demonstrated both my pragmatism and organisational 
talent, which they could have utilized. Yet this peculiar tension between me being a local 
– like them – but an academic – unlike them – was also felt by others, such as Jutta, who 
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expressed a few times her surprise about my accent. She would start laughing after I had 
said something, and then exclaim: ‘You know I am sure your English is really good, but 
you do speak German just like us!’ The East Thuringian vernacular that I speak in German 
was certainly an important marker of being from there. Nevertheless, a German academic 
was not only expected to solely engage with books and theory but to also speak Hochdeutsch 
(High German); that I did not do so made me both familiar (as local) and unfamiliar (as 
an academic).   
 
During the annual meetings of the local and federal state Associations, in November 2012 
in Gera and in December 2012 in Erfurt respectively, I met members of other 
Jugendweihe associations in Thuringia, and I made use of their invitations to visit as well. 
In September 2013, I attended two secular naming ceremonies for children conducted by 
the Jugendweihe Plus Association in Arnstadt (central Thuringia). Silke and Renate were 
helpful in providing me with a great deal of information on their work. I also attended a 
Jugendweihe in May 2013, and a secular naming ceremony in October 2013, which were 
conducted by the Jugendweihe Association in Erfurt, the capital of Thuringia. Ilona, the 
vice chairwoman of the Erfurt Association, patiently answered my questions on another 
day, and provided me with additional archival material on the ritual. While I refer to these 
other Jugendweihe associations and the naming ceremonies only tangentially in this thesis, 
they have helped me in identifying regional differences and commonalities, in tracing the 
way these differences relate to the eastern German lifecourse, and in understanding the 
role of the associations in those processes.  
 
Prior to the ‘ritual season’ in spring, I attended the ‘Wedding Fair’ in the beginning of 
March in Erfurt, where the Thuringian Federal Association had a stand. I also attended a 
fashion show in Gera and the ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ in Jena. All these events served 
teenagers and their parents as preparation for the ‘big day’, but also gave the Jugendweihe 
Association an opportunity to represent itself and its work in a particular light. My 
observation of other preparatory events offered by the Association was limited to a couple 
of Knigge-Kurses (etiquette courses) in Gera and Jena, held by a freelancer. However, I also 
gathered data on these through conversations with Association members, teenagers and 
parents.  
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Archival research 
At the very beginning and the very end of my research I made use of the materials 
available at Gera’s city museum and Gera’s city archive (Stadtarchiv) to gain a better 
understanding of the historical context of Jugendweihe. From my fieldwork in 2010, I 
knew that the city archive had been given material from the former Bezirksausschuss 
(County Committee) for Jugendweihe in Gera, which – at the time – had not been 
indexed. I focussed largely on this collection of reports and working papers, which proved 
incredibly useful for illuminating the discrepancies between the GDR state’s official 
version and its actual reasoning behind the introduction of Jugendweihe, its regional and 
local record taking, and its efforts geared toward making Jugendweihe not only an 
acceptable but also an enjoyable event for the entire family, as well as a social institution 
at a local and national level. I had to sign a confidentiality agreement in order to view 
these records since none of the names in these documents were redacted. 
 
Rituals: Secular, Protestant, and ‘non-Catholic’ 
During the ‘ritual season’ from April to June 2013, I attended a total of 20 coming-of-age 
rituals, all public ceremonies in various locations. 16 of these rituals were Jugendweihe 
ceremonies, and 15 were in the East Thuringian region in Altenburg, Gera, Greiz and 
Jena, with another ceremony in Erfurt. I also attended two Lutheran Confirmations on 
Pentecost, and two Lebenswende (‘life’s turning point’; the Catholic Church’s alternative to 
Jugendweihe for non-religious adolescents) ceremonies, each of which were on the same 
day in different locations. While an in-depth analysis of these different rituals is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, observing them all was extremely valuable in helping me elucidate 
convergences and divergences with Jugendweihe that otherwise might have gone 
unnoticed. During Confirmation and Lebenswende, my role was limited to being a guest or 
observer, but my role regarding the Jugendweihe ceremonies was slightly different. As 
part of the Association’s work, I helped out with setting the stage, checking the certificates 
and books, labelling the seats with the teenager’s names, presenting flowers to initiands 
on stage, collecting donations at the venue’s exit, and cleaning up afterwards. From this 
experience, I learned much about what goes on behind the stage in terms of social 
relations, but also about the work put into coordinating and preparing Jugendweihe in 
order to make these ceremonies successful. Observing the Jugendweihe ceremonies 
30 
 
helped me notice changes and continuities not only in comparison to socialist times, but 
also between 2010 and 2013. Besides the secular naming ceremonies mentioned above, I 
also attended a baptism, a wedding, a golden wedding anniversary, and a few big birthday 
parties. All of these observations aided my thought processes on the lifecourse, but also 
helped me grasp the emotional significance of these events better, not only for the main 
protagonist(s) but for the nuclear and extended family – regardless of their belief or 
ideology.    
 
Families  
Of the six families included in this thesis, I knew four reasonably well prior to my research, 
while I met Andrea and Franka and their families during my fieldwork. The maternal 
grandparental generation of these six families either lived in the same house (3) or next 
door (1) or both maternal and paternal grandparents lived fairly close; the maximum 
distance was 15 km away (2). This residential proximity of three generations in itself 
highlights the importance of familial bonds including a grandparental generation – despite 
a less traditional view regarding the role of women. Perhaps one limitation of this research 
is the fact that these families are all of German ethnic and heteronormative backgrounds, 
which is largely due to the region’s fairly homogenous population regarding ethnicity and 
family types. According to the most recent census of 2011, Gera has only 1.4% foreigners 
and only 4.1% of its German citizenry have a migrant background (FSO-1 2014), while 
‘alternative’ family models are very rare with civil unions, for instance, making up only 
0.1% of family types (FSO-2 2014).  
 
Although I had envisaged participating in several family celebrations to shed light on 
aspects of Jugendweihe that have been sidelined in the literature on this ritual, this was 
not as straightforward as participating in the public ceremony. It was somewhat awkward 
to explain to Thuringians that a family celebration could be the subject of anthropological 
research (and for me, work). Rather these celebrations were perceived very much as 
private, family functions to which one was only invited as a family member or a close 
friend. I was able to attend Lukas’s (Andrea’s son) family celebration, because I had 
explained to Andrea in depth my interest in family matters but also because we quickly 
became friends. I attended Fabian’s confirmation family celebration because I have 
known his mother, Daniela, since I was a child. I also participated in two Jugendweihe 
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family celebrations outwith my fieldwork, one in 2012 and another in 2015 – experiences 
I have also drawn on in this thesis.   
 
During my research in 2010, I was intrigued by the fact that the young adults (18-22 year-
olds) I talked to were entirely unaware that the GDR Jugendweihe – which their parents 
had celebrated – not only involved preparation classes within the school context, but also 
included a pledge of allegiance to the state during the ceremony. However, members of 
the parental generation did not seem to have a problem discussing these features of the 
GDR Jugendweihe with me. My aim was to understand better what, how, and why certain 
aspects of the ritual were or were not transmitted to the adolescent (post-socialist) 
generation. Thus I was particularly interested in conducting family interviews in which 
three generations would communicate with each other, so that I could pay better attention 
not only to the content but also to ‘[p]auses, hesitations, slowing, speeding and emphases 
[…] because they indicate feelings, embarrassments’ (Feuchtwang 2000: 69). Yet I only 
managed to conduct three such interviews with two families, as there was a general 
reluctance about participating in family interviews. 
 
Although I had met Andrea’s parents twice, for example, they refused to participate in 
such a conversation. After Andrea had asked them a few times to no avail, we gave up. 
Similarly, while Sandra’s mother (who had not celebrated Jugendweihe herself) was 
forthcoming during such a conversation, when her husband (who had celebrated 
Jugendweihe) was asked by her to join in, he did not want to divulge any information. 
Partly, of course, he felt somewhat coaxed into it; he started off by questioning the value 
of my research, which he simply viewed as ‘brotlose Kunst’ (i.e. there was no money in it), 
before continuing to challenge anything to do with the humanities and social sciences. 
Both his wife and stepdaughter felt embarrassed by his attitude and repeatedly demanded 
him to tell all of us about his own Jugendweihe in the 1950s. At some point, he stated 
that [the GDR past] was long ago and of no interest to anyone. I responded that this was 
not exactly true, that there was much continued interest, and ongoing research. 
Nevertheless, it was his son-in-law who impatiently exclaimed: ‘This is history. History – 
this exists still now in school [as a subject]! To which he immediately responded: ‘Yet this 
is all falsified – the history!’ While such incidences were extremely uncomfortable, they 
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were also illuminating in terms of intergenerational dynamics, silences, and different views 
and perceptions within one family. 
 
Both my local dialect and the fact that I had celebrated the GDR Jugendweihe myself 
made members of the parental generation in particular feel comfortable in talking to me, 
because I was not simply a local but we also shared particular experiences. In contrast, in 
her study on Jugendfeier12 in Berlin, German-Canadian researcher Rebecca Aechtner 
(2011) highlights her initial difficulties in finding interlocutors, who inquired suspiciously 
about her full motivations for researching Jugendweihe before they made a decision on 
whether to participate in her research – including questions about ‘biographical details 
such as, family tree, political leanings and religious observance’ (Aechtner 2011: 16). For 
some, this reluctance or refusal to participate in her research was due in part to the fact 
that her parents were West German (ibid.). Indeed, while American anthropologist 
Andrew Bickford’s eastern German interlocutors agreed to talk to him because of their 
shared military background and his status as a supposedly objective American ‘scientist’, 
they explained that they would not speak to western Germans as they ‘were simply out to 
demonize them’ (Bickford 2011: 17).  
 
German researchers on East Germany are well aware of the importance of dialect, which 
can also be an indicator of whether the researcher is from the former East or West 
Germany – the latter categorisation potentially leading to mistrust or indeed failure of 
research projects (Wohlrab-Sahr, Karstein, and Schmidt-Lux 2009: 31-36; personal 
communications with Hann 2013, Schmidt-Lux 2013 and Thelen 2015). During family 
interviews, Wohlrab-Sahr et al. simultaneously used an eastern German interviewer to 
gain rapport, and a western German to ask questions that would have been strange for an 
eastern German to raise. Yet I was on my own, and my interlocutors often replied along 
the lines of: ‘Well, you know what it was like back then’, or ‘Why are you asking this, you 
are from here?’. I tended to circumvent these situations more or less successfully by, for 
example, noting that I had attended a different school, at a different time, or a different 
location, or that I was female, to point to factors of variance. However, sharing parts of 
my experience of the ritual celebration in 1987 was most fruitful because parents and 
                                                 
12 Jugendfeier is the German Humanist Association’s equivalent of Jugendweihe; see Chapters 3 
and 7. 
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grandparents could easily draw comparisons, flagging up differences in their experiences, 
memories and perceptions, while also confirming similarities.  
 
Although I had no intention to involve my own family in my research project, my relatives 
have not only helped me in making connections to other Thuringians, but living with my 
family has aided my thought processes on inter-generational familial dynamics as much 
as our conversations about the socialist past and contemporary politics have helped 
shaping my arguments.  
 
Adolescents  
Adolescents proved to be perhaps the greatest challenge for me. While one-to-one 
conversations (before and after their coming-of-age celebration) with teenagers whom I 
had known prior to my research went fairly well, others had an unnatural flow in which I 
remained the asker and the teenager the answerer. I ascribed these difficulties largely to 
the age differential between us, and although I suggested they call me by my first name 
and use the informal you, very few teenagers did so.  
 
Prior to the start of the ‘ritual season’, I had created an anonymous online survey to gain 
a general sense of teenagers’ views. Two teenagers, female and male, who had celebrated 
their Jugendweihe in 2012 tested the survey for me before I started collecting responses. 
I drew teenagers’ attention to the survey by including flyers either in the letters sent out 
to the families prior to the celebration or in the keepsake books they received on the day 
of their Jugendweihe. During the brief rehearsal before the ceremony, they were again 
made aware of the flyer and its content. From the more than 2,800 teenagers that the 
flyers were circulated to, only 55 teenagers took part in the survey (a return rate of less 
than 2%), with 50 providing useful answers in regards to monetary questions. 
Nevertheless, the survey was helpful in three ways: a) it aided me in establishing what I 
needed to further clarify in conversation, and thus I tailored questions for group 
conversations accordingly; b) it confirmed the unpopularity of secular naming ceremonies 
in East Thuringia, with only 1 out of 55 Jugendweihe participants having participated in 
one; and c) because adolescents were reluctant to volunteer how much money and what 
kind of gifts they had received on their Jugendweihe, the anonymous survey provided 
much insight in this regard. After fieldwork, and having had more time to think through 
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my data, I also created another survey for the parental generation, solely related to gift-
giving practices regarding their GDR Jugendweihe, which I distributed among friends and 
to which I garnered 30 responses. This survey helped me in drawing comparisons between 
the late socialist and contemporary time periods and the associated moral discourse on 
consumption and frugality (see Chapter 5).  
 
Ideally, I would have liked to conduct focus groups and discussions with entire school 
classes. However, this approach was difficult to pursue, and would have required me to 
have a very specific set of fixed questions and a clear research proposal, which would have 
needed to be approved in advance by the Thuringian Ministry of Culture. Because I 
sensed from what I gathered in the public discourse on education that such approval was 
unlikely to materialize, and also because I learned in conversation with John Eidson at the 
Max Planck Institute in Halle that his application to conduct research in schools was 
denied, I decided against this route, which would have cost much time and effort. Instead, 
I hoped to observe classes, since the Thuringian school authorities demand the approval 
of only the headmaster of a school for hospitieren (sitting in on classes). I sent emails to 
five schools but only one of them responded. When I met with the headmaster, he 
carefully inquired: ‘I don’t understand why you want to sit in on classes? We, as a school, 
have nothing to do with Jugendweihe!’ I explained that I wanted to participate in 
everything that adolescents at this stage in their lives undergo, in order to understand their 
motivations for celebrating Jugendweihe. Ethics and Religion classes did not exist during 
GDR times, and I wanted to get a sense of their purpose and how adolescents responded 
to them. Another opportunity arose when the Jugendweihe Association donated money 
to one of the schools that had been affected by the May/June 2013 floods. I accompanied 
them and asked the headmaster whether it would be possible to observe some Ethics and 
Religion classes in his school, which he immediately allowed. My observations in both 
these schools and my informal conversations with various teachers informed my 
understanding of how much and in which ways the relations between teachers, 
adolescents, and families had changed (see Chapter 3). 
   
I conducted three group conversations with Jugendweihe participants after their 
Jugendweihe: one with three male and one with three female adolescents, all of whom 
had celebrated Jugendweihe in 2013. I had another group conversation with three female 
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adolescents who had celebrated their Jugendweihe in 2012. These conversations were held 
in the office of the Jugendweihe Association in Gera and included a variety of techniques, 
from writing answers down individually to triggering open-ended discussion between 
them and me through the use of video clip excerpts of their ceremony. I usually knew at 
least one of the adolescents fairly well, and he or she would have a friend or two tag along. 
I explained the purpose of my research and they received €5 in exchange for their time 
and having to travel to the office. I provided something to drink and sweets, and teenagers 
were fairly relaxed due to their being in the majority, so that these conversations were 
both enjoyable and productive.  
 
I also conducted group conversations with three female and male confirmands 
respectively, the former having celebrated confirmation in 2013, while the latter would do 
so a year later. These group conversations were made possible through the help of one of 
the local pastors who had allowed me to participate in confirmation classes (Sunday 
school) and encouraged confirmands to support my research. They were held in the 
parsonage familiar to the adolescents, and I provided sweets as well. Adolescents did not 
require extra time for these conversations, as I held them during their confirmation classes 
(in a separate room). 
 
Although I explained my research to teenagers, because of their age (13-16 years) I gave 
them each a business card, and clarified that their parents could contact me, if they should 
have any questions or concerns regarding the purpose of my research or my use of their 
data. Unlike one-to-one conversations, I recorded group conversations with Jugendweihe 
and confirmation participants, as I did with intergenerational family conversations. I 
explained that these recordings were to ensure that I captured these conversations 
correctly, since it was too difficult for me to take notes when several people were 
discussing at once. In all such cases, I asked for participants’ consent, and usually the 
conversation quickly developed a natural flow in which the Dictaphone was somewhat 
forgotten. Yet I recorded next to none of the one-to-one conversations I conducted, as I 
was well aware that such practices had problematic resonances with the Stasi past. Indeed, 
Aechtner notes that out of 31 students and 46 parents she interviewed between 2008 and 
2010, ‘only seven consented to being digitally recorded’ (Aechtner 2011: 17); and one 
father explained his refusal with direct reference to the Stasi (ibid: 17-18).  
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It was exactly because of this GDR legacy of suspicion and betrayal, emanating from the 
Stasi’s monitoring techniques, that I had anticipated that issues of trust could be a delicate 
matter during my fieldwork. For example, I avoided using the term ‘informant’, because 
people would make an immediate link to a Stasi informant. Although transitional justice 
had aimed at rebuilding social trust after the end of the GDR regime, mistrust seemed to 
intensify in the early 1990s when the extent of the Stasi’s activities came to light. It was 
the revelations of the Stasi’s encroachment in what is supposed to be the private or family 
sphere – free of state interference – which upset also many eastern Germans. I expected 
to face difficulties in regards to gaining access to, and developing rapport with, my 
interlocutors, especially because I was interested in family matters. Prior to fieldwork I 
felt that I had considered these issues carefully and how they may impact my research. 
Yet I felt rather unprepared for and overwhelmed by the way this past became an issue 
for me and for what I was (supposed to be) doing. In the course of my fieldwork I 
experienced unexpected anxieties and doubts about whether what I was doing was ethical 
and I only began to grasp what the issue was almost a year into my fieldwork when the 
media reengaged with the National Security Agency (NSA) scandal. It was revealed that 
the US security agency had not only been spying on ordinary German citizens but had 
also tapped Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone. It was through her oft-cited 
response to the media, ‘Spying out among friends – that’s a no go!’, that it dawned on me 
what I had increasingly felt guilty of doing during fieldwork.  
 
I recognized the parallels in practice between that of an unofficial Stasi collaborator and 
that of an ethnographer (see also Verdery 2014), which made me mistrust myself. It led 
me to repeatedly question whether I was really a good friend or whether my motivations 
were for some sort of personal gain, that is, for the sole benefit of my research project – 
betraying rather than protecting the intimacy of such social relations. Frequent references 
to the Stasi made by my interlocutors and in the media exacerbated these sensations to 
the extent that I seemed to internalise the issue. I could no longer see what the difference 
between me and a Stasi informant was, that is, divulging information to a third party, such 
as the state, in the knowledge that this information could potentially used against my 
interlocutors. Instead, for a great part of my fieldwork, I had already sabotaged this 
possibility by not asking further questions so that I could not gain certain information, 
and by not writing conversations down, I also limited the potential for that information 
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to become available to others. These strategies, which meant that I preferred feeling 
inadequate as an ethnographer to feeling the sensation of reproducing the Stasi legacy, 
were counterproductive to my research project but were crucial to my own socialist past.  
I grappled with these feelings for a long time after fieldwork and learned how to make 
use of them by realising the ways the public and private, politics and kinship are entangled 
in complex ways and draw on intimacy. As I explored the socialist past it was rendered so 
much more tangible and painful to me that the ‘possibility of betrayal is the ever-present 
dark side of intimacy, taking on new and ever more frightening forms in the context of 
state-building’ (Kelly and Thiranagama 2010: 3). This thesis thus shows how the GDR’s 
political elite created allegiances to a state project by using ‘what is immediately intimate, 
the local, the familial, the neighbourly, the friend […] that are projected and enlarged by 
analogy to country, state and people’ (Feuchtwang 2010: 227). It seeks to understand the 
ways in which these social relations were created intentionally by the GDR’s political elite 
through Jugendweihe; and how these intimate relations needed to be renegotiated and 
adjusted after the demise of the GDR state – an ongoing process also within families, and 





Chapter 1 (the lifecourse) demonstrates the interdependency of politics and kinship. The 
crisis of the GDR state in 1989-90 was mirrored by a freezing of state-recorded kinship 
activity, such as births and marriages, which further plummeted after unification because 
the relations between individuals, families, and the new state were in a process of re-
organization. East and West Germany’s social policies diverged substantially, oriented 
around either a ‘socialist family’ or a ‘housewife marriage’ model respectively. The GDR 
Jugendweihe served as a site where the state, its families, and citizens were intimately 
connected as part of the state’s aim to craft ‘socialist personalities’ and ‘socialist families’, 
both deemed necessary in the evolutionary project toward communism. I argue that 
Jugendweihe became an integral part of the East German life cycle and marked the 
coming-of-age of a child at the age of fourteen, the age of heterosexual consent. The East 
German lifecourse had been largely predetermined. Yet today only the school entry 
celebration and the Jugendweihe remain as life-cycle events at a particular age, and hence 
the only two constant reference points for East Germans across three living generations. 
While the school entry celebration is marked nationwide, Jugendweihe is only part of the 
eastern German life cycle. The importance of reproduction is conveyed to the young 
generation during and beyond Jugendweihe ceremonies in references made to sexual 
maturity, and the ceremony bears special potential for reproducing the family and also 
eastern German society.  
 
Chapter 2 (religion/church) investigates Jugendweihe as medium of the historical 
secularization process. The ritual emerged in the second-half of the 19th century as a 
substitute for ecclesiastical coming-of-age rituals, and has been adapted over time by 
diverse movements that were united in their anti-church stance, and challenged the 
contemporary social order. I demonstrate how families’ oscillation between Jugendweihe 
and confirmation resonates with the political contexts of different time periods. It is the 
political/ideological aspect (the initiation into a particular community), which sustains 
communities into the future, and that is responsible for Jugendweihe’s special importance 
as a site of contestation over the past. I focus in particular on the relationship between 
Protestant Confirmation and Jugendweihe during GDR times, which both reflected and 
produced church-state relations. Under the GDR, Jugendweihe lost its critical status and 
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became a means of maintaining the GDR social order. I illustrate how these church-state 
relations play out within the family and highlight the need for families to make a decision 
over which institution they publicly aligned with. The ritual’s political significance and its 
oppositional character to confirmation is largely not transmitted to the younger 
generation of contemporary Jugendweihe participants. I argue that Jugendweihe played a 
significant role in the secularization process in the GDR, when it became celebrated by 
the great majority of East Germans. Today it has returned to being the celebration of a 
minority within the context of unified Germany. It has also become a signifier of eastern 
Germany’s Konfessionslosigkeit (being non-denominational) in contrast to western 
Germany’s widespread (cultural) church affiliation.  
Chapter 3 (collectivity/school) illustrates how school education in the GDR was not 
simply concerned with the formal transmission of knowledge, but also with conveying 
moral values. Moral upbringing – previously deemed to be a task shared by state, church, 
and family – was increasingly brought under the aegis of the GDR state in an effort to 
restrict the authority of the two other social institutions. Jugendweihe, ‘youth lessons’, 
and the GDR school system were closely intertwined and transmitted such moral values. 
One of these values was to imbue youth with collective thoughts and deeds, emphasising 
a larger social group over the individual and also the family. Today, Jugendweihe and the 
school system are supposed to be separate, and preparatory lessons for the celebration of 
Jugendweihe are no longer required. However, the collective form of celebrating the 
public ceremony – as part of the school class – is maintained and re-created by the 
Jugendweihe Association, and also preferred by parents and grandparents. The socialist 
generations negotiate the rearranged relations between familial home and state through a 
moral discourse that judges today’s schooling as geared toward individuality, including 
‘less dedicated’ teachers. Yet parents and grandparents are often unaware or do not 
acknowledge that past forms of collectivity and teachers’ roles were not politically neutral, 
but were part of the state’s effort to create social conformity. I argue that parents and 
grandparents attempt to inculcate collectivity in various ways in the adolescents, in an 
effort also to recuperate the sense of sociality that has been deemed lost after the political 
rupture.  
Chapter 4 (coming-of-age/home) focusses on the family celebration that follows the 
public ceremony and explores what it attempts to accomplish and how. I illustrate how 
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the family celebration can be thought of as having two interrelated aims in providing roots 
and wings to the adolescents. The consumption of particular cakes, the first glass of 
alcohol in public with parental permission, the initiand’s thank you speech, and the 
accumulation of wealth are symbolic manifestations of the adolescent attaining moral 
personhood. I argue that the way commensality, conviviality and gift-giving are performed 
also entails a moral message about work. Affection is shown and recreated through the 
‘labour of love’, that is, the labour put into creating a festive ambience, in making or 
organizing food specialities, and making or presenting gifts tailored to the specific tastes 
of the gift-recipient. These features create familial continuity through time, and recreate 
ties to the familial home. They also strengthen ties to the wider Thuringian Heimat 
(regional home) as a significant constituent of personhood, that is, of being Thuringian – 
and having roots. However, what it is to be a good Thuringian is expressed in a moral 
discourse and practice of how gifts are presented, inculcating the significance of work in 
adult life. I argue that the promotion of a particular work ethic was the aim of the socialist 
state, and is now undertaken by the older generations in their moral discourse and 
practices regarding work – adolescents are ‘given wings’.  
Chapter 5 (distinctions/economics) examines the economic aspects of celebrating 
Jugendweihe, which not only reflects the increasing socio-economic stratification of 
(eastern) German society but itself serves as a site of distinction-making. I argue that the 
change in economic system from a former socialist ‘economy of shortages’ to a free-
market economy – which has led to a proliferation of choice and increased availability of 
goods – has not had an impact on the prevalence of conspicuous consumption itself. 
Rather, it is marked by a shift in the type of presents, from trousseau gifts to an increased 
emphasis on monetary gifts. Today, valuable consumer products have a shorter life-span 
and are subjected to fast-changing fads compared to the socialist past. Unlike money, the 
value of such gifts for a future household has therefore diminished. This shift in terms of 
consumption also signifies a change in socio-economic relations, in which kin no longer 
have to rely on social connections, or networks of extended kin and friends, to procure 
particular valuable consumer goods, and thus, the sole necessity of financial capital is 
emphasised. While monetary gifts appear, at first, as a sign of greater individualism and 
the freedom of initiands to dispose of their money, they are embedded in and countered 
by a moral discourse on frugality. Older generations not only decide that money needs to 
be saved but also promote spending it wisely in order to help set up the initiands’ own 
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future households. A new cycle of consumption is not only deferred, it also reifies socio-
economic differences into the future. 
Chapter 6 (Jugendweihe Association) explores the ways that the local Jugendweihe 
Association negotiates its new place within unified Germany by moving from a former 
GDR state association to a registered association. Older members of the Association, 
especially, refer to themselves as family, which I argue is not mere idiom, but based on 
their shared socialist past and their shared hardships in the post-socialist context. Both 
these pasts are inextricably linked with members’ survival and the survival of Jugendweihe 
in a different socio-political environment, which they feel has been hostile toward them 
and the ritual. Association members are only deemed kin if they work for the cause of 
Jugendweihe, and are willing to put personal interests aside. The kinship idiom is also 
extrapolated to eastern German ritual supporters at large, but this attempt is fraught with 
tensions over ritual authority. I argue that both competition over ritual authority and 
critiques of ritual design indicate that eastern Germans think of the ritual as collectively 
owned. This sense of the collective ownership of Jugendweihe, I suggest, emanates not 
solely from the fact that more than seven million East Germans underwent the GDR 
Jugendweihe. Rather many East Germans feel that Jugendweihe was not a top-down 
state-designed ritual, but that they actively helped in shaping it, and thus identified with 
it. I argue that the continuation of Jugendweihe not only gives meaning to the Association 
members’ work and their current lives, it also justifies their socialist biographies – and 
those of other eastern Germans.  
Chapter 7 (memory/political allegiance) investigates how the endurance of the ritual is 
illustrative of divergent memories between eastern and western Germans that have 
ghostly echoes of the Iron Curtain, and symbolically redraw Cold War boundaries. While 
grandparental and parental generations wished their offspring to celebrate Jugendweihe 
largely because they themselves had done so under the GDR, it also helped them grapple 
with the burden of two dictatorships. I explore how the older generations attempt to 
create a harmonious familial continuity and cohesion through silencing or toning down 
of the political aspects of the GDR Jugendweihe in two ways. Attention is deflected away 
from both periods of dictatorship through emphasising the ritual’s origin in the free-
religious communities in the second-half of the 19th century, and thus defining 
Jugendweihe as a pan-German tradition. Secondly, both family and ritual are portrayed as 
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free from politics and/or ideology. I further examine why many members of the socialist 
generations still do not feel at home in unified Germany, although they have always 
remained in Thuringia. I argue that this sense of displacement has partly to do with the 
way familial, political, and geographical identifications overlap emotionally. Most East 
Germans identified during the socialist past not as GDR citizens but as German, which 
became complicated with German unification when eastern Germans were ‘othered’ in a 
discourse that either portrayed them as ‘too German’ (read authoritarian) or not ‘German 
enough’ (read not like West Germans).  
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Intermezzo: The Big Day  
Nils opened the door to his room. It was plastered with a sign, in black capital letters on 
a yellow background akin to German town signs, which cautioned anyone with the 
intention to enter: ‘Here begins the state territory of Nils’. The soon to be fourteen-year-
old showed me his recently refurbished room in which only a slight hint of childhood 
lingered – one wall had been left wallpapered with aeroplanes. Showing me each element 
of change in his abode, Nils explained that he had inherited the old living room cabinets 
from downstairs when his parents had acquired new furniture the previous year. But this 
year, the blue-eyed teen continued, his parents had bought a new sofa for him, and a new 
TV had been attached to the wall above his desk. He no longer inhabited a Kinderzimmer 
(children’s room), but a Jugendzimmer (teenager’s room). Because he was now a Jugendlicher 
(an adolescent), his room had not only been transformed according to his changing needs, 
it also reflected his own transformation to anyone whom Nils would permit to enter. He 
was no longer a child. Today was the day on which this change would be ceremonially 
marked by the celebration of his Jugendweihe. 
 
So far, we felt like we were hiding from the flurry of last minute preparations downstairs. 
It seemed we would be more in the way than of any help to what I jokingly referred to as 
Nils’s parental ‘Jugendweihe organisation committee’. Beate, in her mid-thirties and Nils’s 
mother, had described to me the concerted family effort of setting up and decorating the 
hired venue in a neighbouring village. Although diverse tasks had been spread across not 
only the nuclear but also the extended family, the cost and the majority of work necessary 
for the celebration was the responsibility of the parents as hosts. Everything needed to be 
set for the family party, which was to start at 5 pm, because there would not be much 
time between getting back from the public Jugendweihe ceremony in the Gera theatre 
and the first guests arriving at the venue.  
 
Beate came upstairs and announced that it was time to get ready, before rushing to the 
bathroom to freshen up and apply her make-up. She then hastened to Nils’s room, 
bringing him his new black trousers and light-blue shirt, which he was supposed to put 
on only at the last minute to avoid spoiling it in any way. She inspected the trousers, 
adding: ‘You need to go over them with a lint roller before you put them on!’ and 
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disappeared behind the open bathroom door. He sighed in annoyance, to which she 
shouted from afar: ‘This is going to be a proper event and you need to be dressed 
properly!’ His mother returned with a lint roller and as soon as she had explained to him 
how to use it she attended to Finn, his five-year-old brother, who – unaffected by the 
commotion around him – continued to play with his Lego bricks. Once he was dressed, 
Beate put on a new black shirt and shoes, and a previously-worn light-blue suit. Then we 
all went downstairs just as Lars, Beate’s husband and ten years her senior, finally returned 
from running the last errands, and stated: ‘Everything is set; now I am really nervous!’ His 
wife laughed anxiously, remarking: ‘Me too, my hands were already trembling when I cut 
the cake earlier’.  
 
The boys did not seem to understand all the excitement, and Nils confided in me that he 
was not nervous at all. I chuckled at his remark, recalling my own Jugendweihe, and 
assessed dryly: ‘Perhaps because – unlike the girls – you don’t have to take the stage in 
high-heels!’ He looked at me baffled: ‘What do you mean by “I have to take the stage?”’ 
I realized his coolness was less a matter of a boy playing tough rather than due to him not 
knowing what awaited him in the theatre. Lars changed into his suit, and Beate checked 
the attire of all ‘her men’. She sighed in relief: ‘We are so lucky to have boys – they are so 
easy. Imagine, with a girl we would have also had to go to the hairdresser this morning!’ 
Once we were all in the car and had buckled up, Beate double-checked whether she had 
the tickets, and the family left the Thuringian village for Gera city centre. 
  
As soon as we had arrived in Gera, we gathered in front of the Gera theatre to wait with 
other initiands’ families for the Jugendweihe ceremony to start. Two ceremonies were 
commonly being held at the same venue on Saturdays in spring, commencing at 11 am 
and 1.30 pm, lasting approximately 80 minutes each. It was a crisp spring afternoon, and 
once Lars’s parents had found us, we were glad to be able to go inside the building.  
 
While we remained in the theatre’s foyer, Nils and the other adolescents entered the 
concert hall in order to take their seats in the front rows. They received a short induction 
by a female Jugendweihe Association member on how and when to walk up onto the 
stage. Most of the girls wore dresses and high heels; some had put on make-up, and had 
their long hair pinned up. Many of the boys sported suits; others opted for the more casual 
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combination of shirts and jeans, with or without a tie. After a small rehearsal, they 
remained seated in the front rows of the theatre. We were then asked to enter, and took 
our seats as indicated on our allocated tickets, in the balconies, while most families filed 
into their places in the rows behind those to be initiated.  
 
Three large pictures adorned the stage, showing, from left to right, a baby, a girl with a 
school bag and a Zuckertüte (a large, colourful cone filled with sweets and toys received on 
the first school day), and a teenage girl. Centre stage, a large screen bore the pink and 
green logo of the East Thuringian Jugendweihe Association on a white and golden 
background. In the right corner stood a lectern and flower arrangement. Behind them, on 
the far right of the stage, were two tables on which books and certificates were stacked. 
Besides several plants as decoration, there was also sound and filming equipment on stage 
(see Figures 1 and 2). 
 
The lights were dimmed and the Association’s promotion trailer, accompanied with 
soaring music, was projected onto the screen. Nils’s parents, his brother, and his paternal 
grandparents almost in sync craned their necks over the railing not to miss anything on 
stage. By the time the theme tune of ‘The Simpsons’ boomed forth from the speakers, 
the audience had settled in a little, and started to be amused by the picture of the Simpson 
family crossing the road – a take-off on The Beatles’ Abbey Road album cover. The image 
served as background for large yellow lettering, which scrolled up the screen announcing 
in a satirical way what was happening in the ‘Thuringian Springfield’. ‘After 14 years of 
care from parents, grandparents, teachers and friends’, the lettering proclaimed, 
‘adolescents have increasingly developed their own will, which also led to much trouble’. 
But today they are encouraged to ‘cross the street with us – you’ve got the green light for 







     
Figure 1: Gera Theatre, concert hall, May 2013 
 
 
          
Figure 2: Stage set for Jugendweihe ceremony, Gera, June 2013 
 
 
The same female member of the Jugendweihe Association who had led the rehearsals 
entered the stage and stood behind the lectern, officially opening the ceremony with the 
following words: 
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At all times, in all cultures it has been peoples’ custom to incorporate 
their own offspring, in a dignified manner, into the community of adults.  
The celebration of Jugendweihe is part of it.  
For you, who sit in the first rows, this day will remain a life-long 
memory. 
Today and here in the beautiful Theatre Gera I wish you, your parents, 
grandparents, and guests enjoyment during the festive hour of 
Jugendweihe! 
 
Then a music group took over the stage and performed a cappella a popular song before 
they introduced themselves as Die NotenDealer. Next a youth dance ensemble delivered a 
performance, followed by a young woman who recited a poem, all of whom were received 
with applause (see Figures 3 and 4). When the theatre had quietened, the screen displayed 
saccharine images of cute children posed in train stations and at various other locations. 
These were accompanied by a voice-over, talking soothingly and metaphorically about life 
as a train journey (‘Der Zug des Lebens’), with passengers getting on and off at different 
stations. The ceremony had so far resembled a theatre performance of sorts, 
simultaneously attempting to entertain and to encourage contemplation of the ‘meaning 











Figure 4: Performance by a cappella group Die NotenDealer; Gera, April 2013 
 
 
Without any introduction, a guest speaker then took the lectern, welcoming the audience 
and talking for roughly 15 minutes about the importance of this day for the adolescents, 
and about familial tensions during the time of puberty, offering advice for teenagers on 
how to master the future. The guest speaker ended by congratulating the teenagers on 
their Jugendweihe, wishing them all the best for their future lives and them and their 
families an enjoyable family celebration.   
 
Photographs of the initiands as babies or young children were then projected onto the 
screen, accompanied by popular music. These photographs prompted laughter from the 
audience, and many sparked shouts and applause from those who recognised a friend, 
child or sibling. Beate and Lars eagerly looked out for Nils’s photograph. When it 
appeared, they pointed out the image to Finn, who had increasingly grown tired of having 
to sit still, but smiled at the sight of his brother’s younger self. Like the ‘life as a train 
journey’ sequence, this part of the ceremony evoked a rather emotional and reflective 
pondering on the passing of time. Many of us in the audience – parents in particular – 
found ourselves tearing up. The photos ended, the music faded out, the commére who 
earlier offered instructions and opened the ceremony once again took the lectern to 
announce that the time had come for the adolescents to receive, solemnly, their 
certificates and books on stage. 
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To gentle instrumental music, the first group of teenagers walked slowly and in single file 
onto the stage, positioning themselves at its centre. While their names were read out, the 
festive speaker presented them each with their Jugendweihe certificates, and another 
member of the Association with the book Worldview – Adolescents Change the World. Both 
shook the initiands’ hands and offered congratulations. The adolescents then each 
received a rose from members of the dance group. A proverb was read, such as ‘Shared 
happiness is doubled happiness.’ While the audience applauded, one or two 
photographers took pictures of the adolescents, who then left the stage while another 
group entered (see Figures 5 and 6). This procedure was repeated until all the initiands 
had received their congratulations. When it was Nils’s turn, the whole family clapped their 
hands energetically, and Beate and her mother-in-law quickly searched for a tissue in their 
handbags. The members of the Association and the festive speaker then left the stage, 
and more music and dance performances followed. 
 
 
     






Figure 6: Photographers taking pictures of the initiated, Gera, June 2013 
 
At last, the commére returned to the stage to thank the festive speaker, who we now 
learned was a Die Linke politician, and the performers – all of whom re-entered to be met 
with flowers and applause. Technical staff and helpers were then thanked before the 
details were announced as to how to buy DVDs and photographs of the event. An appeal 
was made for donations for those unable to afford the entire ceremony fee of €95. The 
adolescents were asked to leave for group photographs, taken in front of the theatre, while 
the relatives and friends were asked to remain in their seats, and were treated to another 
music performance. Photographs completed, everyone reunited outside, and initiands 
received congratulations from their families and friends. Beate and Lars wore big and 
proud smiles on their faces when they hugged their son. His grandparents patiently 
awaited their turn, wishing Nils the best, accompanied with much advice on good 
behaviour, before they parted to get ready for the celebrations. After I had congratulated 
Nils, his parents became so anxious to leave for the family celebration that I had to 
persuade them to quickly take some photographs of the nuclear family in the nearby park, 
then we dashed off.    
 
As explained in the Introduction, between 2012 and 2015 I attended 17 Jugendweihe 
ceremonies organized by the local Jugendweihe Association, all conducted to similar 
scripts. From this intermezzo we can gain a first glimpse into the ritual’s importance for 
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the family. Yet the simple public ceremony, which – unlike other initiations – seems to 
demand very little of the initiands themselves, is also suggestive of Jugendweihe’s societal 
significance. In the following chapters I explore more closely parts of the public ceremony 
in relation to wider social changes after the political caesura. Chapter 4 explores what the 
family celebration attempts to effect, while Chapter 6 is concerned with the role of the 
Association itself. But firstly, in Chapter 1 I set out the relationship between kinship and 
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Chapter 1 
Kinship and Politics: Jugendweihe as Part of the 
Eastern German Life Cycle  
 
…it is simply ahistorical to talk of the family as a 'niche', as though it were some unchanging little cell 
to which one could escape from the big bad world of politics.  
 
– Mary Fulbrook (2005: 117) 
 
The white and bright-yellow tram of the Gera public transport company squeaked as it 
came to a halt at the tram stop, where I boarded it for the final stretch of my journey to 
the Jugendweihe Association. Among the other passengers were two elderly Thuringians, 
who took seats next to each other, in my earshot, so that I involuntarily overheard their 
conversation. Perhaps they were former colleagues or neighbours; they appeared not to 
have seen each other for quite some time but seemed happy to have met by accident. 
They were catching up, and after a few minutes of exchanging reassurances that their 
families were well, the questions became more specific. ‘So how old is your little one 
now?’, the woman asked the man, presumably referring to his granddaughter. ‘She’ll have 
her Jugendweihe next year!’ – ‘Already!’, the woman replied with a deep sigh, adding, 
‘Well, you need nerves for this age in particular! – Our grandson has his Schuleinführung 
(school entry celebration) this year. Time just flies.’  
In the course of my fieldwork I overheard or partook in many similar conversations, 
which ordinarily included questions about the entire families of acquaintances or friends 
who had lost track of each other’s lives. However, what struck me about such exchanges 
was that the children or grandchildren – of whom people often spoke longest – were 
frequently situated within a seemingly predetermined trajectory of the lifecourse, either 
by kin or by their interlocutors. In particular, when the offspring’s age was between five 
and seven or thirteen and fifteen years, conversations would rarely mention an actual age, 
but instead make reference to either their school entry celebration or their Jugendweihe. 
Because the school entry celebration signalled to any Thuringian – and indeed any eastern 
German – that a child was about six years of age, just as a child celebrating Jugendweihe 
was about fourteen, there was no need to state an actual age. Such events – which Arnold 
van Gennep (1960 [1908]) has called rites de passage – were also commented upon because 
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of their significance: they not only punctuated the lifecourse of the individual concerned, 
they demarcated changes in the status of the individual in relation to their family but also 
to society at large. 
When in 1990 the GDR state disappeared, the Christian churches and West Germany 
expected that it would take with it its secular coming-of-age ritual, Jugendweihe. At first 
the ritual’s disappearance appeared likely, as participation figures dropped dramatically; 
but by 1993 they began to rise again (see Table 1). This rebound was partly because, as 
the above conversation suggests, Jugendweihe had become embedded within the East 
German lifecourse. In fact, when I had explained to my parents that I intended to research 
Jugendweihe in order to understand how the ritual had become so successful, and why it 
remained meaningful to people today, my father, who had never undergone Jugendweihe 
himself, had a quick explanation: ‘This is just how it is – it’s in the Ossi – you just can’t 
take it out of him any more’. His assertion suggests two things: Jugendweihe is inseparable 
from Ossis, the colloquial term for eastern Germans – which also means that it does not 
belong to western Germans. This inseparability in turn indicates that the lifecourses of 
eastern and western Germans are somewhat different, largely because – as I will 
demonstrate below – the two states related differently to their citizens for forty years.  
 
 
Table 1: Jugendweihe Participants 1980-2013.    









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Table 1: Jugendweihe participants in the (former) territory of the 
GDR and with Jugendweihe Deutschland e.V., 1980-2013 
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Indeed, when in 1989 the GDR state entered into a major crisis that in 1990 resulted in 
its disappearance, the eastern German family mirrored that crisis – it seemed almost to 
have been frozen in time, at least for a few years. There was a dramatic drop in births, 
marriages, and divorces alike (see Dennis 1998), which in the early 1990s reached record 
lows. For example, the East German total fertility rate (TFR) dropped in 1992 to a level 
of 0.8 children per woman, and – if East Germany had still existed – ‘this would probably 
have been the lowest TFR ever recorded for a country’ (Goldstein and Kreyenfeld 2011: 
453). This quite drastic decline in all state recorded kinship activity, that is, family events 
that require vital records (apart from death), was certainly also palpable in the geographical 
region of Thuringia – as Tables 2 to 4 demonstrate. 
 
 
Table 2: Marriages per 1,000 inhabitants in Thuringia 1980-2013. 
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Table 3: Divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in Thuringia 1980-2013. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Federal State of Thuringia (TLS), 2015. 
 
 
Table 4: Live births per 1,000 inhabitants in Thuringia 1980-2013. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Federal State of Thuringia (TLS), 2015. 
 
These quite clearly quantifiable signs of drastic change have been variously analysed as 
‘demographic shock’ (Eberstadt 1994) or ‘crisis’ (see Kreyenfeld 2003), and are 
understandable responses to an atmosphere of heightened uncertainty caused by the 
political caesura. Yet the East German case has been highlighted by many researchers as 
unique not only among post-socialist societies in transformation, but in particular 
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Table 4: Live births per 1,000 inhabitants in Thuringia 1980-2013
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peacetime’ (Eberstadt 1994: 137; see also Adler 1997; Dorbritz 1997; Kreyenfeld 2003; 
Schwarz 1992). More notably, the upheavals experienced in this time period are rarely 
openly recalled in family narratives other than in terms of job losses (see also Chapters 5 
and 6). In one such rare instance, a mother in her mid-fifties described the Wende-years 
to me as a ‘horrible time’ during which ‘the entire family was glued to the TV screen every 
evening’ in order to have the latest update on what was happening, and in an attempt to 
comprehend it. While she explained in a matter-of-fact manner how unsettling this time 
period was for her and her husband, what made it all so ‘horrible’, it seemed, was how 
hard it had been on their children. Her voice became softer when she volunteered to me 
that her older daughter suffered especially, which she reinforced by stating that her child 
– at the age of eleven – had begun to wet her bed again. Because all family members, 
regardless of age or gender, were in the Wende-years so involved in making sense of – 
and trying to adapt to – the swift changes around them, there was no time to spare a 
thought for an unpredictable future beyond the following day. Everyday life had turned 
upside down: it had become so extraordinary, to an extent that it seemed impossible to 
keep up with. In such uncertain times, it is not particularly surprising that there was no 
time or felt need for extraordinary life cycle events.  
While all these aspects play a role in the reasons that state-recorded kinship activity 
seemed to have come to a sudden halt, it is noteworthy that the lowest numbers for births, 
marriages and divorces were not reached directly in the Wende-years but in the early 1990s 
– after German unification.13 For example, while the Thuringian live birth figure slumped 
in 1991 to 6.7, it reached its low of 5 only in 1994. Although from then onward the 
Thuringian birth rate slowly but steadily rose, reaching 8 in 2013, it has not come 
anywhere near the 1980s figures. These low birth rates evidently also impacted on 
Jugendweihe participation figures fourteen years later. Since Table 1 consists of only 
nominal participants, showing a largely decreasing trend, Table 5 illustrates that although 
Jugendweihe participation rates vary across the past twenty years from 1993 onward, they 
have always been higher in East Thuringia compared to the Thuringian federal state at 
                                                 
13 A monthly analysis of the fertility rate reveals that the drop in the East German fertility rate 
cannot be associated with the opening of the Hungarian border to Austria in September 1989 nor 
with the escalation of the Monday demonstrations and the feared use of fire arms in October 
1989. Rather it only slowly commences after the fall of the Wall when the end of the GDR became 
increasingly conceivable (Dorbritz 1997: 250). 
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large, and have remained well above 40% since 1994, with a clear rising tendency since 
2008.  
 
Table 5: Jugendweihe participation rates in Thuringia and East Thuringia, 1993-2013  
   Sources: Thuringian school authorities (total of pupils at grade 8 per year) and  
                 Jugendweihe Thüringen Association (participants per year) 
 
In this chapter I suggest that the continued relevance of Jugendweihe in East Thuringia 
needs to be understood within the context of the eastern German life cycle. The kinship 
crisis of the early 1990s was not due simply to the disappearance of the socialist state, but 
also to the replacement of the former state by another state, the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This process led to a reshuffling of relations between the state, its citizens, and 
its families. Although such relations between individual, family, and state are always 
fraught because of different perceptions about how much parental and state Fürsorge 
(parental care or state welfare provisions) is deemed to be good, many eastern Germans 
are on the one hand relieved that the socialist state no longer exists, but simultaneously 
nostalgic for the different kinds of social relations it produced. Such different types of 
relations were created through the state’s goal of crafting ‘socialist personalities’ and 
aspiring to a ‘socialist family’ model, because they were deemed essential for the greater 
project of achieving communism. Jugendweihe played a significant role in both, and 
throughout this thesis I will explore how the ritual reflects the ways that eastern Germans 
have dealt with these changes in social relations, which socialist values they hold dear, and 
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Table 5: Jugendweihe participation rates in Thuringia (blue) 
and East Thuringia (red) 1993-2013 in %
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clearly set out the interdependence between the state and the family by focusing on the 
East German socialist family model, which hailed women simultaneously as mothers and 
workers, and thus changed attitudes about what family means and how it is lived. By 
situating Jugendweihe within the trajectory of the eastern German life cycle, and in 
particular in relation to marriage and birth, I demonstrate that contemporary eastern 
German kinship still remains different from western German kinship – because it entails 
aspects of both continuity (with socialist times) and change (due to a different socio-
political context). I show that the GDR state’s combination of somewhat contradictory 
pro-natal policies and socialist feminism has also left its mark on the (post-socialist) 
eastern German family. 
 
The GDR’s Pro-natal Policies and Socialist Feminism  
Dagmar, the vice chairwoman of the local Jugendweihe Association, opened the door, 
and I greeted her with a cheerful ‘Good morning!’. As I passed her, the sun made her 
short dyed hair glint in a lively dark red, and I pretended not to hear her sarcastic remark, 
‘Good morning? Well, have you had a good lie in then?’ It was just after 9 am, but 9 am 
was considered late in Thuringia, where most ordinary employees would have had their 
second breakfast by that time, and where school started between 7.30 and 7.40 am.14 We 
had agreed on flexible times, not least because my parents insisted that I have breakfast 
with them, and because I relied on the infrequent public transport from my parents’ 
village. Yet the Association members often enjoyed mocking my ‘lateness’ – a sign that 
served to characterise me as work-averse. After I hung my jacket on the coat rack in the 
hall, I made my rounds in what was essentially a ground floor flat in a tenement house 
that the Association had been using as office since, they guessed, about 1993. Opposite 
the bathroom on the left were two offices. The first had a wall unit with books and flyers, 
a table with four chairs and a desk with a PC, and was used by Sonja, who only worked 
part-time, and me. Next to it was the largest office with several wall units, a photocopier 
and two desks at which Dagmar and Nicole sat. Because of this office’s spaciousness it 
was also used to receive and deal with parents on Tuesdays’ open consultation days. 
‘Morning!’ I called out to Nicole, the youngest and most recent member, who looked up 
                                                 
14 The federal state of Saxony-Anhalt has used the nickname ‘federal state of early risers’ in its 
promotional campaign. The same might be said of Saxony and Thuringia. 
60 
 
from her laptop. She exchanged a brief glance with Dagmar, who had just sat down at her 
desk opposite, before the thirty-year-old woman noted: ‘What, are you already in? You 
are really early today!’ I left the office and walked through the small kitchen, whose PC 
sliding doors almost always remained open, to the back. In the smallest office Jutta, 
Nicole’s mother, stared at her laptop and without looking up, smilingly commented: ‘Are 
they riling you again, Grit?’ I waved it away and replied, raising my voice, so that it could 
be heard next door: ‘Nah, I’m used to it and anyway it would be more worrying if they 
stopped, because that would mean they no longer cared about me.’ We heard laughter 
and an immediate response from the main office: ‘Hear, hear!’ I went back to the kitchen 
and shouted so that everyone in the office could hear it: ‘So does anyone want coffee?’  
It was common that in the morning between 9 and 10 a.m. someone would make coffee 
for everyone, though the coffee would usually be consumed at our desks. We only 
occasionally had a coffee break in the afternoon, during which everyone would sit and 
chat together. However, lunch was regularly shared around the kitchen table. During these 
lunches together we would not only discuss work matters but also share the latest gossip 
or just talk about last night’s TV programme. On one such occasion, Dagmar asked 
whether anyone had seen the TV documentary on the German feminist movement. 
Because only I had watched it, Dagmar explained to Jutta and Nicole that the programme 
looked at equality between women and men in historical perspective, but largely portrayed 
the western German experience. She continued to voice her dislike about this bias, but 
then added, ‘Although I was really surprised, towards the end they actually mentioned 
that it was different in the GDR. They just asked some random eastern German women 
in the street and they all replied that they felt that life under socialism was pretty gender-
equal. It was actually quite interesting.’ She turned to me, ‘Did you see the bit about how 
they [West German women] still in the 1970s had to ask their husbands for permission 
when they wanted to work?’ While I nodded, she continued, ‘Imagine, if we had to be 
housewives! – We really were so much more progressive than them!’ Jutta concurred, 
exclaiming in her typically outspoken manner: ‘Of course! We were far more progressive 
than West German women – I tell you, we still are!’ 
Although gender equality had been enshrined in the constitutions of both German states 
in 1949, this was not – or not fully – reflected in actual social life in either country. While 
both states made claims to strongly protect the family, their divergent social policies aimed 
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at constructing a different type of family in each other’s mirror-image (Borneman 1992). 
The West German state, with the support of the Catholic Church, began to restore the 
old patriarchal family type that promoted the Hausfrauenehe (‘housewife marriage’) 
(Borneman 1992: 86, 106). In contrast, East Germany set out to construct a new family 
type based on egalitarianism. While the West German political elite viewed family as a 
private affair that may be of concern to the Church but not the state, for East Germany’s 
leadership the family was a political issue. The GDR state’s family policies were inspired 
by Friedrich Engels’ (1884) The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and the 
writings of feminist communist Clara Zetkin, who held that both family and state would 
develop progressively, and that women’s emancipation were key to such progress 
(Borneman 1992: 83). The socialist state viewed the family from the beginning not as a 
private matter but as a ‘basic collective’ whose progress was required in order to 
accomplish society’s greater goal of communism. In order to erase the division between 
production and reproduction that traditionally associated men with the former (public) 
sphere, and women with the latter (domestic) sphere, women were encouraged to become 
Facharbeiter (skilled worker). This role for women was in line with the state’s ideological 
aims but also had pragmatic reasons because, unlike West Germany with its rapid post-
war reconstruction and increasing affluence hailed as ‘economic miracle’, the East 
German state relied on its female work force. Yet the 1950 Mother and Child Protection 
Law also encouraged women to become mothers by guaranteeing female employees paid 
maternity leave and providing mothers with a small monthly allowance as well as a one-
off payment per childbirth (Harsch 2007: 134-5). Whereas in the 1950s women still carried 
the double burden of being mothers and full-time workers, the state aimed to mitigate 
women’s workload not only through a monthly paid day off work for women to attend 
to their housework (Haushaltstag) but increasingly also through better provision of 
childcare and public facilities (Borneman 1992: 90-92). Childcare provisions in turn also 
allowed the state to limit parental authority and increase its ideological influence over its 
youngest inhabitants at an early age. While I will discuss this struggle over authority in 
more detail in Chapter 3 with regards to the GDR school system, what is noteworthy here 
is that not only did women’s employment become the norm, but the state’s provision of 
child care became taken for granted and was seen favourably. In a survey conducted in 
1994, 69% of western German but only 30% of eastern German women agreed that a 
child at pre-school age was likely to suffer because of their mother’s employment (Schober 
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and Stahl 2014: 987). Although these figures dropped in 2012 to 32% and 13% 
respectively, they still illustrate a disparity in attitudes regarding extra-familial childcare 
(ibid.) 
 
Tying the Knot or Not: Becoming a Parent, Marriage, and Divorce  
Social policies are legislated by states with the intention to achieve particular aims, yet the 
effects of such policies are difficult to predict and can have unintended consequences (see 
Blum 2003; Borneman 1992; Friedman 2005). This issue was no different in East 
Germany, where some policies were fairly quickly adopted by citizens, while others were 
rejected, so that the state had to master intricate balancing acts that more often than not 
tipped towards pragmatism on part of the state (see McLellan 2011). While the GDR state 
hoped for a woman to give birth to at least three children, birth rates remained low 
compared to other socialist countries but still higher than in West Germany (Kertzer and 
Barbagli 2003: xxii; McLellan 2011: 57). Overall, the birth rates followed a European 
fertility pattern that tended to rise until the mid-1960s due to improved living conditions 
and then decreased in part due to birth control. In fact, the availability of the contraceptive 
pill and the legalisation of abortion on demand in 1972, increasingly enabled East German 
women to make their own reproductive choices. Despite a declining birth rate, childbirths 
outside marriage steadily increased. Today there is a noticeable trend of an overall 
decreasing birth rate across the 28 countries of the European Union; yet the share of live 
births outside marriage has continuously increased from, for example, an average of 
29.5% in 2002 to 40% in 2012 (Eurostat 2015). At 34.5% in 2012, Germany is well below 
the EU’s average of 40% (ibid.), which seems to suggest that Germans at large still follow 
the more traditional pattern of marrying first and then having children. Indeed, a 2012 
report on Germany’s live births by the Federal Statistical Office explains that until 2009 
records in the territory of the former West Germany comprised solely the mother’s age 
and not her legal status, because until the early 1990s more than 90% of all children were 
born in wedlock (Pötzsch 2012: 10). More importantly, the report points to stark regional 
differences – live births outside marriage in the territory of the former West Germany 
accounted in 2010 for only 27%, while such births total 61% in the territory of the former 
East Germany (Pötzsch 2012: 19). Although figures from other post-socialist as well as 
Scandinavian countries range between 40% and 59% – remaining well above the EU’s 
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average – only Iceland beats the eastern Germans’ high birth rate among unmarried 
mothers with 64.1% in 2010. 
This trend seems to be continuing; I have calculated the proportion of live births outside 
marriage for western and eastern federal states (without Berlin) as being 29% and 62% 
respectively for 2013 (based on data provided by the FSO 2015: 33-34).15 While in East 
Germany many children were already born outside marriage in the 1960s (Pötzsch 2012: 
11), in West Germany this trend started only in the mid-1990s – not least because 
Germany’s 1900 Civil Code (BGB) regarding the status of children born outside marriage 
was only reformed in 1997, granting the same legal status to children regardless of their 
mothers’ marital status (ibid: 18). GDR family law offered support to more than just 
(single) mothers; the category of unehelich (illegitimate) children was removed in 1950, 
which seems to have worked in favour to reduce social stigma previously attached to 
children born outside wedlock.   
Similar to the FRG, the GDR’s social policies focused on and idealized a heteronormative 
family model: ‘one man, one woman, married for life with children’ (Borneman 1992: 92). 
But in reality, the East German marriage rate declined, while the divorce rate steadily rose 
(McLellan 2011: 77). Wolfgang Engler postulates that the reason for this conundrum was 
that East Germans did not perceive their partners as providers either at the beginning or 
the end of their relationship, but rather they ‘married or moved in together because they 
loved each other, and broke up because they didn’t love each other anymore’ (Engler 
2000: 258). This argument, however, seems a bit over-simplistic. For example, Jutta had 
already lived with the father of her first child before they got married, and chuckled when 
she explained to me: ‘You know what, we only married because they [the state] had 
brought in this Ehekredit (marriage loan). This was 5,000 Marks or so and we needed this 
money to refurbish that old flat we lived in!’ Indeed pragmatism – in Jutta’s case to access 
a marriage loan, but frequently also to make a claim on the housing list – was often the 
main reason for affirming an already existent relationship through marriage. GDR citizens 
increasingly learned how to make best use of social policies but also of official socialist 
language for their own needs. 
                                                 
15 2013 figures for a European comparison are unavailable.   
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This know-how was also increasingly used in cases of marital problems and divorce. 
Despite the state’s promotion of marriage for life, the GDR’s divorce rate had been one 
of highest in the world (Kolinsky 1998: 135), and women increasingly made up the larger 
share of marital partners who filed for divorce: 53% in 1958 and 68% in 1984 (Mertens 
1998 in McLellan 2011: 77). This trend seems to suggest that women gained more 
confidence to separate from their husbands due to greater socio-economic independence, 
but indeed – as Betts (2010) and McLellan (2011) have illustrated – it was also indicative 
of the persistence of patriarchal norms within the ‘basic collective’. In his investigation of 
divorce court records in East Berlin, Betts notes that in the late 19th century, priests and 
pastors had been moral educators and key mediators in negotiating the intimate life of 
couples, a role that was taken over by family doctors in the Nazi period, and assumed by 
judges and social workers in the GDR (Betts 2010: 96). More importantly, in the 1960s 
‘courts voiced great concern that strong patriarchal attitudes were still all too present in 
many homes, and that their mission was to eradicate this social poison and to support 
aggrieved female citizens’ (ibid: 105). Similarly,  McLellan (2011: 77-78)  points out that 
in the 1970s infidelity and alcoholism ranked highest among the reasons for filing for 
divorce; a 1975 report from a marriage guidance office elaborates that these were not the 
root causes but responses to an unhappy marriage. Indeed, marital complaints resounded 
the traditional gender conflict about unequal division of labour: women criticised their 
husbands’ lack of support in the household, men argued that their wives were too house-
proud, putting too much of their energies into housework instead of sex (ibid.). These 
issues seemed to continue in the early 1990s, and were exacerbated by new experiences 
of loss of self-esteem due to and anxiety about unemployment, which also increased 
familial tensions as households attempted to adjust to these new circumstances (Dennis 
1998: 96).  
Although many interlocutors from all generations made reference to the importance of 
both life partners and children, these references did not necessarily go hand in hand with 
marriage.  For example, most eastern Germans found it somewhat puzzling that I was 
unmarried and childless. Locals I had known as a teenager, and who I bumped into during 
my fieldwork, would almost always bluntly ask whether I was married, and when I replied 
no, the follow up question was: ‘But you’ve got someone? – Well, as long as you’re not 
alone, that’s all that matters!’ Similarly, Association members would frequently, but good 
humouredly, inquire about my ‘love life’ and encourage me to ‘find a man’. When I 
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explained that I had no interest in finding a Thuringian man, adding that it seemed 
pointless given that I would return to the UK after my fieldwork, it became clear that they 
did not want me to find a marital partner – as I had often experienced in other countries 
– but that they were more concerned about my sexual and emotional well-being: ‘Well, 
just someone for now. We just want you to be happy.’ That marriage was not seen as 
something set in stone, that is, meant for life was poignantly expressed at every 
Jugendweihe ceremony. Towards the end of the ceremony, when the commére explained 
how to procure photographs and DVDs, and in an attempt to persuade indecisive parents, 
she would jokingly point out that parents should consider one thing: ‘You have 
Jugendweihe only once, but you can marry more often!’  
Nonetheless, while my disinterest in matrimony was largely understood and accepted, at 
times even positively commented upon, not having children remained incomprehensible 
to most. ‘Don’t you want to have kids?’ was a common question directed at me, often 
followed by listing the great incentives of motherhood, such as that I would ‘see the world 
with different eyes’ or that a smile from one’s own child was priceless. Although marriage 
has by no means become superfluous, it appears not to be seen as essential for the 
founding or indeed sustaining of a family. In Gera, the great majority of families include 
married couples, but more than 15% are single parents and more than 16% cohabit (see 
Table 6). Thuringia ranks fourth in its share of single parents out of the sixteen German 
federal states, which is particularly high, considering that it belongs to the more rural 
regions (similar to numbers 12 and 13) and that the three highest ranks are large cities 
with predominately Protestant (and atheist) traditions (see Table 7). Among the six East 
Thuringian families that inform this thesis, none of the parents were married before the 
birth of their first child. Three couples had a child before they got married, and another 
couple married during my fieldwork, though they already each had a child from a previous 








Type of family nucleus 
(by living arrangement) 
Regional units 
Gera, city Thuringia Germany 
% % % 
Married couples 68.4 71.6 74.8 
Registered civil unions 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Cohabiting couples 16.1 14.0 12.2 
Single fathers 1.7 2.3 2.1 
Single mothers 13.7 12.1 10.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Single parents 15.4 14.4 12.9 
 
Table 6: Family types in comparative regional units (by living arrangement) in % 
Source:  Census 9 May 2011; from the adjusted stock of registers Federal 




Table 7: Proportion of single-parent families by federal states 
with child(ren) in Germany (in ascending order) 
   
Regional 
key 
Regional unit % 
8 Baden-Württemberg 11,8 
3 Lower Saxony 12,3 
5 North Rhine-Westphalia 12,4 
7 Rhineland-Palatinate 12,4 
9 Bavaria 12,4 
1 Schleswig-Holstein 12,5 
14 Saxony 12,5 
0 Germany 12,9 
6 Hesse 13,1 
12 Brandenburg 13,6 
10 Saarland 13,8 
15 Saxony-Anhalt 13,8 
13 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 14,1 
16 Thuringia 14,4 
4 Bremen 15,2 
2 Hamburg 15,4 
11 Berlin 18,6 
   
Source: Census 9 May 2011; from the adjusted stock of  
           Registers, Federal Statistical Office & the   
           Statistical Offices of the Länder, 2014. 
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Franka, in her early forties and one of the unmarried mothers, had lived with her partner 
and their two children for about two decades above her parents in their tenement house 
in Gera’s city centre. When she asked me about the wedding I was due to attend, I 
explained to her that I was not particularly keen on weddings, especially the fairy tale 
image of a princess-like wedding dress. I elaborated that I felt that such events were too 
costly, and that I personally would prefer to spend that kind of money on a proper 
honeymoon abroad, instead of on a white dress and a big celebration. Franka ran her 
fingers through her short blonde hair, while listening, then suddenly burst into laughter, 
and in her raspy loud voice she exclaimed: ‘Grit, you are like me! If I really had to marry, I 
think, I would just go during my lunch break to the registry office, have a takeaway 
Bratwurst from a street grill (eine Roster auf die Faust) and then go back to work.’ She insisted 
that she would also rather use the money for something else instead of inviting all her 
relatives.  
At the time, I did not think much about this remark; but later I realized that her 
unwillingness to invite all her relatives to a wedding sat at odds with the fact that she had 
been very willing to make a big fuss for her children’s Jugendweihe – to which she invited 
as many relatives as possible. It seemed less an issue of the relatives and the associated 
cost of hospitality, than an issue of to whom attention was drawn on this special day. Put 
differently, she had been very happy for her children to be the centre of attention, but she 
seemed to be uncomfortable with taking on this attention for herself. Franka’s attitude 
toward these two life cycle events, however, also highlights that while marriage’s 
significance has decreased, the significance of having a family has remained high – largely 
because of the importance placed on children as sources of emotional support and 
happiness in life. This emphasis on children as an integral part of a fulfilled life was 
mirrored in the type of photographs that families had selected for showcasing in their 
living rooms. Wedding photographs were conspicuously missing in all of the five non-
denominational families, while in the one family whose son had only celebrated 
Confirmation, a framed wedding picture adorned their living room sideboard. Naturally 
where there was no wedding there cannot be a wedding photo, but even in the families 
whose parents were married, wedding photographs were not present in rooms where 
guests would be received (though they might have been in the bedrooms). Instead what 
all these rather diverse homes had in common was their display of plenty of photographs 
of their children.  
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This emphasis on the adolescents – exemplified through the celebration of Jugendweihe 
– is intriguing, especially since the Soviet ritual system attempted to introduce substitutes 
for all life cycle rituals. A comparison between Jugendweihe, baptism and wedding as well 
as between these life cycle rituals of the Soviet Union and of the GDR, as a satellite state 
of the Soviet Union, might usefully bring to the fore differences in popularity of various 
life cycle rituals – and reasons behind these differences. 
 
The Unpopularity of Other Socialist Life Cycle Rituals 
Of course, cohabitation, birth outside marriage, and single parenthood had become 
acceptable during GDR times in part because the influence of the church and religion had 
diminished. Indeed, the GDR state re-introduced Jugendweihe in 1955 as a secularisation 
tool in its struggle over authority with the church, and in direct competition with the 
Protestant confirmation, which I will discuss in depth in the next chapter. But 
Jugendweihe also created a bottom-up social demand for introducing other socialist life 
cycle ceremonies, to replace baptisms, church weddings and church funerals. For 
example, the County Committee for Jugendweihe in Gera noted in its 1956 and 1958 
annual reports that the main reasons adolescents did not participate in Jugendweihe were 
the persistent, widespread ‘superstition’ fuelled by pastors that ‘youths would end up in 
hell’, and threats that the church would deny sacraments and ecclesiastical rights, such as 
the ability to become a godparent or to participate in future church ceremonies (SAG 01 
and 03). The 1957 annual report cited the incident of a girl who withdrew her Jugendweihe 
registration because of the pastor’s pressure to deny her a future church wedding. It 
concluded that ‘overall the contra-work of the church works better on girls’ and that ‘it is 
again demanded to henceforth forcefully develop a non-church system of dignified 
celebrations at the time of child baptism, wedding, and death.’ (SAG 02: 3-4)  
In various regions East Germans themselves made attempts to introduce such secular 
equivalents to these religious life cycle rituals, but – unlike Jugendweihe – the political 
elite did not see the ideological relevance of such events, and they were scarcely promoted 
and lacked the state’s financial support (Lange 2004). Although in March 1958 the registry 
office in Gera conducted the first socialist Namensgebung (naming ceremony; SAG 09), 
there is little further archival evidence of such ceremonies, partly because they never 
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became very popular. Nevertheless, in the 1960s the state indicated an intent to harmonize 
socialist naming ceremonies throughout the republic by providing guidance on their 
ceremonial features and standardized naming certificates (see Lange 2004). The political 
elite hoped that naming ceremonies would be celebrated in people-owned enterprises, 
which were to carry both the organisational and financial responsibilities for the events, 
thereby linking the celebration’s emphasis to the work collective rather than just the 
family. Yet most families seemed to prefer to celebrate the naming of their new-born as 
a family event, while companies opposed these plans because it meant an increased 
workload for them. As a result, as Ines Lange (2004) points out, collective celebrations 
were the exception to the rule, and most socialist naming ceremonies were conducted at 
registry offices – if they were conducted at all.   
Unsurprisingly then, most East Thuringians I spoke to had never even heard of these 
naming ceremonies. In a conversation with Dagmar on this topic, it emerged that she was 
not particularly fond of them even during socialist times. However, she explained, they 
had been fairly popular in cases where the father of the new-born was a soldier because 
the ceremony enabled him to be away from the barracks and to have a brief holiday at 
home. The other advantage, she added, was that when these ceremonies were celebrated 
at the place of work, under the direction of the labour union of the particular plant 
(Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung; BGL), one would also receive a present from the company. 
Here pragmatic considerations, in which the family could gain some sort of advantage, 
seemed to trump any other reasons – much as they did in the celebration of weddings. 
Yet Dagmar explained her dislike of naming ceremonies with the comment that she ‘did 
not see what the point [of them] was’ in relation to the life cycle. Although she understood 
that people baptised their children in order to have confirmation, she also asserted that 
many did so because they wanted to enable their children to have a church wedding, 
because ‘apparently it [the church wedding] is much more solemn or something much 
more special!’ The ‘pointlessness’ Dagmar saw in such ceremonies emanates from the fact 
that while confirmation in the Lutheran Church was not a sacrament and required baptism 
in order to be celebrated, Jugendweihe was not dependent on the celebration of a naming 
ceremony, nor was the celebration of a (non-religious) wedding dependent on either 
Jugendweihe or a socialist naming ceremony. Furthermore, one already had a birth 
certificate, and a celebration at a registry office appeared to be an unnecessary addition or 
duplication (Lange 2004) – much as a workplace celebration might seem to be redundant. 
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During the Protestant Reformation, and in keeping with Luther’s view of weddings as 
‘worldly things’, for Protestants matrimony was also eliminated as a sacrament – unlike in 
the Catholic Church. In 1875, during Bismarck’s Kulturkampf (the cultural struggle 
between the nation state and the Catholic Church) it was established that weddings in 
Germany ought to be conducted with a registrar as a prerequisite to a religious wedding 
ceremony, because the latter is not in itself legally binding. Religious weddings are thus 
always held in addition to, and only after, a civic ceremony. In East Germany the family 
law of 1965 allowed for the possibility of marrying outwith a registry office, but the 1966 
Civil Status Act decreed that all marriages had to take place at a registry office. Both these 
contradictory laws and widespread petit-bourgeois conceptions of marriage may explain 
why collective socialist weddings never became popular either (Lange 2004). Indeed even 
Walter Ulbricht, the head of state at the time, declared in the session on the Civil Status 
Act:  
I am for state order. A registry office is a registry office and no association 
nor club. A marriage has to take place at a registry office and nowhere 
else. That’s how it is. Whether you celebrate your wedding afterwards in 
a club, you can do as you please. But the marriage has to take place at the 
registry office (cited in Lange 2004).  
 
Lange (2004) notes that socialist wedding ceremonies were rarely taken up, and while she 
does not cite any figures for the county Gera, in the neighbouring Thuringian county of 
Erfurt they amounted in 1963 to only 5.4% – and most of these were held at a registry 
office, not at the workplace. Socialist weddings became increasingly formalised registry 
weddings in which the young couple received a ‘family book’ (Buch der Familie) which 
recorded not only the wedding but the births of any future children that would spring 
from this union. While it served as documentary evidence of family life, it was also 
embossed with the GDR state emblem, and promulgated the 8th commandment of 
socialist morals: that marital partners raise their ‘children in the spirit of peace and 
socialism to all around educated, highly principled, and physically toughened people’.  
 
Today, civic weddings are still the norm, and bride and groom – albeit often ‘traditionally’ 
dressed, with the bride in a white wedding dress and her husband in a black suit – tend to 
spend only 15 to 20 minutes in front of a registrar. They are usually welcomed outside the 
registry office by extended family, friends and/or colleagues, who may have prepared 
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more traditional customs, such as throwing rice (or confetti) at the new couple, presenting 
them with bread and salt to eat, or giving them a wooden beam they have to saw. The 
wedding is then celebrated with close friends and families at a different venue, usually a 
restaurant or hotel. In contrast, church weddings are comparatively rare in Thuringia. 
Taking into account the Thuringian marriage statistics from 2009 to 2013 (TLS-1 2015), 
on average roughly 17% of all marriages also had a church wedding – 12.1% in the 
Protestant Church and 4.8% in the Catholic Church (TLS 2015: 34; TLS 2013: 34; TLS 
2012: 34). Here it is worth emphasising not only the limited number of religious weddings 
held in the region. Rather, the concurrent failure of both collective socialist naming 
ceremonies and weddings highlight the limits of collectivization and indeed failure to 
eradicate familial boundaries. Nonetheless, Jugendweihe appears to have been effective, 
at least to a certain degree, in facilitating collective thoughts and actions. I will return to 
the question of why and how it achieved such success in Chapter 3. 
 
In contrast, in the Soviet Union the secular wedding was the first life-cycle ritual to be 
introduced, and became ‘the most widely established and accepted’ (Lane 1981: 74; 
Drobizheva and Tul’tesva 1983). While there had been so called ‘Red Weddings’ and ‘Red 
Christenings’ fairly soon after the revolution, with the discrediting of Trotsky’s ideas – 
including his advocacy of such rituals – and the party’s decision to promote them as anti-
religious rather than valid in their own right, their popularity declined under Stalinism (see 
Binns 1979 and 1982). However, after Stalin’s death, the new leadership feared a religious 
revival and the possibility that the churches – as the sole extra-state institutions – would 
turn into centres of political disloyalty for disenchanted gulag returnees (Binns 1982: 299). 
Secular life cycle rituals were first re-introduced in republics where the Soviet authorities 
faced particularly strong and popular churches but, unlike under Stalinism, they were 
geared toward the feelings of people concerned, having a markedly personalized approach 
(Binns 1982: 300). In Lutheran Estonia and Latvia, for example, secular coming-of-age 
rituals that entailed many of the features of the Protestant confirmation were introduced 
in 1957, and Binns (1980) mentions in a footnote that the idea was very likely borrowed 
from the GDR Jugendweihe. Yet, unlike in Germany, these rituals were held at the age of 




In these Baltic republics secular weddings and naming ceremonies were also taken up and 
led to the opening of the first Soviet Palace of Weddings in Leningrad in 1959. Because 
of their success, in 1964 the party approved a general policy and campaign to roll out 
secular life cycle rituals across the country. Unsurprisingly, in a country as vast and 
ethnically diverse as the USSR, the popularity of these rituals varied among the different 
republics, not least because of geographically and historically varying religious traditions. 
Weddings became the most popular secular life cycle rituals, although most of them were 
just an ‘elaborate form of registration’ (Binns 1980: 177). Christopher Binns postulates 
that in the Ukraine, for example – the model republic for secular weddings – their 
popularity was due in part to the fact that many churches had closed, and that old registry 
offices were transformed into Palaces of Weddings, making compulsory registrations 
ceremonial (1982: 303). Yet Soviet people were also attracted to the regal splendour of 
these palaces, and in the mundane everyday these ceremonies increasingly afforded them 
‘otherwise unavailable opportunities for frivolous consumer enjoyment and “special 
occasion” uplift, for which they were prepared to make ideological obeisance as a nod to 
political loyalty’ (Binns 1982: 301). Nevertheless, majority Catholic or Muslim republics 
still recorded high percentages – varying from 50 to 90% – of additional (‘duplication’) 
religious weddings (Binns 1980: 177; Drobizheva and Tul’tesva 1983; Lane 1981: 80-82).  
 
Comparison of East Germany with the Soviet Union, then, makes clear the extent to 
which pre-socialist (often religious) traditions account for the uptake of new socialist life 
cycle rituals, an issue which I will revisit in Chapter 2. Unlike in the Soviet Union, in East 
Germany, Jugendweihe became the most widespread secular life cycle ritual. This ritual 
played a pivotal part in attempting to win over the youth for the communist project, in 
moulding them into socialist personalities, and in changing their future lifecourses; but it 
was also a locus for forging intimate connections between the state, the family, and the 
individual. To similar ends, Jugendweihe also plays a part in encouraging a positive view 
of sexuality, and cultivating an appreciation of parenthood and of children in association 
with adolescents’ sexual maturity, which I address in the last section of this chapter.   
 
Love & Sexuality: The Age of Consent 
It was a pleasant late Sunday afternoon in May when I joined a birthday party. We were 
sitting in the garden, conversations and alcohol flowing, while Thuringian sausages sizzled 
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on the barbeque behind us. After I had explained that the reason for my long stay in 
Germany was due to my research on Jugendweihe, the host’s best friend Michael, a 
confident, tall, dark-haired man in his late forties, immediately offered: ‘Grit, I can tell you 
also about my Jugendweihe! Do you want to know?’ Before I could reply, his wife, sitting 
across the table, teasingly interfered: ‘Come on, you don’t remember anything about your 
Jugendweihe – it’s ages ago!’  He, however, asserted: ‘I recall everything – very detailed!’ 
Not just for my benefit but by way of entertaining his now actively listening audience 
around the garden table, he continued: ‘I especially remember one thing and that is how 
my mum showed me up in front of the entire assembled gang! She told everyone!’ With 
a high-pitched voice, he mimicked his mother: ‘“We thought if our boy continues like 
that, we will be grandparents by the time he has his Jugendweihe!”’ He laughed out loud, 
drily adding: ‘That was the moment when I just said “Cheerio!”, and headed off to meet 
up with my friends. And that was that – yeah, that was my Jugendweihe, Grit!’ 
Although Michael thrived on being the life and soul of a party so that any of his narratives 
had to be taken with a pinch of salt, less than a decade after his Jugendweihe he had 
become both a husband and a father. He neatly matched the profile of the ‘average East 
German’, who had children and married at a young age. His story also fits a broader trend 
in which parents and grandparents tended to recall their own poignant anecdotes from 
GDR Jugendweihe celebrations, perhaps perfected and idealized over the years, often for 
entertainment value. These stories had been imprinted on people’s minds because of their 
emotional and social significance, which seemed almost always to be associated with the 
re-negotiation of their familial relations due to their coming-of-age (see also Chapter 4). 
References to sexual maturity were one way in which initiands’ coming-of-age was 
manifested – crucially, in respect to their future role as parents. Michael recalled this story 
so clearly because of the embarrassment caused by his mother, who openly and ‘in front 
of everyone’ commented on him having become sexually active. At the same time, she 
publicly recognized that her son was no longer simply her child but able to have children 
of his own; and thus, that he would not only have greater responsibilities himself, but also 
to others in continuing the family line.  
Of course, this is not to suggest that confirmands do not similarly reach sexual maturity 
during this phase of their lives, but rather that it is acknowledged to a much lesser extent 
– if at all. Unlike the confirmations I attended, which focused on divine and brotherly 
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love (agape) and never on romantic desire (eros), teenagers’ increasing interest in sexuality 
was referenced frequently during the Jugendweihe ceremony. For example, the satirical 
song ‘Puberty’ – performed a capella during most of the ceremonies I observed – was 
received with particular good humour and laughter from young and old alike, especially 
during these two explicit passages: 
Tanja has polished her finger nails pink. 
Fat Bodo scribbled stuff above the toilet sink. 
‘Fuck’ it reads, and Bodo turns red. 




Kai has a driving license and Bodo has not. 
Instead he is a specialist in smutty jokes. 
On school trips he always sits at the back of the bus. 
He plays ‘nut catching’ till the teacher stops all the fuss. 16 
 
Similarly, the guest speakers acknowledged more or less ambiguously the new things 
teenagers might be starting to feel, assuring them that it was alright to ‘blush a little about 
the thought of love, especially when one was thinking not only about love for parents and 
grandparents’, and that the ‘butterflies in one’s stomach during the first dates and kisses’ 
would remain unforgettable. Others were more direct. For example, one popular guest 
speaker, a short middle-aged TV presenter, explained that his own son, at nursery age, 
asked for advice on who to marry after his little girlfriend’s family had moved away: “My 
nursery teacher or rather mum?” He continued to explain that teenagers no longer asked 
their parents for advice regarding matters of the heart, but:  
Today they read [the teenage magazine] BRAVO, the popular rubric “Dr 
Sommer”, where they ask questions such as: “When I have sex for the 
first time in my life, will I stop growing?” – Interesting, isn’t it? It throws 
an entirely new light on short men. It just crossed my mind, my father is 
also not particularly tall. But that’s just how it is, it’s in our nature. Sex, I 
mean. I know, especially during a Jugendweihe speech, one is looked at a 
little strangely when you say yes to sex. But I take the risk and confess: 
people at my age also have sex; even though with a bad conscience. – We 
live in times of global warming. Nowadays everything is sounded out for 
sustainability. And sex too is put to the test. – After all, a lot of warmth is 
produced in the process…  
 
                                                 
16 The phrase ‘Eierketschen’ (nut catching) is used in reference to boys fondling their or other boys’ 
testicles. The singer symbolically touches his groin area while singing these lyrics.  
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These references entertained the audience, of course, but they also seemed to serve as a 
kind of assurance to young people that love and sexuality were fundamental parts of life, 
that they had been for their parents too, and thus that they were nothing to be ashamed 
of. The chapter of the keepsake book received by initiands entitled ‘Love, Partnership, 
Sexuality: 1000 Questions’ covers, in question and answer style, a wide range of possible 
sexual and emotional concerns that teenagers at this age may face. As one mother recalled, 
it was this part of the book that caused controversy when it was passed around the guests 
at her daughter’s Jugendweihe. The mother’s western German friends, who were raised 
as Catholics, felt the book was ‘inappropriate’. What may have offended their sensibilities 
was that the chapter tackled in a liberal manner questions that might not have been raised 
at all within a Christian context – or that would have been answered very differently, such 
as ‘Who is responsible for contraception?’ (Both); ‘Is masturbation harmful?’ (No); or ‘Is 
it pathological or immoral to be gay or lesbian?’ (No). But while this chapter appeared 
educational and aimed to dispel some – still prevalent – old myths, what was more 
surprising to me was the way the questions of adolescent sexuality was covered under the 
following blurb:  
14 years old. Roughly half of the youth is in love. Several already have 
their first kiss behind them. Others still wait for “Mr Right” or “Mrs 
Right”. Because love is not arbitrary neither is kissing. Some do not even 
think about love or at least not about a steady relationship. They do not 
want to be tied, they want to be free; they want experiences without having 
to consider a relationship. They want to concentrate on learning and 
achievement. They do not want to spoil professional opportunities or they 
want to have material security first, before they found a family. And 
perhaps they will find themselves years later sadly alone (Starke 2013: 44).  
 
This excerpt seems to suggest that at the age of fourteen it was not only appropriate or 
‘natural’ to become sexually active – it is, after all, the age of (sexual) consent in Germany 
– but that all the fairly reasonable excuses for not having a relationship or a family while 
still young might lead one to being sad and alone in the future. Indeed, there was a sense 
that guest speakers and the Jugendweihe Association were somewhat promoting not only 
sexuality but also family planning at a young age. At the same time, sexual innuendoes 
within the family were fairly common in the past, as Michael’s anecdote suggests, as well 
as during my fieldwork. After one such ceremony I talked to a male initiand in front of 
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the Gera theatre, while his family was waiting nearby. After I had asked him whether he 
would be willing to have a chat with me a few weeks after his celebration, I handed him 
my business card before leaving. At this point, his maternal grandmother complimented 
him, loudly enough for everyone to hear: ‘Well, there you go, you already got your first 
telephone number!’  
While it was a playful remark, perhaps intended to embarrass both of us, this sort of 
playful innuendo was not simply a matter of teasing or acknowledging change in children 
or grandchildren. It was not uncommon for initiands to have their boyfriends or 
girlfriends at their Jugendweihe family celebration – and girls in particular often had 
(somewhat older) boyfriends in attendance. In cases where such a boyfriend or girlfriend 
was absent, extended kin or family friends would often inquire whether there was 
‘someone special’ in the initiand’s life. At times, a parent would come to their child’s aid 
by pointing out that he or she ‘still had time’. Quite a few of the adolescents whose 
Jugendweihe I had observed were in a ‘steady’ relationship within a year or so, by the age 
of fifteen or sixteen. What surprised me was their parents’ acceptance of such a young 
relationship to the extent that, for instance, girlfriends or boyfriends joined family 
holidays away. These first sexual attractions were often commented on by parents, who 
compared them with their own youth, when they had started going to the disco at the age 
of fourteen, and had their own first sexual experiences.   
But a clear tension was also palpable: on the one hand, parents were happy that their 
children were not alone, that they had found someone special for the present – or indeed, 
even someone for the long-run, who marked the possibility the parents might become 
grandparents. On the other hand, there was the bittersweet sense that there was not much 
time left before the child would eventually ‘fledge’ the family nest and leave the parental 
home. The acceptance of an adolescent child’s new friend as part of the family was not 
simply a matter of open-mindedness and inclusion, but also seemed to serve two strategic 
purposes. First, parents could examine what the new ‘significant other’ in their son’s or 
daughter’s life was like, in the hope they could protect their child from emotional harm 
by assessing whether this person was trustworthy and ‘good enough’ for their child. 
Secondly, it enabled them to come across as liberal while still maintaining some control 
over their child. Parents were still able to spend quality time with their children – thus 
prolonging the time until their offspring would eventually leave the parental home. 
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Parents’ seemingly liberal acceptance thus mitigated the imminent risk of loss, though it 
was inevitable that their child would ‘get wings’. The way parents dealt with their teenage 
child’s changing priorities regarding emotional investment also required sustenance so 
that the emotional ties between parents and children were not entirely broken. Showing 
trust in their child to make the right decision, and extending that trust to their friend, also 
meant giving their children the confidence that family meant roots – if something went 
wrong in the future, they could rely on their family to be there for them. Jugendweihe, 
then, marked not simply a coming-of-age for an adolescent, but it also signalled quite 
forcefully to parents that they had to prepare for the letting go of their offspring. That 
this process could lead to familial tension was quite openly acknowledged during the 
public ceremony but also in conversations with parents. Yet celebrating such a ritual also 
appeared to strengthen family ties, in particular by providing a public opportunity for 
parents and grandparents to acknowledge that their children mattered most to them. 
I suggest that Jugendweihe’s continued popularity reflects a desire to re-strengthen family 
ties in a time period when such family ties are in danger of being severed. Given that the 
ritual served to connect individual, families, and the state, it also raises the question of 
what it means in contemporary Germany where the previous state no longer exists – an 
issue I return to throughout this thesis.  
 
Conclusion 
In 2015, the media marked the 25th anniversary of German re-unification by assessing the 
current state of affairs in various publications – frequently noting that eastern and western 
Germans were closing ranks on many social and economic issues. Yet it was also always 
highlighted that differences persisted, many of which pertained specifically to family 
structures (see, for example, Harmsen and Lenz 2015; Mönch 2015). Thus, in the territory 
of the former East Germany, the majority of children are born outside marriage, most 
mothers work, and there is a greater availability and use of childcare facilities compared 
to its western counterpart. In this chapter, I have illustrated various interdependencies 
between politics and kinship, and the ways these differences between eastern and western 
Germany are in part due to a history of different state policies in the GDR and FRG 
respectively. The GDR’s political elite aimed to achieve a communist utopia through 
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moulding its young citizens into ‘socialist personalities’, and its families into the socialist 
family model, aimed at collapsing gender hierarchies that would eventually lead to an 
overall equal society. Alain Blum (2003) rightly argues that there is no such thing as ‘the 
socialist family’ because socialist states all implemented social policies differently, 
depending on their own specific histories and their peoples’ adoption, rejection or 
negotiation of these state attempts. He concludes that socialist states failed to have a 
lasting impact on rather resilient family structures. Yet – as I hope to have demonstrated 
– East German family structures appear to have – at least in part – changed due to efforts 
made by the GDR state. 
Many pro-natal policies, especially in combination with a socialist feminism, had only 
limited and short-term successes (increase in birth rates) or unintended consequences 
(high divorce rates), while others seemed to have a lasting effect beyond 1989-90 (female 
workforce, births outside marriage, and early-age extra-familial child care). Today the 
eastern German family structure is more similar to the family structure of Scandinavian 
countries than to western Germany because historically the social policies of Scandinavian 
countries and East Germany encouraged a ‘universal breadwinner model’, while, for 
example, those of the UK and West Germany were geared toward a ‘male breadwinner 
model’ (Harsch 2007: 308-309; Kreyenfeld 2012).  
Jugendweihe became an integral part of the East German lifecourse that marked the 
coming-of-age of a child, but simultaneously served the political elite to craft ‘socialist 
personalities’ and to intimately link family, state, and individual. The coming-of-age of an 
individual is – as in all societies – associated with sexual maturity and thus with 
reproduction, which is also of interest to the wider community or the nation-state. 
Because of its extensive social welfare provisions, the GDR has been referred to as a 
‘welfare dictatorship’ (Jarausch 1999); but the political elite also created a prototype 
lifecourse, predetermining what socialist subjects had to do at certain periods in their lives. 
In this typical lifecourse more than 90% of East Germans followed the pattern of entering 
school at age six, celebrating their Jugendweihe at age fourteen, leaving school at age 
sixteen and starting their professional career at seventeen. East Germans – compared to 
West Germans of the same era – would reach financial independence from their parents 
earlier, often by around the age of nineteen. Women were regularly married by the age of 
twenty-one, and would have at least one child by twenty-two (Kolinsky 1998: 121). With 
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the political rupture of 1989-90, opportunities dramatically increased, including travel 
abroad and career choices; but previously generous social policies also changed, often 
unfavourably. The consequences were changes in lifestyle that were welcomed by many, 
but that were also associated with less-welcomed side effects such as a more individualistic 
way of living, the longer financial dependency of children, and a declining birth rate. These 
changes were commented upon by many of my interlocutors, who often appeared to 
stress their negative aspects over their positive ones. In one such conversation Lars, Nils’s 
father, noted what he took to be two interrelated issues:  
Nowadays people weigh up whether they can afford children and calculate 
how much they cost. How can one think this way? Children are important 
in themselves, and anyway if no one has children, we’ll just die out. I don’t 
know, most of the youth today just think about themselves, they are selfish 
and don’t want to work. I mean you are yourself already in your forties, 
people like you and me, we are dying out and then what? One can only 
hope that at least some of the youth, some of our children, keep 
something of this “East mentality” alive.17  
 
The concern of Germans ‘dying out’ is of course a long-standing pan-German anxiety, 
given that Germany has one of the lowest birth rates worldwide and an increasingly aging 
population, but Lars seemed to link this explicitly to eastern Germans, associating eastern 
Germans with a particular way of thinking or set of values. In the remainder of this thesis 
I explore what values are deemed to be part of this ‘East German mentality’, and which 
of them grandparental and parental generations wish to transmit to their offspring. 
Because lifecourses have become less rigid and increasingly diversified, today families 
across three generations share only two events associated with a particular age: school 
entry celebration and Jugendweihe. While a child’s school entry is marked by a celebration 
throughout Germany, Jugendweihe remains a feature exclusive to the eastern German life 
cycle, and thus serves in this thesis as a lens to explore the changing relationships between 
individuals, families, and the state.  
I seek to build on previous studies of Jugendweihe (Aechtner 2011; Gallinat 2002; 
Saunders 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2003), which argue that this ritual is ‘a symbol of an 
emerging eastern German identity’ and a ‘family tradition’, by investigating what this 
identity involves, what family means, and how family is lived in contemporary eastern 
                                                 




Germany. Since the diverging popularity of socialist life cycle rituals across the states of 
the Soviet Union brought to the fore how the uptake or rejection of such rituals depended 
on pre-socialist traditions and religious affiliation, in the next chapter I examine 
Jugendweihe in historical perspective. I explore how the ritual became a popular part of 
the eastern German life cycle and the ways these processes of secularisation impacted 
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Chapter 2 
Jugendweihe and Protestant Confirmation: From 
Minority to Majority and Back (to the Future)  
 
And if we can no longer talk about ritual without history, we also should no longer talk about history 
without kinship. 
– David. E. Sutton (2004: 102) 
 
The a cappella group Die NotenDealer were performing their popular satirical song, 
‘Puberty’, when one of its members broke ranks and slowly moved centre stage. The 
others stopped singing and looked on. The soloist, now the centre of attention, continued 
a little longer until – acting embarrassed – he noticed that he was the only one still singing. 
He then nodded to the audience, raised his arms, and said jovially: ‘Well, thank you!’ The 
audience applauded. The other singers eyed him up suspiciously while he bowed to the 
spectators. At the same time, the lead singer positioned himself next to him to explain to 
the filled concert hall: ‘This is Gábor. He is our bassist. And a bassist in a singing group 
is the lowest level in the food chain’. The word ‘lowest’ was accompanied by a movement 
of his right hand downwards. He continued: ‘Gábor had confirmation.’ There were some 
giggles and a fair amount of laughter. The lead singer reproachfully looked at Gábor, and 
then stepped away backwards, encouraging the audience, ‘A little applause for Gábor!’ 
The audience applauded again, and the group got ready to finish their song together. But 
instead, the band froze. I had stopped the DVD, a recording of the previous year’s 
Jugendweihe ceremony in the Gera theatre. Sitting on an office chair, I turned to three 
young women who had participated in the ceremony and asked: ‘How do you understand 
that joke? Is it a joke, or what is happening here?’ 
Fifteen-year-old Nele, who had celebrated not only her Jugendweihe but also her 
confirmation in the previous year, suggested carefully:  
Well, that now… that perhaps, that was expressed… that perhaps, there 
is confirmation but that most [people] have Jugendweihe. That’s just 
really… well, that is not completely something negative for the 
confirmation, but that really most do Jugendweihe and there is really 
hardly any confirmation anymore. Okay, perhaps that has also changed 
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people, but actually, I think, it results in the same principle. Confirmation 
is on a church basis and here [Jugendweihe] it’s not. And I don’t know, 
if… well, it’s difficult to explain.  
 
I prompted her: ‘What do you mean by “results in the same principle”? That one also 
becomes an adult with confirmation or what do you mean by that?’  
She continued: ‘Yes that, well, not that there is not the same feeling as with Jugendweihe 
but yet there are many…’ 
Her friend, sixteen-year-old Sophie, who had celebrated only Jugendweihe, suggested 
helpfully: ‘Parallels?’ 
Nele: ‘Exactly, parallels… well, and that actually it’s almost the same, apart from being 
also affiliated to the church. At least that’s how I felt about it.’  
Sophie appeared to be more daring and offered: 
Why, I believe, in that scene they wanted to point out a little bit that there 
is also… well, that those who have confirmation that they, to a certain 
degree, that they also are … outsiders, a little bit, I’d say. Because he also 
was so dismissed and the others looked at him so weirdly. For example, 
in my class only three people had confirmation. […] and that these other 
three people, who did not take part, perhaps that then they can’t really 
join in a conversation; and that they then are also a little bit excluded, well 
not really excluded, but just that they perhaps did not feel that they really 
belong (dazugehörig fühlen). 
I inquired, ‘And have they celebrated only confirmation or also Jugendweihe?’  
Sophie: ‘Only confirmation’.  
Since the three girls were friends but had only been classmates since the ninth grade, after 
the restructuring of their cohort into different classes, I asked the other two girls who 
were already classmates at the time of their Jugendweihe, ‘And what about you?’  
Sophie’s age-mate Pia, who had also only celebrated Jugendweihe, replied: ‘Well in our 
class there were only…,’ she turned to Nele and asked: ‘How many were there?’  
Nele: ‘Only me and Anna’, and Pia continued:  
Yes, there were two who had confirmation in our class. Well, Nele was 
the only one who also did Jugendweihe, well she could talk about it, [and 
turning to Sophie, she added], as you just said. And the other girl was, well 
she wasn’t an outsider, but she gladly listened, because she just wanted to 
know how it was and we also wanted to know how things proceeded with 
them. And yes… But you can just see that Jugendweihe is just more 
popular, well yeah, has increased more than the church version. 
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When Gábor breaks ranks during the performance, the lead singer reprimands him by 
ranking him at ‘the lowest level in the food chain’, and noting that the bassist celebrated 
confirmation. While there is no direct link expressed, the implication is clear, even to the 
adolescents in the audience: Gábor, by celebrating confirmation, is somewhat of an 
outsider and ranked below everyone else, or as the lead singer noted during other 
performances, ‘belongs to a Randgruppe’ (marginal group) – because the majority of East 
Thuringians (and eastern Germans) celebrate Jugendweihe.  
Indeed, based on data I collated from the Thuringian Statistical Office and the Thuringian 
Ministry of Education, among the 16,560 Thuringian pupils in grade eight in 2013 
(TMBWK 2014), 3,000 teenagers celebrated Protestant confirmation (TLS 2015: 34) and 
6,765 celebrated Jugendweihe.18 This suggests that about 18% of eighth graders celebrated 
the Protestant confirmation and 41% participated in Jugendweihe. In addition, less than 
1% celebrated the Catholic substitute ritual for non-denominational youths, the 
Lebenswende, and approximately 6% celebrated the Catholic confirmation. The Catholic 
confirmation (Firmung) is not straightforwardly comparable because it is not as tightly 
connected to the age of fourteen as the Protestant confirmation is (Konfirmation). In Gera, 
for example, 37 teenagers celebrated the Catholic confirmation in 2013; but because of 
the low number of Catholic Church members, they united several age cohorts, ranging 
from fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds (Schmidtke 2013). Put differently, most 
Thuringians mark their coming-of-age with a public ceremony, while approximately a 
third do not.19 Some of the latter teenagers, however, may still celebrate their coming-of-
age only within the family, and hence remain unrecorded. More importantly, in Gera 483 
of the 690 eighth graders in 2013 celebrated Jugendweihe, that is, 70%.  
 
The former East Germany is considered to be one of the most areligious regions 
worldwide (Froese and Pfaff 2005; Pickel 2010), which is in stark contrast to West 
Germany’s ‘culture of church affiliation’ (Pickel 2011). The reasons for this fact have often 
been reduced to the GDR state’s secularisation efforts, in which Jugendweihe played a 
crucial role (Meulemann 2004; Thompson 2012); but increasingly, that explanation has 
                                                 
18 Comparable participation figures for Jugendweihe and confirmation are not easily procured, 
and the divergence in administrative units complicates matters.  
19 There may also be some teenagers who celebrate both Jugendweihe and Protestant confirmation 
but – compared to the times of state socialism – such ‘double-celebrations’ are rare.  
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been qualified by factors emanating from the time prior to state socialism (Hölscher 2001; 
Schmidt-Lux 2010; Wohlrab-Sahr 2011). Given that Jugendweihe participation rates in 
Thuringia sit at around 40%, and at almost 50% for the former East Germany (Weyel 
2011), Gera’s participation rate stands out; and such regional differences suggest that 
factors other than an ‘enforced secularisation’ (Meulemann 2004) under state socialism 
may play a role. While I have argued in the previous chapter that Jugendweihe became an 
integral part of the East German lifecourse, in this chapter I explore the conditions under 
which, and the strategies by which, this integration was accomplished. I trace the 
relationship between the Christian confirmation and Jugendweihe as its substitute in a 
historical perspective, in which Jugendweihe served to challenge the authority of the 
church, and increasingly also the Christian worldview.  
 
First, I illustrate how the historically oppositional character of these two rituals resonates 
with contemporary teenagers’ explanations about their reasons to celebrate Jugendweihe, 
before I briefly sketch Jugendweihe’s emergence in Thuringia in the second half of the 
19th century, and its adoption by various movements that overlapped in their stance 
against the church. I then show that both the region’s predominant Protestant working 
population, as well as Thuringia’s ‘cultural socialism’ (Klenke 1995 in Kachel 2011: 174), 
fostered the uptake of Jugendweihe in East Thuringia prior to state socialism. I then turn 
my attention to tensions between church and state during GDR times, and the ways the 
ritual reflected these conflicting relations. This diachronic approach to Jugendweihe 
brings to the fore how the oscillation between Jugendweihe and confirmation resonates 
with the political context of different eras. It aims to show the reasons that the ritual 
continued through various historical eras and caesurae, and will also provide an insight 
into why Jugendweihe is celebrated at age fourteen. I argue that the Jugendweihe’s 
coming-of-age dimension – which historically links to initiands leaving school at 
approximately fourteen years of age – evolved already in the 18th and 19th centuries, as 
part of the Protestant confirmation. This feature ensured the ritual’s continuity, yet its 
aspect of initiation into a particular community also made it controversial – and renders 
the ritual a site of contestation over the past. By focusing in particular on the pledge of 
allegiance – which served to commit adolescents not only to a particular community but 
also a particular worldview – I argue that the ritual became an instrument capable of being 
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used by various movements that vied with one another for adolescents to sustain their 
particular social group and to shape a particular future.  
 
Based on this historical backdrop, in the second part of this chapter I explore how these 
church-state relations played out within the family, and how the GDR Jugendweihe 
successfully altered the mainly Protestant lifecourse to a konfessionslose – non-
denominational or unchurched – lifecourse.20 I argue that the ritual’s role as a force for 
social change became reversed under the GDR regime, where it served to maintain the 
social order which went hand in hand with a reversal from a minority to a majority that 
celebrated the ritual. More importantly, within the families of Jugendweihe participants, 
the ideological role that the ritual played under the GDR – which was manifested in the 
preparation lessons and the pledge of allegiance (Jugendweihe Gelöbnis) – is not transmitted 
to the younger generation today. This silencing of certain features of the GDR 
Jugendweihe is also facilitated by the fact that today’s Jugendweihe no longer features a 
pledge of allegiance. I suggest that the lack of a pledge in today’s ceremony also represents 
a critique of contemporary state-church relations. As such, Jugendweihe has returned to 
its origins as an oppositional force to today’s social order, celebrated by a minority in 
present-day Germany.  
 
Jugendweihe and Being ‘Konfessionslos’  
When I asked teenagers from Gera and its surroundings why they wanted to celebrate 
Jugendweihe, they expressed their reasons in relation to others – mainly their parents or 
their family. Teenagers also emphasised what they were not, before describing their 
decision to celebrate Jugendweihe as a matter of their own choice or desire. In 
conversation with fourteen-year-old Sarah, a few weeks prior to her Jugendweihe, she 
noted: ‘It was clear that I would celebrate Jugendweihe, we just aren’t that religious.’ Her 
smooth transition from ‘I’ – denoting herself as a seemingly autonomous person – to her 
description of ‘we’ – she as a member of her family – and what they as a unit were not, 
                                                 
20 The term konfessionslos (non-denominational or unchurched) developed in the 19th century and 
is frequently used to state that one is not a member of the Protestant or Catholic Churches. In 
the Weimar Republic, these two churches became recognised by the state as corporations under 
public law (Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts). The term often overlaps with atheist views, but 
should not be seen as necessarily a statement of non-belief (see Aechtner 2011: 202-206). 
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was reasonably common. She continued to explain that once in a while her family would 
go to church, perhaps at Christmas or Easter, because of tradition, but not because they 
actually believed. Her age-mate Lennart, from another Gera village, described what he 
was not, instead of what he was, in similar terms – setting out with the fact that he took 
Ethics classes from the start instead of Religion: 
 … and in my family now it is only my mother who – well on the birth 
certificate there is just ‘Protestant’ on it, ‘Protestant church’, and on my 
father’s just not, and also not on mine. And that’s why I didn’t do 
confirmation or anything else; that’s why Jugendweihe was actually, say, 
the only thing left. Well, but not that you just have it like that, but also yes, 
because yeah, it simply – yes: it was the most obvious for me and my 
family.    
 
When I asked whether his mother would not have wanted him to celebrate confirmation, 
he declared: ‘No!’ Lennart then explained that his mother did not want it at all, having 
told him that although her birth certificate stated that she was ‘Protestant’, she only ever 
went to church for Easter and Christmas. On these occasions he would join her, ‘because 
in principle they belong to it, they are church festivals in principle.’ While, according to 
Lennart, his mother was still a nominal church member, his father was not; he added: 
‘They [his parents] just told me: “We would like you to do Jugendweihe, but if there is 
something to be said against it, if you want to do confirmation – very urgently, for example 
– then we [can] also do confirmation”, but I opted for Jugendweihe.’ Somewhat surprised 
by this explanation, I inquired: ‘So you are actually baptised?’ Lennart denied it, which led 
me to suggest that he could not have celebrated confirmation in that case. ‘Yes…,’ he 
agreed, adding, ‘but it was along the lines that… that in principle they had offered me a 
choice. Given that, I said: “Yes, I want to do Jugendweihe!”  
What struck me in these conversations was that, while I had asked these teenagers why 
they had wanted to celebrate Jugendweihe, their responses included the church and/or 
contrasted Jugendweihe with confirmation – neither of which factors I had mentioned at 
this point. Gera had no Christian schools,21 and because the city has an extremely high 
non-denominational population even for East Germany – at 85% (see Table 8) – I had 
expected adolescents to self-identify more positively as konfessionslos or atheist. Instead, 
they framed their decision around what they were not – contrasting themselves to a very 
                                                 
21 The first Christian school opened after my fieldwork in September 2014 in Gera.   
   
  87 
small minority of Christians. More importantly, although teenagers always explained that 
their decision to celebrate Jugendweihe was closely related to their parents, siblings or 
cousins, or their family more generally, they tended to stress that it was their own decision, 
and that they had been given a choice. Two girls, Celine and Leoni, told me in two 
independent conversations that when they were much younger they had thought that ‘one 
had to celebrate Jugendweihe’, and only learnt later that it was voluntary, but could not 
describe to me why they had imagined so.  
I would suggest that the teenagers’ explanations – focussing on the contrast with 
confirmation and on negotiations between their own decisions and their family’s wishes 
as matter of choice – stem from the fact that celebrating Jugendweihe is only intelligible 
historically in relation to, and specifically in opposition against, confirmation. Even today 
a contrast is drawn by adolescents – who may not be aware that such a conflictual 
relationship between the two rituals harks back to the mid-19th century, when 
Jugendweihe emerged as a substitute to confirmation. This opposition was made most 
forcefully during the socialist era – which partly shaped the lifecourse of today’s parental 
and grandparental generations – with the state’s adoption of Jugendweihe. While a 
comprehensive history of Jugendweihe is beyond the scope of this thesis, in the next 
section I sketch the historical background that led to the ritual’s emergence and uptake in 
Thuringia prior to state socialism.  
 
Table 8: Germany’s Religious Membership as per 2011 Census 
Religious membership                
(in detail) 
Gera, city in % Thuringia in % Germany in % 
Roman Catholic Church 2,500 3 174,280 8 24,869,380 31 
Protestant Church (Lutheran) 9,420 10 529,010 24 24,552,110 31 
Evangelical Free Churches 860 1 14,620 1 714,360 1 
Orthodox churches / ./. 6,630 0 1,050,740 1 
Jewish communities / ./. 790 0 83,430 0 
Others 910 1 14,030 1 2,116,460 3 
Not a member of a public-law 
religious society 
80,850 85 1,433,690 66 26,265,880 33 
       
Source: https://ergebnisse.zensus2011.de [Accessed 19/10/2014] 
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The Emergence and Spread of the Jugendweihe Ritual 
In order to understand the appearance of Jugendweihe and its link to confirmation, it is 
useful to begin with the German Protestant Reformation (1517-1648). The theological 
debates during this era were concerned, among other things, with the relationship 
between infant baptism and confirmation. Confirmation is one of the seven sacraments 
in the Catholic Church, but reformers like Martin Luther viewed it as ‘merely a human 
invention’, noting that ‘God has said nothing about it’ – and as such, they desacralized it 
(Behrens 1996 in Aechtner 2011: 56; Vischer 1958: 58). Luther’s emphasis was on 
religious instruction for baptised Christians who, he held, should receive the sacrament 
of communion only once they have a basic understanding of Christian doctrine (Vischer 
1958: 61). The introduction – or reinvention – of the Protestant confirmation is 
commonly ascribed to Martin Bucer’s 1539 ‘Ziegenhainer Church Order’, which struck a 
compromise with the Anabaptist movement, which aimed at the discontinuation of infant 
baptism (EKD 2014). Protestant confirmation evolved over the next two centuries into a 
ritual in which adolescents professed their Christian faith and consciously confirmed their 
infant baptism, and as a precondition for communion. It also marked the end of their 
religious instruction, at which point they were examined on their understanding of the 
pillars of Protestantism – Luther’s ‘Little Catechism’ – and became full members of their 
congregation.  
The theologian Lukas Vischer holds that, due to increased struggle for dominance 
between the Catholic and the Protestant churches in the 18th century, confirmation began 
to include a pledge to the Protestant church as a means of preventing Protestants from 
converting to the Catholic church (Vischer 1958: 80-81). At the same time, the 
significance of confirmation was already beginning to spread well beyond the question of 
church recruitment.  Because of the emphasis on the confirmands’ Urteilsfähigkeit (ability 
to make informed judgement) after the successful completion of their religious 
instruction, confirmation increasingly made people members not only of their 
congregation, but of civic society at large (ibid: 83-84). This development was fostered by 
connecting confirmation with school-leaving when Prussia introduced compulsory 
schooling (Schulpflicht) in 1763 – and as eight years’ school attendance gradually became 
the norm in the beginning of the 19th century. Over time, the age of fourteen came to be 
formalised as the appropriate moment for celebrating confirmation, leaving school and 
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entering the workforce, thereby reshaping the ritual and emphasising the confirmands’ 
coming-of-age within wider society.  
Bo Hallberg, the first scholar to trace Jugendweihe’s historical development, situates its 
origin within Enlightenment thought in the mid-19th century (Hallberg 1979: 5-21).  The 
first record of the term ‘Jugendweihe’ can be dated back to 1852, when Eduard Baltzer – 
pastor of the free-religious congregation of Nordhausen22 formed in 1847 – is believed to 
have conducted the first Jugendweihe (Chowanski and Dreier 2000: 12-19; Gandow 1994: 
11). Such free-religious congregations were part of either the ‘Friends of the Light’ (the 
Protestant Lichtfreunde) or the German Catholics (the Catholic Deutschkatholiken), which 
united in 1859 in the rationalist Freireligöse Bewegung (Free-religious or non-denominational 
movement). They aimed toward a Christianity based on the word of God rather than 
church dogma. In 1851, Gustav Adolf Wislicenus, a theologian and influential preacher 
among the Lichtfreunde, criticised the practice of celebrating the Protestant confirmation 
because its profession of faith (Glaubensbekenntnis) not only committed confirmands to the 
Christian belief but also established their full church membership (Hallberg 1979: 50, 77). 
Protestant confirmations continued nevertheless, but were altered over time in response 
to this criticism, and were described as either ‘Jugendweihe’ or ‘confirmation’ 
interchangeably until the term ‘Jugendweihe’ prevailed in the 1880s (Isemeyer 1989: 13; 
Meier 1998: 126). It appears that some of these ceremonies originally included a form of 
avowal while others did not, but avowals gradually disappeared (see Meier 1998: 131).23  
During the same period, two other movements developed in Germany – the freethinkers 
and the labour movement – and their overlapping anti-church views and attitudes toward 
the education of the young led to their collaboration with the free-religious movement 
and the eventual adoption of Jugendweihe.  
The freethinker’s agenda differed from the free-religious movement in that freethinkers 
sought not to be ‘free in religion’, but rather entirely ‘free of religion’ (DFV 2016; Meier 
1998: 97). When the Anti-Socialist Law (Sozialistengesetz) of 1878 prohibited all socialist 
and social-democratic organisations in the German Reich (formed seven years earlier), 
many socialists sought sanctuary in freethinker organisations, which were deemed 
                                                 
22 Nordhausen is in North Thuringia, and belonged at the time to the Prussian state of Saxony. 




apolitical by the state (Isemeyer 1989: 14). Hallberg argues that the freethinker movement 
had two currents: the bourgeois element focused on a natural-scientific worldview; and 
the working class element, focused on a social-revolutionary worldview based on Marx’s 
dialectical materialism (1979: 83). This divergence led to the formation of separate 
proletarian freethinker organisations. These proletarian freethinkers were particularly 
active in labour movement strongholds, and organized Jugendweihe ceremonies in which 
socialists and communists alike participated (Isemeyer 1989: 26).  
With the foundation of the Weimar Republic in 1919, the state church was constitutionally 
rejected; but the legal status of churches as public law corporations – a precedent 
established in the 19th century – was retained (Barker 2004: 168). Churches thus had state-
like rights to levy taxes and to provide religious instruction in school, both of which 
remain contested issues. At the same time, in the strongholds of the labour movement – 
such as Thuringia, Saxony and Berlin – there developed what Dietmar Klenke defines as 
Kultursozialismus (‘cultural socialism’) (in Kachel 2011: 174). ‘Cultural socialism’ is perhaps 
best understood as a combination of social-democratic local politics that were supported 
through social and cultural infrastructures, and geared toward socialist hegemony (ibid). 
Under this umbrella fall proletarian singer and sports clubs, the socialist youth 
organisation, and the Kirchenaustrittsbewegung (church exit movement) and they comprised 
a wide variety of activities, including socialist education and Jugendweihe ceremonies, all 
of which gained particular momentum in East Thuringia (in Kachel 2011: 174-177). 
Unsurprisingly, in 1925 records show a proportion of Konfessionslose (non-denominational 
people) in the East Thuringian cities of Jena at 10.9% and Gera at 15.3% – in contrast to 
Thuringia broadly at 4.4% and the German Reich as a whole at 2.5% (Klenke in Kachel 
2011: 174).  
My archival research suggests that in Gera, the first Jugendweihe within the proletarian 
freethinker tradition was held in 1914 (SAG 11). Collaborations between the Socialist 
Party of Germany (SPD) and the proletarian freethinkers in promoting Jugendweihe is 
evidenced by a proletarian freethinker’s Jugendweihe appeal, published in February 1923 
in the local newspaper and SPD organ, Ostthüringer Tribüne (SAG 10). 
 
Manfred Isemeyer ascribes the success of the proletarian freethinker Jugendweihe to the 
fact that the ceremony and the preparatory course were not aligned to party politics (1989: 
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31). Both confirmation and Jugendweihe required that participants complete a 
preparatory course. Potential Jugendweihe participants prepared for their new societal 
roles – as workers conscious of the class struggle – by attending instructive lectures and 
musical performances, recitations and walking tours. These activities, like the speech 
during the Jugendweihe ceremony, were designed to foster the aims of the labour 
movement.  
 
In a speech delivered at a proletarian freethinker Jugendweihe in 1927, Minna Specht – 
an influential socialist and educator – refers to the lip service that many pupils pay during 
their confirmation after they have undergone confirmation instructions 
(Konfirmandenunterricht):   
There was talk about sin, salvation, death and God. Perhaps there are 
some among them who believe in particular doctrines on these questions. 
Most believe nothing. They take part [in confirmation] because it is 
conventional and because otherwise it is more difficult to get an 
apprenticeship (Specht 1929: 8).  
 
In this excerpt there are two interesting points. Specht criticises participation in 
confirmation based on convention or habit instead of one’s belief or conviction. She also 
points to a link between not celebrating confirmation and the possibility of one’s future 
education and work prospects being hampered. Both issues – as we will see below– apply 
equally to Jugendweihe under the GDR regime, once the relationship between 
confirmation and Jugendweihe as celebrations conducted by the majority and minority 
respectively were reversed. Yet this Jugendweihe speech is also noteworthy as it was given 
in Göttingen, Lower Saxony, which would become part of West Germany in 1949. 
Indeed, Jugendweihe ceremonies were held in smaller numbers right across Germany, 
including in Hamburg, North-Rhine Westphalia, and Lower Saxony; but during the Cold 
War, Jugendweihe became gradually associated with a communist ritual and the GDR 
regime, and thus disreputable in West Germany (Isemeyer 1989: 37-38; Mohrmann 1999: 
135, 137).  
 
Unlike social democratic Jugendweihe ceremonies in other SPD strongholds, such as 
Berlin or Saxony, the proletarian freethinker ceremony appears not to have included a 
pledge to a particular cause (Isemeyer 1989: 36). It seems likely that Communist Party 
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(KPD) followers’ preference for ‘political instruction’ and the inclusion of a commitment 
to political aims as part of the ceremony underpinned a decision to split from the 
freethinkers in 1929, in order to conduct their own more politicised Jugendweihe 
celebrations (ibid: 28). 
 
In May 1932, the government of Reich President Brüning decreed the prohibition of 
‘godless’ communist organisations with immediate effect. The SPD condemned this 
decree, whilst admitting that the proletarian freethinkers and the communists had been 
embroiled in harsh competition (SAG 12). Shortly after Hitler came to power in early 
1933, the SPD and its aforementioned organ were also banned. Although Jugendweihe, 
in the proletarian freethinker tradition, was therefore prohibited under the Nazi regime, 
the role of Jugendweihe during the Nazi era remains a controversial matter among 
scholars and the public alike (see Aechtner 2011: 91-94; Gallinat 2002: 35; 40-44; Meier 
1998: 160-186). In the 1920s, völkische movements that are perhaps best described as 
populist and ‘ethno-racialist’ – aiming toward a ‘pure’ German nation – evolved both 
within and outwith the church. The völkische Deutsche Christen (German Christian) were 
particularly strong in the Thuringian Protestant church (Seidel 2011: 212), and continued 
practising confirmation (Meier 1998: 170). However, the Deutsche Glaubensgemeinschaft 
(German Faith Movement) included adherents from the free-religious movement, and 
they conducted Jugendweihe ceremonies. This movement, headed by Jakob Wilhelm 
Hauer, propagated an ‘authentic German Christianity’ embedded within a mixture of 
Christian and Germanic symbols – anti-church and völkisch in character (Meier 2001: 25-
26; Hallberg 1979: 106-112). For their part, the Nazis certainly attempted to streamline 
an abundance of festivities in relation to adolescents’ school leaving at age fourteen – 
variously described as ‘Commitment of the Youth’, ‘Referral Celebration’, ‘Life’s Turning 
Point’ and Jugendweihe (Gandow 1994: 19; Meier 1998: 180). From 1941 onward, these 
celebrations were to be called only ‘Commitment of the Youth’, and from 1943 they were 
to be organized solely under the auspices of the Hitler Youth (Meier 1998: 180-184). The 
theologian Andreas Meier describes these ceremonies as ‘Nazi Jugendweihe’ (ibid). In 
contrast, Gallinat disagrees with his assessment because, she holds, these ceremonies were 
not necessarily called Jugendweihe (Gallinat 2002: 35). Aechtner similarly views the Nazi 
label as problematic as the Jugendweihe of the German Faith movement was not 
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performed by the NSDAP party itself (Aechtner 2011: 94). I concur with both scholars.24 
Nevertheless, the Nazi regime certainly drew on a longer continuity of practice associated 
with marking the coming-of-age at fourteen.   
 
This brief historical overview shows that Jugendweihe emerged and evolved in a way that 
renders the ritual ‘a microcosm [of]… a strongly contested political landscape’ (Gallinat 
2002: 23). Protestant confirmation, usually celebrated between Palm Sunday and 
Pentecost, became held at age fourteen universally across Germany, and was gradually 
associated with adolescents’ school leaving. It not only marked the adolescents’ coming-
of-age within the Christian congregation but, as they entered the workforce, a coming-of-
age in society at large. Over time, Jugendweihe emerged as an alternative to confirmation, 
and was adopted by various movements. These movements were united in their anti-
church stance, but divided in their worldviews, especially regarding how the future should 
be shaped. They also had in common a desire to sustain their own existence into the 
future – often through educating the future generation about their worldview and aims. 
Thus what is conveniently referred to as ‘Jugendweihe’ meant different things to different 
people, at different points in time. Jugendweihe has – like confirmation – two features: it 
marks a coming-of-age, and an initiation into a particular community, not simply that of 
the working population, but one that subscribed to a certain value-system. This latter 
aspect – initiation into a particular community – made it a controversial ritual. Moreover, 
Jugendweihe always served as a means of critiquing the social order of the time. The 
ritual’s critique, however, became less distinct when celebrated in the German Faith 
Movement during the Nazi period. When the GDR state adopted the ritual for its own 
aims, Jugendweihe turned into a full-fledged conservative force that maintained the social 
order – a development I will explore in the next section.  
 
Jugendweihe as a GDR State Tool of Secularization 
Following the end of World War II, roughly 17 million people resided in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone (Sowjetische Besatzungzone, SBZ). 15 million were nominally Protestants, 
1 million Catholics, and only five percent declared themselves konfessionslos (non-
                                                 
24 Arguably, Meier’s eagerness to connect Jugendweihe and National Socialists is somewhat short-
sighted as he does not argue that the confirmation under the Nazi regime was a Nazi confirmation 
– not even the confirmation by the völkische Deutsche Christen. 
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denominational) (Betts 2010: 55). Yet, at the time of the GDR’s demise in 1989, the role 
of majority/minority between the Protestants and the non-denominational populace had 
long been reversed. As in other socialist countries, the GDR state pursued the elimination 
of religion as the ‘poison of the masses’, and sought to substitute it with a secular 
worldview in line with Marxism-Leninism. Yet unlike in other socialist countries, such as 
Poland or Czechoslovakia, there was little direct persecution of Church leaders or 
Christians. Instead, church-state relations in the GDR were marked by alternating 
strategies of toleration and confrontation, closely embedded in the wider context of Cold 
War politics. Both the state and the church vied for the young generation to strengthen 
the future of each institution respectively, but there were also regional differences in 
strategies and in their success rates. Here it is noteworthy that minority religious groups 
– such as the Catholic enclave of the Eichsfeld in West Thuringia, or Jehova’s Witnesses 
– remained largely resistant to these secularisation efforts (see Berdahl 1999a; Rajtar 2010; 
Wappler 2010). As I will illustrate below, the GDR Jugendweihe was fairly quickly and 
widely taken up in East Thuringia. This reasonably quick uptake was due to the combined 
conditions stemming from the interwar years – as discussed in the previous section – and 
what has been described as the ‘Thuringian way’ taken by the regional Protestant church, 
that is, a path characterized by compromise and cooperation with the GDR state (Seidel 
2011: 216).   
 
In 1945, the Protestant Church of Germany (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands, EKD) was 
founded and united the diverse regional Protestant churches.25 There was no open 
ideological clash between communists and the church in the immediate post-war years. 
The Soviet authorities were guided by Lenin’s view that religion should be tolerated as a 
private matter unrelated to life in socialism, and had no intention of further diminishing 
their very fragile support among Germans by offending local religious beliefs (Allinson 
2000: 87; Betts 2010: 55). The Soviet Union did not confiscate church property, unlike in 
                                                 
25 The Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD) is commonly translated as Evangelical Church of 
Germany, and consists of Lutheran and Reformed denominations for which the state collects 
church tax. Throughout this thesis I refer to it as the ‘Protestant church’ in order to avoid 
confusion with Evangelical movements. In German the distinction is usually made between 
‘evangelisch’, which has increasingly become synonymous with church affiliation in opposition to 
the Roman Catholic Church, and the term ‘evangelikal’, which corresponds more closely to 
‘evangelical’ in English. Pentecostals, Baptists, and Methodists are not part of the church tax-
paying members of the EKD. 
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other Eastern bloc countries, but instead aimed at stability and peace in this period (Betts 
2010: 55). Freethinkers and free-religious communities again conducted Jugendweihe 
rituals in all four occupied zones of the former German Reich. In Thuringia alone, 2,200 
girls and boys celebrated the ceremony in 1948 (Chowanski and Dreier 2000: 48; 
Mohrmann 1999: 135). In 1950, the state’s ruling SED party surprisingly prohibited 
Jugendweihe celebrations, arguing that it did not have ‘a militant approach towards the 
church’ (Chowanski and Dreier: 51-52). Therefore Jugendweihe was to be rejected, and 
the focus was to be channelled to school graduation celebrations, organised by the Free 
German Youth (FDJ). Arguably, this move can be interpreted as a demonstration of the 
SED’s willingness to sustain amicable relations with the church by abstaining from 
competition over the same time-space in the ritual calendar, while also reining in anti-
church movements. However, Jugendweihe was still being arranged by a variety of 
organisations, while the school graduation celebrations were organised only by the FDJ, 
the youth organisation of the SED (ibid: 50-53). The prohibition of Jugendweihe was a 
strategy for the state to claim its sole leadership role (Führungsanspruch), and an attempt to 
gain control over its adolescents by having all aspects of social life administered by 
organisations under the SED’s command – not unlike the 1943 streamlining of 
ceremonies under the Nazi regime.  
 
Although the 1949 Constitution of the GDR guaranteed religious freedom, the SED 
seemed to change its respectful attitude toward the churches and a period of anti-church 
hostilities ensued in the early 1950s. Most of these activities were geared toward 
weakening the church’s influence on the young, exemplified by the dissolving of Junge 
Gemeinden (Young Parishes) – the youth organisation of the Protestant Church – between 
April and June 1953 (Mawick 2013). While the Soviets had already passed a law in 1946 
establishing that school education was the prerogative of the state and religious education 
that of the church, extra-curricular religious education sessions were still held in schools; 
but even these sessions were banned in 1953. 
 
 Two events of political import in the same year were closely related to the GDR state’s 
decision to re-introduce Jugendweihe. Following Stalin’s death in March, the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) pursued a new course and demanded the SED follow 
suit with a less-confrontational strategy. Such a change appeared already too late, since 
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increasing discontent of East German civil society culminated in the workers’ uprising of 
17 June 1953, which could only be supressed through the intervention of Soviet forces. 
Protocol 15/54 of a governmental meeting in March 1954 reveals the extent to which the 
state believed its authority was threatened by Christians, who did not recognise it as the 
highest authority (reprinted in Meyer 1998: 264-269). The pan-German organisational 
structure of the Protestant Church of Germany was seen by the GDR state as enabling 
the West’s ‘bourgeois forces’ to easily infiltrate GDR society via the church. The SED 
saw in both – the insurrection in 1953 and the sway of the churches – the influence of the 
‘class enemy’, materialised in West Germany. It was believed that West German media 
propaganda had fuelled the uprising, and that the GDR churches – through their 
cooperation with the FRG churches – were compromised by ‘reactionary/imperialist 
elements’ within. The continued popularity of ecclesiastical coming-of-age rituals was of 
particular concern, and prompted an attempt to counter this trend through the 
reintroduction of the Jugendweihe ceremony as an alternative, including the introduction 
of preparatory lectures to ‘strengthen civic education’ (ibid). Thus, when faced with crisis, 
the juvenile state turned to Jugendweihe as medium of control (see Kertzer 1988: 2).  
  
An appeal, signed by prominent public figures, explained a public demand for the 
celebration of an important stage in adolescents’ lives – that of leaving school (Chowanski 
and Dreier 2000: 54-58). Young people, regardless of their worldview, were invited to 
celebrate Jugendweihe, and their parents were encouraged to enrol them at their local 
committees (ibid). The Central Committee for Jugendweihe in the GDR (Zentraler 
Ausschuss für Jugendweihe in der DDR, hereafter ‘Central Committee’) was hastily established, 
and in November 1954 it was made responsible for the ceremony’s organisation and 
structure, the design of the youth lessons (Jugendstunden), and the content of the keepsake 
book. Its directives were spread to smaller committees at lower levels, covering the entire 
country. The Christian churches were taken aback by the re-introduction of Jugendweihe, 
and pursued an either/or approach, insisting that Jugendweihe and confirmation were 
incompatible because – often citing Matthew 6:24, ‘No one can serve two masters’ (Betts 
2010: 62; Wohlrab-Sahr et al. 2009: 328).26 The issue was not simply a question of ritual 
                                                 
26 No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the one and love the other, or you will be 
devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and the mammon (Matthew 
6:24). 
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participation but – as was the case with Wislicenus’s critique of confirmation in 1851 – of 
public commitment. Confirmation committed its participants to God, the Christian 
community, and the Christian church, while Jugendweihe committed its participants to 
socialism, the socialist community, and the state. The churches decided not to allow 
Jugendweihe participants to be confirmed, because the pledge represented a rejection of 
the church. This situation posed a Zwiespalt (an inner conflict), for many families at the 
time, regarding whether to align with the church or the state as doing both became 
untenable. They had to weigh up the strength of their convictions, and decide whether 
those convictions were stronger than the possible disadvantages associated with denying 
allegiance to either institution (see Betts 2010: 70; Wohlrab-Sahr et al. 2009).  
 
The population of the County Gera, the administrative unit established in 1952 
comprising the territory now referred to as East Thuringia, was largely Protestant. These 
Protestants affiliated with the Protestant-Lutheran Church of Thuringia, based in 
Eisenach, and one of the member churches of the Protestant Church of Germany (EKD). 
The EKD’s churches had the power to determine their own affairs, and pursued different 
strategies in their relations with the GDR state based on divergent theological rationales. 
The Thuringian church’s bishop, Moritz Mitzenheim, interpreted the Lutheran ‘Two 
Kingdoms Doctrine’ in a way that suggested secular authority was to be respected as the 
source of a worldly order (Allinson 2000: 87; Besier 1999: 529-530; Seidel 2011: 216). 
While he resisted the state in the first decade of his term, from 1945-55, Mitzenheim 
increasingly followed what came to be known as the ‘Thuringian way’: opting for 
compromise and cooperation in the church’s relationship with the socialist state (ibid.). 
His non-confrontational stance, perhaps intended to provide the church’s authority with 
a greater lease of life and to take the pressure off of religious families, led him to become 
renowned as the ‘red bishop’. Mitzenheim called upon religious parents in January 1955 
not to send their children to partake in Jugendweihe, as this ‘was a matter of conscience 
and not politics and therefore protected by the GDR constitution’ (cited in Allinson 2000: 
101). However, in practice Protestant churches (unlike Catholic churches) gradually took 
a more relaxed stance, and allowed youths to celebrate both rituals – provided they only 
paid lip service to the state’s pledge. Often adolescents also decided to celebrate 
confirmation before Jugendweihe, in order to avoid the renunciation of their ecclesiastical 
rights – such as partaking of the Eucharist, becoming a godparent, or participating in 
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future ecclesiastical life cycle rituals. Sometimes such church rights were taken away in 
hindsight; but increasingly, the Protestant church allowed their adolesents to regain them 
by demonstrating an active Christian lifestyle. Although Thuringian pastors largely 
followed bishop Mitzenheim’s stance, there were local differences in the extent to which 
the clergy fought a ‘war of attrition at parish level’ (Allinson 2000: 102), and as such – to 
continue Allinson’s metaphor – families were caught in the crossfire of both institutions.  
The uptake of the GDR Jugendweihe was initially slow – with less than 20% of fourteen-
year-olds participating in the first ceremonies in 1955. Perhaps some of these adolescents 
belonged to families that participated in Jugendweihe prior to the GDR’s initial 
prohibition, and/or subscribed to the GDR’s proclaimed all-encompassing values. As the 
1956 annual report of the Bezirksausschuss (County Committee) for Jugendweihe in Gera 
described it, participation was not only an open commitment to Jugendweihe, but 
‘simultaneously a commitment to peace, unity, democracy and progress’ (SAG 01: 1). The 
annual reports of the County Committee Gera illustrate that County Gera’s participation 
rate was always above the GDR’s average (see Table 9). In the 1950s, participation in both 
confirmation and Jugendweihe was – wherever possible – painstakingly recorded. Reports 
provided detailed information on numbers of participants and compared them with the 
total number of fourteen-year-olds. Unlike the official portrayal of Jugendweihe as all-
inclusive event, the reports reveal quite clearly the state’s actual aim: undermining the 
church’s influence. For the city of Gera, 87 of 635 participants (13%) were noted as having 
celebrated both rituals in 1956 (SAG 01: 10), though this duplicity was clearly higher in 
rural areas because the county’s rate of double celebration levelled out at around 40% in 
the 1950s (SAG 05: 10). Celebrating both the religious and the socialist ceremony was 
seen as a failure of the County Committee’s Aufklärungsarbeit (literally: enlightenment 
work, here political awareness work), and as a 1960 report recalls, the party was required 
to lead the way in collaboration with the worker collectives to ‘improve the effectiveness 
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Table 9: GDR Jugendweihe Participation, 1955-60. 











participants  in %  
1954/55 2,379 11,934 19.9 52,322 17.7  
1955/56 2,912 10,869 26.8 64,343 23.7  
1956/57 2,857 9,750 29.3 64,666 26.4  
1957/58 4,397 9,914 44.4 107,186 44.1  
1958/59 7,254 8,203 88.4 139,830 80.4  
1959/60 5,913 6,205 95.3 113,275 87.8  
   
Source:  Annual reports of the Bezirksausschuss für Jugendweihe in Gera  
(Stadtarchiv Gera: III A06-12388; III A06-12381; III A06-12384; III 
A06-12382; III A06-12380; III A06-12379),  
Figures on GDR totals from Chowanski & Dreier (2000) 
 
In spite of an initial reluctance in the uptake of Jugendweihe, there was a tremendous 
increase in the Jugendweihe participation rate – in particular from 1958 to 1959 (see Table 
9, highlighted). This increase should not, however, be interpreted as solely due to the 
Thuringian Protestant church’s more lenient position on the issue. Rather, in this period 
the state intensified its secularisation efforts in multiple ways. Archival data shows that 
the Central Committee increased its decentralisation efforts, in which all parts of society 
were to be involved in the organisation and execution of Jugendweihe ceremonies (see 
also Chapter 6), but the SED party also increased their promotion of socialist values. 
Although a conference entitled ‘New Life – New People’ was held in 1957 to familiarize 
the public with the ‘theoretical and practical problems of socialist morale’ (Hanke 1976 in 
Brock 2005: 45), 1958 was the year when ‘questions of ideology, morale and personality 
finally took centre stage’ for the SED’s policies regarding the creation of the ‘socialist 
personality’ (Brock 2005: 45). The same year, the head of state – Walter Ulbricht – 
promulgated the ‘Ten Commandments for the New Socialist Human Being’. Their 
promotion was geared to providing a moral framework that underlined the moral 
superiority of the socialist project, but also functioned as a surrogate for the Christian 
doctrine. In 1959, a new school system geared towards ‘scientific atheism’ and ‘socialist 
morale’ was introduced in the GDR (see Chapter 3). While extra-curricular religious 
education had been permitted in schools again, the Lange Decree of 1958 further 
hampered attendance by demanding that pupils have a compulsory two hour break 
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between the end of the school and the beginning of extra-curricular activities. Religious 
instruction was gradually moved away from schools to church premises.  
East Germans increasingly left the church, and what had been referred to as the ‘people’s 
church’ (Volkskirche) had largely lost its people by the late 1960s (Betts 2010: 73; Goeckel 
1988: 212). County Gera already had a Jugendweihe participation rate well over 90% in 
1960, a percentage that was only achieved a decade later for the entire GDR. In contrast, 
the Catholic Eichsfeld in West Thuringia remained devout throughout the GDR’s 
existence, and Jugendweihe participation rates remained very low (Allinson 2000; Berdahl 
1999b; Wappler 2010). After the new GDR constitution of 1968 came into force, 
rendering the EKD leadership illegal because it included West German representatives, 
the East German churches separated from the Protestant Church of Germany and 
founded the Federation of Protestant Churches in the GDR (Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen 
der DDR) in 1969 (Besier 1999: 532). Following the East German Federation of Protestant 
Churches’ proclamation during the 1971 synod that their intention was to be ‘a church 
not alongside or against socialism, but a church within socialism’ (see Besier 1999: 534; 
Zademach 1985), church-state relations entered into a phase of relaxation.   
In the 1970s, the GDR state was safe in the knowledge that its citizens, at least overtly, 
had acquiesced to it. County Committee reports from Gera paid only scant attention to 
participation rates from 1972 onward, because they remained consistently well over 95%. 
Instead, such reports refocused on winning over ‘hearts and minds’ by improving the 
content and organisation of both the youth lessons and the ceremonies, in particular their 
emotive force for all participants. This refocusing suggests that the political elite did not 
misinterpret adolescents’ participation in Jugendweihe as a straightforward demonstration 
of identification with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the same time, the new ‘church 
within socialism’ also found new confidence with its autonomy from its West German 
counterpart, and a new role. It increasingly became an advocate of socially peripheral 
groups, and provided a space and a platform for peace and environmental movements – 
not least the dissident movement in the late 1980s (see Goeckel 1988; Hadjar 2003; Seidel 
2011). Because this decisive battle over the young had been won by the state, church-state 
relations remained relaxed until its demise. Yet since the church provided the only space 
supposedly outwith the purview of the state, it remained a potential site for disloyalty and 
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opposition. Only after the fall of the Wall did the extent to which the churches had been 
infiltrated by the Stasi come to light (see Besier 1999). 
The state’s sustained mistrust of its citizens is also evidenced in Jugendweihe participation 
reports that recorded and reported any potential future dissidents – that is, Jugendweihe 
abstainers. Jugendweihe County Committee records of the 1980s show that adolescents 
rarely refused participation, and those who rejected the GDR Jugendweihe did so largely 
on religious grounds. These abstainers generally belonged to either Protestant or Catholic 
denominations (often the father would be a pastor in such cases), or were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and also included pupils whose parents had an ongoing exit permit application 
to West Germany (SAG 08). Teachers and school principals often engaged such students 
in ‘heart-to-hearts’ and arranged discussions with their parents and parents’ employers in 
order to encourage their participation. Such persuasion tactics were often reported to the 
Central Committee in order to demonstrate that schools had done their utmost to achieve 
a 100% participation rate. 
 
This longue durée view of Jugendweihe shows that the ritual continued to feature an anti-
church stance, even though at times ambiguously so. Yet, unlike the time period prior to 
the foundation of the German nation-state, or during the Weimar Republic – where 
Jugendweihe served various movements to criticise the social order of the time – under 
the GDR regime, the ritual’s function gradually reversed, and it was deployed to maintain 
the status quo. As such, the ritual cannot easily be categorised as either challenging the 
social order (Cohen 1993; Kelly and Kaplan 1990; Kertzer 1988) or maintaining it (Bloch 
1992; Durkheim 1964; Rappaport 1999), given that it served both functions at various 
points in time.  
While initiation into a particular community varied, what remained throughout the 
metamorphosis of Jugendweihe is the coming-of-age aspect at age fourteen. I suggest that 
this continuity regarding personhood was produced through the family. And in the 
remaining part of this chapter I explore how the continued church-state tensions under 
state socialism played out in Franka’s maternal family. I argue that evident generational 
differences in their perception of these church-state relations, and their own religious 
attitudes, are due to varying pressures and experiences under the GDR in different time 
periods. Nevertheless, participating in Jugendweihe was based on family ties.     
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‘Freiwilliger Zwang’ (Voluntary Coercion): Negotiating Agency and 
Authority 
The first time I met Frau Becker, Franka’s sixty-one-year-old mother, she told me about 
her own Jugendweihe, which she celebrated in 1966. ‘But I had luck, you could say,’ she 
noted with candour, ‘that in my times I did both: I am confirmed and I had Jugendweihe. 
That was a little difficult back then during GDR times, if you wanted to participate in 
confirmation, but... Back then I said that I would only take part in confirmation, because 
at first we were told that you are only allowed to do one.’ I inquired: ‘By whom?’ ‘Why’, 
she replied, ‘from school or from the state, I would say.’ She continued: 
And I said back then, very well, I’ll just do confirmation and won’t take 
part in Jugendweihe. But it wasn’t as simple as that either; to simply say, 
one doesn’t take part in Jugendweihe. In addition, I was attending such an 
R class, where anyway everything was so political… 
 
Franka interrupted, simultaneously providing a different ending to the statement: ‘where 
everyone was a swot!’ R classes were special language classes with a focus on Russian 
(hence the R), which were supposed to consist of pupils with high foreign language 
competency, but more often included pupils whose parents were politically aspiring and 
active SED members. Franka’s mother continued, adamant and unfazed:  
Everything was political and linked up a little bit higher. And … they more 
or less… well, I don’t want now to say that they coerced me, but I was 
advised that I must partake in Jugendweihe. And I agreed to it, but at the 
Jugendweihe I did not sound out the pledge in unison. But I only took 
part and I also got my certificate like everyone else. And then I also did 
extra confirmation. 
 
Frau Becker explained to me that she also took part in all the youth lessons, since 
‘everything was tied to the school class’, but had found them to be educational and ‘of no 
harm’. She had been baptized as a baby and later attended Sunday school, and also 
confirmation classes, elaborating that once you were baptized, it was hoped you would 
also be confirmed; ‘this was, more or less, the course of time’. However, she recalled no 
demands on the part of the church to choose between Jugendweihe or confirmation, but 
only those from the school. Indeed, she suggested that the reason for the school 
pressuring her to celebrate Jugendweihe was perhaps only due to the special class she 
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attended, because ‘they wanted the complete school class to take part in Jugendweihe, and 
well, then I said, “Okay, I’ll just do both.”’  
Later in the conversation, her daughter Franka admitted that – although she was not 
baptized and ‘did not give a hoot about the church’ – she was aware of an ongoing conflict 
between church and state, mirrored in the two life cycle rituals, when she had her 
Jugendweihe in 1984. She attended an ordinary secondary school (POS), but recalled that 
one of her classmates, whose family was strictly religious, ‘got into trouble’ because she 
only wanted to celebrate confirmation. In the end, the girl and/or her parents prevailed, 
and she did not partake in Jugendweihe. Franka claimed that she was only excused because 
she was a ‘very, very good pupil’. When I further asked whether the trouble was caused 
because she wanted to celebrate only confirmation, Franka agreed, which led her mother 
to expand on her own Jugendweihe story. She emphasized that she also ‘wanted to 
celebrate only confirmation, but that the school or rather the state as such, didn’t play 
along with that’, and continued: 
My mother was at the time Genossin (a female comrade, meaning an SED 
party member) and everything. The party summoned her a couple of 
times, because I had said, “I won’t do Jugendweihe and basta!” But there 
was no way. And afterwards I just said, “Well okay, I’ll partake in it, but I 
just won’t say the pledge!” And that was afterwards the only compromise 
they were willing to make. 
Surprised by her elaboration, I asked: ‘So they [the party] knew?’ She explained that this 
was the deal they had struck, she would partake in Jugendweihe because ‘they, more or 
less, compelled me to, but I wouldn’t say the pledge’. We discussed this deal further, and 
established two factors that played a role in the state’s representatives’ agreement. For 
one, everyone spoke the pledge out loud, that is, the response ‘Yes, this we pledge’ after 
each verse, so that one missing voice would not be noticeable. And secondly, when the 
pledge was read out, the initiands used to stand together in the front row facing the stage, 
their backs to the audience, so only the guest speaker would be able to see who would not 
respond. Franka declared:  ‘The main thing was that you took part!’ And her mother 
responded: ‘exactly, they just wanted to tick the box: she has taken part in it. And that 
was that.’ To which her daughter mockingly added: ‘The socialist Gemeinschaft was together 
and that’s that. Yes.’  
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While I will discuss the issue of Gemeinschaft, or community, in Chapter 3, here it is worth 
noting Frau Becker’s emphasis on the fact that she had changed her mind from not 
wanting to participate in Jugendweihe to participating in it. She variously described this 
process of decision-making as ‘not coerced’ and ‘more or less compelled’ by a greater 
authority, namely the state. This decision-making – which to a certain extent entails a 
conundrum present in all rituals – has been described during GDR times by the oxymoron 
freiwilliger Zwang: ‘voluntary coercion’. It was ‘voluntary’ because it was still a choice made 
by an agent, but ‘coerced’ because the agent bowed down to a greater authority, the same 
authority that was present during and produced through the ritual act itself.  
Notably, Frau Becker did not refer to her teacher, her headmaster or indeed her mother 
in describing her decision-making process, though they must all have influenced her quite 
directly. Instead, she described it as her decision that was negotiated with some kind of 
higher authority generically identified as ‘die’ (here, they), only admitting later that her 
mother was summoned by the party (SED). The fact that either a teacher or the 
headmaster of her school must have reported her to her mother’s employer and/or the 
party in order to exert pressure on Frau Becker’s mother, which in turn must have affected 
Frau Becker enough that she partly gave in, remains unacknowledged. The extent to 
which she may have intentionally concealed this aspect in our conversation is difficult to 
assess, because she might also have felt it undeserving of mention – the more so in that 
it was such a normalised course of action during GDR times. However, when I noted that 
she had been quite brave to openly refuse to pledge, she asserted: ‘I am just not a Mensch 
(human being) who had to put up with everything!’ This assertion, I believe, was not 
simply an avowal of who she was, but also seemed to imply that her mother was not such 
a Mensch either. Her mother had bowed down to party pressure, because party members 
had to follow SED cadre directives and play a role model function for socialist society at 
large. Indeed, on the matter of Jugendweihe, Frau Becker’s mother had sided with the 
party when, ideally, she might have sided with her daughter. Yet Frau Becker emphasised 
her decision-making instead of explaining it as complying due to maternal pressures. 
Given her mother’s party membership, this tactic could be construed as avoiding the 
discussion of a potential family conflict at the time, while simultaneously subtly 
contrasting her mother’s stance with the upholding of her own convictions, albeit as part 
of a compromise. In Frau Becker’s case, the question of whether, and to what extent, 
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political pressures or ideological differences between mother and daughter may have 
sparked a familial conflict remain unspoken.  
However, for Franka, the dilemma of whether to abstain from Jugendweihe never even 
arose, having been precluded in her recollection from the outset by her insistence that she 
‘did not give a hoot about the church’. Franka’s views diverged from her mother’s, a fact 
that was carefully negotiated during our conversations, sometimes more successfully than 
others. When Franka was born, five years after her mother’s Jugendweihe, Frau Becker 
wanted to have her baptized; but because her husband was not a church member, and 
they had not married in church, a baptism was not possible. Franka’s mother noted that 
the baptism would have been nice for Franka’s maternal grandparents, but that at that 
point, she herself no longer cared that much because of the difficulties the church had 
posed her, by not allowing her to have her child baptized. Nevertheless, Franka’s mother 
remained in the church, and only left much later; she was uncertain of the year, but 
thought it must have been during or after the Wende time. She explained that she had 
been made aware that she would also have to pay church tax for her husband, adding 
indignantly, ‘but money has nothing to do with belief! My husband wasn’t in the church 
so why should he or I pay for him?’ She felt it such an injustice that she decided to leave 
the church; and she recalled, ironically, that she had to pay 5 Marks in order to do so.  
What is noteworthy here is that while Frau Becker’s personal break with the church came 
only later in life, her children and grandchildren were raised without any Christian 
religious instruction, and thus family life became increasingly more areligious. 
  
 ‘Voluntary Coercion’ Revisited: Assessing the Past in the Present 
During my fieldwork, I hardly ever came across the expression ‘voluntary coercion’, 
though most people of my own or older generations would know the phrase. Yet East 
Thuringians have not forgotten this tension between agency and authority. One day, over 
breakfast with friends – all of whom are parents – we came to discuss my research. One 
father, whose daughter was not yet old enough for a coming-of-age celebration, inquired: 
‘So what is Jugendweihe actually now, just another Pflichtveranstaltung (event that requires 
attendance)?’ Before I could answer, the two mothers – whose children had already 
celebrated either Jugendweihe or confirmation – responded in unison: ‘No, it’s totally 
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voluntary!’ One of the mothers, Daniela, who had celebrated confirmation and 
Jugendweihe in the GDR, and whose son only celebrated confirmation in 2013, agreed 
that Jugendweihe today was voluntary. But she did not feel the same way about the GDR 
Jugendweihe. When I had asked her a few months earlier whether her son would also 
celebrate Jugendweihe, she answered in the negative, adding: ‘This doesn’t make any sense 
anymore!’ She saw her own GDR Jugendweihe celebration as paying lip service in order 
not to stand out, and – since this was no longer necessary – celebrating the ritual today 
seemed superfluous to her.   
However, views on whether the GDR Jugendweihe had a voluntary character varied even 
among people who had celebrated both Jugendweihe and confirmation in East Germany, 
especially regarding whether one should have or could have resisted participating in it. A 
forty-year-old local pastor told me of an incident in one of his meetings with the church 
elders of his devout parish, at which he asserted that he felt the Protestant church during 
GDR times should not have taken such a soft stance on Jugendweihe. Christians, he 
argued, should have resisted participating in Jugendweihe. But he was quickly put in his 
place: ‘That’s easy for you to say, you are from the West!’, his parishioners responded. As 
he recounted how his parishioners had taken offence, he explained that he was well aware 
of what the situation was like in the GDR because his family had relatives there. He then 
admitted that ‘of course I am aware that this is different from actually having lived and 
experienced the GDR, but I wasn’t clueless either’. He emphasized his awareness to make 
the point that there was a difference between him and the majority of his western German 
contemporaries, who were quick to judge in spite of having no experience and little 
knowledge of everyday life in East Germany.  
While the Christians of his parish celebrated both Jugendweihe and confirmation during 
socialist times, their dual celebration does not mean that they were not convinced 
believers; rather, they made a choice to tread the path of least resistance. This was not 
always the case, as the pastor recounted to me in another conversation. They had told 
him how, during GDR times, the village headmistress was ‘deep red’ and thus particularly 
horrible to Christian children. Since she was a music teacher and aware which children 
attended religious instruction in the parsonage – they had had to pass her house – she 
would ask them to sing ‘the Internationale’, perhaps the most famous battle song of the 
socialist labour movement. They would always refuse to sing it because the lyrics of the 
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second stanza state that ‘no supreme being will save us: no God, no Kaiser, no tribune’. 
Every time they refused, they received a fail from the teacher. But one day the parents 
decided to go to the school and ask her: ‘Do we have religious freedom in the GDR or 
not?’ This confrontation led her to erase the bad marks, and she never again picked on a 
Christian pupil to sing the song.  
Participating in the GDR Jugendweihe appears to have been an act of giving in: to 
renounce publicly one’s actual beliefs (even if one was just paying lip service), while 
refusing to sing lyrics that contradict one’s beliefs and standing up to the headmistress 
seem to be acts of resistance. Both, however, were based on a pragmatic attitude to 
everyday life in East Germany. Non-participation in Jugendweihe, as much as bad marks, 
could have led to being denied a good place for further vocational or tertiary education, 
thus diminishing one’s job prospects. Indeed, the issue of future job opportunities 
becoming hampered is frequently mentioned in accounts of the GDR Jugendweihe, both 
in scholarly literature (see, for example, Besier 1999: 526; Betts 2010: 72; Meier 1998: 219; 
Plum 2015: 43) and in national media and church press releases about the ritual (see, for 
example, Bickelhaupt 2015; Kock 1999; Plesch 2012; Vorländer 2015). Unsurprisingly, 
even today associating Jugendweihe with GDR state repercussions is highly contested 
among easterners, partly because of East Germans’ divergent experiences under the 
GDR.  
These differences in experience are due to the fact that tensions in church-state relations 
varied in different periods of the GDR, but they also depended on a specific person’s 
school environment and their teachers’ own convictions (see also Brock 2005: 78-83). 
Frau Uhlemann – a sixty-three-year-old grandmother who had celebrated both 
Jugendweihe and confirmation in 1964 – told me in conversation that, for her, celebrating 
confirmation was not so much a matter of conviction as a way to rebel against her parents, 
who did not approve of her decision. She explained that her family had moved to a new 
part of town, but that she continued to attend confirmation classes with two former 
school friends. The two friends, and her maternal grandmother, were present at her 
confirmation, but her parents did not attend. She noted that only three classmates 
celebrated confirmation, and added that ‘the ‘real’ [convinced/devout] Christians were 
‘left alone’ [by the state]. ‘They definitely weren’t persecuted, as some of them claimed 
after the fall of the wall!’, she asserted. I agreed that ‘persecution’ was perhaps too strong 
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a term, and that it didn’t match my experience of the GDR in the 1980s either; but I also 
recounted to her the way some teachers bullied religious pupils in my school. In response, 
Frau Uhlemann explained that she never experienced anything like that, and that her best 
friend – who was Christian and not a FDJ member – got a sought-after vocational training 
post with Abitur. Similarly, Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often been cited for 
not having partaken in Jugendweihe; but at the same time she was a FDJ secretary and 
had studied physics in the GDR (see, for example, Küsters 2016; Langguth 2011; Mayntz 
2013). Her father was a pastor, and it is frequently claimed that children of pastors could 
have only ever studied theology during the socialist era. These memories of socialist 
experiences collapse the propagated portrayal of a clear dichotomy between Christian 
Jugendweihe abstainers, who suffered career disadvantages, and Jugendweihe participants 
with stellar careers.  
The Jugendweihe County Committee’s annual report from 1958 notes, among the main 
arguments the church made against the ritual, the contention that ‘Whoever does not 
partake in Jugendweihe, will not receive a post or will not be allowed to enter high school,’ 
adding parenthetically, ‘(oftentimes this slogan was released in order to disgruntle the 
populace)’ (SAG 03: 4). Regardless of who actually introduced and spread such rumours, 
the fact remains that state representatives seemed unable or disinclined to dissolve them 
– perhaps because of their beneficial side-effects in increasing Jugendweihe participation. 
Indeed, Jehovah’s Witnesses – who not only refused to partake in Jugendweihe but also 
to become members of the Pioneers and Free German Youth organisations – were denied 
further education, and often proper vocational training posts as well (Rajtar 2010).27 This 
connection between professional opportunities and membership in youth organizations 
seems much more plausible given that such memberships were always included in school 
leaving reports, with which one had to apply for posts, whereas (non-)participation in 
Jugendweihe was not stated. However, as Frau Uhlemann’s example suggests, it appears 
that there was no clear state directive, but rather that responses to non-participation were 
down to the discretion and convictions of individuals. In other words, decisions about 
                                                 
27 Jehova’s Witnesses were persecuted not only under the Nazi regime but also under the GDR. 
Their interpretation of the Bible denies any authority other than God, and they regard any state – 
whether democratic, totalitarian or authoritarian – as the work of Satan. They remained non-
conformist under the GDR regime, that is, they refused to vote, or to do military service; and 
children and adolescents attended school but rarely participated in extra-curricular events or the 
Pioneers, and never became members of the FDJ (see Hacke 2000; Rajtar 2010).  
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the repercussions abstainers would face were left to the judgment of teachers and 
members of the local Jugendweihe committee – and most likely party functionaries. 
Nonetheless, the potential of future disadvantages in itself was what really led to the sense 
of ‘voluntary coercion’: the arbitrariness of the ways the state flexed its muscles rendered 
the risk incalculable. For many, the probability that abstaining from Jugendweihe could 
lead to repercussions was sufficient reason to participate in the ritual. 
The ways in which the character of the GDR Jugendweihe is portrayed nowadays by 
Thuringians – as either voluntary, coercive, or something in between – depends partly on 
how they experienced it at the time, but also opens up a space in which they can re-narrate 
their life stories in accordance with their present-day affiliations. Christians tend to 
emphasise the coercive character of the state in their explanations of why they also 
celebrated Jugendweihe, by commonly claiming that they ‘had to’. Non-religious people, 
on the other hand, focus on a choice they made, whether they liked it at the time or not. 
Many in the latter category, particularly in the parental generation, would also admit that 
they were simply ‘Mitläufer’ – a blind follower or conformist – participating because 
‘everyone did it’, without thinking about it at all, viewing Jugendweihe as part of the 
‘natural order’ of things (see also Sandra’s statement in Chapter 3). The possibility of 
abstaining from Jugendweihe – a possibility Franka’s mother dismissed by saying: ‘But 
there was no way!’ – is often downplayed in hindsight. But for many teenagers in Gera, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, such a possibility of choice may not even have occurred 
to them. The reasons for not recognising choice have to do with the fact that many may 
not have had any contact with divergent views on the matter – whether Christian or 
otherwise. The ritual had also become a kinship event by the 1980s, regardless of the 
political elite’s intentions – but also, as it happens, in line with them (Borneman 1992: 
165), so that many teenagers were keen to celebrate Jugendweihe. Indeed archival records 
of the time prove that many of the school classes had a 100% Jugendweihe participation 
rate (SAG 08).  
There are also generational difference in people’s perception of the issue of refusing 
Jugendweihe participation. Franka appears to have less of a problem recounting her 
classmate’s refusal to partake in Jugendweihe than her mother had in recounting her own 
struggle. By the time of Franka’s Jugendweihe in the 1980s, Christians were already – as 
they are today – an exception in Gera. At that time, very few people would still have faced 
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a dilemma in choosing between one ritual and the other, or would have considered 
abstaining from Jugendweihe. Today, perhaps, for some, there is also an element of shame 
involved in admitting that they never considered not participating in Jugendweihe. For 
others the tendency to brush over the question of dilemmas – and to assert that one ‘had 
to’ celebrate Jugendweihe – is easier than to admit that the option of refusing to 
participate existed, which would require admitting a lack of courage to refuse. 
Yet the possibility of celebrating both confirmation and Jugendweihe also led to a kind of 
unawareness or blurring of the state’s actual aims, which I only realised when I went out 
one night with some former school friends. Both were mothers of children who had 
celebrated or were about to celebrate Jugendweihe, and one of them asked me what I 
thought of the contemporary ceremony. I responded that I had enjoyed it, actually, and 
that it was much more entertaining than our own had been. She agreed, but because she 
knew that the other friend and I had also celebrated confirmation during GDR times, 
carefully inquired: ‘Well, I mean I don’t know whether Jugendweihe was intended to be 
in opposition to confirmation back then …’ My other friend quickly asserted: ‘No!’ in 
contrast to my response: ‘Well, it was!’ But just as I wanted to explain, my friend cut in: 
‘Why? After all, we did celebrate both, Jugendweihe and confirmation!’  
 
The Jugendweihe Pledge and its Disappearance 
In the introductory vignette to this chapter, female adolescents watched a scene from 
their public Jugendweihe ceremony, in which the bassist of an a cappella group was 
singled out as being ‘the lowest level in the food chain’, and as having celebrated 
confirmation. The girls rather carefully negotiated their responses to this excerpt, perhaps 
partly because they did not want to make each other feel uncomfortable. Nele, who was 
brought up in a Christian family, but also participated in Jugendweihe, played down the 
scene, while Sophia raised the issue of confirmands feeling like outsiders. Pia, being at 
first a reconciliatory force, then proudly blurted out an assertion of Jugendweihe’s greater 
popularity.  Other teenagers, to whom I had played the equivalent excerpt from their own 
Jugendweihe ceremonies, similarly noted that one could perhaps describe it as mobbing 
(bullying), that there was a sense of Schadenfreude and something like Gruppenzwang (peer 
pressure). However, they only associated these issues with the contemporary relationship 
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between Jugendweihe and confirmation; and as such, they could not really make sense of 
the sketch, which did not correlate with their experience. Therefore, they did not ascribe 
much significance to the scene, though it must have felt rather different to members of 
parental and grandparental generations. The scene is ambiguous, and thus allows 
multifaceted interpretations– like Jugendweihe itself. The members of the group appear 
to single out Gábor as a peripheral person, but in the end demand of the audience to 
applaud him; and as such members of the older generation can chose whether they want 
to see it as a sign of ‘backwardness’ or ‘courage’ that he celebrated confirmation. 
Yet the Jugendweihe vow – which was the crux of the tension between the two rituals, in 
particular for religious people, who were pressured by both the state and the church to 
align exclusively with one institution or the other – is almost never discussed today. While 
very few people refused to partake in the GDR Jugendweihe from the 1960s onward, 
many who took part paid only lip service. As a friend reminded me, the pledging of vows 
was so much part of the socialist life – as a Pioneer, as an FDJ member and so on – that 
one more pledge was not seen as particularly unusual or worthy of consideration. But for 
some people it was. Some, as in the case of Franka’s mother, did not pledge allegiance 
during the ceremony at all; others did, but crossed their fingers by way of excluding 
conviction in what was said out loud (as I did during my ceremony). This is not to suggest 
that there were no people who happily and solemnly pledged allegiance to the socialist 
state and future – as I learned, somewhat perplexed, from a local member of The Left 
party in 2010. When I asked him how he felt about his GDR Jugendweihe, he responded: 
‘Why, it felt like an incredible historic moment for me!’ But he was the only one that I 
came across who admitted this reaction more than twenty years later.  
In autumn 1989, the GDR Jugendweihe committee proposed to substitute the vow with 
a promise that could well be applied today, if the ‘socialist German Democratic Republic’ 
were crossed out:  
In this celebratory hour we promise before our mothers and fathers to 
live honestly and genuinely and to approach other people with tolerance 
and dignity. 
We can only fulfil our dreams and life-wishes in peace: We will protect it 
and advocate for a blossoming earth and a healthy environment.  
With knowledge and good work we want to make our socialist German 
Democratic Republic comfortable for all people. 
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We want to learn from the rich history and culture of our people and to 
continue its humanist, anti-fascist and progressive traditions. 
We keep our consciences alert for solidarity and a humane living-together 
of nations. 
 
Illona, the chairwoman of the Erfurt Jugendweihe Association, rummaging through her 
own archival material on Jugendweihe, handed me a photocopy of its wording that had 
been printed in the regional daily Das Volk at the time (see also Chowanski & Dreier 2000: 
116-7). Underneath the piece, in her neat teacher-like handwriting, she had noted: ‘With 
the end of the GDR these considerations took care of themselves!’ From an outsider 
perspective this may raise the question: why? Could the ritual not have been employed to 
pledge allegiance to the unified German nation-state? But such a suggestion would puzzle 
contemporary members of the Jugendweihe Association, and many Thuringians too. 
When I conducted fieldwork in 2010, none of the teenagers had been aware that the GDR 
Jugendweihe included a pledge of allegiance to the state – nor that this pledge had caused 
some people inner conflicts. This lack of awareness was no different in 2013. Partly 
because the contemporary ritual neither has such a pledge, nor a substitute, and the 
pledge’s past existence goes unremarked in the contemporary ceremony. The only 
exception I encountered was a rather generic aside – made by only one of six guest 
speakers, in four of the 16 Jugendweihe ceremonies I observed – that ‘…in the past one 
had to pledge something…’.  However, teenagers’ ignorance regarding the pledge also 
demonstrates that parental and grandparental generations do not talk about this aspect of 
Jugendweihe with their offspring. During our conversation with Franka, his mother, and 
Frau Becker, his maternal grandmother, Daniel listened to what was said; but he did not 
show any particular interest, perhaps because what we talked about seemed set in such a 
distant – and for him, irrelevant – past. But when Daniel’s older sister and her boyfriend, 
twenty-one-year old Ronny, joined us half-way through Frau Becker’s recollections of her 
experiences with the pledge, they listened attentively. Ronny, who appeared not to have 
celebrated Jugendweihe himself, suddenly inquired: ‘So how is it actually nowadays with 
Jugendweihe? Do you have to pledge anything?’ Franka and her mother quickly exclaimed 
‘No!’, and explained that one can do as one pleases. Unexpectedly, Ronny offered his 
thoughts on the issue: ‘Well, I don’t know, but I have to say that I actually think that’s 
good with the pledge.’ Franka responded with a counter question: ‘But what do you want 
to pledge to here?’ And her mother added assertively: ‘Yes, it doesn’t make sense now.’ 
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Franka affirmed: ‘Exactly, at the moment this doesn’t make sense.’ But Ronny only half-
agreed, explaining: ‘Yes, but, if it was now and here a decent state, I’d say, if you still had 
that, I’d find that good.’   
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have explored Jugendweihe in historical perspective in order to tackle 
its emergence and its survival through various historical periods and political caesurae. 
This approach has demonstrated that the advent of Jugendweihe was closely associated 
with challenges to church authority – both by the public and the state, and that 
Jugendweihe served as a substitute to Protestant confirmation. Both Protestant 
confirmation and Jugendweihe became increasingly linked with adolescents’ school-
leaving and entering the workforce, and thus with coming-of-age at fourteen. This 
coming-of-age aspect allowed the ritual to continue through diverse historico-political 
periods, and to be adopted by various movements as a means of initiating adolescents 
into their respective communities, associated with particular worldviews. These 
movements shared an anti-church stance, and the initially secular ritual became 
increasingly anti-religious. I argued that a diachronic view of Jugendweihe shows that the 
ritual served different functions at different times – either of challenging the social order, 
such as prior to and during the Weimar Republic, or maintaining it, such as under the 
GDR. The oscillation between Jugendweihe and confirmation resonates with the political 
contexts of different eras, but it is Jugendweihe’s initiation aspect that renders the ritual a 
site of contestation over the past. 
In the second part of the chapter I explored more closely how the struggle over authority 
between the GDR state and the church – reflected in the relation between Jugendweihe 
and Confirmation – played out within one particular family. Both state and church asked 
that adolescents commit themselves exclusively to one institution or the other, because 
the commitments – that is, the pledge of allegiance to the state or the profession of faith 
in the church – were seen as incompatible. For many religious families, particularly in the 
1950s and 1960s, this insistence produced dilemmas over whether to follow their religious 
convictions and risk potential repercussions, or to publicly commit to the state in order 
to avoid such risks. While they had to decide as a family unit to publicly align to either 
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church or state, this decision also led to familial tensions between parents and adolescents, 
tensions that were not always openly acknowledged. Yet the GDR Jugendweihe’s 
political-ideological role in fostering socialist personalities, and as tool in the struggle over 
authority with the church, was not actively transmitted by the older generations. Although 
teenager’s explanations resonate with the historical opposition of Jugendweihe and 
confirmation, they usually viewed Jugendweihe as a ritual that was like confirmation, just 
without the church. Today’s teenagers’ decision to celebrate Jugendweihe were always 
made – as they were during state socialism – in relation to their family’s preferences; but 
their explanations, in which they set themselves apart from the church in an environment 
that is largely unchurched, appear peculiar. I would suggest that this distinction is 
understandable within the context of the German nation-state: celebrating Jugendweihe 
today is also a signifier of being non-denominational, in contrast to West Germany’s 
‘culture of church affiliation’ (Pickel 2011). A secular world view is thus what has become 
the basis for family values to be passed on to the next generation. In the following 
chapters, I look more closely at what these family values are. 
At the same time, the pledge that set church and state apart, and that caused such 
dilemmas for religious people, has not been part of Jugendweihe ceremonies since 1990. 
I do not want to suggest that all families whose offspring celebrated Jugendweihe in 2013 
shared exactly the same view as Franka’s family in regards to the reasons why the 
contemporary Jugendweihe does not include a pledge to the state. Nevertheless, I believe 
that their mistrust of the state is indicative of the ritual’s role reversal: Jugendweihe no 
longer maintains the social structure – as it did under the GDR – but represents a critique 
of the current social order, and more specifically, of both the church and the state. This 
view cannot be reduced to either the distant or the GDR past, but must also be 
understood in the context of the changes that were brought about with the Wende. In 
eastern Germany, there was no religious revival after the fall of the Wall, as was the case 
in other post-socialist countries. This areligiosity remains partly because the church, which 
was a key player in the 1989 revolution, lost its oppositional force to the state – and 
although the state is separated officially from the church, this separation is no longer as 
clear-cut as it was under state socialism. Frau Becker’s comments about the church tax 
collection reflect a greater change in church-state relations – underpinned by West 
Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which retains the privileges granted to churches as 
public law corporations by the Weimar constitution (see Barker 2004). Thus the state, for 
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example, collects church taxes on their behalf through automatic deductions from church 
members’ payrolls. In 1991, the system of church tax collection was made applicable to 
the territory of the former GDR (see Spiegel 1990) – and thus the state and the church 
became entangled in a way they had never been under state socialism. The church, which 
for many easterners was also a refuge from the state during state socialism, has lost its 
oppositional role in post-Wende eastern Germany. This new state-near role of the church 
played a role in eastern Germans’ decision to leave the church after the demise of the 
GDR.  
 
The parallels between the avowals in the Protestant confirmation and the GDR 
Jugendweihe are striking: the former’s profession of faith is not simply a commitment to 
God but also to the Christian community, and the Christian church; and the GDR pledge 
of allegiance was not only a profession to the Marxist-Leninist worldview, but also to the 
socialist community, and the GDR state. Since the contemporary version of Jugendweihe 
defers neither to the Marxist-Leninist worldview, nor to the state, what is the purpose of 
the public ceremony and to whom is deference paid? In the following chapter I shall 
further explore avenues that help us better understand the ritual’s social role in present 
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Chapter 3  
Inculcating Collectivity: Jugendweihe and School  
 
[Durkheim’s] genius lies in having recognized that ritual builds solidarity without requiring the sharing 
of beliefs. Solidarity is produced by people acting together, not by people thinking together. 
– David Kertzer (1988: 76) 
 
It was an April morning at the office of the Jugendweihe Association. Dagmar called all 
of us into her large office, because she wanted to show us ‘something off-putting’ on her 
laptop. Sonja, Nicole, Jutta and I gathered around Dagmar’s desk, and she declared, in 
anticipation of what we were about to see, that over the weekend she had come across a 
few Jugendweihe ceremony clips on YouTube which she felt she needed to share with us. 
The first thought that sprung to my mind was the possibility of a new competitor in the 
region that she would find worrisome, but it quickly became evident that the ceremony 
in the clip was from 2010, and held in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.28 Dagmar was 
appalled about the quality of the ceremony, which had been held in a sports hall; everyone 
quickly concurred that it was an inappropriate venue because it could not create a solemn 
atmosphere. They also commented on how the adolescents were entering the hall in pairs, 
walking down an aisle formed by the arrangement of chairs, with the audience standing 
up. For Dagmar and Jutta, this procedure was too reminiscent of the way Jugendweihe 
was celebrated in the GDR. The ‘Einmarschieren’ (‘marching in’ – though no one actually 
marches but enters a venue either in single file or pairs) had long been discarded by the 
local Jugendweihe Association, though it was still an essential element at other 
Jugendweihe ceremonies, for example, of the Jugendweihe Association in Erfurt.   
The various programme excerpts, edited together in the clip, received a great deal of 
ridicule. Sonja, Jutta and Dagmar unanimously deemed the compere ‘too old’ for the task 
of leading the ceremony. Toward the end of the clip, another elderly man appeared on 
stage, only half-visible behind a lot of technical equipment, announcing that the official 
part was over, and the time had come to party. When he then started singing rap-like into 





his microphone to music that blasted out of loudspeakers, a feeling of fremdschämen 
(vicarious embarrassment) was clearly visible on the faces of the participating teens, and 
among the watching Association members in the office as well. Everyone was both 
amused and taken aback: they denounced the ceremony as ‘niveaulos’ (mediocre), and were 
shocked to find that the responsible association belonged to the national Jugendweihe 
Germany Association, recognizable through the blue Jugendweihe keepsake books that 
the adolescents in the clip all held.  
However, Dagmar demanded our attention anew, and played another video clip.29 This 
time it was of a Jugendfeier (youth celebration), the Humanist Association’s equivalent of 
Jugendweihe, held in the Friedrichstadt-Palast in Berlin, also in 2010. Here the adolescents 
entered in a fairly relaxed manner, in single file, and had to walk toward the stage. 
Although it took a long time, because the venue was of a considerable size and designed 
for a large ceremony, the Association members agreed that this entrance was better than 
the previous one we’d seen. Dagmar pointed out how spartan the stage was, decorated 
with only four small pillars that marked off a passage way for the adolescents, and judged 
it ‘dull’. But what caught everyone’s attention was the fact that the Humanist Association 
had the adolescents take to the stage individually: they were queuing in single file, an 
adolescent’s name was read out, the adolescent walked between the pillars to be 
congratulated, to receive a flower, and then a volunteer guided them to the back of the 
stage. The others were quick to agree that this practice lacked a sense of togetherness 
(Zusammengehörigkeit), and they felt that their way of organizing the ceremony – where a 
whole group, usually of classmates, went on stage together – was ‘much nicer’ (viel schöner).   
Although the Association members never referred to themselves as ‘ritual experts’, their 
critical discussion of the content and the form of these ceremonies revealed that they 
understood themselves as such. Their comments about the first clip underline what a 
challenge it is to cater to the different tastes of the three generations usually present at the 
Jugendweihe ceremony, involving both thoughtful consideration and an up-to-date 
awareness of popular culture in order to sensibly combine old and new. They judged the 
association in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to have failed in achieving the 
appropriate atmosphere not only because of the chosen venue, but because the ceremony 
                                                 
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIxtAfej0fM 
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fell short in its task of uniting the different generations. Dagmar and her colleagues were 
taken aback that this association was a member of the national Jugendweihe Germany 
Association and felt that there should be some ‘quality control’ across the (national 
association) board. By viewing these clips, and dismissing the way these ceremonies were 
organized, the women also implicitly praised their own work and made it explicit to 
themselves – but perhaps also to me –  that they had achieved a niveauvoll (high-class) 
standard, which was worth maintaining.  
While I will discuss the work of the Jugendweihe Association and its members further in 
Chapter 6, my focus here is on their assessment of the adolescents’ taking to the stage in 
the second clip. This ritual element had been somewhat taken-for-granted because of the 
ceremony’s GDR legacy, and it only caught their – and my – attention through a direct 
comparison with the Jugendfeier of the Berlin Humanist Association. What had been self-
evident as the ‘right way’ was suddenly made explicit in the Association members’ 
juxtaposition between the Humanists’ focus on the individual and their own focus on the 
social group or collective – and the latter way of conducting the ceremony was clearly 
favoured. Jugendweihe ceremonies focus to a lesser extent on an individual initiand, and 
differ in this aspect from the Humanists’ Jugendfeier and the Protestant confirmation. As 
described in the Intermezzo, during the Jugendweihe ceremony, adolescents take to the 
stage in a group. They are usually from the same school class, and thus the stage group 
can comprise up to 13 girls and boys. Although their names are read out individually, they 
stand collectively on stage and are then congratulated and presented with a book and a 
certificate each, before each being given a flower. Unlike at a Protestant confirmation, 
where each individual receives or has chosen their own biblical verse, a proverb, such as 
‘Don’t dream your life, live your dream!’, is read out for the group. Then a photographer 
takes several group pictures of them before indicating with a nod that they can leave the 
stage in single file, in reverse order of the way they took it. Since all Jugendweihe 
ceremonies I have ever attended were organized this way, I only realized through 
discussion of the YouTube clip that the stage could be taken and left differently.  
This emphasis on the stage group is grounded in the strong association between 
Jugendweihe and the school class, which stretches back to GDR times, when the 
preparation for and the celebration of the Jugendweihe ceremony was closely intertwined 
with the socialist school system. The GDR education system was strongly influenced by 
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the Soviet pedagogues Nadezhda K. Krupskaya and Anton S. Makarenko, who held that 
socialist education was in essence socialist collective education (Kollektiverziehung) – at its 
core was the upbringing of the individual within and through the collective (Neuner 
1975a: 1282).30  The tension between individuals’ self-interests and the interest of the 
collective was to be resolved through the moulding of socialist personalities, who were to 
develop interdependently with the collective. Crucially, where personal self-interest would 
be in conflict with the collective, the socialist personality would subordinate those 
interests for the greater good of the collective (see Farkas 1977; Neuner 1975b). How this 
goal was to be achieved exactly remained unclear, and was a question frequently debated 
among pedagogues and philosophers. As such, Endre Farkas (1977) explains that the 
‘collective’ unites members in a community based on mutual interests. Collectives can be 
categorized into micro and macro, depending on their size and whether their members 
have face-to-face contact or not. For example, the school collective is a micro collective, 
whereas a macro collective mirrors social strata, but in a broader sense also refers to ‘the 
social homogenous socialist society as a whole which gradually evolves under the 
conditions of a developed socialism – the socialist nation’ (Farkas 1977: 960).  
The slogan ‘Vom Ich zum Wir’ (From I to We), which the GDR state promoted in the 
1950s to encourage the rural population to join agricultural collectives (LPGs), nicely 
condenses the attitude the state – throughout its existence – sought to foster in its 
permeation of all aspects of everyday life. People generally organise themselves into 
various social groups throughout their lifecourse, but the different collectives in the GDR 
– with the exception of the churches – were all created under the aegis of the state. Not 
only the party or the military, the Pioneer and FDJ collectives, or any other mass 
organisations were state-organised – but also the kindergarten group, the school class, the 
work collective, and the house community of a tenement block (Hausgemeinschaft). The 
state’s desire to collectivize people’s lives was thus also a crucial feature of the ways life-
cycle rituals were conducted: secular name-giving ceremonies (instead of baptisms) and 
Jugendweihe (instead of confirmation) were celebrated as part of a wider collective, and 
not just for one initiand and their family. Indeed, this emphasis on the collective over the 
                                                 
30 Nadyesha K. Krupskaya actively designed the Soviet Union’s education system after the 
October Revolution. She was also Deputy Commissar of Education (1929-1939) and Lenin’s wife 
(1898-1924). 
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individual was designed even to transcend death – through the state’s promotion of 
collective, anonymous urn burials.31 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, despite the intended ideological purpose of such collectives – 
which were eventually to dissolve into a utopian communist society – many East Germans 
enjoyed the sociality they entailed: that is, collectivity. Farkas differentiates the sociological 
term ‘collective’ from the axiological term ‘collectivity’, noting that the latter, as a value 
category, expresses the inner state and togetherness of the collective. Collectivity 
combines objective and subjective moments – the degree of togetherness of the collective, 
and the experiencing and becoming conscious of togetherness by its members respectively 
(Farkas 1977: 960). When most of these collectives began to crumble with the demise of 
the GDR state, the common trope of a lost ‘sense of togetherness’ began to emerge – and 
was still frequently mentioned by members of grandparental and parental generations 
during my fieldwork. Indeed, the historian Lutz Niethammer notes that ‘the collective 
experience of the GDR appears in hindsight the actual core of “Ostalgie”: the ensemble of 
positive Gemeinschafts-experiences in a “workerly society”’ (Niethammer 2009: 208).  
In this chapter, I trace changes in the school system which are closely associated with 
changes in organizing and preparing for Jugendweihe. Under the GDR the school system 
and Jugendweihe aimed not only to transmit factual and ideological knowledge, but to 
foster particular moral attributes – in particular, collectivity. This fostering of collectivity 
among pupils also aimed at moving ties subtly away from the family – as the smallest 
collective – to larger collectives in order to inspire adolescents to work for the greater 
good of socialist society. The GDR education system was part of a larger ideological battle 
over moral superiority between the East and the West, where each condemned the dark 
features of the other’s social order: ‘the dog-eat-dog characteristics of unrestrained 
capitalism’ and ‘the sacrifice of individuality to the state and the collective’ under state 
socialism (Fenemore 2007: 2). In regard to Jugendweihe, Gallinat holds that ‘the collective 
atmosphere is no longer propagated. Collectivity does not seem to be apparent anymore’ 
(Gallinat 2002: 166). In contrast, I argue that today collectivity is actively sought by the 
                                                 
31 As discussed in Chapter 1, collective weddings never took off, and collective naming ceremonies 
were also rare. Urn burials had been already fairly popular in the 1920s in East Thuringia for 
similar reasons discussed in relation to Jugendweihe (see Happe, Jetschke, and Schulmann 2011). 
Under the GDR, urn burials took on a new collective aspect, but a discussion of funerary practices 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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parental and grandparental generations in two ways: in a collective that spans generations 
in both the family and wider eastern German society; and in the collective of the school 
class. In this chapter, I focus my attention on the latter. First, I explain the GDR education 
system, before I turn to the post-Wende changes associated with collectivity and 
Jugendweihe preparation and celebration, and the ways they are embedded in a broader 
moral discourse echoing the tension between individual and collective. 
 
The GDR School System 
One of the major tasks for the East German political elite after the Second World War 
was to re-educate a population infused with Nazi ideology, and to raise a new untainted 
generation in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The denazification of schools as part of this 
‘anti-fascist-democratic school reform’ included employing new teachers (Neulehrer) and 
the introduction of an eight-year integrated school (Einheitsschule) in 1946 (Brock 2005: 
41-42; Fenemore 2007: 54-55; Fulbrook 2005: 120-121). Besides anti-fascism, these 
schools were based on the principles of secularity and unity, emphasising scientific 
subjects and facilitating equal education opportunities regardless of class or gender (ibid.). 
Only in the latter half of the 1950s did the political elite begin to focus more forcefully 
on moral values and the fostering of the socialist personality. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the ‘Ten Commandments for the New Socialist Human Being’ were promulgated 
in 1958, and made explicit the state’s competition with the church. They also underlined 
that individual and societal aims and values were congruent in socialism; thus, for 
example, ‘Thou shalt accomplish good deeds for Socialism, for Socialism leads to a better 
life for all workers’ (my emphasis). In 1959, the ‘Socialist Development of the School 
System in the German Democratic Republic Act’ replaced eight years’ compulsory 
schooling in an Einheitsschule with compulsory ten-year attendance at a Polytechnische 
Oberschule, ‘polytechnic secondary school’ or POS. This step, the law argued, was necessary 
because: 
With the construction of socialism began a new stage of societal 
development. The creation of the fundamentals of socialist society also 
required the socialist education of the young generation. This can only 
come about through the school, which is closely connected to social life, 
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especially to socialist production. Notably the gap between mental and 
physical work and between theory and praxis will be thereby overcome.32 
The POS thus drew strongly on historical materialism, and aimed to raise the young 
generation ‘to love work and working people’, and to become part of the skilled workforce 
of a modern society. Only approximately 10% of pupils attended an EOS, the extended 
secondary school –  12 years of schooling that led to an Abitur (similar to A-levels), which 
qualified pupils for university entrance. Although all schooling was free of charge, as were 
all forms of tertiary education, places in EOS and for university were scarce. They were 
given only to teenagers who performed well academically, who themselves, as well as their 
parents, toed the SED party line, and who preferably came from a peasant or worker 
background (Brock 2005: 76-78; Fulbrook 2005: 121). While many of the educational 
changes made by the GDR state were laudable on paper, in reality they were heavily 
circumscribed both by lack of resources and by ‘the huge pressure for ideological 
conformity’ (Fulbrook 2005: 122). The POS remained the main educational institution 
for all GDR citizens until the state’s demise. More importantly, as the act stated in 
paragraph 2 (1), ‘[t]he academic Erziehung and Bildung of the youth is exclusively a matter 
of the state.’  
Notably, the English term ‘education’ is distinguished in German by two closely related 
notions: Erziehung refers to the instilling of particular moral norms and values, a process 
perhaps best described as socialisation; while Bildung refers to the more formal aspects of 
education, that is, acquiring factual knowledge and developing intellectual capabilities (see 
Brock 2005: 10-11). In Germany, compulsory schooling has been legally enshrined 
(Schulpflicht) since 1919 – though in some parts of Prussia it has been mandatory since the 
18th century; and thus formal education, or Bildung, can be easily understood as the task 
of the school – and thus the state. However, Erziehung is somewhat more controversial, 
because the transmission of values to children was traditionally shared by three parties: 
the parental home, the church, and the school. The explicit objective of ‘the GDR 
education system …to convey knowledge not only of facts, but also – and especially – of 
values’ (Brock 2005: 10) underscored the extent to which the state aimed at gaining a 
monopoly on education, redirecting it not only away from the church (see Chapter 2) but 
                                                 
32 1959 School Act – Gesetz über die sozialistische Entwicklung des Schulwesens in der Deutschen 




also away from the parental home. This redirection was not necessarily viewed negatively 
by all East Germans, but was rather understood as a provision of support to parents when 
such values were shared. Indeed, for many, the role of the school in Erziehung became 
entirely taken-for-granted. Jutta, for example, recalled to me how shocked she was when 
she and other parents had been told at the first parents’ evening after the Wende that ‘We 
[the school] are no longer here to erziehen (raise) your children!’ She explained to me that 
this attitude was quite ridiculous, given that the time children spend in school is usually 
more time than they spend with their parents; and she insisted that the bringing up of 
children ought to be done by both school and Elternhaus (the parental home). 
Indeed, this intended cooperation between the education system and the family, with both 
working together to mould socialist personalities, was made explicit in the 1965 
‘Integrated Socialist Education System Act’, which stated in paragraph 1 (1):   
The aim of the integrated socialist education system is a good education 
for the entire people, the education and upbringing of all-round and 
harmoniously developed socialist personalities, who consciously create 
societal life, change nature and lead a fulfilled, happy and humane life. 33 
The law also asserted in paragraph 7 (4) that, ‘in the socialist state there exists congruence 
between the societal aims of education and upbringing and the interests of parents’. In 
reality, of course, this congruence did not hold for the majority of families. However, one 
also needs to bear in mind that many of the virtues that the state promoted and that 
parents sought for their children did overlap, without necessarily intending the same end 
goal – that is, communism. One of the main characteristics of the socialist personality was 
to be ‘thoroughly imbued with collective thoughts and deeds and [to] actively, consciously 
and creatively contribute to the shaping of socialism’ (Fulbrook 2005: 115). This value 
was enthusiastically fostered in kindergarten, prior to school, and through the extra-
curricular Pioneer and FDJ collectives; but it was also an important dimension of 
schooling – for example, built in weekly rotas for pupils to wipe the blackboard 
(Tafeldienst) or to get milk bottles for breakfast (Michldienst). Although pupils’ services 
undoubtedly presented an economic benefit to the state, they also taught responsibility as 
                                                 
33 1965 School Act – Gesetz über das einheitliche sozialistische Bildungssystem, 
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/schulgesetz65.htm. 
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part of the collective, and respect for the work of cleaners and caretakers at the school 
(Brock 2005: 182). Such practices fostered values which many parents sought to teach 
their children as well.  
Jugendweihe was strongly embedded within the school, and continued – despite the 
prolonged education of ten years – to be celebrated at grade eight, to mark adolescents’ 
coming-of-age. But it also had ‘the aim, alongside the school and together with the 
socialist youth organisation, to educate staatsbewusste (state-conscious) young citizens of 
the German Democratic Republic’ (ZAJ 1986: 11). After the GDR’s demise in 1991, this 
long-standing connection changed: after receiving ‘repeated inquiries’, the Thuringian 
Cultural Ministry informed all state school offices that participating in Jugendweihe was 
an adolescent’s and their parents’ personal choice, and that any promotion on the part of 
the school or of teachers was prohibited (letter dated 6 February 1991 shown to me by 
the Association). West Germany and the Catholic and Protestant Churches presumed that 
after German unification the ritual would disappear; but by 1993, the numbers of 
Jugendweihe participants had started to increase (Meier 1998: 7-8). In an attempt to 
eradicate old power structures, the Cultural Ministry re-asserted its stance in another letter 
in 1993, explaining that Jugendweihe was not a school event. Schools were prohibited 
from promoting the ritual through the school, as were individual teachers, and the 
cooperation of schools with ritual organisers was also banned (fax dated July 1993 shown 
to me by the Association).  
Yet, as I illustrate below, this connection between Jugendweihe and school was still 
actively sought through informal means, both by the Jugendweihe Association and by 
parents and grandparents. The Association and parents alike stressed their desire for 
pupils to celebrate Jugendweihe together, while teachers – as was demanded of them – 
remained largely silent on this issue, or at least remained in the background (as we saw in 
the headmaster’s reaction to my inquiry about Jugendweihe in the Introduction).   
 
Enrolment for Jugendweihe  
Members of the Jugendweihe Association invested a lot of work in organizing stage 
groups using the school class as primary reference point. Whenever a parent – usually a 
mother – rang up the office to inquire about Jugendweihe ceremonies, almost always the 
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answering Association member could be heard responding with these two questions first: 
‘Which school does your child attend? And which school class (a, b, c)?’ As such, stage 
groups almost always consisted solely of classmates – as they had during GDR times. In 
some instances, there might be a teenager or two who do not belong to the class, because 
they and their parents might have returned for the Jugendweihe celebration from a 
western federal state to their place of origin – as was the case for 34 adolescents in East 
Thuringia during the 2013 ceremonies. Such cases appear to be less a matter of the 
unavailability or lesser popularity of Jugendweihe in these regions per se, than a matter of 
where grandparents are; many commonly remain in East Thuringia, and their presence is 
integral to the family celebration. While the role of the family and the ways that 
personhood is constituted through place will be explored further in Chapter 4, here it is 
noteworthy that it was often grandmothers, whose grandchildren lived in a western 
federal state, who enrolled them for Jugendweihe. On one occasion, I witnessed the 
female neighbour of a potential initiand’s grandmother picking up the enrolment form 
and information leaflets. She explained to us that her neighbour’s children and 
grandchildren lived in the ‘old’ federal states, where they do not have Jugendweihe. Since 
the grandmother worked long hours, she helped her out by picking up the forms for her 
from the Association’s office.  
As a rule, however, it was mothers who called the Association to inquire about the 
enrolment process, who collected the forms, sent them in or handed them back, and who 
paid the registration fee. It was not uncommon for the Association to send a pack of 
leaflets and registration forms for an entire school class, upon request, to an Elternsprecher 
(parent representative, usually female) who would then distribute them during a parents’ 
evening to interested parents. In cases where such information was not appropriately 
disseminated to the relevant parents, some would complain; but others were aware that 
they had failed to get informed and/or enrol their children for the ceremony. For example, 
during the ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ fair in Jena, a mother rushed to the Jugendweihe 
Association’s stall and admitted, embarrassed: ‘Oh I am such a bad mother, I forgot to 
enrol my child! Is there anything I can still do now?’ The connection between 
Jugendweihe and the school was desired by parents, partly out of convenience, and partly 
because it was what they were used to from their own celebration under the GDR. As 
such, the Association members did not create this link between Jugendweihe and school, 
but they worked to sustain it – reminiscent of GDR times.  
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More often than not, parents were somewhat puzzled that Jugendweihe and school were 
separate matters. One Tuesday morning, on a Sprechtag (open consultation day) at the 
Jugendweihe Association, I overheard two women – perhaps in their late thirties or early 
forties – discussing the issue in front of the Association’s building. The mother who 
wanted to register her daughter for Jugendweihe was about to finish her cigarette, while 
her friend looked at the Association plaque listing opening times and, seemingly 
perplexed, asked: ‘So, what, the school doesn’t do anything at all [related to Jugendweihe] 
anymore?’ The mother shook her head and explained, ‘No, the school doesn’t do 
anything, it’s all via this Jugendweihe Association now.’ Her usage of ‘now’ (jetzt) was not 
narrowly defined as in ‘at the present moment’ but referred to a time-span, that is, the 
post-Wende period of twenty-odd years, set in contrast to ‘früher’ (former, earlier, or 
former times), which referred to socialist times under the GDR. Many of my interlocutors 
would employ these terms in a similar fashion, or would draw the same distinction by a 
‘vor’  and/or ‘nach der Wende’ (before and after the turn), where the political caesura of 
1989-90 denoted the separation of two time periods (Feuchtwang 2005: 180). Because 
grandparents and parents celebrated their Jugendweihe and attended school under the 
GDR, they frequently compared their school system with that of their children, which I 
explore further below.  
 
The GDR Youth Lessons and Preparing for Jugendweihe Today  
Frau Krause, the female manager of a clothes shop located in the Gera Arcaden shopping 
centre, and part of an international chain of retail clothing stores, received me one April 
afternoon at her work. Dagmar put us in touch after telling me that it had been due to the 
shop manager that that year’s Jugendweihe fashion show in Gera came into being. Frau 
Krause was an attractive woman in her early forties, who explained to me – even before 
we sat down in a back-room office – that she had allocated half an hour for our 
conversation. In a charming but business-like manner, she informed me that the clothes 
chain she worked for used to have a Jugendweihe collection, but had discontinued it in 
2005 because it was no longer lucrative. She quickly added that the reason for this decline 
in celebrating Jugendweihe was due to low birth rates after the fall of the wall, but that 
things had changed around the time her son – who was due to celebrate Jugendweihe in 
2013 – was born: birth rates had been on a slow but steady rise since the late 1990s. Since 
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she wanted to get informed for her son’s Jugendweihe, she looked through the 
Jugendweihe Association’s leaflet, and noticed that the Goethegalerie – a shopping mall in 
Jena, Thuringia’s second-largest city – organized an annual ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ that was 
already in its 15th year. Wondering why such an event did not exist in Gera, she decided 
to speak to the western German centre manager, Herr Schmidt. She suggested to him that 
they had to do something in Gera as well, because: ‘We must keep the customers in Gera 
rather than lose them to Jena!’ While this seemed a sound commercial argument, Frau 
Krause elaborated that the problem was that all Wessis (‘Westies’, colloquial for western 
Germans) associated Jugendweihe with the GDR, and were thus apprehensive. When I 
added, ‘Well, they associate it not just with the GDR but also with communism’, her lips 
curled into a smile and she asserted, ‘Yeah, but we just celebrated it because we were not 
church members’. She claimed to have convinced the centre manager by insisting: ‘We 
must do it!’, and he had agreed to run a trial test in 2013. If it should succeed, he agreed 
to consider developing a professionally planned, annual event.  
While her initiative was apparent, and may have been partly out of self-interest and an 
attempt to secure her role as store manager, there seemed to be more to Frau Krause’s 
motivations. She continued by telling me that it was her son’s classmates who she had 
recruited to model in the three fashion shows. She appeared a little disappointed that her 
son did not participate, despite the incentive of receiving a voucher worth €50 each. 
Through pupils’ participation as models, the school class also topped up their class kitty 
(Klassenkasse) with an additional €250. Frau Krause then volunteered to me that she was 
the parent representative and, as is often the case, she had contacted the Association about 
Jugendweihe enrolment and handed out the forms to interested parents during one 
parents’ evening. She also suggested to parents that it would be lovely for the entire class 
to take part in at least one youth work event – echoing the youth lessons run under the 
GDR – offered by the Association. Many had been interested in the trip to the MDR34 in 
Leipzig, but since it was during the Easter holiday it was inconvenient for most. She then 
proposed the Knigge etiquette course, which was a popular idea among many parents and, 
in a reflective mode, she added:   
                                                 
34 Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk – the public broadcaster for the federal states of Thuringia, Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt; i.e. ‘Central Germany’. 
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I think it’s just great that they do stuff together. I already think ahead to 
when they’ll have their graduation party, and I imagine it’ll be just lovely 
for them to show what they have been doing together over the past years. 
But maybe that’s just me…Actually they’ve done quite a bit; they [as a 
class] also went to the Bundestag in Berlin, and they really liked it.  
What struck me was that she was not simply concerned about her own son, but rather 
about her son as part of what was formerly called the Klassenkollektiv (class collective), the 
school class. During GDR times, the so called Jugendweihe-year – the academic year of 
the eighth grade – would be officially heralded with an opening event that was attended 
not only by the teenagers but also by their teachers and parents. There would be other 
representatives present, such as their future guest speaker and someone from their school 
class’s Patenbrigade (literally: godparent-brigade), a work collective of a peoples’-owned 
enterprise (VEB) that would accompany a school class through their entire schooling in 
a spirit of support. This opening event was followed by ten ‘youth lessons’ (Jugendstunden) 
over a period of several months running up until the ceremony. The vow and the youth 
lessons were seen as forming a unity, and although they changed over the lifespan of the 
GDR according to wider Cold War politics, their aim – to enhance ideological education 
at a crucial stage in a pupil’s life – persisted:    
The youth lesson is a specific form of deliberate, determined, methodical, 
and organized work of education and upbringing (Bildungs-und 
Erziehungsarbeit). Its task consists of helping to educate and to rear the 
adolescents in this particularly important phase of life for the development 
of the socialist consciousness, so that they embrace the scientific 
worldview and the morals of the working class and learn to act as young 
revolutionaries of our time (ZAJ 1974: 60). 
This ‘important phase of life’, commonly perceived as a phase in which teens challenged 
authority, granted adolescents greater rights and responsibilities than those afforded to 
children. This status change was also manifested in a change in the curriculum at grade 
seven (twelve/thirteen-year-olds) with the introduction of the subject ‘Civics’ 
(Staatsbürgerkunde). Furthermore, POS education – which included subjects such as 
‘School Garden’ (Schulgarten) and ‘Handicrafts’ (Werken) in the lower stage (Unterstufe) – 
continued its emphasis on productive work from the seventh grade onward, with the 
change to theoretical subjects like ‘Introduction to Socialist Production’ and ‘Technical 
Drawing’ and the hands-on subject ‘Productive Work’, where adolescents either worked 
in a company or were given production-like tasks in a training centre.  The eighth grade 
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–  the school year during which pupils would celebrate Jugendweihe – was also the year 
where adolescents would leave the Thälmann Pioneers, recognizable through their red 
neckerchiefs, to become a member of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth; FDJ), 
who wore dark-blue shirts. While these memberships were also always granted and 
celebrated as part of the school class, at the age of fourteen, adolescents received their ID 
cards individually (Personalausweis). This document was the most important one held by 
GDR citizens, and adults were required to carry it at all times and to show it upon request.  
The GDR youth lessons were run purposefully as extra-curricular events, but nevertheless 
for a given class with the class teacher often also taking on the role of ‘youth lesson leader’ 
(Jugendenstundenleiter). While some of these youth lessons entailed ideological group 
debates, many also involved fieldtrips in order to convey a real-life and ‘emotionally 
effective’ experience for the adolescents that never could have been achieved in a 
classroom setting (ZAJ 1986: 75-78). The youth lesson entitled ‘Your work is needed’ 
might have been held in a regional VEB, where adolescents could talk directly to workers 
and observe production processes.35 The youth lesson ‘Culture and art make our life richer 
and more beautiful’ was intended to involve either watching a theatre production or ballet 
performance, or visiting an art gallery; a trip to the observatory in Jena was a possible 
option for youth lessons entitled ‘We change our world’ or ‘Scientific-technical progress 
– Your challenge’. One main concern was to use regional memorial sites in youth lessons, 
and in East Thuringia this aim commonly entailed an excursion to the former Buchenwald 
concentration camp and its memorial site near Weimar. Such a trip could either be 
conducted as part of the ‘We fulfil our revolutionary legacy’, ‘Peace is not a gift’ or ‘Our 
socialist fatherland’ lessons, to stress that the GDR was continuing the anti-fascist legacy 
and was thus morally superior to West Germany – a topic I return to in Chapter 7 (ZAJ 
1986: 103-108; see also Wegner 1996). But while these lessons arguably aimed to transmit 
particular content, they were also in and of themselves viewed as educative tools that 
simultaneously fostered class collectivity and parental independence as the Jugendweihe 
handbook notes:  
A particularity of the excursion lies in the fact that the adolescents are for 
a longer period of time – at least for a day – together as a collective. In 
addition, the trip and the stay at the destination put greater demands on 
                                                 
35 Youth lesson titles varied slightly over the years; here I use the ones as agreed by the ZAJ in 
1982, and referred to in its last Jugendweihe Handbook (see ZAJ 1986: 55).   
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order and discipline of the individuals […] this provides a good 
opportunity to develop the self-education of youths. (ZAJ 1974: 97-98). 
This emphasis on the class collective is also visible in the photographs of GDR 
Jugendweihe ceremonies, where not only the stage group – which often only comprised 
a part of the school class – was photographed, but also the entire school class after the 
ceremony. In contrast, today such class photographs are not automatically taken by the 
professional photographer, though some parents organize school class portraits. For 
example, Andrea asked me prior to Lukas’s Jugendweihe whether I would mind standing 
in for the photographer, who had cancelled, to take photos of the school class after the 
ceremony.  
Such collectives do not entirely cease to exist once school is finished, either – as is 
evidenced by the fairly popular class reunions that parental and grandparental generations 
regularly hold, and to which class teachers are also always invited. When I returned in 
2014 for my school class’s fifth reunion,36 we had a guided tour through our former school 
– which still had utensils and equipment from GDR times, as well as Pioneer and FDJ 
memorabilia that made us reminisce about both the political-ideological dimensions of 
our schooling, and our group experience during our school years. In the evening and after 
dinner, we also paged through our red Gruppenbuch – a book that every class owned, and 
where class members documented the class collective’s activities throughout its ten years 
of schooling, from visits to the theatre and fieldtrips to Ernteeinsätze (harvest support), or 
our donations in ‘solidarity’ with Nicaragua and elsewhere. These activities attracted much 
discussion, such as whether our many donations actually ever reached their destinations, 
or whether they went straight back into SED functionaries’ pockets. Regular social 
gatherings with former GDR work collectives are also common among the grandparental 
generation. This intense involvement with the school class during GDR times, including 
being members of the young and Thälmann Pioneers and the Free German Youth, and 
later part of the work collective, were almost seen as ‘natural’ progressions in one’s 
lifecourse, and were rarely challenged – except, very occasionally, by religious East 
Germans. Celine’s mother, Sandra, noted in one of our conversations on her reasons for 
celebrating Jugendweihe: ‘Because everything was so determined during East times [GDR 
times], you just ran along everywhere, anyway – whatever, you had your FDJ shirt, and 
                                                 
36 We decided upon graduating in 1989 to hold reunions every five years. 
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you had your Pioneer neckerchief around, you know, everything was so predetermined, 
you actually didn’t have to think.’  
Yet while this sentiment would be similarly expressed by many of my interlocutors, it does 
not mean that all adolescents during GDR times behaved like stellar socialist personalities. 
Rather, ‘just running along’ and ‘not having to think’ were features of a way of life for 
people who experienced the social order of the time as unchangeable (see Yurchak 1997). 
As with the Jugendweihe vow, that may have meant frequently dancing to the tune of the 
political elite as required, but it did not translate to loving their music. ‘Rebellious 
behaviour’ existed, but was often limited in scope in order to avoid drawing attention – 
and hence potential repercussions – to oneself, and by extension to one’s family. Tanja, 
Jan’s mother, described herself as a rather rebellious teenager, and recounted her own 
story of defiance as a thirteen-year-old. Her best friend’s father was a big shot in the FDJ, 
and therefore had several ‘blue shirts’ in his wardrobe, which the girls ‘borrowed’ one 
evening. They wore them in order to stay out beyond their curfew during the festivities 
marking Gera’s 750th anniversary in 1987 – an event not to be missed by anyone in the 
region, which lasted several days, usually into the small hours. Tanja smirked, noting: ‘No 
one bothered us – wearing an FDJ shirt meant you were at least fourteen, certainly no 
longer a child.’ But many might also have presumed that the girls had valid reasons to be 
there because it was unlikely that anyone would have worn a FDJ shirt voluntarily for 
socialising in the evening. Of course, Tanja’s rebellion was directed against her parents, 
who had prohibited her from staying out late; but it was also an effective use of the state’s 
collectivizing means for one’s own individual ends.  
Today there is no requirement to attend preparatory courses in order to participate in the 
Jugendweihe ceremony. However, the Jugendweihe Association offers a wide range of 
‘youth work events’ that echo youth lessons of the GDR past but are also adapted to the 
new conditions. Some of these events could be categorized as recreational, including trips 
to ‘Tropical Island’, a large tropical theme park, and the Babelsberg film studios, both 
located in Brandenburg. They also promote short trips to the Hanseatic city of Hamburg, 
to diverse European capitals, and usually fortnight-long summer holiday camps in 
Hungary and Spain. Then there are offers that are more future-oriented, aiming to teach 
the adolescents adult skills, such as the etiquette course, or to provide ideas for future 
employment opportunities, such as trips to either the BMW automobile manufacturer or 
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the MDR, the regional public broadcaster (TV and radio), both located in Leipzig. The 
Association also provides a day excursion to the memorial site of the Buchenwald 
concentration camp. All of these offers can be taken up by anyone, regardless of whether 
they celebrate Jugendweihe; but, since they are not free, attendance is limited to 
adolescents who are interested in these events, and whose parents can also afford to pay 
for them. The Association’s leaflet advertises some free events too, such as the ‘Day of 
Jugendweihe’ in Jena, where teenagers can – among  other things – get ideas on how to 
favourably present themselves through watching fashion shows and receiving advice on 
cosmetics and hairstyles from professional stylists.  
Today’s youth work events are relatively poorly attended compared to youth lessons in 
GDR times.  This lower attendance besides the financial aspect is also due to significant 
other factors. Naturally, teenagers quite often have other priorities, and a trip to a different 
city is no longer something special. In contrast, during socialist times any trip would have 
been highly coveted, given limitations on mobility tied to travel restrictions (abroad) or a 
lack of cars. Today teenagers almost always prefer to partake in such events not by 
themselves, but with a friend or a group of friends. Since the school and preparation for 
Jugendweihe are no longer interwoven, as was the case during state socialism, it was often 
up to a committed teacher or to a parent – such as Frau Krause – to suggest something 
from the leaflet of youth work events, and to organise it as a fieldtrip for the entire school 
class, regardless of whether the teens celebrated Jugendweihe or not. Visits to the Deutscher 
Bundestag (Lower house of the German Parliament) in Berlin or the Thüringer Landtag 
(Thuringian state parliament) in Erfurt were particularly popular and well-suited as school 
fieldtrips, since they were both free of charge and educative. Such free trips were, 
however, only possible because members of either the regional or the federal parliament, 
who tended to be party members of The Left, paid for them from their visitor budget.  
While nowadays, Association members and members of the Left party may also have 
ideological reasons for maintaining and supporting the celebration of Jugendweihe, 
parents seem to be largely concerned about the collective character of preparing for and 
celebrating Jugendweihe. Frau Krause’s concern about her son’s school class ‘doing things 
together’ thus stemmed from how she herself had experienced her Jugendweihe 
preparation: as part of her school class, something that she – like most parents – wanted 
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their children to experience as well. Notably, this experience of collectivity was important 
to teenagers, too.  
Celebrating as a School Class: Friends and the ‘Klassenverband’ 
Although in 2013 – unlike in the 1950s – there were only a few teenagers who celebrated 
Jugendweihe and confirmation (see Chapter 2), such instances brought to the fore what 
an important role friendship and being part of the school class played in families’ decision-
making processes around both rituals. While the school class was frequently referenced 
by all generations, what seemed central for the parental and grandparental generation was 
what they generally called im Klassenverband (as part of the school class; Verband can be 
translated as union or collective) – a word that hinges on togetherness among classmates. 
When Tanja wanted to invite me to her son’s coming-of-age celebration, she sent me an 
email half a year ahead of time to find out whether I would be in Germany and able to 
attend. She explained that Jan’s confirmation would be in May the following year, but 
noted: ‘…we [she and her husband] have decided, that he can also experience the 
Jugendweihe ceremony with his class.’ I was rather intrigued by their decision, and she 
later explained to me that she felt he would have missed out if he had not celebrated in 
the Klassenverband – since almost everyone in his class celebrated Jugendweihe. However, 
more than a year after Jan’s Jugendweihe celebration I had a conversation with her 
husband about my research. I explained to him that I was interested in finding out why 
people celebrate Jugendweihe or confirmation and, by way of example, noted that his wife 
had explained to me that Jan’s Jugendweihe celebration had given him the opportunity to 
celebrate as part of his school class. Tanja’s husband, however, subtly corrected me before 
reinforcing the importance of friendship:  
Well, I mean the confirmation we did because of her [his wife]. And we 
went along to the church services and all in preparation for it. And I did 
really like it in there, in church, but I don’t believe in it. […] To be honest, 
Jan also wasn’t that close to his peers from confirmation classes. They had 
the opportunity to continue after confirmation – that was the plan, you 
know – but that didn’t happen, although the pastor is really okay and 
liberal. For me, it was important that he also celebrated Jugendweihe. I 
mean, we asked him and he said ‘yes’, because almost everyone in his class 
did it, but if he had not wanted it, then I would not have forced him to do 
it. But it’s nice he did it.  
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As I learned later, Jan’s three closest friends – all of whom only celebrated Jugendweihe 
– were also in his school class. Although Jan celebrated confirmation in grand style, partly 
because it was almost a month before his Jugendweihe, the Jugendweihe family 
celebration was kept small in scope. While in such cases the family also celebrated twice, 
it only properly marked the initiand’s coming-of-age celebration once, that is, by including 
extended family and friends. Jan’s age-mate Nele explained her reason for celebrating 
Jugendweihe in addition to confirmation in a similar vein:  
Well, I, for example, had confirmation first, because my parents are 
kirchlich (churchly) and so… and because my friends and everyone 
celebrated Jugendweihe, then I just thought, because actually my entire 
class was there [in the theatre], that I will just do it too. So it really 
depended on the class, on my friends, who also had Jugendweihe.  
And when I later inquired about her family celebration, she made clear what her priority 
was: 
Well, I celebrated just the confirmation really big, because it was also more 
important to me. Since I only did Jugendweihe because of my friends, and 
that’s why I didn’t celebrate Jugendweihe again in big style. I just went to 
eat out with my family, and, yes, we just had a bigger celebration for 
confirmation.  
It seemed that confirmation was more meaningful for Nele and her family, but as with 
Jan, Jugendweihe mattered because of school friends. Nele wanted to celebrate 
Jugendweihe in order to share the experience with her peers. In neither case was this 
desire denied, but rather encouraged by their parents, despite the extra cost. This 
acquiescence, I believe, was not simply a matter of bowing to peer pressure, but was partly 
because Jan’s parents had only celebrated Jugendweihe, while Nele’s father had celebrated 
both Jugendweihe and Confirmation. They too viewed the sharing of this experience with 
one’s classmates as crucial, since this was the way they had experienced their own coming-
of-age celebrations.  
Under the GDR, pupils had a form of stability and Geborgenheit (sense of security) because 
the majority spent ten years in class with largely the same classmates, often already 
acquainted with them from kindergarten. This continued togetherness of classmates, 
however, was drastically disrupted by the school reform undertaken after the Wende, 
which – as with the previous political caesura, after World War II – was intended to mark 
a break with the former regime’s political indoctrination at school. While this reform was 
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deemed necessary and welcomed by most easterners, the GDR’s schooling principles of 
secularism and unity – which translated into a scientific curriculum without religious 
instruction, and the integrated POS system for ten years – were also abolished.  
Since the West German federal system grants cultural sovereignty to the German federal 
states, the states’ school laws vary. In the 1990s, most of the western federal states had a 
three-track system, which meant that pupils were commonly separated after years four 
and eight to attend different schools according to their academic abilities. Abitur was 
attainable in East Germany after 12 years of schooling, whereas in West Germany it took 
13. A popular joke in the 1990s – often cited still today – was: Why do they need 13 years 
for their Abitur in the West, while we in the East only need 12? – In the West they have a 
year of acting classes. The joke played on the fact that westerners were quickly perceived 
by easterners as experts in self-representation, as self-interested ‘smooth talkers’, who 
could not only sell anything they wanted but were also able to sell themselves in the 
changed economic conditions that required such a skill. In contrast, easterners never had 
to learn how to compete on the job market, because work was a legally enshrined right. 
They also had no practice of putting themselves in the limelight, as such behaviour ran 
entirely against the principles of collectivity. As the historian Angela Brock argues, a ‘sense 
of community’ (Gemeinschaftsgefühl) was to be instilled as the first step toward collectivity, 
and was to ‘manifest itself in virtues such as helpfulness, consideration, a sense of duty, 
discipline, and modesty’ (Brock 2005: 181).  
Thuringia did not entirely adopt the West German model, but kept a 12-year Abitur and 
decided to create a new, hybrid, two-track school structure (Gemeinschaftsschule) where 
pupils are only separated once after eight years of schooling (Pritchard 2002: 52; 
Waterkamp 2010: 12). Nevertheless, many members of the older generations felt that the 
West German school system had been foisted on them (see also Pritchard 2002). This 
feeling emerged because, in addition to the Gemeinschaftsschule, there were now three other 
and more commonly available secondary school types – in Thuringia these are Regelschule, 
Gesamtschule and Gymnasium (TMBJS 2016). Most pupils have to decide after four years of 
primary school, and depending on their academic achievements, which secondary school 
they want to attend. This separation of pupils into different schools has become 
associated increasingly with status, an issue I return to in Chapter 5. Here, it is notable 
that in these schools another separation follows after the eighth or ninth grade, and often 
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another merger or reshuffle of a class could occur thereafter – depending on class size 
and dearth of teaching personnel, as many teenagers reported to me had happened to 
them. Whereas adolescents did not particularly enjoy this process, because it might lead 
to a separation from their school friends, mothers judged such changes more harshly. 
There were a few occasions where mothers commented on it in a ‘divide and rule’-like 
fashion: ‘Today it is not in their interest for the adolescents to stick together, so they 
separate them as often as they can.’ Here ‘their’ and the latter ‘they’ (die) refer to an 
indeterminate authority, at whose mercy the interlocutors feel themselves to be. This 
usage of ‘they’ was commonly used to refer to the Stasi or party big shots under the GDR, 
but continues to be used to refer to past and present authorities (see also Chapter 2).  It 
reflected in this instance a feeling of having had no say in these school restructuring 
processes, which is also understandable – especially given that, according to a 1995 survey 
by the Institute for Research in School Development, only 20% of easterners favoured 
this change in the school structure, and 58% would have preferred the GDR’s school 
structure ‘to be retained but divested of its party-political ideological pedagogy’ (Pritchard 
2002: 52).  
In short, celebrating Jugendweihe as part of the school class was not only desired by 
parents and grandparents because they had celebrated it this way during GDR times. 
Rather, an experience of collectivity was sought because many of them viewed the 
separation of school children not as a matter of greater educational opportunities per se, 
but as a sign of a political system that had no interest in actively fostering solidarity. But 
it was not simply the school structure that frequently attracted disapproval; contemporary 
school teachers, as I show below, were also the focus of the older generations’ assessment 
and criticism.    
 
The Defunct Role of Teachers as Moral Guides  
When I phoned forty-eight-year-old Sandra to arrange a meeting, she immediately warned 
me about her teenaged daughter Celine’s rebellious attitude and behaviour, so typical of 
this ‘difficult age’. She then moved on to complain about Celine’s teachers: according to 
Sandra, they could not fulfil their responsibilities as role models, because – amongst other 
flaws – they smoked in front of the school.  She then suggested that, unlike during GDR 
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times, teachers were no longer their friends, and that they no longer cared. Sandra believed 
that the reason for this change was that ‘back then’, teachers and pupils could develop a 
real relationship, because they would spend ten years together and teachers would have 
motivated their pupils – which was no longer the case. Today, she felt, there was only 
pressure for children to perform at a high level, and parents – not teachers – had to step 
in to help their kids. Admittedly, she added, she didn’t feel equipped to do so, because 
most of the school curriculum she did not understand herself. More importantly, she 
noted her dislike of how self-confident the youth of today are (including her daughter):  
Surely, their self-confidence shouldn’t be undermined, but at the same 
time too much of it isn’t good at all. Honestly, I will never forget how 
Celine came home from her first day at school and, imagine, the first thing 
she said to me was: “Mom, you no longer call the shots, I am a person 
myself and I can decide for myself!” And I mean, if that’s what they teach 
them in school, you know everything is so fast-moving… Seriously, this 
entire school system today, you can just scrap it (kannst du in die Tonne 
klopfen)!  
Such complaints about the current school system, in which the GDR schooling always 
served as comparative yardstick for parents and grandparents alike, came up frequently 
during my fieldwork and were wide-ranging. These criticisms varied from an increased 
pressure for pupils to perform well in order to have better job prospects, to generational 
clashes around a perceived general lack of respect for the older generations and for 
parental or grandparental authority more specifically. These are, of course, not unfamiliar 
sentiments, and already existed in the GDR – as well as in many other countries today, 
post-socialist or otherwise. However, the older generations’ negative view on separating 
classes in the course of their children’s schooling is specific to eastern Germany. They 
also frequently made derogatory remarks about the subjects ‘Religion’ and ‘Ethics’, and 
wished their offspring’s teaching would focus more on ‘scientific’ subjects. Despite having 
anticipated many of these complaints, I was surprised that Sandra’s judgement of 
contemporary teachers – and the comparisons she made to a somewhat idealised version 
of how GDR teachers used to be – echoed that of many other parents and grandparents 
to whom I spoke. As I will illustrate below, this disgruntlement emerges because changes 
in the post-Wende school system are not only reflective of a change in the relationship 
between individual and collective, but they are associated with a change in the relationship 
between the school and parents, in which teachers fulfil no longer an additional role as  
moral guides.   
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A couple of months earlier, I had been put in touch with Franka by a mutual friend. She 
insisted straight away on using the informal ‘you’, noting that she was no friend of 
formalities. Chatting away, she assured me in her deep voice that she ‘wanted to be of 
help’ but that she worked a three-shift system, which made it more difficult to arrange a 
convenient time. Franka would let me know the following week what days would suit her 
best. Toward the end of our conversation she mentioned that she had to pick up her son, 
Daniel, from football training. When I remarked that this was a good hobby for a teenager, 
she agreed, adding: ‘Yeah, it is a sensible activity because he learns how to behave in the 
Gemeinschaft (community), and he is also off the street and can make no nonsense!’   
A couple of weeks later, I visited Franka at her home and together with her son and her 
mother we talked about their Jugendweihe celebrations. Pondering over any changes after 
her own Jugendweihe, Franka explained that her school class had not insisted that their 
teachers should address them with the formal ‘you’ (Sie) after their Jugendweihe. 
Addressing initiands with ‘Sie’ had been a common practice during GDR times, to signal 
their change in status and underscore that they were no longer regarded as children. Many 
teenagers made ample use of this newly gained privilege as a way of conveying which 
people in positions of authority they liked or disliked – requiring those they disliked to 
use Sie, and allowing those they liked to continue to address them with du. While Franka 
wanted to stress that her class got on well with most teachers, her mother interrupted her 
to draw a difference between past and present teachers: ‘Well, in former times, the teacher 
was still your friend. These times are long over.’ And while Daniel smilingly nodded in 
agreement, she stated: ‘Sadly, that’s the way it is!’  Somewhat puzzled by this comment I 
inquired: ‘How “friend”?’, and Franka’s mother elaborated: 
Well, the relationship between teacher and pupil, if you will, that has 
strikingly changed in recent times. I mean to say, when I now think back 
to my teachers – those were teachers out of conviction, not because they 
haven’t learned another job or because they perhaps will be verbeamtet 
(appointed as a tenured German civil servant) or because they earn a pile 
of dosh, but those were teachers because they gladly wanted to be 
teachers. They wanted to teach children and so on and so forth: the 
teacher was your friend. – If you had a problem, and you didn’t catch on 
to something, you could just go to your teacher and you would say: “I 
haven’t understood that!” The responses you’d receive from a teacher 
today when you tell him after a lesson that you didn’t understand 
something, they are very different from back then in our times. Back then 
the teacher sat down with you and explained it to you again. Today you 
receive the response: “You should have paid attention during the lesson” 
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and that’s the teacher already finished with you. The relationship between 
teacher and pupil as it prevails today is, sadly, catastrophic! 
 
This assessment baffled me, especially because Franka’s mother had explained to me 
earlier that ‘the school’ had talked her into doing Jugendweihe, although she had wanted 
to celebrate only confirmation (see Chapter 2). I suggested carefully: ‘But nowadays 
teachers have less of a say than they used to, haven’t they?’ My inquiry, however, led her 
to suddenly direct her blame for this ‘catastrophic relationship’ in the opposite direction: 
This is a very big reason, which also really makes matters worse… that 
teachers nowadays have no longer any Handhabe (basis, usually refers to a 
kind of legal basis). Now, if a – well, okay of course there was less of that 
back then – well, but if someone in my age ran riot as a pupil, then the 
teacher had a chance to punish them. That’s not like today, that if the 
teacher gives you an entry (for misbehaviour noted in the class book, 
which usually leads to a lower mark), or a fail and the pupil comes home, 
the next morning father and mother are in school – at the break of dawn, 
to tear a strip off the teacher! This is just not a relationship. And that’s 
also, I always say that, it’s a surprise that there are still people who want 
to be teachers and to try to teach such a gang of little rascals! Because the 
youth of today what they do to people, and the many teachers who […] 
what else are they supposed to put up with in school? They have to say 
“thank you” when a pupil spits at them!  
Daniel’s maternal grandmother’s first assessment seemed to blame teachers entirely for 
the worsening of their relationships with their pupils, which she suggested was based on 
teacher’s carelessness and self-interest instead of their dedication. This difference in 
motivation was succinctly described by Franka in the same conversation as a matter of 
Beruf oder Berufung (profession or calling). The second complaint – which followed the first 
by only a few seconds – posed an opposite argument, finding fault with the young 
generation. This contradiction, which Franka’s mother did not appear to perceive as such, 
puzzled me. I later realised that she was not describing a simple pupil versus teacher 
conundrum to solve, but a tripartite relationship that also included the parental home. 
Her use of the word ‘Handhabe’, and her remark regarding parents taking the side of their 
children instead of the teacher’s, marks a change in authority that is not explicitly 
expressed. In fact, as I suggested in Chapter 2, it may be that she was unwilling to clearly 
spell this out as it would mean portraying her own mother in an unfavourable light – given 
that her mother did not side with her on the issue of abstaining from Jugendweihe, but 
bowed to both the party and the school, and in essence the authority of the SED state.  
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Although GDR teachers varied in their personal political stances, as did the environments 
of particular schools, in principle the teacher was the long arm of the state. Regardless of 
whether they were SED party members or not, teachers had to undergo ongoing political 
instruction, known as the Parteilehrjahr, where they were also brought up to speed with the 
latest SED directives on education (Plum 2015: 159). Thus, their role as teachers went far 
beyond transmitting knowledge – Bildung; they often spent time with pupils in extra-
curricular activities, among them Jugendweihe, fostering the moral attributes that a 
socialist personality was to exhibit – thus playing a crucial role in the Erziehung of their 
pupils. Some teachers carefully negotiated their role, and to an extent protected children 
or teenagers who were not ‘state-loyal’ from potential repercussion; Franka distinguished 
her former teachers of ‘such [ideological] ilk and others’. With re-unification came a 
greater freedom for pupils, but also less authority for teachers. As such, teenagers are not 
necessarily more badly behaved than previous generations; rather they have a greater 
opportunity to play parents and teachers off against each other to their advantage, because 
the former role of teachers as moral guides has changed, and the relationship between 
parents and teachers is no longer perceived to be in harmonic unison – even if this unison 
often was just simulated. 
Even today, class teachers are often present at their class’ Jugendweihe ceremony, and the 
Association supported their attendance through the provision of free tickets for teachers 
upon request. The Association’s endorsement stemmed from the intertwining facts that 
Jugendweihe had been celebrated with teachers during GDR times, but also that some of 
the Association members had been pedagogues themselves in the past. It was also quite 
common for Association members to critically assess how the diverse trips on offer went, 
which were always accompanied by at least one Association member. This assessment 
was partly based on reflecting on adolescents’ behaviour, but also by reflecting on the 
class teacher’s relationship with the accompanying Association member and with her or 
his pupils. Often these reflections involved harsh criticism of a lack of manners or interest 
on behalf of either pupils or teachers, or indeed both. Teachers were frequently judged as 
not being dedicated enough and as ‘just doing their job’, resonating with Franka’s 
mother’s assessment. But for Sonja and Dagmar, who had both been pedagogues in the 
GDR, there were also occasions where they asserted that a particular teacher was really 
engaged and, they suggested that this reminded them of how teachers used to be during 
GDR times.  
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Whether teenagers today would invite their class teacher to their Jugendweihe very much 
depended on the closeness or amicability of their relationship. Some seemed to be rather 
keen for their teachers to be present, while others did not care about their attendance at 
all. It also appeared to depend on parents’ commitment regarding school matters, and 
their perception of whether the class teacher was ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This assessment itself 
was sometimes curiously expressed as a kind of mutual respect based on ‘getting on with 
pupils’, rather than, as one might expect, on a teacher’s capability in imparting their 
knowledge of the curriculum. In another conversation after Daniel’s Jugendweihe, Franka 
told me that she had accompanied Daniel’s school class on a (non-Jugendweihe related) 
fieldtrip, and recalled her positive surprise about how well the pupils got on with their 
deputy class teacher. Since he was soon due to retire, the pupils had given him presents 
and threw a kind of farewell party for him during the excursion, and she added: ‘Actually, 
he is so popular, but, as I said before: older generation.’ She further explained that Daniel’s 
older sister had already told her that he was a really well-liked teacher, and then explained 
his popularity by saying: ‘You know, he makes jam at home, and then he brings it in [to 
school] and lets everyone [in class] try it. He gave me homemade elderflower liquor [by 
way of thanking her for her support] and you know, he’s one of those, who stands there 
in the evening and makes herb butter and then he brings bread and they all eat herb butter 
first [before they start the lesson].’ And her mother agreeably asserted: ‘Yeah, that’s 
precisely because he is an old teacher!’  
While both of these references to the teacher as an ‘old teacher’ and from the ‘older 
generation’ appear to be a commentary on his age, they also implied something else: he 
was from the (old) generation of teachers who were trained during GDR times, as 
Franka’s mother had ascertained in our first conversation. Because Jugendweihe was part 
of a GDR teacher’s job, while today it is entirely a matter of the parental home and the 
Jugenweihe Association, it also became the locus of assessment of teachers’ ‘dedication’. 
Today teachers’ attendance at the ceremony would have to be in their own spare time. 
Nevertheless, many teachers took pride in their class’s invitation to the Jugendweihe 
ceremony, and their attendance also demonstrated that they cared about their pupils 
beyond their job description. Quite often, teachers could be seen not only congratulating 
their pupils on their Jugendweihe the day after the ceremony, but also presenting them 
with a flower, a card or a small gift. Such gift-giving was not a particularly easy logistical 
task in terms of both preparing and presenting a little something for about 20 teenagers, 
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but it underlined the importance of the occasion and the teachers’ professional dedication, 
while demonstrating that they maintained an amicable teacher-pupil relationship. That 
this gesture truly mattered to some teachers sank in when a female Gymnasium teacher told 
me about her troubles with the regional school authorities. It had been relayed through 
her headmaster that they had decided to transfer her to a different school (a Regelschule), 
news that came to her as a bit of shock. However, instead of arguing that such a change 
during a rather crucial period for her pupils might badly affect their academic results, she 
exclaimed: ‘But they can’t do this now, my class has Jugendweihe this year!’  
Her exclamation, however, was a reflection of involvement that many parental and 
grandparental generations felt was lacking among today’s teachers, and which they 
sometimes assessed in terms of a teacher’s dedication and efforts regarding extra-
curricular events – and curiously commensality. All of these expectations and gestures of 
dedication have in common, I believe, that they were – like the togetherness of the school 
class – aimed toward creating Geborgenheit for the pupils. This word entails a rather 
complex German concept, commonly translated as a ‘sense of security’ ‘but [which] 
actually evokes an immediately positive sense of sheltered-ness, nested-ness and well-
being’ (Hutta 2009: 252). Geborgenheit is a sentiment of life (Lebensgefühl) that can be 
variously expressed but that is generally believed to be essential in particular for raising 
children, and thus often connected with the family home. But the Geborgenheit that many 
members of the socialist generations seemed to seek was that of a harmonious being 
together in the collective – not instead of the family as the GDR state intended, but in 
addition to it.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have illustrated the ways in which preparing for and celebrating the GDR 
Jugendweihe were closely intertwined with the socialist school system, and thus had a 
pronounced collective character. The GDR regime promoted various collectives that were 
supposed to be united by and working towards a common goal, and that were hoped to 
eventually resolve into one utopian communist society. While many of these state-
sanctioned collectives crumbled after re-unification, the school class is one case where a 
broader moral discourse of the ideal relation between individual and collective re-emerges. 
The GDR’s political elite intended the moral education of pupils to move the young 
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generation’s bonds subtly away from the family, as ‘the smallest cell of society’, to larger 
collectives, such as the school class, and to thereby motivate people to contribute to the 
shaping of socialist society without being limited by kin bonds. Although the school 
reform in the early 1990s was perceived by most easterners as necessary to purge the 
socialist education system of its ideological indoctrination, many members of the socialist 
generations dislike the current school system, which they commonly compared with their 
school experience and Jugendweihe celebration under the GDR. This discontent about 
the school system was linked to the changes in moral education. 
 
There were two issues that stood out particularly, and that were frequently criticised: the 
change of the school structure, and the change of the role of teachers. Although both of 
these changes were closely interwoven with the ideological nature of the GDR school 
system, they were also framed by parents and grandparents in moral terms. The change 
in school structure led to a separation of pupils at least twice during their years of 
schooling, which was contrasted with the unity of the school class maintained for ten 
years under state socialism, and the sense of togetherness it fostered. In the post-Wende 
context, the defunct role of teachers in inculcating specific moral attributes was in various 
ways assessed as having had a negative impact on pupils’ moral personhood. What these 
various criticisms have in common, I suggest, was that they aimed to recuperate the older 
generations’ positive sense of togetherness and security, perhaps best encapsulated in the 
German term Geborgenheit. The continued celebration of Jugendweihe as part of the school 
class, parents’ desire for their offspring to participate in preparation events as part of the 
class, and Jugendweihe class photos are all manifestations of the older generations’ 
attempts to inculcate collectivity in their offspring, and simultaneously to recuperate what 
they felt had been lost after the Wende.  However, I would also suggest that this longing 
for collectivity was not – as the GDR state intended – a move away from the family unit, 
but rather an addition to it. Collectivity, then, needs to be understood in contrast to the 
capitalist ‘elbow society’ (Ellenbogengesellschaft, in reference to the use of elbows in queue-
jumping or in sports competition to get ahead of others) in which the individual is 
characterized by egoism, competitive self-interest or ruthlessness – a general 
inconsiderateness towards others felt to be prevalent in contemporary life. The essence of 
the ‘elbow society’ is the opposite of what the Association members deemed a ‘much 
nicer’ way of celebrating Jugendweihe in the introductory vignette: togetherness.  
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This togetherness, however, was based on doing things together rather than thinking 
together – not unlike the dynamics of ritual itself – in order to create harmony both among 
pupils but also compliance with the state. Although GDR school education frequently 
stressed critical engagement – these thought processes had to be in line with the state’s 
ideology because as one song by the SED went ‘The Party, the Party is always right!’. This 
oppressive aspect of the collective is partly downplayed today, but was often also not 
recognized at the time.  
 
Of course, it was in particular prudent to move adolescents’ ties away from their family 
where the family was not in line with the state’s aim. In the next chapter, I look more 
closely at the Jugendweihe family celebration and what it attempts to accomplish, but also 
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Chapter 4  
On Roots and Wings: The Jugendweihe Family 
Celebration  
 
There are two things that children should get from their parents: roots and wings.  
– Proverb ascribed to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.  
Thuringia! 
Goethe especially moved here from the west. 
Thuringia! 
David Bowie…once flew over it – at best. 
[…]  
But why do they reduce our magnitude  
To sausages and dumplings – in short, food? 
Because here the mums are so super, 
Because here the mums are so super! 
Once they start grating potatoes,37 I believe, 
You want to be under their skirt and never leave… 
 
– Excerpt from the ‘unofficial hymn of Thuringia’ by comedian Rainald Grebe (2004) 
 
A few weeks following Celine’s Jugendweihe celebration in June, I sat with her family in 
the large dining room/open kitchen of her parents’ impeccable but cosy house. Frau 
Schubert, the seventy-four-year-old mother of Sandra, who lived next door, had just 
assured us again that her own Jugendweihe celebration had been ‘very simple’. When I 
asked her more about it, it became clear that she was talking about her school leaving 
celebration, and that she had actually never undergone a Jugendweihe. She had left school 
at fourteen in 1953, two years before the first GDR Jugendweihe was held; and when 
Jugendweihe ceremonies had been prohibited by the state; but since her father had run a 
small firm, her participation in a proletarian Jugendweihe would have been highly unlikely 
regardless (see Chapter 2). Perhaps because she could not contribute much to our current 
                                                 
37 Thuringian dumplings, often called ‘green dumplings’, are made with 1/3 boiled potatoes and 
2/3 raw potatoes that are finely grated.  
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conversation, she suddenly turned to another life cycle event that every person present 
shared with her:  
There was not much happening [at the school leaving celebration] and I 
have to say that’s what it was like at the Schuleinführung (school entry 
celebration). Although I can recall that I had such a Zuckertüte (a large, 
colourful cone filled with sweets and toys received on the first school 
day)… but it was straight after the war and there were just bread rolls in 
it – white bread rolls – they were very rare then. Back then there were only 
dark ones [available]. 
Slightly surprised about this present, I asked: ‘In your Zuckertüte?’ Frau Schubert 
responded, ‘Yes!’ Peter, Celine’s fifty-year-old father, asked further: ‘Nothing else?’ She 
continued: 
Of course, white bread rolls and I don’t know what else… well, very few 
sweets, a few pencils and a little bit of what one needs for school. There 
was the introduction to school when everything was explained and that 
was that, and then we just went back again to play on the street. 
Sandra, Celine’s mother, exclaimed: ‘So those were actually really lovely times – one got 
excited about white bread rolls!’ Her mother elaborated: 
Yes, white bread rolls and cocoa. After all, that was a rarity! And that was 
only possible because my father was a plumber and when he worked at 
the baker’s he would receive in addition a bag of bread rolls – and they 
were white!  
Her entire face lit up as she continued: ‘And my mother made hot cocoa and we had 
buttered bread rolls and hot cocoa. It was delicious! It was a really great meal.’   
While she first used the German word Brötchen for ‘bread rolls’, when Frau Schubert 
described her mother preparing hot cocoa to drink with their buttered bread rolls, she 
switched to the more regional term Semmeln – rendering the scene of commensality more 
tangible and palatable to us. The grandmother’s memory was one that – despite its 
outmoded glorification of bread rolls and cocoa as rarities – united the three generations 
through their shared experience of the family’s practices of commensality, conviviality, 
and gift-giving. These practices obviously also feature in the Jugendweihe family 
celebration, which is the focus of this chapter.  
East Thuringians of all three generations referred to Jugendweihe as a ‘family tradition’, 
and scholars have noted that eastern German parents foreground the familial aspect in 
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recollections of their own GDR Jugendweihe (Aechtner 2011; Gallinat 2002, 2005; 
Saunders 2002; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2003). Yet scholars have either neglected this aspect 
in their investigation of the ritual’s continuity (see, for example, Wolbert 1998; 2011), or 
acknowledged it but paid only limited attention to the actual family celebration (see, for 
example, Aechtner 2011; Gallinat 2002, 2005; Gandow 1994; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2003; 
Saunders 2002).  This chapter seeks to close this gap by focussing on what is accomplished 
through the family celebration of Jugendweihe.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that the GDR state attempted to foster different types 
of collectives, which were designed to move ties away from the family and ultimately to 
alter kinship itself. In this chapter, I suggest that most families under the GDR celebrated 
the Jugendweihe family celebration, despite and against the grain of the state’s ideological 
aims (see Borneman 1992: 165) – and indeed, these celebrations served to re-strengthen 
family ties. I illustrate how through the use of emotional attachments – both familial and 
local/regional – Jugendweihe not only became part of individuals’ biographies, but also 
of their family histories, thus securing its continuity after the state’s demise. As I have 
shown in the previous chapters, the public change of status that fourteen-year-olds 
underwent in past ceremonies – in the last century, indicated by entering the workforce 
or receiving an ID card, or through being addressed with the formal Sie instead of the 
informal du (you) – has become less visible nowadays. By contrast, the family celebration 
– through the consumption of particular foods and alcohol, the giving of a thank-you-
speech, the accumulation of money through gift-giving, and the intentional creation of 
‘lovely memories’ – remains important, not only marking the end of the adolescent’s 
childhood and socially transforming them into an adult person, but re-creating kin ties as 
well. 
 
The Consumption of ‘Coffee & Cake’  
I arrived just after four o’clock on that Saturday in May, a little late for Lukas’s family 
celebration. I had stayed behind to help the Association members wrap up for the day 
after the last Jugendweihe ceremony, before heading over to Lukas’ parents’ place. Lukas’s 
ceremony had been held that morning, and he had gone on to have lunch with his parents, 
siblings and grandparents in a restaurant before returning home to kick off the family 
party with Kaffee & Kuchen (‘coffee and cake’). The living room was full of guests, most of 
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whom were sitting around the festively decorated Kaffeetafel (dining table for ‘coffee and 
cake’). Although they seemed to have already finished their coffee, the table was still not 
cleared because they were waiting for me. Andrea, Lukas’s mother, introduced me to 
everyone present – Lukas’s grandparents, aunts, cousins, family friends and his best friend 
– as her ‘friend who also researches Jugendweihe, and thus will write about Lukas in her 
PhD thesis.’ There was a little stir as some guests made teasing comments about Lukas’s 
‘imminent fame’, and we both felt slightly embarrassed. As soon as I sat down, Andrea 
and her guests encouraged me to tuck into the cakes – but I struggled to do so, because I 
was trying simultaneously to answer their countless questions about my life in Scotland. 
In between these questions, the guests recommended which cakes I should try because 
they were particularly delicious. Even after I finished, there was still plenty of cake left.    
In Germany, cakes are usually reserved as a treat for weekend afternoons or for special 
occasions. Although families have rather more time on weekends than they did in the 
past, Sundays are still very much seen as a ‘family day’ in East Thuringia. Compared to 
other European countries, the freeing-up of the weekend for the family occurred fairly 
late in East Germany: East Germans worked half a day on Saturdays until the introduction 
of the five-day working week in 1967, and children went to school on Saturdays until 
1989. Since shops are commonly closed on Sundays, Sunday afternoons between three 
and four remain special occasions when coffee and cake are consumed in the company 
of family or friends – an event quite literally referred to as Kaffee & Kuchen (coffee and 
cake).  
Indeed, on the first Sunday after my arrival ‘in the field’, my mother announced that she 
would bake a white buttercream torte. It is neither my favourite cake, nor had she actually 
ever made this cake before – and as such her choice perplexed me. However, I quickly 
ascribed her choice to the fact that November was not the right season for baking one of 
my favourites – an apple or a plum cake – as she would not be able to use fresh fruit from 
the trees in our garden. She presented the cake to my father and me in the afternoon, and 
he critically analysed every bit of it: the texture of the buttercream, the amount of 
strawberry jam used, the consistency of the sponge. The cake did not look quite as perfect, 
but I immediately recognized it as the same type of cake my late grandmother’s baker was 
famous for, far beyond his village. Tasting this special combination – the richness of the 
buttercream, the sweetness of my mum’s homemade strawberry jam, the fluffiness of the 
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sponge layers – immediately brought back all the warm feel-good moments of my 
childhood, when my extended family would sit around my grandmother’s living room 
table on some festive occasion. It was this very Proustian moment of involuntary memory, 
which – despite including many absent family members – was so pleasant, that made me 
realize that my mother expressed her love through home-made food, and that my being 
with them for a year was a kind of special – almost unimaginable – family reunion.  
This special afternoon treat also plays a significant role in all major life cycle rituals, and 
most of my interlocutors mentioned it as part of their coming-of-age celebration. For all 
major family celebrations – from secular name-giving ceremonies or baptisms, 
Jugendweihe or confirmation celebrations, to big birthday parties, weddings, wedding 
anniversaries, or funerals – to provide appropriate Kaffee & Kuchen is seen as essential to 
their success. These Kaffee & Kuchen are set off from the ones provided on a Sunday in 
various ways. Regardless of whether the festivity takes place at home, in a restaurant, or 
in a hired venue where one would self-cater, the centrepiece  would be a large table 
covered with a table cloth – usually white – and laid with a porcelain coffee service, cutlery 
and paper or cloth serviettes. There could be decorations in the form of little flower 
arrangements, but there are always at least two candles (depending on the size of the 
Kaffeetafel) to create a festive atmosphere (see Figure 7). Hosts were expected to offer non-
coffee drinkers a substitute, such as a variety of herbal teas, so that the occasional tea-
drinkers could choose according to their preferences. For children there was usually a hot 
beverage such as cocoa provided, in case they did not like to drink herbal or fruit tea. Of 




Figure 7: Kaffeetafel 
While coffee has become a daily commodity, under state socialism, coffee beans and 
ground coffee were not always easy to attain – and even when available, they were very 
expensive.38 During one festivity I attended, a group of pensioners had begun complaining 
about today’s cost of living and reminiscing about the ‘good old days’, when one 
grandmother in her sixties remarked that during GDR times, she always drank a coffee 
substitute during the week, and would only indulge in a cup of real coffee – as a special 
treat – on a Sunday. Another grandmother in her seventies responded to this comment, 
by way of acknowledging that they perhaps had been a bit too nostalgic: ‘Yes, don’t we 
have it good now!  These days we can drink real coffee every day as we please, whenever 
we like to!’ But after a brief moment of silence – and perhaps reflection – most continued 
to lament the current prices of bread and butter, and some commented that if you were 
to convert these from East Mark to Deutsche Mark and from there to Euro, the increase 
                                                 
38 There was a coffee crisis in the late 1970s that led to the introduction of a coffee mixture, which 
included roasted chicory.  
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was outrageous! But even during socialist times – when good coffee was scarce – on such 
festive occasions guests expected to be offered proper coffee.   
However, the most striking thing about these afternoon festivities was the assortment of 
cakes that would be offered. There seemed to be an unspoken rule that one had to serve 
a minimum of ten different types. This wide range of cakes set the occasion apart from 
regular Sunday Kaffee & Kuchen, because even if it was a ‘special’ Sunday such as Easter, 
one would usually have only one or perhaps two types of cakes. There was no main or 
‘festive’ torte at a Jugendweihe (nor confirmation), as is customary at wedding or name-
giving ceremonies – where such a torte is almost always decorated with the name of the 
newly-wed couple or the name of the child respectively (see Figures 8 and 9). Sometimes 
there are two additional torte-like round cakes of either a buttercream or a fruit variety, 
sliced into eight or twelve triangular pieces on the table, but they are not held to be an 
essential element of a Jugendweihe family celebration. Indeed, Frau Lorenz, Nils’s 
paternal grandmother, explained to me that she and her husband did not even have a cake 
at their wedding in the 1960s – tortes, she insisted, were not at all common in the past. 
Rather, pride of place went to the approximately ten or more different cakes or tarts that 
fall under the category of Blechkuchen (tray cakes), cakes baked in a large rectangular tray 
instead of a round baking tin. The term does not indicate any specific type of cake, as 
there are countless variations on the theme – usually involving a solid dough base, either 
Hefekuchen (yeast cake) or Mürbeteig (short pastry), or a sponge cake-like base. These types 
of cakes are presented on platters, with five to ten types on one plate, cut in small, easy-




Figure 8: Cake at a Name-giving Family Celebration 
 
 
Figure 9: Wedding Cake 
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Figure 11: Presentation of Thuringian Blechkuchen Assortment 2 
 
Of course, as a Thuringian, for me these cakes did not stand out at all – but I certainly 
would have noticed their absence. I only realized that the way these cakes were served 
was a more regional custom when a non-Thuringian, present at one of these celebrations, 
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disapprovingly commented on it. When I inquired what was ‘wrong’ with it, it emerged 
that she deemed both the size and shape of the servings ‘inappropriate’: a piece of cake 
had to be triangular and of a size that you could not eat more than two without feeling ill. 
For Thuringians, on the contrary, it was essential to present their guests with a great 
selection of cakes. The wealth of selection was believed to create an appropriate 
atmosphere, and underlined the significance of the event; as one grandmother poignantly 
remarked: ‘Well obviously the more types of cakes, the more festive the occasion’. As 
such, there seemed to be no upper limit, other than cost considerations. In one of the 
family celebrations I attended, I counted twenty-four different types of homemade cakes 
plus one sweet pastry filled with fresh cream – the Schillerlocken – which had been bought 
in a bakery shop. This pastry was named in reference to the curls of the German poet 
Schiller who – like Goethe – is often claimed by Thuringians as ‘their poet’. But there are 
other reasons why there has to be such a great variety of cakes, too.  
The great selection assured that there was something suited to everyone’s tastes. 
Thuringians differentiate between dry (trocken) and wet (nassen) Kuchen and the variety of 
cakes could comprise, for example, white or brown Streuselkuchen (streusel or crumble 
cake) and nut cakes, for those who prefer dry cakes, and cherry, tangerine or a 
combination of tropical fruit cakes for those who like wet cakes. There are also rhubarb, 
gooseberry or red current tarts available for the more sour/tart taste buds and different 
types of buttercream as well as Mohnkuchen (poppy seed cake) for those who prefer heavier 
options. Almost always, there would be a version of Papageikuchen (‘parrot cake’, consisting 
of at least three differently coloured parts) that was favoured by children and adults alike. 
Other popular variations were Eierlikörkuchen (German eggnog cake), “Eiskrem”-Kuchen 
(ice cream cake), LPG-Kuchen and often several types of Quarkkuchen (a lighter version of 
a baked cheese cake). This great variety also assured that the presentation of cakes was 
colourful since, as the German saying goes, ‘das Auge isst mit’ – it should also be a feast for 
the eyes. But perhaps more importantly, such a varied, well-presented selection 
guaranteed that people ate together. This commensality – like that I described above, 
sharing buttercream torte with my parents – allowed them to imagine that they had more 
in common with their commensals: they shared not only food, but a family history 
punctuated by such family celebrations (Gillis 1997: 93). But because there is such a great 
variety of cakes that guests might be disappointed about being unable to try them all, the 
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small size of the pieces was a thoughtful measure: as everyone I asked explained to me, it 
enabled guests to taste all types of cakes, if they wished. 
For virtually all life-cycle rituals, buying cakes in a supermarket is frowned upon. At one 
occasion where a mother also served two bought cakes, she pointed it out immediately 
before any potential complaints could be raised. She explained that the cakes were of a 
particular well-established brand, and had been tested by her and her family beforehand, 
and found to be of an acceptable standard – that is, homemade-like. The usage of the 
term ‘bought cakes’ was somewhat misleading, because it enabled the distinction from 
cakes that were in fact also bought but nevertheless ‘homemade’ – just not in one’s own 
home. Most hosts, usually full-time working mothers or wives, are not skilled enough to 
bake such a great variety of cakes, and do not have the time to do so. As one friend, when 
I asked her whether she had baked all the cakes herself, ironically replied: ‘Sure, Grit – the 
whole of last week, because I had nothing else to do!’  
Instead of buying a selection of cakes from a supermarket, it was customary either to 
arrange with a local bakery or a Backfrau (baking woman) to bake a selection of cakes that 
could be picked up on the day of the celebration or the previous afternoon/evening. Such 
arrangements had to be made in good time prior to the party in order to decide on the 
selection and – in the case of a ‘baking woman’ whose services one had not previously 
used – also in order to taste some of her products to be certain of her baking skills. ‘Baking 
women’ commonly acquired their skills through practice rather than through professional 
training leading to qualification as a baker or pastry chef. They tend to run small (official) 
baking businesses, or to be friends or acquaintances who would bake specially for such 
big occasions by way of earning an extra (usually unreported/untaxed) income. 
Nevertheless, both types of baking women rely largely on word of mouth spread through 
contented customers. Their baking skills are paramount; and while they tend to offer 20-
30 different types of cakes, they are unlikely to share their recipes as is otherwise common 
among friends and family members.  
The Thuringian Blechkuchen or Festtagskuchen (festive day cakes) are rather simple compared 
to, for example, the elaborate or intricately decorated three-tiered wedding cakes at British 
and American weddings. In the 30th edition of what may be the most popular Thuringian 
baking recipe book, the Thuringian Backfrau Gudrun Dietze explains that ‘our cakes do 
without expensive ingredients. We have already learned from our mothers to respect the 
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simple things.’ (Dietze 2013: 8).  Baking Thuringian Festtagskuchen requires the skill to 
create variety with fairly few and basic ingredients, as well as precision, because – despite 
different textures and elements – the cakes should all be about the same height, and 
should never be higher than two centimetres. But to bake a great variety takes a lot of 
time and effort; and, as Dietze adds, for a successful outcome, ‘[t]he most important 
ingredients are patience and love’ (ibid.).    
While forgoing Kaffee & Kuchen was unheard of in socialist times, and especially in rural 
areas, today it is not part of every Jugendweihe family celebration. Celine only had ‘coffee 
and cake’ with eight people before the party of 27 continued in a restaurant; her mother 
explained that it was simply too expensive and required too much effort for her to provide 
it for everyone.39 The celebration of Franka’s son, Daniel, did not include coffee and cake 
at all, because it was attended by a lot of children and dinner had to be served very early; 
proper Kaffee & Kuchen was seen as superfluous if not wasteful, besides (or because of) the 
associated costs. Nils’ party started at 5 pm, which was too late to provide coffee and 
cake; but his parents decided to offer it after dinner, because, as Beate remarked: ‘It’s not 
a proper celebration without cakes!’ (Figure 11). While thrift seemed to be the main reason 
to forgo Kaffee & Kuchen, there also appeared to be a difference between urban and rural 
areas: Celine’s and Daniel’s celebrations, which downplayed the cakes, both took place in 
the city centre of Gera. But when I asked Andrea about ‘coffee and cake’, she asserted: 
‘You can’t get away with not having cakes in a village!’ 
For Andrea’s family, not having cakes would have been unimaginable for another reason: 
Lukas was a cake lover who regularly baked himself and who, at the time, was toying with 
the idea of becoming a pastry chef. Andrea explained to me that every member of their 
nuclear family had been allowed to choose two types of their favourite cakes from the 
selection of the local Backfrau.  This ‘baking woman’ baked all the traditional Thuringian 
cakes, and her services had been used previously for the Jugendweihe celebrations of 
Lukas’s older siblings. Yet her emphasis on village life suggested that they had to abide by 
some village norms, and provide a great variety of cakes. Indeed, it was custom to also 
give a Kuchenteller or Kuchenpaket (a plate or package with a selection of cakes) to neighbours 
                                                 
39 Costs for ‘coffee and cake’ vary depending on the number of guests, and whether one self-
caters or has it in a restaurant. For Jugendweihe celebrations I estimated the cost to range between 
€35 and €200.  
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and acquaintances who brought a gift but did not attend the party. The use of cakes as 
thank you gifts also required a sufficient selection of cakes, as to return only one or two 
types could earn one a reputation for being a Geizhals (cheapskate; literally greed throat). 
This custom of giving neighbours cakes had also been pointed out by Daniel’s mother 
and grandmother, who then noted: ‘Well, back then [in GDR times], this street was a 
Gemeinschaft, just like a village.’  
Unlike the practice of expressing gratitude through cakes that his mother and 
grandmother remembered, Daniel just called everyone by phone to thank them. Celine, 
too, thanked her gift-givers by sending them a thank you card instead of cakes. While this 
practice appeared acceptable in urban spaces, it was frowned upon by members of the 
grandparental generations in the Gera villages in particular. Some gift recipients used a 
Piccolo (a small bottle of sparkling wine) or a small box of chocolates as a sign of gratitude 
instead, which was generally appreciated. Yet neither gift was held to be the appropriate 
way of reciprocating by members of the grandparental generation, who expected cakes 
from the celebration. Frau Lorenz reminisced about how she would enjoy ‘badmouthing 
people’s cakes if they weren’t that great or not enough different types’ in the past. I asked 
whether the critique was really about the cakes, or whether it had more to do with whether 
one liked the people who had given the cakes. Abashedly, she replied: ‘The cakes, of 
course – you wouldn’t get them in the first place, if you didn’t like the people!’ Later she 
explained that she and her husband had also given ‘5 Euros to the boy who does the paper 
round in the village on his Jugendweihe’ the other year. She noted: ‘I mean we aren’t really 
obligated to this family, if you will, but he’s a busy boy. He, and also his family, thanked 
us.’ There was, however, no complaint about not having received any cakes from them. 
The cakes were not purely for consumption within the extended family, but a means to 
expand the house, including other households in a network of mutual obligations. I will 
return to this issue of how different households related to each in the next chapter.  
Most crucially, at the Jugendweihe family celebration, the initiand eats this kind of cake 
selection for the first time in their own honour, with their family. At children’s birthday 
parties, such cake selections do not feature; and, though rarely celebrated, at a baptism or 
a secular name-giving ceremony the main protagonist does not eat these cakes. These 
cakes then mark the adolescents’ coming-of-age in culinary terms. The consumption of 
these cakes re-incorporates them into the family with a different status: the next time such 
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cakes will be consumed in their honour would be at their wedding. Although Daniel’s 
celebration formed an exception to the rule by not including Kaffee & Kuchen, there are 
four other signifiers of such change in status that I will discuss in the rest of this chapter.    
Toasting and Dining 
In conversation with Daniel’s family a few weeks after his Jugendweihe, I asked him what 
the best thing about his celebration was. With a big smile, he burst out: ‘Why! I was 
allowed to drink!’ Accompanied by much merriment by his grandmother and mother, he 
admitted that it had not been his first time to drink alcohol, but it was the first time in an 
‘official manner’: in the presence of his parents and guests. When I asked what he drank, 
suggesting: ‘Sparkling wine, wine or beer?’, his mother laughingly interrupted: ‘All of it – 
and in that order!’ Similarly, Celine recalled her family celebration as follows: 
Well, first of all I was shocked that so many [guests] had come [to the 
restaurant]. Then I was happy about the money [gifts]. Then we sat there 
and the waitresses were coming with two trayfuls of Sekt (sparkling wine) 
and I thought: “Huh, will I now get Sekt, too?”  And then she just gave 
me one glass and – to just drink it, made me somehow feel awkward. 
Her dad cut in: ‘Mmh right, so [that’s why] you just sat down somewhere else and drank 
another glass!?’ I offered: ‘But you were allowed to drink…?’ when her mother 
contributed, ‘I too got my first glass of Sekt at my Jugendweihe!  But that you straight 
away ordered another one, [I didn’t realize]!’ There was much amusement and I tried 
again: ‘But that wasn’t the first time that you drank alcohol, was it?’ Celine quickly and 
briefly shook her head, covered her lips with her hand to hide from her parents what she 
was whispering to me: ‘No, not all, but don’t say it out loud!’  
Neither during socialist times nor today is a fourteen-year-old legally permitted to 
purchase and/or consume alcohol; but in both eras, this part of the family celebration 
was perceived to be a crucial element of Jugendweihe. Regardless of whether it was 
celebrated at home or in a restaurant, a teenager is supposed to drink their first glass of 
alcohol publicly, without any repercussions from their parents. Although today, most 
youths would have tried alcohol by this age, the fact that parents allow their child for the 
first time to drink alcohol in public signals an important change in their relationship. 
Though he or she is not yet endowed with the same rights and responsibilities as an adult, 
a greater sense of trust in the initiand is conveyed symbolically: the first public drink 
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acknowledges a gradually increasing ability to take on board responsibilities (to know 
one’s limits) that go hand in hand with such rights (to be allowed to drink alcohol like an 
adult).  
It was quite common that the drinking of the first glass of alcohol at one’s Jugendweihe, 
the opening of the festive dinner/buffet, and the adolescent’s thank you speech coincided 
in a short toast that made it at least appear that the adolescent was the host – though in 
reality their parents were. Toasting was conventionally done with a glass of Sekt, German 
sparkling wine, equivalent to the Spanish Cava or French Champagne that in most 
European countries is fundamental for any special festivity; in a predominately beer-
drinking country, it again underlines the extraordinariness of the event. The classic semi-
dry version of the East German brand Rotkäppchen was most often used on such occasions 
in Thuringia – it was a winery whose growing region is mostly in neighbouring Saxony-
Anhalt but also partly in Thuringia along the rivers Saale and Unstrut. For the toast, the 
initiand – who was commonly seated at the head of the table – stood up in order to thank 
their guests, sipped on the Sekt, and declared the buffet to be open. From then on, 
adolescents would be able to drink alcohol during family celebrations. Not all adolescents 
were keen on alcohol, but the act of thanking one’s guests and opening the buffet even 
without alcohol was common, and this act itself signified a clear transformation: children 
would never give such a formal thank you speech. For the first time, the initiand was not 
simply a gift recipient – such as at a children’s birthday party – but also took on obligations 
to his or her guests.  
The evening feast consisted of a variety of different types of meats, cold and warm, often 
in combination with Thuringian dumplings. It frequently also included cheese and fish 
platters, as well as fruits and salads. Most important, however, was the variety of servings 
of warm meats with sauce. Thuringian cuisine is fairly heavy, consisting of carbohydrates 
and meats – a diet believed to emanate from the region’s traditional employment in 
agriculture, forestry, and mining, which required the type of food that would sustain one 
through a hard day of physical work. But while Germany’s meat consumption is generally 
high, eastern federal states consume more meat than western federal states, and Thuringia 
is the front-runner for meat consumption among men (BUND 2013). This high meat 
consumption, as a study conducted in 2013 by the German Federation for the 
Environment and Nature Conservation (BUND) argues, is due partly to a pan-European 
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increase in meat eating, as the Sunday roast (Sonntagsbraten) has become an everyday roast 
(Alltagsbraten). Nevertheless, these formerly-Sunday-roast-style meats are still central to 
family festivities. Thuringia’s high meat consumption is also due in part to the regular 
consumption of Thüringer Rostbratwurst, and Thuringians pride themselves on having the 
best German sausages. These are popular throughout Germany, and fairly regularly 
consumed – barbecues in the spring and summer are unthinkable without them. Notably, 
these sausages are not offered at important celebrations, as they would undermine the 
exceptionality of the event. Where barbecue-style meats were served, it was more likely 
to find the regional speciality Thuringian Mutzbraten: a 250 g piece of pork neck marinated 
in salt, pepper and marjoram for several hours, and then roasted over birch wood for two 
hours, before being served with Sauerkraut (German style cabbage). These particular foods 
and drinks served during the family celebration also recreated a link to the regional home 
– the Heimat of Thuringia. Thuringians would frequently comment on the quantity and 
quality of food as well as the type. Usually during the feast the atmosphere became 
gregarious – partly because people tried as much of the food as possible, and exchanged 
their evaluations of food with others. At Nils’s celebration, his father’s aunt loudly 
appraised the food by stating: ‘I would never refuse an invitation from him, because I 
know there is always plenty of tasty food!’ 
 
Figure 12:  Section of a Buffet at Jugendweihe Family Celebration 
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The consumption of particular foods and alcohol, as well as the thank you speech, were 
markers of the adolescent’s symbolically performed status change. Yet bearing in mind 
that ‘commensality can be thought of (1) as confirming kinship or even (2) as constituting 
kinship in a real sense’ (Robertson Smith 1927: 347; Bloch 2005; Carsten 1995b), we 
should also note a difference in closeness between people that was created through the 
consumption of different foods. The feast, that is, meats and boiled foods, were shared 
among kin and close friends who were invited to the party – leftovers would not be shared 
with everyone, but usually only with kin, thus creating a family boundary. In contrast, 
cakes and alcohol appeared to function as a social conductor that created and maintained 
egalitarian solidarity within the wider community (see Bloch 2005: 47). The cutting of a 
tray cake into small pieces allowed commensality among many people – rendering them 
a sort of whole – and this consumption also incorporated the initiand into the wider 
community as equally obligated to each other. The consumption of specific drinks and 
foods – preferably traditional Thuringian cuisine, locally sourced and produced – served 
to reconfirm social ties and the initiand’s status change, but also to reinforce the initiands’ 
ties to their family home and their Heimat: the regional home of Thuringia, which provided 
them with a strong sense of roots. 
 
Gift-giving 
Lukas, who had already slipped into more comfortable clothes before my arrival, was 
grinning like a Cheshire cat when I gave him his present: an envelope including a card, 
money and a voucher, but also a small gift-wrapped book. From his parents, who hosted 
the entire celebration, he had received a smartphone and an Xbox game. He seemed 
satisfied about all of his presents as he carefully arranged the envelopes, some flowers and 
a plant on top of the sideboard, smiling to himself. Above it, in the air, a big transparent 
balloon floated conspicuously, with three smaller balloons attached to the same string 
dangling underneath it. Besides helium, it contained another blue balloon, on which best 
wishes were penned, and in which money was visible.  
Indeed, the most frequently given gift – and the one most sought after by teenagers – was 
money. Most teenagers were well aware that, by celebrating Jugendweihe, they would 
receive a substantial amount of it from their relatives, family friends and acquaintances – 
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on average, approximately €1,200.40 They either had observed the accumulation of money 
during the Jugendweihe of an older sibling or cousin, or heard about it from friends; but 
they also heard about it from their parents themselves. When I had asked Lukas five 
months earlier about why he wanted to celebrate Jugendweihe the following year, he was 
not entirely sure, and explained that both his sister and brother had celebrated it too, 
recalling it as a pleasant memory. Andrea then pointed out that of course, all teenagers 
also knew that they would make money with this celebration. Lukas, rather drily but with 
a cheeky smile, insisted: ‘But we don’t have to celebrate it, you can give me the money 
just like this [without having to go through all this fuss]’. At which point she turned to me 
and almost apologetically explained: ‘Of course they don’t really understand it [now], but 
afterwards they’ll be happy to have celebrated it’.  
Andrea was not an exception. Many adults referred to the gift-giving aspect of the ritual 
as one of the main motivators for their children or grandchildren to undergo the ritual in 
the first place. However, while teenagers tended to acknowledge that money played a role 
in their decision-making, they almost always denied that it was the principal reason, 
describing it as more of a welcome by-product. When I spoke with teenagers, they hardly 
ever raised the issue of gifts or money themselves. Despite it being a customary part of 
the ritual, they rarely included it in explaining what the ritual was about, and I had to 
prompt them directly to tell me about their Jugendweihe presents. Instead, they 
emphasised the atmosphere of the one-off-event in which they were the main 
protagonists, and they almost always stated that it was ‘simply lovely to celebrate with the 
entire family’. What was ‘lovely’ then, as illustrated in the first part of the chapter, was 
that the adolescent was the centre of attention for one day: the extended family gathered 
for her or him – the first drink of alcohol, the festive ambience, the special food and its 
consumption in commensality that created the image of an ideal family home.  
However, this ideal family image was not always met. Sandra recalled how, at her own 
Jugendweihe, she sat at the head of a large dining table which stood empty except for her 
father and mother. Her parents had just recently announced their imminent divorce, 
which led the family to show their disapproval of her parents’ decision by staying away 
from what should have been Sandra’s party. She seemed to have been punished by her 
relatives for her parents’ decision. And her parents were shown that there was no family 
                                                 
40 Based on my survey data of 50 teenagers who celebrated Jugendweihe in 2013; see next chapter. 
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celebration without family – an essential ingredient to make their daughter happy. I was 
taken aback by what seemed to me a rather cruel thing to do to a fourteen-year-old, but 
Sandra played the incident down as something that did not matter much to her – perhaps 
because of her mother’s presence during this conversation. Later, she emphasised that 
her failed Jugendweihe celebration was the main reason that she had insisted her daughter 
should have a great family celebration. Celine’s older sister had also celebrated 
Jugendweihe, and the fact that siblings should be treated equally also featured as a 
rationale – a concern that was expressed by all families, in particular with regards to gifts, 
which ought to be of equal value for all children.  
Money gifts were usually – but not always – given in an envelope that also included a 
Jugendweihe card with best wishes for the future, presented to the adolescent either on 
their Jugendweihe day after the ceremony, or anytime thereafter (commonly up to a 
month or two). People of older generations often disapprovingly explained to me that 
teenagers nowadays requested only money. However, in the same conversations they then 
admitted that they did not know what their grandchildren, nephews or nieces really 
wanted or needed; to give money was also an easy option for them, which meanwhile 
allowed the teenagers to save up to make a larger purchase in the future. Frau Becker, 
Daniel’s grandmother, emphasised the change in gift-giving practices when recounting 
that she, like her daughter, had received items for her Aussteuer (trousseau), before adding:  
My most expensive present though, I got from my grandmother. It 
was an umbrella for 80 Marks, I still know this like it was today! This 
was an umbrella that cost 80 East-Marks! – I still know it like today. 
We had an umbrella shop here in the street and she said: “On your 
Jugendweihe you’ll get an umbrella from me!” And then we went 
there and I know this like it happened yesterday! I still know [how] 
she then said: “I would like to have an umbrella for the girl on her 
Jugendweihe and, ach this is a pretty one, show us this dark-grey 
one!” And then the shop assistant said: “She is a young girl, would 
we not like to have something prettier, here I have one with flowers, 
a dark-blue one.” This is the one I got and it came to 80 Marks, I 
know this like [it was] today – yes, from my grandmother. 
Her recollection was animated, and she could not stop telling us over and over again how 
clearly she remembered. In fact, in all such recollections people very rarely used erinnern 
(to remember/recollect) but more often noch wissen (to still know), which seemed to 
emphasise the vividness and factuality of their memory.  But because the umbrella was 
such an expensive item at the time (in 1966), she also stopped and laughed between her 
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recollections, with her daughter, grandson and myself joining in – it seemed ridiculous 
today to spend so much money on an umbrella, and indeed to hold an ordinary umbrella 
itself to be a special gift.  
Gift-giving has been central to all Jugendweihe celebrations, regardless of the time period, 
but the type of presents has changed as well as the value of the gifts. Parents often joined 
in with grandparent’s laments about today’s excess of gifts, and thus played down the 
amount of money and presents they received at their own Jugendweihe celebrations in 
the 1970s or 1980s. The headline of an article published in March 1978 in the Erfurt 
newspaper Das Volk (The People) asked: ‘How do we celebrate Jugendweihe?’. 
Addressing the issue of gifts, it stated that indeed ‘Jugendweihe is sometimes mixed up 
with a medium village wedding’, quoting a female teenager who expressed her 
disappointment about the many towels she received. A male teenager explained that it 
was best that he could decide himself what to buy so that ‘there was no trouble with shirt 
sizes and so forth’, and adds that he received 1,500 Marks – at the time well above twice 
the average monthly salary. Another female teenager, however, stated that ‘money is quite 
nice’, before continuing, ‘but I am against giving only money. It is so anonymous. A 
present should always remind us of this exceptionally beautiful day in life’ (Müller 1978). 
One concern of the GDR state was for the family celebration to facilitate the creation of 
such an exceptional day, in which the teenager was the centre of attention without 
encouraging the main protagonist to become a consumer-driven, egoistic individual. Both 
editions of the Central Committee’s Jugendweihe Handbook from 1974 and 1986 
cautiously explain that ‘with gifts one could erziehen (to educate), but also verziehen (to 
spoil)’ the recipient (ZAJ 1974: 163, 1986: 161). The reader is then reminded of what is 
deemed an appropriate gift in line with the ideals of socialist society:  
Theatre visits, short trips and other collective forms of experience enjoy 
as much popularity as durable consumer goods. It is also to be encouraged 
when youths earn means through their own productive and socially 
valuable activity and [can] fulfil a special wish for themselves with the help 
of relatives, at their Jugendweihe or later. Yet every gift-giver must know: 
it is not the monetary value? of Jugendweihe presents that is an expression 
of appreciation for the adolescent, but the consideration in how far their 
needs are met or developed, or rather how the interests and inclinations 
of the gift-recipient are responded to (ZAJ 1986: 161). 
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Despite these guidelines, initiands conventionally received not only money, but also 
special commodities, because the latter were not easily attainable and thus particularly 
coveted. Such gifts included more individualised items such as jewellery, clothes, or 
cosmetics. By far one of the most popular gifts in the 1980s was a portable stereo of the 
VEB RFT Stern, such as an R160 or SKR700, the price of which amounted to 
approximately 1,500 GDR Marks. Teenagers often saved up for such a product from their 
Jugendweihe money, or received it as present on the day of their coming-of-age 
celebration. Girls would commonly also receive gifts of a more social nature, that is, 
trousseau items – a fact recounted by all mothers. Such tea towels, towels, bed linen, 
tablecloths, and so on were stored for future use, when the initiands would set up their 
own household. The most expensive goods that are held to belong to a household, such 
as a car, white goods, or TVs, were never part of Jugendweihe gift-giving; but arguably, 
Jugendweihe money, which was commonly saved, would be used for such major future 
expenditures. Money and special gifts were thus also a symbolic marker of the initiand’s 
status change – they were given money and special items for their future to help their 
transition to becoming financially independent and as a prelude to marriage.  
While cosmetic products and jewellery for girls are as prevalent today as they were in the 
past, computer games for boys and vouchers and books for both genders are also 
common today. As with the portable stereos of socialist times, nowadays it is not 
uncommon for teenagers to receive a computer or laptop from their parents, or as a 
collective present from their family. Often this was explained as a necessity for school 
and in general a requirement of contemporary life. At first glance, this shift from portable 
stereo to computer seems like a shift from entertainment to work; but the use of both of 
these products is in reality not that different. During socialist times, to have a good 
portable stereo also meant receiving West German radio stations, such as BAYERN 3 or 
RIAS 2, which were popular among youth for the music they broadcasted. More 
importantly, one was not only able to keep up with the pop culture of the West but to 
record one’s favourite songs on tape, most of which music was not available for purchase 
in the GDR. As the computer today enables the teenagers to enter a new, unknown world 
– a source of more and different knowledge – the portable stereo performed this function 
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in the past: it enabled young people to see the world from a different perspective, much 
to the dismay of the GDR state.41 
Under state socialism, money always would have been received in an envelope. But kin 
and close family friends would present their money gifts in conjunction with a hard-to-
get-hold-of commodity, such as a trousseau item. Today, to receive an envelope and card 
including a €10 note was an acceptable gift from a neighbour, but not deemed an 
appropriate gift from close family members. As sixteen-year-old Sophie explained her 
anticipation of the cards with well-wishes and money inside, she pointed out with some 
embarrassed giggles: ‘well, depending on the degree of bond/relationship (Bindung) to the 
one [person], more or less [money]’. But this giving of monetary gifts according to the 
closeness of the relation was not only different in terms of what (or how much) was given, 
but often also how it was presented. Because many consumer products are bought much 
more easily now than under state socialism, when such purchases required connections 
(known as Vitamin B) to gain access to such products, they did not represent enough 
effort and time spent for the recipient, and thus lost value in expressing a close 
relationship (see Carrier 1990; Cheal 1987). Money presents were thus often extravagantly 
wrapped or individualized – such as in Lukas’s aforementioned balloon gift, or Nils’s 
money gift, which referred to his favourite hobby: model trains – in the hopes of achieving 
such a memorable effect (see Figure 13).  
                                                 
41 Arguably, this conclusion may not hold true for the 1980s: indeed, some scholars have argued 
to the contrary, that West TV had a stabilizing effect on the GDR. Youth with access to West TV 
tended to be in greater support of the GDR regime than those without – presumably because of 
their better access to entertainment (see Kern and Hainmueller 2009). Similar conclusions may 
apply to West radio broadcasts.  
   
  169 
 
Figure 13: Making Commodities into Presents. 
 
Frequently, teenagers received not simply money or ‘things’, but ‘experiences’, such as 
tickets to a show of their favourite music group or to a football match of the team they 
support. For many parents, it mattered more to give an experience rather than a product 
or money – even when their offspring wished for products or money. One divorced father 
eloquently elaborated the reasons for his choice of gifts. His eldest daughter, according 
to him, owned too much: she had all the latest and most expensive gadgets that teenagers 
today perceive to be necessary, but which are also quite clearly treasured as status symbols. 
For him, his daughter already showed signs of not really appreciating the value of what 
she had been given by her parents and others. He blamed this attitude largely on her 
mother, his ex-wife, who herself – he said – exhibited extravagant shopping habits. 
Recalling his daughter’s celebration the previous year, he noted that it was much more 
important to him to do something special with her in order to create eine schöne Erinnerung 
(a lovely memory). He organized a short trip to another city where just the two of them 
stayed at a hotel, ate in a fancy restaurant and went to see a musical together. This gesture 
cannot be hastily interpreted as competition with his ex-wife for their children’s love, or 
as an attempt to make up for missed time spent together – the two parents have shared 
custody, and their two children stayed regularly at their father’s house. Rather, besides the 
greater importance of memories over material things, he also saw the trip – very much 
like the events parents choose in preparing their offspring for the life ahead discussed in 
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the previous chapter – as an appropriate way to ‘teach’ her how to behave as an educated, 
well-mannered grown-up in unfamiliar surroundings.  
Money and special gifts, then, served both in socialist and contemporary times as symbolic 
markers of the adolescent’s status change – a sign of greater autonomy from their parents.  
But they also communicated what was not necessarily verbally addressed, that is, the 
emotional bond between kin, especially parents and children. Because commodities have 
lost their extraordinary appeal as rarities, today they are no longer deemed appropriate 
gifts by parents and grandparents – unlike under state socialism, when they were coveted 
presents and contradicted the GDR state’s intention. While I return to the issue of 
changing gift-giving practices in regards to commodities in the next chapter, here I want 
to point out that their contemporary inappropriateness as gifts was related to both the 
little labour involved in acquiring them, and to the fact that they were not extraordinary 
and thus not memorable – unlike Frau Schubert’s bread rolls or Frau Becker’s umbrella. 
In both instances, the grandmothers recalled not just the product, but also its giver – 
rendering the giver and their affection immortal in the women’s memories.  
The presentation of gifts also played a crucial part in the conviviality of the family 
celebration, for what gift-giving attempts to effect on the adolescent, and for the way 
family is re-created and represents itself to others, which I discuss below. 
 
Conviviality  
Because Nils’s Jugendweihe ceremony was in the afternoon, his family party started later 
than Lukas’s; but it was also bigger, and held in a refurbished former barn that his parents 
had hired for the occasion in a neighbouring village, instead of at home. Finn, Nils’s 
younger brother, took orders from guests, returned to the bar where his father poured 
the drinks, and brought them to the guests’ tables. Music played in the background, and 
the festively decorated venue had gained an air of boozy jollity during the feast. It was 
about 9.30 pm when a family friend delivered a beam of wood, and Lars called upon his 
son: ‘Nils, come up here now, you have to (hammer in a) nail!’ Since the German word 
nageln has the same sexual connotations as the English ‘to nail’, a man in his seventies 
snorted with laughter, shouting: ‘It’s never too early to learn how to nail properly!’ This 
remark led to quite a bit of laughter, and while the man’s wife chuckled she simultaneously 
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scolded him for his inappropriateness. Nils – an ordinary tack hammer in hand – had to 
compete in turns against his father, his older cousin, and a family friend. The latter had 
not only delivered the beam, but brought along a large sledgehammer, and with one hit 
he drove the nail into the wood like it was butter – Nils had no chance.   
It was often such experiences on their Jugendweihe day that were recounted most 
frequently by adolescents. While they usually occurred during the family celebration, in 
some instances the initiands were surprised by their families immediately after the 
Jugendweihe ceremony. On the questionnaire I gave her prior to our conversation, 
fourteen-year-old Leoni claimed that the best part of her Jugendweihe was ‘the surprise 
after the ceremony when she was picked up from the theatre in a rally car’. I observed 
quite a few such surprises in front of the theatre, and witnessed at least three occasions 
when girls were picked up in black or white stretch limousines (see Figure 14). When I 
pointed this out to other female observers or to teenagers in conversations, they seemed 
to agree that it was an overindulgent or excessive display; their reactions echoed fourteen-
year-old Sarah’s: ‘This really mustn’t be! It’s just a bit too much. I mean, what do they 
want to do for their ‘Prom’ (Abiball)?’42  
 
 
Figure 14: A Stretch Limousine Waiting for a Female Initiand at the Gera Theatre. 
                                                 
42 In Germany graduation celebrations are common but the Abiball is a recent development and 
similar to the Prom in the USA. It is celebrated by Gymnasium graduates only. 
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On one occasion, a girl was greeted outside the theatre after her Jugendweihe ceremony 
by an amateur fanfare orchestra, of which presumably she herself or one of her family 
members was a member (see Figure 15). Such scenes always drew attention to the teenager 
concerned, and not only underlined the importance of the event but were a guarantee of 
making the teenager feel special, creating an unforgettable experience – ‘a lovely memory’. 
Although aimed at making the main protagonist feel special, the use of a limousine and 
the performance of an orchestra were not simply for the initiand. Fourteen-year-old Lena, 
who celebrated confirmation but attended her classmates’ Jugendweihe, recalled how 
exciting it was to be in the stretch limousine of her friend with other classmates. Similarly, 
the fact that the fanfare orchestra played in front of the theatre rendered it a public 
performance that any passer-by could enjoy for free. These surprises benefited not only 
the initiand but were often enjoyed by others as well.   
 
 
Figure 15: Amateur Fanfare Orchestra Playing in front of the Gera Theatre. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the focus on the collective played a pivotal role for the GDR 
state. From the 1970s onward, the state increasingly promoted collective family 
celebrations, where the families of an entire school class were encouraged to celebrate 
together after the Jugendweihe ceremony (ZAJ 1986: 159-160). Daniel’s grandmother 
pointed out this difference in celebrating styles by comparing her daughter’s with her own 
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and her grandson’s Jugendweihe. Although all three Jugendweihe celebrations were 
limited to their own extended family and friends, Franka left her Jugendweihe family 
celebration to ‘prowl the streets with her friends’. These friends celebrated together with 
other classmates in the same restaurant on the other side of town. Today such collective 
celebrations are extremely rare, and when they occur they usually consist of only two 
families – as was the case with Leoni’s celebration. Leoni recounted to me that she 
celebrated with her ‘best pal’s family’, but that the best present she received was from her 
parents: tickets to a gig of her favourite singer. However, it was not simply the ticket itself 
that mattered, but as Leoni put it: ‘It came across as so cool!’ She explained that her 
parents, her best friend’s parents, and some other family members put together a set list 
of her favourite songs from this singer and imitated him in a performance. Her father 
then presented her with tickets at the end. Two friends who were present at her 
celebration and part of this conversation smiled and nodded in agreement about this great 
surprise, which had entertained all the guests.  
Large family celebrations frequently included gag-like performances meant to enhance the 
initiand’s feeling of being special by putting them into the limelight. Similar to the money 
gifts that some relatives had arranged and personalized creatively, these performances not 
only had entertainment value, but were usually organized by parents and close kin as an 
expression of intimacy. A voucher or tickets bought online or in a shop would not suffice 
to show the level of closeness the relation had: a performances showed that family knew 
the person’s preferences, and took the time to create something that could not simply be 
bought. During weddings, anniversaries and big birthday parties the recitals of jokey 
poems, often especially written in rhyme to tell something about the Jubilar (person who 
is being celebrated) and their lifecourse, were a fairly common practice. Often such 
performances were prepared long in advance by family members and close friends, who 
may have met beforehand to rehearse or to make props. At a friend’s 40th birthday 
celebration, her partner, her siblings, and her daughter with partner had organised several 
such sketches that re-enacted – often in costumes and with props – the funniest incidents 
in the Jubilar’s life, such as how she came to her nickname. Although she knew that her 
family had prepared something, she did not know what – and part of the surprise was that 
she had to participate in these sketches. She was prompted by family members after each 
sketch to explain its significance to the guests who were uninitiated to these stories, which 
formed part of the family history. Because she often explained embarrassing moments 
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out of breath and with much laughter, it became the most amusing element of the 
celebration for her and everyone present. I witnessed similar sketches at other birthday 
celebrations as well as weddings and wedding anniversaries.43 
At fourteen, the recounting of tales from across the lifecourse is not yet feasible – though 
sometimes teenagers received a framed photo collage or a photo book of their stages of 
life so far: from being a baby to becoming a pupil to the present. Where such gifts are 
presented, they were usually handed around to everyone, as (in some cases) were photos 
of their parents’ and grandparents’ Jugendweihe celebrations – offering many topics for 
conversation and reminiscence about the past. Besides the entertainment value such 
performances and gifts provided, they also expressed a sentiment that partly harks back 
to socialist times. As I have shown above, in contemporary eastern Germany, the 
purchase of things is not limited by state supply or private connections but by one’s 
available funds, there was also a sense of that being ‘too easy’ – it was impersonal because 
no labour was required (see Cheal 1987). To buy a gift for someone was certainly 
appreciated, but it was appreciated much more when it was well thought-through, and 
presented in a way that not only entertained the recipient but also all the guests. The 
families I spent most time with were obviously close-knit units, and their social 
interactions were both critically intimate and affectionate, but not once during my entire 
fieldwork did I hear the term ‘love’ verbalized between parents and children. Adolescents’ 
faces often lit up when they recounted their Jugendweihe experience, and while the event 
quite clearly had an emotional impact on them, they did not express explicitly what was 
written all over their faces. The only exception was a female survey respondent, who, 
when asked what besides money she had received on her Jugendweihe, wrote: ‘a bag, and 
lots of love from my family’.  
These sketches, performances and photographs thus displayed a much greater 
appreciation of the person being celebrated, and communicated what money or the 
wrapping of a gift could not convey: that a great deal of thought and time had been 
invested in preparing and executing these shows, all for the main protagonist (see Cheal 
1987). Yet these attempts by family members to make the main protagonist feel special 
                                                 
43 Such performances were given in addition to the ‘standard’ customs of a wedding, such as the 
couple’s sawing of a beam of wood, welcoming the newly-weds with bread and salt, the first dance, 
the decorating/spoiling of their wedding suite and the wedding ‘newspaper’ – though these also 
required a great deal of preparation.  
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and to communicate their love also displayed this intimacy to others. They showed to 
extra-family members – at times by letting them in a little on family stories – that the 
family was ‘really close’, as another friend present at the aforementioned birthday party 
somewhat enviously commented. 
 
Gift-giving and Conviviality: Money & Work  
Sometimes the way money was presented also entertained all the guests – but 
simultaneously fulfilled an educative role in which the adolescent became the target of 
mockery because he or she received money without having worked for it. When Daniel 
told me that he received a computer from his parents, like his sister had five years earlier, 
and could otherwise only recall money and some sweets, his grandmother prompted him 
to tell me what he had received from one of his aunts. He remembered and chuckled: 
‘Alright, yeah! – I got coals!’ He continued to explain that when she had asked him what 
he wanted for his Jugendweihe, he colloquially replied: Kohle! (‘dosh’, literally: coal). While 
he thought it funny that his aunt took his request literally, and played a joke on him, his 
grandmother mischievously grinned and pointed out to me: ‘She had a real sack of 
charcoal briquettes and amongst them all there was a box with money. But he had to get 
his hands dirty first in order to take it out!’ 
Similarly, sixteen-year-old Mia told me with a mixture of embarrassment and joy, and with 
much struggle to find the appropriate words, that her family had organized a porcelain 
toilet bowl. This toilet had been painted pink by them and was filled with brauner Pudding 
– a kind of thick chocolate custard. She was given rubber gloves and was supposed to 
extract the money – approximately thirty coins worth €1 each – from the artificial 
excrement, seemingly cleaning the toilet in front of the gathered crowd of guests. Mia 
laughed when she recounted this episode; when I asked her whether it had been 
embarrassing, she concurred and added: ‘And the photos they took, even more!’ While 
these gags, like the aforementioned sketches, have great entertainment value for everyone 
present, they also show the teenagers up. Adolescents played along, but they were 
ridiculed, because ideally money should be earned rather than simply received. These 
stories are recounted with enjoyment, but it was also the uncomfortable sensation of 
embarrassment that made these episodes memorable; and it is very likely that these are 
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the scenes they will remember for longer and perhaps retell to their own children one day 
– perhaps showing the photos that captured these moments. But the embarrassment 
factor in all of these is also an expression of intimacy and love: you only dare to show 
someone up or to make a fool of yourself in front of those to whom you are close, and 
who you trust. By enacting such sketches, strong family ties were made visible, but also 
re-strengthened at a time when the adolescent increasingly sought autonomy. At the same 
time, these sketches indicated that kin fostered an appropriate work ethic and the financial 
independence of the initiand.   
From his female cousin, who had had her own Jugendweihe only three years earlier, Nils 
received a blue bucket filled with sand and a small sieve (see Figure 16). He sat for a good 
part of the evening surrounded and carefully watched by three younger boys, sieving 
through the sand to find the coins hidden in it. He could not finish the task, and continued 
the following day – partly because he was asked to hammer in nails to prove his manliness. 
These gifts and tasks appear to be gendered. Like the fact that the earlier mentioned 
stretch limousines seemed to be hired only for girls, the boys’ tasks mimicked those of 
miners, carpenters or builders – stereotypically associated with men; whereas the girl had 
to clean a (pink!) toilet, a task often associated with the female domestic sphere. Yet at 
the same time this gender division was somewhat blurred. When I asked Nils’s cousin 
where she got the bucket idea from, she explained to me that she herself had had to 
undergo the sand-sieving task. In a similar blurring, Nils’s mother, Beate, made Nils 
compete again after his hammering competition. This time he had to compete against his 
paternal grandmother in peeling a carrot – a game he lost at terribly. When I asked Beate 
afterwards why she did this, she explained to me that it was high time for Nils to help in 
the household. She compared his reluctance – he always had to be asked for help, and 
only grudgingly provided it – with that of his much younger brother, who voluntarily and 
willingly helped his parents in household chores.  
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Figure 16: Nils’s Bucket of Sand Money Present 
Regardless of their dubiously gendered nature, these money gifts – where the initiand had 
to sieve through sand, mine through coal, or clean up excrement at the family celebration 
– appear to be post-unification innovations, as do the hammering in of a nail or the 
peeling of carrots. Not a single parent or grandparent had mentioned such gifts or 
practices to me as part of their own GDR Jugendweihe.44 Yet because the value of physical 
work has decreased in terms of both status and money in the post-Wende era, and because 
adolescents remain in education longer, the moral message appears to be clear. Maya 
Mayblin (2010) argues that while parents in Northeast Brazil welcomed the prohibition 
of labour for children under the age of fourteen, they also became concerned that their 
children would not develop any ‘courage to work’. Parents thus actively accustomed their 
children to work not simply out of financial necessity, but to cultivate coragem – a feature 
of moral personhood that enables them to perform physically challenging and 
monotonous labour (Mayblin 2010). I would suggest that East Thuringian parents and 
grandparents were troubled similarly by the fact that their children no longer learn what 
physical labour means. Some of the older grandparents left school and started work aged 
fourteen. Most of the grandparents and parents – as I demonstrated in Chapter 3 – 
participated in physical labour through both formal schooling and extra-curricular 
activities, in agricultural collectives and manufacturing companies. Primary school 
                                                 
44 These are also not mentioned in the scholarship on Jugendweihe, though their absence could 
also be due to the limited interest in the family celebration. 
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teachers too had frequently encouraged children to help their working mothers in the 
household.  
With the vanishing of the GDR and the introduction of a new school system, 
contemporary adolescents not only stay longer than ever in education; they are no longer 
taught about physical work as part of the school curriculum. Unlike in Northeast Brazil, 
however, the concern focused less on the adolescents’ failure to gain stamina for their 
future role as workers. Rather, I suggest, the socialist generations sought to stress that 
work is valuable in itself and to be respected. Because ‘work’ is no longer just hard physical 
labour to the same extent as it was in the past, the older generation feared that adolescents 
might not appreciate how hard their parents and grandparents worked. Especially because 
the socialist generations’ work was so sharply devalued in the post-Wende era, they sought 
to recuperate respect for their own lives’ work from their offspring, and to teach them 
not to dismiss people today who are doing menial jobs (see also Chapter 5). At the same 
time, these ‘work activities’ at the celebration show adolescents that one needs to earn 
one’s own living through work and to become financially independent. The popular 
phrase that one ought not to receive money, but to actually earn (verdienen) it, is commonly 
evoked among Thuringians. In German ‘verdienen’ has a double meaning and is used both 
for ‘to earn’ (money or otherwise) and for ‘to deserve’ (something), stressing the greater 
moral import of making money is through work – not investment, speculation, or 
inheritance.  
Money, special gifts and the way they were presented communicated what often remained 
unsaid – affection among kin. At the same time, money symbolized the initiand’s changed 
status, and took on an educative role (transmitted variously through gags) about the value 
of work. Instead of relying on their family’s financial support, these gestures 
communicated the importance of adolescents working for themselves and ideally earning 
money – they were given ‘wings’.  
 
Conclusion 
In German, the saying ‘Schnapps is schnapps and work is work’ propagates the notion 
that celebrating and working are two different domains that should not intermingle: what 
makes a celebration (‘Schnapps’) extraordinary is that it is set off in various ways from 
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everyday life (work). While both the public ceremony and the family celebration reify this 
distinction, in reality these two domains are interrelated: how we celebrate depends on 
how we work, and what we can afford to spend on celebrating depends on our earnings 
from work.  
In this chapter, I have illustrated that the Jugendweihe family celebration had two aims. 
On the one hand, it recreated familial ties among extended kin – but especially between 
the initiands as the main protagonists and their family members, during a time where 
adolescents sought greater autonomy from their parents. On the other hand, the family 
celebration symbolically marked the initiands’ change of status through various means: 
the consumption of particular foods; the initiand’s drinking of his or her first glass of 
alcohol in public with parental permission; the toast or thank you speech; receiving money 
and special gifts; and entertaining gags related to work. (While not all of these practices 
necessarily applied to all families, certainly variable combinations of at least three of the 
five symbolic acts did.) Of course, references to sexual maturity, as discussed in Chapter 
1, and as described in Nils’s case above, are an additional sixth feature of adolescents’ 
departure from their childhood. Unlike other family celebrations, then, in family 
celebrations of Jugendweihe, the adolescent was at its centre and symbolically 
transformed into an adult person.  
Notably, the family celebration united family members across the generations – a feat 
achieved not only through the above-mentioned practices, but partly because it appeared 
that they shared an event that has always been celebrated in their family. During the family 
celebration, such familial continuity was created through very sensory experiences for the 
adolescents, (re)creating bonds to the family and also the region of Thuringia, in ways that 
will very likely be recalled as positive memories of home later in life. As Celine’s 
grandmother’s story in the introductory vignette proves, of course, Jugendweihe was not 
always shared across all three generations. When Frau Schubert’s attempts to recount her 
Jugendweihe failed, she shifted to the school entry celebration as a feature that all family 
members shared – recreating a familial continuity. As Celine’s grandmother remembered 
out of the blue that in 1946 it was delicious to eat buttered white bread rolls, she also 
recalled that it was her parents who had enabled her to have this rare food. Consuming 
them with the comfort and the sweetness of cocoa was for her also intrinsically linked 
with the pleasant memory of her mother, who made the hot cocoa, and her father, who 
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got hold of the rare goods. Similarly, the eating of such rare foods later in life evokes 
memories of close kin and comfort, as I experienced with the home-made torte. This 
special comfort food then becomes tantamount to the comfort a family provides. Thus 
eating and drinking regional foods and drinks together at the family celebration also 
entailed processes of (re)making home, in both senses of the German words: zu Hause 
(home) and Heimat (regional home or ‘homeland’). Since Heimat is an important German 
concept that not only relates to identity but can form the link between local, regional, and 
national belonging, I will return to it in Chapter 7. 
There were certain features of the GDR family celebration that were clearly not in line 
with what the GDR state had intended – such as gift-giving practices and the limited use 
of collective family celebrations – highlighting the limits of state influence on families. 
Nevertheless, the Jugendweihe family celebration itself contributed to the state’s aim to 
some extent. Through the use of the emotional attachments – both familial and 
local/regional – Jugendweihe not only became part of individuals’ biographies, but also 
of their family histories, thus securing its continuity after the state’s demise. 
Simultaneously, the post-socialist innovation of inculcating a work ethic into the 
adolescent through entertaining gags appears to recall the GDR state’s aim of educating 
workers. As such, adolescents’ attachments to the familial home and to Heimat were 
strengthened, but they also ought to be hard-working, earn money, and be able to look 
after themselves – they were given roots and wings.    
Arguably the Jugendweihe family celebration could be celebrated as just that – a private 
function. But we saw in Chapter 3 that the class collective played a significant role in the 
continuity of the public Jugendweihe ceremony. In the next two chapters, I further 
explore reasons, effects, and legacies for the continued celebration of the Jugendweihe 
public ceremony. In the next chapter, I turn my attention to relations between households 
– returning to the socialist state’s work ideology and changes in gift-giving practices; and 
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Chapter 5 
‘Frugal Inequalities’: Jugendweihe as a Site of 
Distinction-making  
 
Thou shalt always strive for improvement of your performance, to be frugal, and to 
strengthen the socialist work discipline.  
 
– Seventh Commandment of the ‘Ten Commandments for the New Socialist Person’  
It was early evening on an unpleasantly cold Friday in December, and I was sitting with 
three adolescent boys at the large wooden table in the parsonage’s cosy kitchen. The 
kitchen’s homely atmosphere conjured up pleasant sensations of extended family meals 
and long conversations. Fourteen-year-olds Moritz and Timo and thirteen-year-old Jakob 
all went to different schools, but had been attending confirmation classes together for 
over a year, and were due to celebrate their confirmation on the following Whitsunday. 
The rest of the confirmand group were in the spacious living room next door, rehearsing 
a small sequence with the pastor that was to be performed at the Fourth Advent church 
service in one of the villages under his pastoral aegis. Moritz had just finished explaining 
that his family was Christian, in response to my question about why they had decided to 
celebrate confirmation next year. It was Timo’s turn to explain his reasoning, but the 
conversation developed in an unexpected and uneasy direction. 
‘In any case,’ Timo said, ‘I’ve always thought that those who do Jugendweihe – that they 
are… well, that they attend a Regelschule (state secondary school) …and they [would] always 
have their peaked caps put on half-properly …and the like. And that they – well, that 
Jugendweihe is only done by those who later…well, how can I put this?’ 
 
Jakob whispered a suggestion: ‘Assis (White trash)!’ Everyone started to chuckle, 
suggesting a sort of agreement, but also an awareness that the use of the word was not 
politically correct. But Timo objected: ‘No, no!’ He still could not find the right words, 
and so I suggested, ‘Who will later receive Hartz IV benefits?’ Hartz IV is the colloquial 
term for the ALGII, an unemployment and social welfare (Sozialhilfe) benefit, introduced 
with the social reforms of Agenda 2010, which came into effect in 2005. Timo again 
objected, ‘No, not Hartz IV, like…,’ and trailed off. Moritz filled in the sentence, 
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asserting, ‘Regelschüler’,45 and reiterating the connection Timo had made previously to 
Regelschule, the common state school that leads to a school leaving certificate after ten 
years, as opposed to the Gymnasium (similar to a grammar school) – which is usually also 
a state school, but which leads to an Abitur that would allow pupils to go on to university 
(see Chapter 3). 
 
But still Timo was not satisfied. ‘Mmmh…I don’t know how I should say this,’ he 
continued.  Jakob whispered another suggestion that Timo could not understand, and 
then, clearly amused, repeated it louder: ‘Penner (Hobo)!’ Chuckling, Timo still protested, 
‘No, no …,’ before repeating, ‘How shall I say this…?’ Moritz returned to Jakob’s earlier 
suggestion, asking, ‘Assis (White trash)?’, but Jakob was becoming impatient: ‘Do just say 
it!’, he insisted. ‘Well,’ said Timo, like those who don’t have a proper job, well they swing 
back and forth.’ Attempting to help him clarify what he was trying to convey, I began, ‘So 
if I understood you correctly, you had the impression that…’ – but he cut me off, blurting 
out: ‘Well those who don’t have a well-ordered life – they don’t lead a well-ordered life!’ 
Referring back to Moritz’ earlier interjection, which Timo had seemed to agree with, I 
asked, ‘So in your opinion, no one at a Gymnasium would celebrate Jugendweihe?’ ‘Well, 
not if they lead a relatively ordered life, I would think,’ he responded, having finally found 
the explanation that suited him. ‘And I always thought, well I am not that kind of a guy… 
and I’ll just do this [confirmation].’ 
 
Timo’s perception of a ‘well-ordered life’ was based on his own family, who seemed to 
provide him with a greater sense of security than the families of his peers whose parents 
had never married, or whose parents had divorced. It also reflected what he had been 
taught in both school and church, through the Christian Gymnasium and the confirmation 
classes he attended – which emphasised a heteronormative lifestyle supported through 
the father’s regular employment. All of the three boys’ families belonged to a parish that 
stood out in the region because of its active Christian lifestyle. I was told by many 
independently that the pastor was held to be particularly pious and the strictest in the area. 
Thus, the parents’ choice to send their children to confirmation classes with him, rather 
than to another more liberal pastor, was not only based on proximity, but also on their 
                                                 
45 Regelschüler is a student who attends a Regelschule. A Gymnasiast attends a Gymnasium. 
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own convictions: the extent to which they adhered to and engaged with a Christian 
lifestyle. 
However, what struck me in this conversation was the fact that Timo did not describe the 
decision of whether to celebrate confirmation or Jugendweihe in terms of a simple 
religion/atheism binary, as one might expect, and as Moritz before him had done. The 
three boys all seemed to agree in their association of the Jugendweihe celebration with a 
lower social stratum compared to their own. Timo’s struggle to articulate his thoughts 
appeared to be based on discomfort about using offensive language, but judging from 
Jakob’s and Moritz’s repeated suggestions and the way he laughed about them, it was 
likely that he agreed with their assessments. These derogatory terms imply that teenagers 
who celebrate Jugendweihe belong to families of the lowest strata within society, or even 
to families who are excluded from such a society. Teenagers may not be very familiar with 
terms such as ‘social class’ or ‘social stratum’, but the absence of such terminology was 
total during my fieldwork, and noticeably so, in the language of all generations. Socio-
economic differences that are often articulated in terms of ‘class’ in the UK or the USA 
are not expressed in this way in Germany. Rather, such categorisations are commonly 
described either according to their location as soziale Brennpunkte (‘social focal points’) that 
refer to socially-deprived areas of a town (as synonym for Problemviertel – problem 
area/troubled suburbs); or by identifying people as Sozialschwache (‘the socially weak’ 
referring to the socially deprived/disadvantaged – though the German equivalent 
‘benachteiligt’ is hardly ever used, perhaps because it would suggest that there was some 
form of structural injustice at play).  
 
Yet the way Timo described the particular manner of wearing a cap, his references to 
education and employment, are all signifiers of exactly what remained unsaid – 
distinctions based on judgment of taste and socio-economic background (Bourdieu 1984). 
Pierre Bourdieu argues that social distinctions are not only based on economic capital, 
such as money and property, but also on social and cultural capital. Social capital refers 
to ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition’ (Bourdieu 1986: 29). In contrast, cultural capital is accumulated through 
socialisation and institutional education, and marks a person’s ability to know how to 
behave in different social environments – for example, how to dress or speak in certain 
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circles. All of these forms of capital are necessary for upward social mobility, and in certain 
conditions both social and cultural capital can be converted to economic capital.  It is 
through cultural capital in particular that distinctions are articulated.  
My focus in this chapter is on the interdependencies of economics and ritual, and on the 
ways the change from a socialist command to a capitalist market economy is reflected in 
socio-economic changes around the celebration of Jugendweihe. I view the ritual ‘in terms 
of notions of house economy and human sociality’ (Gudeman and Hann 2015: 6) and 
illustrate that the celebration of Jugendweihe not only reflects the increasing socio-
economic stratification of eastern German society, but also serves as a site of distinction-
making itself. In order to render these changes visible, I first briefly discuss the social 
structure of the GDR, before I show how distinctions are made today by adolescents and 
members of the parental and grandparental generations – through references to education 
and occupation respectively. I then turn to the example of Celine’s family, and their 
attempts to set themselves apart from other East Thuringians by drawing distinctions 
through clothes, photos, and through references to taste. In the second part of the 
chapter, I note that despite these processes of distinction-making and greater social 
stratification – especially in the actual value of monetary gifts compared to 1970s and 
1980s – families seem to share a moral discourse on work and frugality. This discourse 
on frugality plays out in two ways. On the one hand, families attempted to keep the cost 
of the family celebration low; on the other, adolescents were taught to be frugal and to 
save money gifts for their future. I suggest that parents’ and grandparents’ concerns that 
adolescents viewed the celebration of Jugendweihe as a money-making venture reflects a 
change in gift giving practice from consumer products to money gifts. Money gifts today 
are often larger, but confined to a smaller social group than they were under the GDR. I 
argue that this change in gift-giving practice reflects a change in social relations, with a 
concurrent shift in distinction-making. Under state socialism, status was acquired through 
the emphasis on social capital, which in the post-socialist context has shifted to a greater 
focus on economic and cultural capital.  
 
The GDR’s Social Structure 
The boys’ references to distinctions recounted in the introductory vignette to this chapter 
made me feel uncomfortable. It was only after some reflection about the reasons why that 
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I recalled a conversation I had had with an eastern German woman earlier in the summer. 
Urte and I had been introduced through a mutual friend, who thought it would be useful 
for us to meet because we shared not only the experience of a GDR childhood and the 
Wende, but an interest in eastern Germany, and time spent studying social sciences in the 
UK. Urte was just a little younger than me, and said that she had enjoyed her courses at a 
reputable British university in the mid-1990s, having got on well with many of the students 
in her cohort, who had similar views and were politically active. But then she added:  
But you know I never quite understood why we didn’t really hit it off. We 
hung out a lot and stuff, but there was something missing that back then 
I couldn’t put my finger on. I only realised much later what it was: they 
were all from really well-off backgrounds. [She shook her head and 
admitted, smiling:] But I guess as an East German you just didn’t think 
about class, did you? 
I realised that I had actually never considered the issue of ‘class’ before I lived in the UK, 
where there was constant talk about it and where I grew increasingly aware of the 
existence of greater socio-economic differences. Naturally, I knew about ‘class’ from 
history lessons, and as a crucial aspect of Marxist ideology; but it was part of the past, and 
never part of my life in East Germany. Although state socialism aimed at eliminating 
inequalities, they never entirely disappeared; but socio-economic differences under the 
GDR, and even in the 1990s in eastern German society, had been comparatively small. 
Since East Germany described itself as a worker-and-peasant-state, with the working class 
(Arbeiterklasse) ruling, like other socialist countries it attached the  greatest status to ‘the 
worker’, who was glorified in state ideology (Fulbrook 2005; Kideckel 2002; Satjukow and 
Gries 2002). Work was an essential aspect of the socialist personality and, as explained in 
Chapter 3, inculcated in school – explicitly from grade seven (twelve/thirteen-year-olds) 
onward through both theoretical school subjects (‘Introduction to the Socialist 
Production’, ‘Technical Drawing’) and practical ones ( like ‘Productive Work’, where 
adolescents worked one school day per fortnight either in a company or in a training 
centre). As we have seen, Jugendweihe, too, played a significant role in fostering the 
socialist work ethic (Arbeitsmoral) – especially through its preparatory programme, which 
included a youth lesson entitled ‘Your work is needed’ (commonly involving a visit to a 
people’s-owned enterprise in order to observe the production of goods first hand and to 
talk to workers, the ‘socialist heroes’; see ZAJ 1974: 60-62; ZAJ 1986: 98-103). This 
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emphasis on work was also reflected in the GDR Jugendweihe ceremonies, as this excerpt 
from a 1986 Jugendweihe speech demonstrates:   
In our time the invincible force of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
its world-changing revolutionary worldview, have particularly 
conspicuously come to the fore. Bei uns [in our place] social security and 
Geborgenheit [feeling of safety and belonging] are a matter of course, in stark 
contrast to the unemployment, new poverty, homelessness, and hardship 
faced by many elderly, and millions of young people’s Zukunftsangst [worry 
about the future] under capitalism. In our country the socialist reality 
warrants everyone to prove and to develop their strengths. […] 
Before you – the future experts of a modern socialist large-scale 
production, the future masters of microelectronics, robotics, electronic 
and fully-automatic conveyer belt lines, the skilled workers in all sectors 
of the economy – are plenty of opportunities to stand the test of time! 
Enable yourself already in school to be at all times a match for the rapid 
development of science and technology. Take on your responsibility 
today, but also tomorrow!46  
In the 1980s, most East Germans no longer bought into the discourse of socialist 
superiority over capitalism, because they had experienced first-hand economic shortages. 
They also constantly saw the wide and colourful product ranges of capitalism on West 
German TV, or sampled such consumer goods through parcels received from West 
German kin (Westpakete) and purchases made in the chain Intershop – a GDR state shop 
opened in 1974 that sold western products for hard currency, i.e. West Marks (see also 
Veenis 2012). And while the legally prescribed right to work provided social security, it 
also meant that there was no need for competitiveness over or in a work place, which also 
led to inefficiency that fuelled such shortages (see Engler 2009; Fulbrook 2005). 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not East Germans subscribed to official state 
ideology, many identified with the value of work. As Olivia Harris illustrates, work itself 
can be a value and thus a fundamental part of one’s personhood (Harris 2007) – an 
observation which holds true for many members of the generations who were socialised 
in the GDR. This link between work and personhood was perhaps best illustrated by a 
conversation I had with a fifty-year-old man at Lukas’s Jugendweihe family celebration. 
Rolf, a family friend, and I stood on the patio enjoying the formidable May sun, and – as 
he sipped from time to time on his bottle of beer – he was volunteering his life-story to 
                                                 
46 Excerpt from a Jugendweihe speech 27 April 1986 at the Ho Chi Minh POS in Erfurt; tape 
recording from the archive of the Jugendweihe Association Erfurt.  
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me, in an attempt, as he later put it, ‘to make up for having pestered you with so many 
questions about your life in Scotland’. But his narrative did not include, as one would 
suspect, the happy stories of how he met his wife, their wedding, their two sons’ births or 
graduations, nor any recalling of holidays and hobbies. It consisted exclusively of his 
struggles that had come with the Wende. It was a narrative sequence of having lost his 
job, seeking work further afield, commuting to the West and being ridiculed and exploited, 
re-training for additional qualifications, and seeking a new job closer to home, punctuated 
by technical language (which I found incomprehensible) describing his programming 
tasks, to evidence his expert knowledge. His life, and who he was, seemed to be solely 
defined through work. Indeed, the processes associated with the Wende – the devaluation 
of East German labour and products, the closing down of companies in which people 
had worked for their entire lives, and widespread unemployment – were experienced not 
only by Rolf, but by many East Germans as profoundly undermining their ‘sense of self 
and identity’  (Berdahl 1999b: 199). These experiences are engrained in the East German 
psyche; and while people commonly recognized that the GDR’s economy was beyond 
ailing, they simultaneously asserted that ‘we worked so hard’, almost always while sneering 
about the Treuhand (Trust Agency) – which many hold responsible for the unjustified 
liquidation of the companies in which they used to work (see also Chapter 6). 
Unemployment was thus a traumatic experience for many, not because of a decrease in 
available funds, but because they could not work, rendering them morally questionable as 
persons. 
Yet one also needs to bear in mind that during socialist times, different types of ‘work’ 
were almost equally valued, as long as they served the greater good of socialist society. A 
Facharbeiter (skilled worker) was seen as equally worthy of praise and remuneration as a 
medical doctor or a university professor (i.e. members of the ‘intelligentsia’). Because 
wages did not vary greatly and private property was very limited, distinction-making 
focussed less on economic than on social capital. In an ‘economy of shortages’, one could 
not simply buy products, but required Vitamin B – B for Beziehungen, or connections, in 
order to have access to certain goods and services. This access to resources was available 
on the one hand through Westbeziehungen (connections to the West), which not everyone 
had, and which enabled distinction-making by the display of simple but coveted western 
products in the home, or by wearing western clothes. On the other hand, resources were 
available through local connections, that is, the ‘[n]etwork of friendships, acquaintances, 
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and associates [that] were created and maintained through gift exchange, bribes, and 
barter trade’ (Berdahl 1999a: 118). Shop assistants who could save some ‘under the 
counter’ products (Bückwaren), or plumbers who could fix something in the house, 
depended on each other as much as the manager of a company (usually a SED 
functionary) who was able to ‘redirect’ materials or a doctor who could make an urgent 
home visit. This social network of interdependencies similarly affected the East German 
habitus. Herr Schmidt, a westerner who had moved to Thuringia with his family straight 
after the Wende, described to me somewhat nostalgically how different social life in the 
early 1990s in the East was compared to the Ruhrpott – a heavy industry region in North-
Rhine Westphalia – they had come from. He noticed this difference through the ways 
villagers celebrated events such as Maibaumsetzen (the erection of a maypole before or on 
May Day).  What appeared to have puzzled and fascinated him most was that East 
Germans, regardless of their occupations, celebrated together. A lawyer and a company 
manager, he had observed, would be sitting with ordinary workers on a bench and 
drinking beer together or singing along to the same songs. However, he added, these kinds 
of social interaction had long since changed or indeed vanished.   
In the GDR, party functionaries and managers self-defined as part of the ‘ruling working 
class’, and over the years the state stretched its definition of ‘working class’ further and 
further in order to include as many citizens as possible (see also Niethammer 1991). But 
as the historian Mary Fulbrook argues, the characteristics of a class – such as collective 
consciousness, common interest in opposition to other classes, inequalities, and so on – 
simultaneously dissolved, which led to the emerging of a new kind of collective identity: 
the ‘ordinary’ East German (Fulbrook 2005: 214). Similarly, Engler (2009) holds that over 
time, the GDR had become an increasingly uniform society, in which diverse social 
milieus and their associated value conceptions disappeared, so that:   
Techniques of distinction and of aloofness such as nimbus, aura, and 
prestige provoked alienation. Eccentrics led a delicate, always contested, 
existence. The worker demeanour did not suffer ‘follies’. In a society of 
almost equals no one was entitled to symbolically distinguish oneself from 
the others. Who asserted such an entitlement sinned against the Gemeinsinn 
(public spirit) (Engler 2009: 180).  
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As such, distinction-making was much more subtle under the GDR. As Daphne Berdahl 
argues, ‘[c]onnections replaced property as an indicator of social status’ (Berdahl 1999a: 
122).  
In what follows, I demonstrate that a reverse process is now under way. I argued in 
Chapter 3 that the preparation for, and celebration of, the GDR Jugendweihe was aimed 
at focusing on the collective over the individual – a value that is still promoted by the 
Jugendweihe Association today, to a certain degree, and upheld by the grandparental and 
parental generations. However, the contemporary Jugendweihe celebration also mirrors 
the increasing social stratification of eastern German society, and simultaneously serves 
as a site where such distinction-making is played out and rendered visible. Because 
consumption and production are intrinsically linked, distinction-making manifests itself 
in the ways people celebrate and what gifts adolescent receive; but it is also embedded in 
a moral discourse that draws on the ideals of the socialist worker’s identity: work and 
frugality.  
Demarcating Confirmation from Jugendweihe Participants 
References to socio-economic distinctions, such as those in the introductory vignette, 
were not only clumsily articulated by teenagers. In a conversation I had with Dagmar (the 
sixty-year-old vice-chairwoman of the Jugendweihe Association) about the different life 
cycle rituals, she mentioned that she had heard that getting married in a church, or having 
a baptism or a confirmation, was somehow more solemn. ‘Well what do I know’, she said,  
Maybe it is for them. But I think that after the Wende lawyers and doctors 
and suchlike wanted to stand out from the crowd; you know what I mean? 
That’s why they celebrate confirmation. I mean here everyone does 
Jugendweihe – it’s nothing special. 
Similarly, Celine’s grandmother claimed that although her parents did not baptise her, 
they would have preferred if she had celebrated confirmation at the age of fourteen, 
because her father owned a small business during GDR times. While private businesses 
were frowned upon by the state as reactionary and hindering further development towards 
communism, Celine’s grandmother, Frau Schubert, did not describe it as a matter of either 
religion and/or state opposition that led her parents to prefer confirmation. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, Christians (by conviction rather than convention) tended to emphasise that 
the celebration of confirmation during GDR times was primarily an affirmation of their 
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belief in God – as it is today – and that they only celebrated the GDR Jugendweihe under 
coercion from the socialist state. While Christians formed a minority within a largely 
secular/atheist society, neither Dagmar nor Frau Schubert – whose own life-worlds do 
not include religion – expressed such connections. Instead they pointed to a difference 
between the majority of ‘ordinary’ people and the minority of ‘special’ people, which in 
both accounts was expressed through a juxtaposition translatable to working class (in 
GDR terminology) versus other (intelligentsia and private business owner respectively). 
Furthermore, Celine’s grandmother’s assertion that her father owned a business – like her 
daughter today – implicitly, without a need to directly verbalise it, set her family apart 
from the majority of society, since most people (past and present) are employees rather 
than employers. In both instances the grandparental generations’ view of confirmation 
and Jugendweihe – associating the latter with a large majority that did not want to stand 
out – expressed subtle differences in socio-economic standing. 
 
The confirmands’ use of derogatory language in the introductory vignette, and their more 
directly-voiced assumption that Jugendweihe participants would have a lower education 
than themselves, is also revealing. Not attending a Gymnasium, a school that teaches an 
advanced secondary school curriculum leading to an Abitur, suggests one cannot belong 
to the potential high-achievers of society. Since it is unlikely for a Regelschüler to attend a 
university, it precludes them from future well-paid job opportunities. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the majority of East Germans attended a POS, and since attending an EOS or 
university was associated with state loyalty, this attendance was a rather flimsy status 
symbol. However, today the school type has become a marker of not only intellectual 
capabilities, but increasingly also one of status and a sign of upward social mobility. Pupils 
from Gymnasiums – regardless of whether they celebrated Jugendweihe or confirmation – 
liked to point out which school they attended, just as Lennart, Daniel’s school friend, did 
when I discussed future aspirations with him, Daniel, and Lukas:  
 
Well, yes, you have set yourself a goal; well a kind of dream that you will 
not be a Hartz IV recipient or something like that. Because one has, well 
I am, for example, – or both of us – are at the Gymnasium and then we’ll 
have an appropriate school certificate, I would think, and with an Abitur, 
for example, to become a Hartz IV recipient you wouldn’t dream of that 
or wish for it.  
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Aware that Lukas attended a Regelschule, I asked, ‘But I believe that someone with a 
Regelschule certificate would not wish for that either, would they?’ Lennart responded, 
‘Sure, one would never wish for that! But especially not with an Abitur, because, for 
example, one is already more highly qualified than with a Realschulabschluss and yes…’.  
Although Lennart did not distinguish between confirmation and Jugendweihe participants 
based on school type, he clearly expressed that he viewed himself less in danger of 
becoming unemployed due to attending a school that would qualify him to attend 
university. This association also illustrates that in reality, the distinction between education 
and the type of coming-of-age ritual one celebrates – of the sort drawn by the confirmands 
at the beginning of the chapter – is not (yet) evident. Indeed, in the same conversation, 
Moritz, Timo and Jacob told me that most of their classmates at the Gymnasium had 
celebrated Jugendweihe. This assertion contradicted their earlier statements somewhat, 
but because all three of them attended a Gymnasium, such a distinction was easily 
acceptable; they knew no one present would oppose such a demarcation.  
Both Jugendweihe and confirmation participants consisted of a mix of pupils who 
attended either Regelschule or Gymnasium. In fact, it was more likely for pupils from a 
Gymnasium than from a Regelschule to participate in Jugendweihe. Germany has extremely 
high inequality in educational opportunities compared internationally, and attendance at 
a Gymnasium is particularly dependent on one’s (parents’) socio-economic background 
(Becker 2012). Unsurprisingly, then, in cases where teenagers did not mark their coming-
of-age through a celebration, they were more likely to be found in a Regelschule. Not 
celebrating Jugendweihe was most often due to unaffordability, and thus families and 
teenagers from lower socio-economic backgrounds were disproportionately affected. In 
the next section, I look more closely at the costs attached to celebrating Jugendweihe in 
order to unearth convergences and divergences across families and between the socialist 
past and the present.  
 
The Cost of Celebrating the Jugendweihe Ceremony 
When I asked Celine during our family conversation how many pupils in her class had 
celebrated Jugendweihe, she told me that not everyone had participated. Her mother, 
Sandra, asserted that in fact not very many of Celine’s classmates had celebrated 
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Jugendweihe, only ten or eleven; and her father, Peter, added that ‘they didn’t have enough 
money’ to do so. This comment triggered Celine’s grandmother to exclaim: ‘Many have 
not got that much money! It costs a lot of money. The celebration alone you have to pay 
for – in the theatre, that’s really…! Well, I thought the school would take care of it or the 
city would do it, that they…’. Celine’s father interrupted: ‘Everything that was for free 
back then [during GDR times], today you have to pay for yourself!’ 
They then took turns complaining about the cost of the tickets for the public ceremony 
in the Gera Theatre, for which they claimed to have spent €200. When I carefully 
suggested that the cost was actually €95 and that it seemed to be a reasonable price – 
given that it included not only the teenager’s participation but also six tickets for guests – 
they admitted that they were unsure of how much they had actually paid and perhaps 
exaggerated. Nevertheless, Celine’s mother forcefully continued: ‘Well, all the same, what 
do you think what the Hartzer here… for them even €100 [is a lot] – for someone who 
receives €350 [per month] Hartz IV.’ And Celine’s father added: ‘It is a lot all right, but 
it’s not that that’s expensive – it’s everything that’s added – the ‘Drumherum’ (everything 
else).’ And Celine’s mother drove her point home: ‘Her friend, for example, she wasn’t 
part of it [Jugendweihe] – when you have to calculate with €350, you just cannot spend 
€100!’ Now Celine cut in: ‘But they can make something like an application so that they 
can get it paid by someone, can’t they?’ And while both her mother and her grandmother’s 
partner confirmed that this was the case, she herself further considered: ‘Yeah, but when 
you then also have to buy a dress and everything else…’. 
Such complaints about unfair changes in state provisions after the shift from a socialist 
to a capitalist social order are a fairly common phenomenon among people in post-
socialist societies (Mandel and Humphrey 2002: 3). However, while Celine’s parents and 
grandparents criticised the fact that one now has to pay a ceremony fee – which marks 
the greatest difference from the GDR Jugendweihe, which was state-sponsored and thus 
free – they also acknowledged that it was not the fee but the associated cost of the 
celebration that hindered other teenagers from partaking. Indeed, all these associated 
costs already existed in the GDR era, including expenses for hospitality, clothes, and gifts. 
But the act of pointing out these socio-economic issues cuts both ways. On the one hand, 
it was a criticism of the current social order, which exacerbated social stratification and 
thus excluded people; on the other, it was a re-assertion that one personally was not 
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affected by these changes, but rather belonged to a higher stratum. In fact, Celine later 
told me that her best friend, Lexi, had desperately wanted to celebrate Jugendweihe, which 
caused an argument with her mother. She did not explicitly mention that Lexi’s mother 
could not afford to cater to her daughter’s wishes, but – given Sandra’s indication that 
Lexi’s mother was a Hartz IV recipient – it was likely a matter of affordability. Lexi’s case 
was not an exception: I was told of other people who, despite employment, claimed to be 
unable to afford their child’s Jugendweihe celebration because of their low income. 
Yet Celine’s own family led a comfortable lifestyle, which not only included regular 
holidays abroad but was also mirrored in their new German car, an Audi, in their 
fashionable clothes, and in their impeccable and stylish house. Sandra and Peter both 
divorced their first partners and decided not to get married again. They met during the 
Wende-time, and Peter once admitted to me that when he had first set eyes on Sandra 
some twenty-odd years ago he thought her to be conceited because of the way she always 
put so much effort into her appearance. His friends expressed similar fears to him; but he 
added, ‘you quickly figure out that she is not like that all. Once you get to talk to her you 
realize she is totally down to earth and doesn’t mince matters.’ Like their two daughters, 
Sandra was always well-dressed and – unlike most eastern German women of her 
generation – I have never seen her without make-up. She runs a small successful catering 
business with eight employees, whereas Peter has worked as a mechanic at the same 
dealership garage his entire life. He bemoaned that he could no longer make money ‘on 
the side’ by repairing cars of friends or acquaintances, which was a useful income 
generator in the GDR’s second economy, and was still worthwhile in the early 1990s. 
Nowadays, such work was no longer profitable, and most of his ‘spare time’ was spent 
helping out in his wife’s business by running diverse errands. Indeed, Celine’s parents 
pointed out to me several times that they worked hard and long hours. When they showed 
me around their lovely, big garden, which looked immaculate to me, they claimed they no 
longer took things very seriously, but went on to point out every nook and cranny of 
imperfections. According to them, it was in a ‘terrible state’ because, due to their work 
commitments, they hadn’t had enough time to tend to the gardening properly.  
Although Celine knew about Jugendweihe already from her older sister, she was not at all 
certain whether to celebrate her own – and her uncertainty was augmented by her best 
friend’s situation. Sandra insisted that her daughter should mark her coming-of-age, which 
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was partly based on treating their two daughters equally. But she was even more insistent, 
as explained in Chapter 4, because Sandra herself had been denied a happy family 
celebration by her relatives, who demonstrated their disapproval of her parents’ imminent 
divorce by refusing to attend her party. Although she had initially played the incident 
down, perhaps because of her mother’s presence, after Celine’s maternal grandparents 
had left, Sandra elaborated that her bad experience had been the main motivation behind 
her insistence on celebrating Celine’s Jugendweihe. She noted: ‘It’s like if you now say no, 
then this phase is over, and you didn’t experience it and that is just a shame. I just didn’t 
want that [for her]. She had to celebrate it come hell or high water!’. This concern may 
explain why Celine’s mother invested so much energy, effort and money in celebrating 
the family celebration in a restaurant, catering for a total of 27 people. However, it does 
not account for why she also insisted on attendance at the Jugendweihe ceremony. In fact, 
her husband had played along with what seemed to be largely her decisions. While he 
thought that the ceremony had been entertaining, he admitted he instead would have 
preferred a party with Celine’s classmates’ families in the garden or a hired venue, or 
perhaps, just a low-key family celebration. This difference in attitude was, I believe, not 
simply based on gender and their varying experience of their own GDR Jugendweihe, but 
also intersected with their families’ differing socio-economic backgrounds.  
After Celine and her grandparents had left, Sandra brought out the photographs of 
Celine’s Jugendweihe. Peter proudly commented that the professional photographer had 
been taken by their daughter’s looks, and had said that she could even pursue a career as 
model. Celine was indeed a strikingly beautiful girl, and on the day of her Jugendweihe 
she looked like she had just stepped off the catwalk on Heidi Klum’s popular TV show 
Germany’s Next Top Model. She seemed to be closer to eighteen than her actual age, in part 
because of the way she presented herself. She sported a knee-length silky dress with a 
small décolleté that was not too revealing but nevertheless highlighted her slim feminine 
physique, enhanced by high heels. Her long brownish-red hair was stylishly pinned to one 
side, where it fell in bouncy curls down over her left shoulder. The soft rose colour of her 
dress harmonized with her face’s porcelain skin and make-up had been skilfully applied 
to accentuate her blue eyes. The day of her Jugendweihe was her big day, and she was 
dressed to impress – a fact which had been well-captured by the photographer. 
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Unlike most parents who buy their teenager’s Jugendweihe outfit in one of the clothing 
stores at the shopping mall or by mail order, Sandra selected a few dresses from a boutique 
in town not frequented by adolescents. As we were flicking through the photos, Peter and 
Sandra both assessed the other teenagers’ attire, and recalled others from the ceremony 
those participants who were not in the photographs they had bought. They both took 
issue with some male adolescents who had worn trainers, and some girls who wore too 
short a skirt, both of which were judged to be under-dressed or inappropriate for the 
festivity. But they also disliked the fact that some female adolescents ‘entirely overdid it’, 
and they mocked those who were ‘wearing a crown’:  a couple of girls wore debutante-
like outfits including a tiara in their hair. When we were looking at the photographs taken 
of the group of adolescents on stage after being congratulated on their Jugendweihe, 
Sandra pointed out that the girl standing next to Celine on stage was the daughter of one 
of her employees. She shook her head and remarked: ‘What are the chances for that to 
happen, that they of all people would stand next to each other? It was kind of awkward.’ 
The fact that her daughter and her employee’s daughter stood next to each other on the 
stage seemed to cause her some discomfort.  
Admittedly, I was a little stunned by her comment, especially as it appeared to contradict 
the empathy she had expressed earlier for Lexi’s situation. However, their earlier 
comments about people who could not afford to celebrate Jugendweihe – which I had 
initially interpreted as complaints directed against the state for not offering more support 
– also entailed something else: it was their way of subtly expressing that they could afford 
it, and did not have to rely on outside help for providing their daughter with the ‘big bash’ 
she deserved. The public ceremony then provided an extra opportunity to show off the 
fact that they could afford for their daughter to go to the hairdresser’s in the morning for 
a special hairdo, and to buy a special dress that no one else would have. The remarks 
about the inappropriate clothes of others also established that their own offspring was 
dressed appropriately for the occasion. Moreover, the fact that Celine’s parents had 
purchased not only selected photographs of the ceremony, as the majority of parents did, 
but had also gone to an appointment with the photographer to take portraits of their 
daughter was another way of distinguishing themselves from others. Most families were 
not able or willing to spend extra money on professional photographs, let alone purchase 
thank you cards with the initiand’s portrait from a photographer. While Daniel called most 
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people he could not thank in person for his presents, Lukas’s and Nils’ parents made 
thank you cards at a photo machine in a drug store from a portrait I had taken of each on 
their Jugendweihe.  
During conversations I had with Peter and Sandra independently, they both had said that 
it was hard to find the ‘right employees’, that is, people willing to work hard. However, I 
later learned that Sandra paid her employees less than the aspired minimum wage – which 
seemed out of tune with her concern about people not having enough money to celebrate 
Jugendweihe. Sandra’s and Peter’s work ethic was not simply a matter of ‘if you work hard 
enough, you can afford certain things’. But through their commentary on their own hard 
work, they also implied that others were not working hard. Indeed, the recounting of 
Sandra’s difficulties in finding appropriate staff made explicit the fact that they subscribed 
to the idea of ‘if you work harder than others, you can get ahead of them’ – a possibility 
that was very restricted under the GDR. 
For Celine’s family, the public ceremony was an additional opportunity for distinction-
making: a hybrid of the old cultural capital of the GDR (Jugendweihe itself) and the new 
cultural capital (the appropriate way of presenting oneself by standing out in a fashionable, 
tasteful manner). Sandra knew how to present herself: she did not adhere to the ‘natural 
woman’ look that was propagated under the GDR, but at the same time she did not 
overuse make up. Family members’ clothes were selected in a manner that was deemed 
to fit within the new social order, and other people’s failure to do the same was pointed 
out in various ways. While work outside the home remained important as source of 
income, it was used increasingly as a way to distinguish oneself from others. In short, 
Celine’s parents were able to combine the old and the new as successfully as the 
Jugendweihe Association in its adaptation of the ritual: celebrating Jugendweihe meant 
not denying one’s own past and sharing it with other Thuringians. Yet it also meant 
illustrating to a larger audience that they were people who had ‘made it’ in the new social 
order.  
While the ceremony fee, the special clothes and photographs represented costs incurred 
for the public ceremony, the greatest cost of celebrating Jugendweihe was attached to the 
family celebration and gifts, which I discuss next. 
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The Cost of the Family Celebration: Hospitality and Gifts 
Grandparents in particular often commented negatively on the excess of expenditure for 
both Jugendweihe celebrations and gifts. When I spoke to Herr Lorenz, Nils’s paternal 
grandfather, about Nils’s upcoming Jugendweihe celebration, he exclaimed in reference 
to Nils’s parents: ‘They are crazy – [They invited] thirty people! What that all cost!’ 
Jugendweihe family celebrations usually didn’t appear particularly lavish. On the contrary, 
parents liked to point out to me their strategies for having kept costs low. For families to 
spend between €2,000 and €2,500 on their child’s Jugendweihe, when they catered for 
more than twenty guests and celebrated at a restaurant, was not unheard of – but it was 
also not the rule. Sandra claimed to have spent an estimated total of €2,000, including not 
only the restaurant bill and the ceremony fee but also Celine’s outfit, presents, and 
photographs. Both Lukas’s and Daniel’s families only had lunch at a restaurant and then 
celebrated with their extended family and friends at home or at a hired venue nearby 
respectively. Nils’s family had no lunch at all, and celebrated at a hired venue as well. 
Andrea, Franka, and Beate had explained to me that it was more economical not to 
celebrate in a restaurant: in all three families, dinner was provided through a catering 
service and supplemented with some home-made foods. But while avoiding restaurants 
was a way of keeping costs low, so was the decision of how many people to invite. Lukas’s 
party consisted of 18 people who managed to fit in the living room, though furniture had 
been moved out and rearranged, and the sunny weather helped people to spread outside 
onto the patio. Franka, Daniel’s mother, decided to hire an inexpensive venue located in 
the same street as their home because her partner came from a large family that made it 
impossible to celebrate in her living room; she added: ‘And to have a celebration for 45 
people at a restaurant, well that really goes beyond the scope of it…that would already be 
a wedding!’.  
But while both Kaffee & Kuchen and dinner used to be must-have elements at any major 
life-cycle event, not providing the former seemed also to be a way of saving money. 
Sandra claimed that it was ‘too much’ and ‘too stressful’ to provide Kaffee & Kuchen for 
everyone as well as. However, Franka was certainly also interested in keeping the cost of 
the celebration low, since she – as she told me some months later – had been made 
redundant from her job as a lathe operator around the same time. Prior to her 
unemployment, she had not been paid by her company for a few months, despite working 
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double-shifts to fulfil customer contracts. Money in Daniel’s family was certainly tight – 
unlike in the case of Celine’s. But while Franka explained that it would have been too 
stressful for her to also provide Kaffee & Kuchen since she catered herself, she added that 
she had recently been to a festivity where most of the dinner remained untouched because 
they had offered Kaffee & Kuchen. Since there was not much time between the two meals, 
and since she could not serve dinner late because of the many young children among her 
kin, it would have been wasteful to provide it.  
As such, much thought went into the planning of hospitality – often by mothers, who 
were in charge of these family affairs – in particular, in order to avoid excessive 
expenditure. Yet their attempts to save costs cannot simply be reduced to a lack of 
financial resources, as the difference of funds between Celine’s and Daniel’s families 
indicates. In her study of quinceañeras celebrated to mark the coming-of-age of girls in 
Latin American communities in the United States, Julia Alvarez (2008) reports that despite 
parents’ unemployment and/or struggles to make ends meet, families often spend vast 
amounts on lavish parties for their daughters. These parties were marked by conspicuous 
consumption on the part of the aspiring minority migrant families, who sought to 
demonstrate to others that they had succeeded in the USA. Alvarez estimated an average 
cost of $15,000 for a quinceañera, and although such costs were often shared among the 
extended family and community, parents frequently incurred debts for the celebration 
(Alvarez 2008: 39; 78-79). In East Thuringia, incurring debts for Jugendweihe was 
unheard of; and I suggest that keeping costs low, and freely explaining how one had done 
so, both reflected the moral value of frugality. Modesty and frugality were values variously 
expressed by all generations, and conveyed to teenagers in regard to monetary gifts.   
As already noted, grandparental and parental generations often pinpointed money as the 
main motivation for adolescents to celebrate Jugendweihe, while many adolescents only 
talked about their presents after having been asked about them directly (see Chapter 4). 
Generally, there was a sense of unease in speaking about such matters; and because many 
teenagers felt uncomfortable about stating how much money they were given, I included 
some questions regarding gift-giving practices in an anonymous survey, which made 
visible stark differences in the amounts of money teenagers received on their 
Jugendweihe. The survey collected information from 50 teenagers who celebrated 
Jugendweihe in 2013, and indicates that the average amount of money they were given 
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was slightly more than €1,200.47 While most teenagers (15) received more than €500, 
almost as many received more than €1,500 (12) and more than €1,000 (10) (see Table 10). 
Money had already been an important Jugendweihe gift under state socialism, and I was 
somewhat baffled by parents’ and grandparents’ portrayal of today’s Jugendweihe as 
consumer-driven. After my fieldwork I conducted a small survey of gift-giving practices 
at GDR Jugendweihe celebrations among the parental generation, which garnered 30 
responses (see Table 11). Here too, substantial amounts of money were indicated, 
averaging a little more than 700 GDR Marks. While at first sight there appears to be an 
increase in the monetary value of gifts in the post-Wende context, these figures are not 
so easily comparable – in part due to differences in spending power in each time period, 
but also because consumer goods were given as well (an issue I return to later).  
 
Table 10: Monetary Gifts received by Jugendweihe Participants 2013  
Participants Amount of Money in % 
6 > € 2,500 12 
5 > € 2,000 10 
12 > €1,500 24 
10 > €1,000 20 
15 > € 500 30 
2 > € 200 4 
50  100 
 
Table 11: Monetary Gifts received by Jugendweihe Participants 1975-1989  
Participants Amount of Money in % 
0 > M 2,500 0 
0 > M 2,000 0 
4 > M 1,500 13 
6 > M 1,000 20 
18 > M 500 60 
2 > M 200 7 
30  100 
 
                                                 
47 A total of 55 teenagers took part in this survey, but only 50 of them made useable statements to 
the question of how much money they received. 
200 
 
However, what is certainly clear is an increase in stratification. While in the 1970s and 
1980s, the difference between the largest amount a teenager received on their 
Jugendweihe (more than 1,500) and the lowest amount of money received (more than 
200) was approximately 7.5 times, today this difference (between more than 200 and more 
than 2,500) has increased to 12.5 times. These big variances were surprising in themselves; 
but what this meant for teenagers was only brought home to me in group conversations, 
when such divergences were revealed among friends, generating awkward moments for 
the teenagers and me alike.  
Such awkwardness emerged when I spoke with Amy, Jessica and Leoni, three female 
friends who attended the same school and had celebrated Jugendweihe about half a year 
prior to our conversation. Before we began, I asked them to fill in a brief questionnaire 
which also asked about their parents’ occupations. Jessica boisterously exclaimed: ‘My 
mum’s occupation? What am I supposed to fill in here: cleaner? How embarrassing is 
that!’ Later, when I questioned them about the details of their family celebration, Amy 
and Leoni had to think for some time about how many guests were at their Jugendweihe 
party, and both eventually settled on ‘about 35 or 40’ each. However, when it was Jessica’s 
turn, she very quickly and precisely exclaimed: ‘11!’, causing everyone to giggle. While 
such differences can easily be ascribed to divergent family sizes, it became apparent that 
there were also socio-economic factors at play when they elaborated upon what they had 
received for their Jugendweihe. While Amy’s and Leoni’s lists were long, with special gifts 
and substantial estimated amounts of money, Jessica – half disappointed and half 
embarrassed – explained that she did not receive very much money, and hence did not 
save any of it. These large variances mirror differences in each family’s ability to build 
social networks, and the extent of those networks, but also the socio-economic status of 
both family and social network – which are essentially interdependent. Jessica’s family not 
only struggled in socio-economic terms, it also lacked social capital. 
As Jessica’s case demonstrates, what teenagers do with their money, also depended greatly 
on the amount of money they received. Many adolescents made larger purchases, such as 
a laptop or a digital camera, or they spent part of the money on something they fancied, 
while the remaining (usually greater) amount was saved. Most commonly – if the amount 
was substantial – the money was put into a savings account. Of the above-mentioned 
survey sample, 36% claimed to have saved their entire Jugendweihe money, while 42% 
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claimed to have saved between 50 and 80%. Teenagers frequently mentioned the great 
costs attached to obtaining a driving licence, which at the same time was seen as an 
absolute ‘must have’. Predictably, many saved a significant part or even their entire 
Jugendweihe money for this venture, which was anticipated within approximately three 
to five years of the celebration. Saving money was often viewed as a matter-of-fact 
decision: if you wanted to ‘achieve’ something in life, such as owning a car or building a 
house, you would require a lot of cash, and you could not save up for this early enough. 
The importance of saving money was stressed by many adolescents, and while not all had 
a current account, I did not come across a single teenager who did not have a savings 
account. In Germany, saving money is also a moral act: to be a spendthrift would already 
preclude you from achieving anything in life, because you had to start accumulating 
money for the future.  
The necessity of saving money came to the fore in particular when I asked teenagers in 
group conversations about their aspirations and dreams for the future. Sixteen-year-old 
Pia named three essential life aims: she wanted her own house, children, and for ‘my 
family to be happy – that is the alpha and omega!’ When I later asked her and her friends, 
Nele and Sophia, how they would deal with it, if things did not go according to their life 
plans, I referred back to what they had told me earlier, prompting: ‘For example, if you 
don’t get the university place or you don’t get the mortgage to build your house?’ I had 
somehow anticipated that they would refer to their family’s (at least moral) support, but 
Pia quickly and drily countered: ‘But one can already save money for one’s house!’  This 
attitude towards saving, I suggest, was perhaps even more pronounced in eastern 
Germany where offspring could not expect – unlike in West Germany – to receive 
valuable property or financial assets through inheritance or inter vivos transfer, since the 
accumulation of property and money were heavily circumscribed under state socialism 
(see Leopold and Schneider 2011: 600).  
Saving Jugendweihe money was recognized for its potential to be useful later in life, yet 
this potential was limited. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the importance of work 
and the way it could make one independent was conveyed by the older generations, who 
seemed to encourage teenagers to be self-reliant at an early age. Although teenagers shared 
an immediate common goal of graduating, attending university was not something that 
was set in stone for all of them; as Pia explained: 
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Well, at the moment it is like this: we are at a Regelschule and we would have 
to do yet another three years [in order to be able to study at university] 
and when you then consider how long that is until you, until you finally 
earn money, this is already a long time! And then …you can still study 
later. Well, nobody dictates that you have to do it now.  
While the money that teens received on their Jugendweihe set them up reasonably well 
for their future lives, their own aspiration was to become truly independent – and this 
independence was only to be achieved through earning money oneself, as early as possible. 
When I asked him about his dreams for the future, Daniel straight away stated, ‘Well, that 
after the festivity (Jugendweihe) I am close to being independent, to be content with what 
I have done in life, so that I am then fröhlich (cheerful). Asked when he would be ‘cheerful’, 
he replied: ‘Well, when I’ve got a good job, I’m independent and… well, when I have 
managed a good start into my Berufsleben (working life/career) and that through it, like – 
yes, that I can live!’ When I asked him further what he meant by ‘independent’, he 
commented: ‘Well that I don’t have to necessarily rely on help.’ 
However, it is important not to overstate teenagers’ willingness to save money, or indeed 
to argue that they could fully decide for themselves how to make best use of their 
Jugendweihe money. Rather, the ritual’s monetary gifts served an educative function in 
the changing relationship between the adolescents and their parents. Teenagers seemed 
to be given more freedom of choice in what to do with their ‘own money’; but in reality, 
more often than not parents had the final say on financial matters. Because this 
contradiction was recognised by adolescents, it could also create – or add to – familial 
tensions, because parents and teenagers might disagree about what the money was to be 
spent on, or when. Such tensions emerged between Celine and her father, who had already 
claimed in our conversation that, for teenagers, the ritual was nothing but ‘an opportunity 
to make money’. He felt this fact confirmed when his daughter expressed that she was 
indeed the most pleased about ‘the dosh’. However, she then continued with a complaint 
made while looking reproachfully at her mother: ‘But it has all been paid into my savings 
account!’, to which her father countered: ‘As it should be!’  
While the majority of adolescents saved at least part of their money, there were not only 
differences in terms of amounts, but also in terms of what it might be spent on. While 
Celine received more than €1,000, she explained to me that saving the money was not 
meant for a particular purpose; it just prevented her from spending it on ‘something 
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useless’, as she described it. However, her mother added that Celine’s older sister had 
used her Jugendweihe money for her first car, which – unlike under state socialism – has 
become essential for employment. Peter interjected that they will very likely pay for 
Celine’s driving licence so that her Jugendweihe money need not be touched for this 
purpose.  
Celine – through her parents’ insistence – was already accruing funds for her future life. 
But this accrual was only possible because her family was in a more privileged socio-
economic position than others, such as Jessica, or Celine’s best friend, Lexi. Despite these 
increasing socio-economic differences, and some families’ efforts to distinguish 
themselves through clothes and photographs, what families appeared to have in common 
was a practical attitude marked by frugality. In the last section, I want to illuminate what 
these changes in gift-giving practices can tell us about changed social relations.  
 
Changes in Gift-giving 
I have argued that through sketches (Chapter 4) and the saving of money, Jugendweihe 
served to convey to the younger generation quite practically that one ought to work for 
money and ought to save it for future use. This process of making a moral person starts 
long before Jugendweihe, and certainly does not stop with its conclusion. Often being 
frugal as a moral practice was simply verbally reinforced between older and younger 
generations, as I witnessed one May afternoon a few weeks after Lukas’s Jugendweihe 
when I passed the ice cream parlour in the large shopping mall in town, and saw his sister 
Regina and his paternal grandmother, Frau Jahnke, sitting there. I stopped to say hello, 
but since Frau Jahnke is not only outgoing and chatty but also curious, I was very quickly 
drawn into a conversation about my life in Scotland. Frau Jahnke, who was in her 
seventies, inquired what I had been doing for nine years in Edinburgh, adding, ‘surely not 
just studying?’ She seemed to be relieved to hear that I had worked before, and to approve 
of the fact that I had been trained in a ‘proper job’ by telling me that she was a book-
keeper herself. She continued to reminisce about how impossible it was now to imagine 
that ‘back in the day’ everything was ‘calculated in our heads’ and without the help of a 
computer. And since book-keepers tend to be good with money, this discussion led her 
to explain to me her reasons for being in town that day: to ask for a loan from a bank.  
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Frau Jahnke was surprised to hear that, despite her advanced age, she was eligible. The 
young bank clerk, she said, had then involved her in a conversation about what loaning 
practices were like during GDR times; but she confessed that she could not remember 
whether loans existed in the GDR, and exclaimed: ‘Possibly not! I mean how can they 
give you a loan for a car or furniture when you had to wait for it for years?’ Today, of 
course, she continued it was a different matter – there was too great a temptation and 
people could so easily take up loans. Yet she too held the view that money needed to be 
earned and saved before one could spend it. Regina, who was four years Lukas’s senior, 
listened patiently and smiled knowingly the entire time in a way that led me to believe she 
had heard her granny’s views on the matter many times before. But granny Jahnke paused, 
looked at her granddaughter and gently advised her: ‘Take your two grandmothers as role 
models; we still know how to look after money, most people today do not know that any 
longer!’ Regina bluntly replied: ‘Granny, there is no money in my current account and I 
don’t have an overdraft, so I cannot take any money out nor accrue any debt!’ But her 
granny countered: ‘So you say, I once heard that people took out a loan for a holiday. 
Imagine, a holiday! How could they?’ 
Although Frau Jahnke never volunteered what she required the loan for, throughout the 
conversation she made clear to me and to her granddaughter that it was a well-considered 
step, and something of a necessity. She also seemed to differentiate acceptable reasons to 
take out a loan: it had to be for something that was produced and durable, rather than a 
fleeting holiday. The fact that money properly should be spent on something practical 
and lasting, I would suggest, was also noticeable in the ways gift giving has changed 
around Jugendweihe. Such changes in gift-giving practices in rural post-socialist contexts 
have been noted, for example, by Monica Vasile (2015) in Transylvania and Frances Pine 
(2000) in the Polish Podhale for weddings. In both contexts, money given on the occasion 
of a wedding served as a ‘means for redistribution from the community to the newly 
established family’ (Vasile 2015: 159), but the value or type of gifts changed after the 
demise of the socialist command economy.  
Vasile notes that while monetary gifts at weddings had already increased in the 1960s and 
1970s due to the economic boom that led to employment in state factories and cash 
income, greater inflation occurred as part of the rapid economic post-socialist 
transformation. She estimates that an average wedding in 2009-10 would yield roughly 
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€14,000, that is, an increase in monetary gifts from the 1980s by approximately twelve 
times (Vasile 2015: 154-155). In contrast, Pine (2000) demonstrates that among the 
Gorale in the Polish Podhale, gift-giving practices at weddings did not necessarily change 
in terms of relative value; rather, where formerly the mandatory gift was a set amount of 
money, in the 1990s newlyweds were presented with ‘household appliances, glass and 
china’ (Pine 2000: 97-98). Pine argues that this shift from money to household goods is 
representative of commodification and a greater value ascribed to work outside the house 
than it was under state socialism. Both these examples demonstrate exceptional cases of 
abundance within each respective country, and of course coming-of-age rituals are not as 
lavish as weddings per se – as Franka pointed out earlier – in order to draw a distinction 
between them. Yet such life cycle rituals frequently mirror each other, and Jugendweihe 
– as noted in Chapter 4 – served in the 1970s and 1980s to contribute to the adolescent’s 
future household, either through money or (in the case of girls) through trousseau items. 
Jugendweihe always included a combination of monetary and non-monetary gifts, but 
contrary to the Gorale weddings, East Thuringians appear to have shifted from consumer 
goods to money. This shift is perhaps best illustrated by the two pictures of Jugendweihe 
gift displays below: one from my own Jugendweihe in 1987, the other from a 
contemporary Jugendweihe (see Figures 17 and 18). The gift display of the contemporary 
Jugendweihe is rather modest: a tiny table with some flowers, personalized monetary gifts 
and small wrapped gifts. The table in the 1980s displays not only personal gifts, such as a 
portable stereo and jewellery, but also trousseau items, such as bedlinen, towels, tea towels 
and table cloths – all visible, that is, unwrapped. The table had to be extended to fit all 
the items, as is noticeable by the hurriedly laid down, undersized table cloth; flowers are 




Figure 17:  Jugendweihe Gift Display 1987 
 
 
Figure 18: Jugendweihe Gift Display 2013 
 
Under state socialism, the convention in villages in particular was for girls to receive 
trousseau items for their future household on their Jugendweihe. I have never come 
across a female member of either the parental or grandparental generation who had not 
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received towels and/or tea towels on their Jugendweihe in the GDR. Often there would 
be additional household goods, such as bedlinen, table cloths, bath towels and 
handkerchiefs. Presents tended to be recorded by recipients, partly to thank the giver, but 
also to be able to reciprocate in future. One mother, who had kept her list of Jugendweihe 
presents from the late 1980s, received a total of 31 towels, 27 tea towels, 19 handkerchiefs 
and 3 bath towels, as well as a cook book, a sewing kit, and a set of tea spoons. In addition 
to these trousseau gifts she received personal gifts such as perfume, clothes, a pair of 
tights, a purse and a watch, as well as a total amount of 1,220 GDR Marks. Unsurprisingly, 
only four of these gifts came from close kin, while 67 were from other households. Boys 
sometimes also received trousseau items, but this was rare and usually limited to a few 
handkerchiefs and a towel. A father who showed me his Jugendweihe present list from 
the early 1980s had received a total of 1,485 Marks. He had also received a total of 103 
Jugendweihe cards, of which 15 were cards only – usually from age mates – while 17 
presented him with a gift, such as a bag, a watch, clothes, and handkerchiefs. He received 
money from 71 different households: 5 Marks each from 23, 10 Marks each from 26, and 
20 Marks each from 9, with higher amounts between 50 and 100 Marks from relatives.  
 
In the past Jugendweihe worked not unlike rural weddings: the greater community helped 
to set up a fund for the adolescent’s future life – most money was saved, and trousseau 
gifts were stored away for future use. Given this combination of consumer items and 
money, it is difficult to establish with confidence that an actual increase in gift-giving 
occurred in the post-Wende years, as Vasile has indicated for Transylvanian weddings. 
But it does seem clear that a shift from consumer items to money has occurred. Despite 
this conspicuous consumption during GDR times, grandparental and parental generations 
seemed to insist with concern that Jugendweihe today is ‘all about money’. Although today 
individual gifts are still given, not a single adolescent reported having received trousseau 
items – with the exception of Jessica, who remarked: ‘I also got a towel from my mother. 
No clue what I am meant to do with that!’ This discontinuity of trousseau items is unlikely 
to indicate that parents no longer hope their offspring will set up their own households. 
Rather, in the past, such consumer goods were less subject to fashion trends as is the case 
in contemporary capitalist society. Indeed, Andrea pointed out to me how she was still 
using the tea towels she had received on her Jugendweihe more than 30 years ago. Socialist 
consumer goods were durable and produced to last, and in turn were used with greater 
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care – unlike today, as I was painfully reminded toward the end of my fieldwork when my 
four-year-old laptop broke. My friend who came to assess the damage, commented: ‘Well, 
four years is a pretty good lifespan; laptops are not meant to last. This is how capitalism 
works. It’s not like socialism any more when things lasted forever.’ Today both the giving 
and displaying of such items, I suggest, is inappropriate because they are no longer lasting, 
useful assets for a future household. 
 
More importantly, nowadays these items are easily available, and can be bought at the 
time of need – both according to fashion and to one’s personal taste. In contrast, and as 
stated in the first section of this chapter, under the GDR people not only required 
sufficient funds to buy products, but to get hold of such products required the social 
capital of Vitamin B (connections). The display of consumer products and the stack of 
cards visible in Figure 17 were not simply a display of the economic fecundity of the 
household. Rather these goods displayed the social capital of the household, that is, how 
well-connected it was to other households. These displays of portable stereos, travel bags, 
or towels and bedlinen that the initiand received – usually from close and extended kin – 
symbolized connections that enabled those kin to procure such coveted goods. The stacks 
of cards from various households are indicative of the wide network of relations of mutual 
obligations, and reproduced them into the future as well. Gifts from neighbours and 
family friends, who were not part of the family celebration, were often reciprocated with 
a plate of cakes, and with money gifts on the occasions of the other households’ 
Jugendweihe or wedding celebrations. Today, none of the initiands I talked to received 
gifts from more than 30 different givers – indicating that the money given per person has 
increased while the social network has shrunk. 
 
Since nowadays Vitamin B is no longer required for the services of tradespeople or for 
purchasing consumer goods, status symbols are expressed differently. Gifts have shifted 
accordingly from a focus on social capital that was convertible to economic capital, to 
solely economic capital. This shift in turn explains why some families have eliminated or 
limited ‘coffee and cake’, since the cakes under socialism were also used to expand the 
household through commensality – acknowledging other households in a network of 
mutual obligations. While money provides a better option for attaining necessary services 
and items for the future, it also symbolizes what grandparents in particular complained 
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about with Jugendweihe, which was congruent with their complaints about capitalism at 
large: that it was all about money. Although money featured prominently in the GDR 
Jugendweihe, today a similar amount of money gifts would be spread among far fewer 
households. As such, the complaint, I believe, was not directed against money itself, but 
its change in symbolic value, which now de-emphasised the connections for which it had 
previously stood (as much as household goods had). Today, households have contracted 
in terms of the size of social networks on which they depend; and these connections 
required in a ‘economics of shortages’ (Kornai 1980) have disappeared with the 
disappearance of the GDR’s second economy.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have illustrated that Jugendweihe mirrored the greater socioeconomic 
stratification of contemporary eastern German society. On the one hand, it excluded 
adolescents from celebrating the ritual due to economic reasons. On the other, some 
Thuringians perceived Jugendweihe to be associated with a lower social stratum, which is 
perhaps less surprising given the ritual’s historical link to the labour movement (see 
Chapter 2). Neither of these two issues would have arisen as markers of difference under 
state socialism. I particularly focused on greater socio-economic differences among 
Jugendweihe participants, which was discernible, for example, in the divergences between 
the lowest and highest amounts of money gifts received. The ritual served in both socialist 
and contemporary times to support the adolescent through the gift-giving of money and 
consumer goods for their future life, and thus not only helped them to set up their own 
future households, but also reproduced cycles of consumption and mutual obligation with 
others (Bloch and Parry 1989). At the same time, it reified existent socio-economic 
differences and transmitted them into the future, where some adolescents would set out 
with a much lower fund than others.  
I argued that a change in distinction-making has taken place in which signifiers of social 
class – such as occupation and education – are increasingly referenced, though they played 
a limited role as status symbols in the socialist past. People subtly distinguished themselves 
from each other through references in taste, such as in respect to clothes; and I suggested 
that the public ceremony also represented an opportunity for families to present 
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themselves in a way that showed that they had succeeded in the new social order. Both 
past and present Jugendweihe celebrations attracted considerable costs for the familial 
household, both in terms of hospitality and gifts. Yet while the families I discussed 
differed in terms of economic standing, they appeared to share a moral discourse on 
frugality – a value that they hoped their offspring would adopt. This emphasis on frugality, 
I suggest, needs to be also understood in light of the fact that due to state socialism the 
accumulation of money and property was very restricted, and as such eastern Germans 
inherit less compared to western Germans. Indeed, the Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs noted in its Fourth Poverty and Wealth Report that an average western 
German household owns 132,000 Euros in real estate and financial assets – in contrast to 
the average eastern German household at 55,000 Euros or only 42% of its western 
counterpart (BAMS 2013: 343).  
The change in gift-giving practices from the socialist command economy to a capitalist 
free market economy, I suggested, was mirrored in the ritual as a microcosm of wider 
socioeconomic relations. I argued that this shift reflects a decline in social relations 
between households. As noted in Chapter 4, under state socialism the state’s intention 
was to direct people away from material and monetary gift-giving on the occasion of their 
Jugendweihe. Yet because consumer goods became fetishized as valuable due to their 
rarity and as status symbol of social capital – and specifically, the ability to attain them 
through connections – they played a crucial role both in distinction-making and in creating 
and maintaining social relations. With the disappearance of the second economy in the 
free market economy, which only requires money to purchase goods and services, such 
social relations appear to have vanished as well. This contracting of social relations, I 
suggest, is similar to the changes in social togetherness discussed in Chapter 3, and is what 
older generations complain about when they point out that Jugendweihe is ‘only about 
money’.    
Nevertheless, I suggest that parental and grandparental generations successfully combined 
the old cultural capital – the habitus of celebrating Jugendweihe – with some of the new 
cultural capital of the contemporary social order. Since the Jugendweihe Association 
appears to be the proprietor for organizing and maintaining the celebration of 
Jugendweihe into the future, I turn my attention to its work and the Association’s relation 
to wider society in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
The Jugendweihe Association: Keeping it in the 
‘Family’? 
 
It was November 2012, and the combined annual meeting and year-end celebration of 
the regional Jugendweihe Association was being held in the restaurant at Castle Osterstein 
– a location in the forest above the romantic old part of Gera, with views over the entire 
city. Dagmar, the vice chairwoman, explained how the Association had fared in the past 
year, thanked everyone for their hard work, and asked rhetorically: ‘who would have 
thought, we’d still be here today?’. The tone was congratulatory; but there were also 
challenges ahead in maintaining and raising the Association’s profile and participation 
numbers. And as such, despite the relaxed atmosphere, there was a sense of anxiety about 
the future of Jugendweihe, and the need for Nachwuchs (new blood or offspring) in the 
Association – a concern that echoed through Dagmar’s speech and the one given by Elke, 
the chairwoman, thereafter.  
Meanwhile Sonja, one of the oldest members of the Association, was sitting next to me 
and whispering information on the organisation’s ‘who’s who’ in my ear. 27 members 
were present, out of their nominal membership base 35. She explained to me that many 
of them, and/or their parents, had been involved in Jugendweihe during GDR times. 
Sonja referred to some of them jokingly as ‘real pre-historic rock’ (richtiges Urgestein), not 
only because of their work for Jugendweihe in socialist times but also because they ‘had 
been faithful’, and had continued their work in a changed political landscape.  
The convivial atmosphere of the meeting, followed by lunch, resembled a family gathering 
more than a board meeting. Members not only ate and drank together, they also gossiped 
about some former members – the ‘black sheep’ of the Association – and interrupted 
each other in ways only acceptable among close friends or family members. After lunch, 
members took turns in telling rude jokes, or engaged in more sincere conversations, 
depending on where they were sitting at the large U-shaped dining table. Once everyone 
had waved goodbye and parted, Jutta, an Association member in her mid-fifties, and I 
descended the hill together and continued chatting about the meeting and the Association. 
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When I remarked that there seemed to be quite a lot of members who had already been 
working for Jugendweihe in some capacity during GDR times, she agreed, smilingly 
adding: ‘They also all come from dieser Richtung (‘this [political] orientation’). 
Because of the family-like character of the meeting, I was not surprised when some of the 
members explained to me that the way they related to each other was like a family: ‘We 
are actually just like a big family!’ While one can quickly discard such remarks as 
metaphors or even as pretence aimed at portraying an idyllic association world to me as 
an outsider/researcher, as fieldwork progressed, this notion of a family-like bond was 
frequently confirmed. The way members interacted with each other on a day-to-day basis 
(see Chapter 1), the way they celebrated each other’s life cycle events, such as Elke’s and 
Dagmar’s 60th birthday parties, but also the ways they cared for each other were suggestive 
of family-like bonds that were beyond mere idiom.  
This chapter focusses on the Jugendweihe Association and its members, and considers 
how they negotiated their new place within a unified Germany by moving from a former 
state Jugendweihe County Committee to a registered association. I argue that the forms 
of relatedness I observed among Association members were created through a shared 
experience of the socialist past, and the shared hardships of the Wende-years – but also a 
shared political perspective that affected these experiences in particular ways. In the first 
part of this chapter, I show that the older Association members continue to employ the 
socialist rhetoric of a ‘fight for the cause’, but have substituted ‘communism’ with 
‘Jugendweihe’. While Association members not only referred to one another as family-
like but incorporated first degree kin into the Association, I suggest that their sense of 
kinship was based on a shared moral project of sustaining Jugendweihe into the future. 
In the second part of the chapter, I argue that the extrapolation of the kinship idiom to 
the Association’s ‘clients’ depended on the same shared view of Jugendweihe among 
eastern Germans. Due to the changed socio-political environment and the perceived 
collective ownership of Jugendweihe, tensions over ritual authority arise that have political 
and economic dimensions.   
The Association Family: The Struggle for the Cause of Jugendweihe 
With the end of the GDR state, a time of great uncertainty began for its institutions and 
their employees, and the Central Committee for Jugendweihe in the GDR (ZAJ) was no 
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exception. Some of its members decided in 1990 to found a successor organisation in 
Berlin, the Interessenvereinigung für Jugendweihe e.V. (Interest Group for Jugendweihe, 
Registered Association) in order to secure the continuity of the ritual and also their own 
livelihoods. This organisation functioned as an umbrella Association for the six (‘new’) 
Federal State Associations that formed in the same year in the territory of the former 
GDR. These associations had smaller regional offices akin to the former GDR’s 
Jugendweihe County Committees, but they were not legally independent. Although most 
of the contemporary Association members had not been members of the GDR’s Central 
Committee for Jugendweihe, the ones who were recalled this period as a struggle. Illona, 
in her sixties and the vice chairwoman of the Erfurt Association, had been a German 
teacher, and due to voice problems was transferred to work for Jugendweihe in 1987. She 
explained to me that in 1989, when it looked as if Jugendweihe would not survive, state 
officials had offered her the opportunity to return to school; but she declined, adding, ‘I 
thought it would be better to fight at the Jugendweihe front.’ 
This ‘fight’ was embedded in the larger societal processes of socio-economic 
transformation and transitional justice, which I will discuss in turn. The Treuhandanstalt 
(colloquially Treuhand, literally ‘faithful hand’, ‘Trust Agency’), founded in June 1990, 
became responsible for privatizing GDR enterprises in order to transform publicly-owned 
property into free market-suitable ventures. However, in reality most of these enterprises 
were liquidated (abgewickelt; literally: to unwind). Many East Germans saw these 
liquidations as a somewhat triumphal procession on the part of West Germany, intended 
to destroy the already ailing economy by removing competition, gaining  capital 
cheaply (some of these ventures were sold for a symbolic value of DM 1), or 
both.  Eastern Germans’ view of the Trust Agency is based on its responsibility for ‘a 
massive transfer of [collective] property from East (national) to West (national and 
international), with 80 percent of all firms now in West German hands’, also eliminating 
‘three-fourths of all East German industrial jobs’ (Borneman 1997a: 34).48 
                                                 
48 Borneman notes two main criticisms that continue to feature in contemporary discussions: 
inadequate consideration of the economic viability of bidders’ restructuring plans, and emphasis 
on the creditworthiness and standing of the buyer rather than the value of GDR firms (Borneman 
1997a: 34-35). The first president of the Treuhand, Detlev Rohwedder, was assassinated in April 
1991 – allegedly by the terrorist group Red Army Faction. His murder remained unresolved and 
surrounded by speculation. 
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With unification in October 1990, the Trust Agency also took over the capital of the 
GDR’s political parties and mass organisations. The GDR Central Committee for 
Jugendweihe had received substantial funding annually for the organisation and execution 
of the then free-of-charge ceremonies.49 Because these funds were deemed SED party 
capital which required further investigation, they became subject to restrictions by the 
Trust Agency in 1991. While the agency’s course of action seems understandable, Illona 
and Elke both criticized it (independently of each other), suggesting it was unjustified to 
freeze all funds, since they included fees that parents had paid in 1991 that were irrelevant 
to the SED legacy. Both Association members interpreted this as a sign that the Trust 
Agency had striven to eliminate the Association and Jugendweihe simultaneously – but 
they also proudly added that it had failed to achieve its aim. Indeed, a dispute over the 
funds ensued, lasting 16 months and only resolved in May 1993 through a compromise 
agreement – a series of events also portrayed as a struggle and a success story in the 
German Association’s book For the Youth, With the Youth, a special edition on the occasion 
of its 20th anniversary (see JWA 2010: 17).  
The socio-economic transformations of the 1990s went hand in hand with mass 
unemployment, with rates soaring to roughly 20% (Destasis 2013).  While job insecurity 
was a new experience for most eastern Germans (see Chapter 5), they also had to undergo 
a lustration process if they wanted to work (again) in civil service positions in the new 
democratic state bureaucracy. As in other post-socialist societies, this process entailed the 
vetting of former state officials in order to purge the public sector from those who were 
deemed unacceptable, mainly due to their collaboration with the former socialist state 
security apparatus. Such measures were considered necessary as part of the greater aim of 
transitional justice, in order to address and come to terms with the repressions of the 
socialist dictatorship, and also to establish citizens’ trust in the new state institutions. The 
1991 Stasi Records Act enabled access to some former state security files, and henceforth 
the media reported on one Stasi scandal after another. At the same time, many eastern 
Germans also made rather personal discoveries, learning that people they had considered 
kin had reported on them (see Lengsfeld 2011). In combination with the ‘extraordinary 
right of termination law’ that was part of the Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag), the same 
                                                 
49 In 1990 this totalled 19 million Marks for the running Jugendweihe year (Chowanski and Dreier 
2000: 201). 
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Act also sought to cleanse the civil service of those that had been too close to the 
communist project, including teachers.  
Because the ‘file fever’ (Verdery 2014: 3) was acute and arguably led to greater mistrust, I 
was not entirely surprised when a western German father explained to me how dubious 
he had found Jugendweihe. Herr Schmidt, as noted in Chapter 3, had moved with his 
family to Thuringia during the Wende years, and in 1994 he and his wife discussed their 
son’s wish to celebrate Jugendweihe.  Describing their thought processes, he explained, 
‘We were not really sure where this Jugendweihe Association came from, you know, what 
people they were.’ He smiled – seemingly more about his recollections than at me – and 
added, ‘For us they were all Stasi!’ While this mistrust was perhaps greater among western 
Germans, who lacked the cultural capacity of reading between the lines in order to assess 
people’s political or ideological leanings, eastern Germans often had similar sentiments. 
Indeed, when former classmates and I recounted stories from our school years, two of 
my male friends quickly steered the conversation towards speculating about which of our 
teachers might have been Stasi informants.   
Although many of the older Association members had been pedagogues, they largely kept 
quiet about this issue, with the exception of one part-time member of the Erfurt 
Association. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Dagmar and Sonja had dedicated their GDR 
working lives to education. They also often reminisced about great events they had 
experienced together, such as the 1973 ‘World Festival of Youth and Students’ held in 
East Berlin. Indeed, Dagmar once volunteered to me that it was because of Sonja that she 
had become a Pioneer leader. Only once, when I had asked head-on about what happened 
to teachers after the Wende, did she explain to me that she no longer wanted to be part 
of the new school system and hence did not re-apply. At the same time, however, she 
volunteered that Sonja underwent the ‘entire process’ and – presumably because she was 
found ‘unsuitable’ – had a tremendously difficult time making ends meet as a seamstress.50  
Nevertheless, what interests me here is how their experience and treatment in the post-
                                                 
50 On the dismissal of Thuringian teachers in the 1990s due to their Stasi involvement, see Kathrin 
Winkler’s judicial work. She argues that the Thuringian Cultural Ministry did not distinguish 
particularly well between the different degrees of Stasi involvement, leading to the unnecessary 
dismissal of some teachers – not entirely in line with the legal specification. Yet some teachers 
were able to continue their employment, despite a verifiably high degree of Stasi involvement. 




socialist context – whether justified or otherwise – led them to care for each other. 
Dagmar had not forgotten her former mentor and friend Sonja, and enabled her to work 
for the Association. She herself had been hired by the Association because of a former 
GDR colleague, a decision that Elke commented on at Dagmar’s birthday: ‘I knew straight 
away when I saw you for the first time fifteen years ago, she fits in with us (die passt zu 
uns)!’.   
While they seemed to be dedicated to each other because of their shared socialist past and 
the hardships of the post-socialist context, Elke’s first assessment of Dagmar suggests 
that shared histories alone were not enough to make one a ‘fitting member’ for the 
Association. Rather, I would suggest, one also had to be dedicated to the shared moral 
project of Jugendweihe. Such a shared moral project became more evident in Dagmar’s 
use of the ‘struggle’ trope in reference to the late 1990s and early 2000s, after she had 
started to work for the Thuringian Jugendweihe Association. In one conversation, she 
explained to me that they had realized with ample foresight that the low birth rates during 
the Wende-years would have a ripple effect on Jugendweihe ceremonies. They hoped that 
offering the Namensgebung (secular naming ceremony, see Chapter 1) as well as letting out 
the premises of a former youth holiday camp in the Thuringian forest would provide 
second sources of income. The latter’s purchase, however, proved to be a bad investment 
because the buildings required much more refurbishment than expected. Dagmar 
explained to me that the Association members and their husbands worked for several 
weekends fixing it up, for nothing more than ‘a lunch and a thank you in return’. They 
tried not to employ expensive tradespeople and did as much as they could themselves, 
including de-cluttering the large premises. She added, ‘Every Friday we left Gera, drove 
there, worked, on Sunday we returned, and Monday back at the office; for years we did 
that’. But despite all this work, the venture failed. As Dagmar put it, ‘They didn’t exactly 
beat a path to our door!’ While the location was ideal for providing accommodation to 
winter sport enthusiasts, the Association had miscalculated the new post-socialist 
conditions. People either lacked the financial means due to unemployment, or preferred 
to spend them on a summer holiday in Spain or Italy – destinations to which East 
Germans were not allowed to travel under the GDR. Dagmar conceded that mistakes had 
been made because everyone was new to these circumstances, but in her recollection she 
stressed the dedication of all to work toward a common goal: the survival of the 
Association and of Jugendweihe.  
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This ‘working together’ toward a common goal should not suggest that the ‘Association 
family’ never experienced internal conflicts. But Association members were carefully 
selected based on their shared socialist past because they were more likely to have a set of 
shared values. Where a member diverted from the moral code, this diversion could lead 
to exclusion – perhaps best evidenced by what Dagmar recounted to me several times as 
a ‘real little revolution’: the toppling of the female managing director (Geschäftsführerin) in 
2002. Many Association members had been unhappy with her because they felt she was 
not working in the best interests of the Association and was too selfish. The managing 
director’s character was frequently cast in a negative light, and they insinuated that she 
had worked to fill her own pockets – though this misconduct was never clearly spelled 
out. In the run-up to the AGM in December 2002, when a new managing committee was 
supposed to be voted in, Association members had heard through the grapevine that the 
managing director intended to appoint a man she could ‘work well with’ – that is, as 
Dagmar explained, someone who would follow her instructions instead of the other way 
around, as prescribed by the Association’s articles. Members in other regional offices had 
secretly organized a substitute candidate, and brought along a busload of roughly forty 
people who registered on the day of the annual meeting to become members by signing 
a form and paying the monthly membership fee. These people had been instructed to 
vote for the alternative candidate, who in turn, as one of his first tasks upon being elected, 
put the managing director on leave.  
This strategic move enabled the majority of members to rid themselves of a ‘black sheep’ 
who had endangered the existence of the Association and the continuity of the ritual 
because they felt she did not work in the interests of either. But this little coup also set in 
motion a variety of structural changes regarding the Thuringian Association, which 
eventually led to the establishment of the Jugendweihe Ostthüringen e. V. as a legally 
independent entity in 2005. Dagmar saw the formal establishment of the regional 
association as one based on logical business reasoning. The funds that the regional offices 
generated from either participation fees or sponsoring, she explained, were the result of 
their own hard work, and they wanted to decide how and on what to spend them in their 
own region. Instead, these funds had always been lodged in the account of the federal 
state organisation, and sustained a managing director, his office and an employee – all 
held to be superfluous for their lack of contribution to ‘the association pot’. Other 
regional associations followed suit, and together decided that they wanted to work under 
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the umbrella of a federal state organisation only when it was beneficial to all – such as in 
organizing cost-effective excursions. From then on, the regional associations were 
juridical persons in their own right, and thus in charge of themselves. Essentially, as 
Dagmar put it, these regional associations should have already formed in 1990, but instead 
they had been ‘ruled centralistically’.   
As such, it was not only in moments of commensality during office lunches (as noted in 
Chapter 1), or in extended meetings and times of conviviality during work outings and 
life cycle celebrations that kinship-like bonds were created and maintained, but in these 
critical periods in the Association’s history that they had mastered together and bonded 
over. When I heard the story of the disgraced managing director for the first time, I had 
attributed Dagmar’s use of ‘revolution’ to the revolution of 1989; but I only realized later, 
when I combined her re-telling of the story, other comments made by her, and comments 
by other older Association members that the term resonated with the GDR’s Marxist-
Leninist ideology of the (class) struggle and revolution. This ‘struggle’, which appeared to 
be ongoing, shared another socialist rhetoric of ‘fighting for the cause’. During GDR 
times, ‘the cause’ was an omnipresent phrase and shorthand for ‘the cause of the 
communist project’; but now it seemed to have been substituted with ‘the cause of 
Jugendweihe’. In other words, the older Association members appeared to be not simply 
co-workers (Mitarbeiter) and fellow campaigners (Mitstreiter) but also Mitkämpfer – fellow 
combatants, albeit without physical force, in their struggle for the continuity of the ritual. 
This ‘fighting for a cause’ also entailed the moral code of collective living propagated by 
the GDR: the setting aside of personal interests for those of the group (see Chapter 3). I 
do not want to suggest that all Association members subscribed equally to this moral 
code; but because almost all older members had held GDR civil service positions and had 
some sort of connection to Jugendweihe, they clearly had taken on board and continued 
the rhetoric of the struggle, and also perpetuated some of its content.  
Martin Holbraad (2014) argues in the case of the Cuban Revolution that Cubans are not 
contradictory when they are both dedicated to the revolution and critical of it, but that 
‘the revolution qua object of discontent and the revolution qua cause of self-sacrifice are 
just two different things’ (Holbraad 2014: 383). Particularly relevant for my material here 
is that the former is embedded in discourse, while the latter is an action: the commitment 
to self-sacrificial violence. A revolutionary commitment remains, despite the failure of the 
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revolution – and what we are left with, Holbraad suggests, are fighters ‘in the service of 
revolution as a total and totalising political universe’ (Holbraad 2014: 384). The older 
women of the Association use the terms ‘struggle’ and ‘the cause’ – the all-encompassing 
revolutionary language of the GDR. Yet the cause and struggle in the post-Wende context 
have changed, and have been subsumed in fighting for ‘the cause of Jugendweihe’ – to 
ensure Jugendweihe’s survival into the future. While there is a similar dynamic at play to 
the one Holbraad describes, I suggest these eastern German women diverge from his 
Cuban male interlocutors not in their commitment to the cause, but in its manifestation. 
They are not the violence-prone fighters that would sacrifice their lives; instead, their 
commitment is expressed through work for the greater good, in which the greater good 
is Jugendweihe itself.  
Of course, not everyone shared this commitment, and therefore these difficult time 
periods necessitated – perhaps more than during socialist times – the separation of the 
wheat from the chaff. When Sonja referred to some people jovially as ‘real pre-historic 
rock’ in the introductory vignette of this chapter, it was an indication of their lengthy 
shared history of ups and downs, and the extent to which their bonds had become close 
and unbreakable. Like the ideal family, their relations had become solid as rock.  
 
The Family within the Family: A Matter of Trust 
The Association members’ family-like bonds were strengthened in another way: through 
the incorporation of other family members. Dagmar and Jutta frequently pointed out to 
me that they took pride in their work, and that it was not comparable to ‘ordinary’ work 
because of the irregular hours and their deep commitment to Jugendweihe. They 
explained on several occasions that their job demanded that they work during the 
Jugendweihe season on Saturdays – at a time that was held to belong to the family. 
Dagmar and Jutta agreed that you could only do such work if you had also an 
understanding partner. Indeed, both of them had their husbands on board whenever 
required, whether for fixing something damaged at the office or helping out at 
Jugendweihe ceremonies. This involving of one’s partners in the work of the Association 
was a fairly common practice beyond the Gera Association as well. In the Erfurt and 
Arnstadt Associations – whose work I observed as well –  husbands, siblings and offspring 
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were all helping out at ceremonies or at youth work events, or were asked for advice and 
help on matters such as the Association’s website. Although these relatives were neither 
employed nor remunerated, they were frequently invited to work outings or other 
celebrations. Noticeably, the local Association’s membership base was roughly 70% 
women, and all of the crucial full-time staff positions were held by women. This greater 
female membership might be suggestive of the perceived appropriateness of women 
taking on roles associated with caring for the family. Though given that the GDR state 
pursued a pragmatic socialist feminist strategy that led to a large female proportion of the 
workforce already in the 1960s (see Chapter 1), the greater female membership is perhaps 
equally reflective of women’s self-evident role as workers in eastern German society – 
while also being a trace of the fact that in the GDR, work itself had been framed as part 
of ‘the struggle for the cause’. Here, however, I am interested in the ways the boundaries 
between first degree kin and the kin of the Association became blurred, especially in 
relation to the young generation.  
Naturally, most of the Association members who had worked for the former GDR’s 
central committee for Jugendweihe were already retired or about to retire, and the main 
concern for the Association was to secure Jugendweihe’s existence into the future. There 
was an ongoing search for teenage volunteers who would help out with setting up, reciting 
poems or presenting the books and flowers to the initiands at Jugendweihe ceremonies. 
During GDR times, these tasks were performed by teenagers from the Pioneer and the 
Free German Youth organisations, which delegated appropriate members. Today, 
teenagers were chosen solely based on their looks and their talent, but always from among 
former Jugendweihe participants. These volunteers also had to be reliable in order to 
ensure the smooth-running of the ceremonies. They happily received a small 
remuneration, but also seemed to enjoy being part of making such ceremonies successful. 
While the financial benefit surely played a role in encouraging teenagers and twenty-
somethings to participate, older members did not describe the young people’s motivations 
so much in terms of money. Rather, they described it as loyalty – not to the Association 
but to Jugendweihe. Sonja, for example, once asked a group of volunteers off stage in 
Jena, ‘And you, girls and boys, will you remain faithful to Jugendweihe?’   
This question appears to suggest that at least the older Association members were seeking 
commitment from others, not to them or the Association, but to ‘the cause’ of 
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Jugendweihe. It also hints that such a reliance on others is fraught with risk: it requires 
trust. This issue of trust, I would suggest, was particularly pertinent in regards to the 
continuity of Jugendweihe into the future in the case of members who were full-time staff, 
and thus the decision-making core of the Association. It was common for Elke, Dagmar, 
and Sonja to express some sort of concern about the Association’s future in terms of their 
need for a younger generation to follow in their footsteps. And yet – to my knowledge – 
they never advertised an opening in the Association. Instead, members almost always 
became involved through word of mouth and kin relations. Nicole had started working 
for the Association in spring 2013, in order to take over some of the tasks carried out by 
Sonja and Dagmar. As daughter of Jutta, originally it had been Nicole’s older sister who 
was supposed to start work for Jugendweihe. However, she became pregnant 
unexpectedly, and Nicole, who was unemployed at the time, stepped in.  At first it seemed 
the most convenient and mutually beneficial solution for all; but Dagmar explained to me 
that hiring her also met the organisation’s need for young people who knew ‘what it took 
to work for Jugendweihe’ because of their mothers’ work. This explanation again implied 
dedication and some sort of ‘innate’ knowledge, but the apparent ‘handing down’ of a job 
was to be carefully negotiated.  
Unsurprisingly, there was an underlying concern about how the situation would be 
handled once Nicole’s sister’s maternity leave was over, as neither of the sisters wanted 
to ‘steal’ the job from the other. The sisters had hoped that both would be able to work 
for the Association. However, Dagmar explained to me that she had sat down with them 
and their mother, and while they had been upset, she made it clear that they were not 
running a family business but a proper registered association and thus had to adhere to 
the rules. Indeed, she associated this decision with the recently uncovered cases of 
nepotism among the Christian Social Union (CSU) party members in the Bavarian state 
parliament, who had employed relatives – their parents, children or wives – despite a law 
from 2000 that prohibited such work contracts (see Hengst 2013). By making such 
comparisons, she implied that neither she nor the dealings of the Association were 
anything like those of the corrupt Bavarian politicians. Although there seemed to be a 
concern that the Association could be charged with nepotism, Dagmar appeared to 
believe that it was only a problem if three family members were on the Association’s 
payroll at once. Surprisingly, more than half a year later, I learned that Elke’s daughter – 
who was already a nominal Association member – would start full-time work for the 
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Association. It was explained to me that this carefully considered decision had been made 
by Dagmar and Sonja, and was not a suggestion put forth by Elke herself. Dagmar praised 
Elke’s daughter not only because she would be reliable new blood, but also because of 
her work experience in marketing, which would be beneficial for Jugendweihe. Jutta –  
who was a close friend of Elke’s prior to her work for the Association, and indeed got 
her job because of Elke – also seemed happy with this decision, commenting: ‘I’ve known 
her since she was little, to me she is like my own daughter!’ In these instances, the German 
word Nachwuchs – which stands for both ‘biological offspring’ as well as ‘new blood’ within 
an Association or company – had become quite literally synonymous.  
While this kind of recruitment of ‘new blood’ may seem peculiar, and perhaps not unlike 
the recruitment strategies of the impeached Bavarian politicians, I suggest it diverges from 
the latter in two fundamental ways. In the case of what came to be variously known as 
the ‘relatives affair’, ‘salary affair’ or ‘family affair’, the Bavarian state parliament came into 
disrepute because its MPs had – through the employment of their wives on high salaries 
as ‘sham freelancers’ – distributed public funds to the financial benefit of their own 
families. Although the employment of one’s daughter in the (non-state) Association also 
meant ensuring funds for close relatives, this contract was based on both their work for 
the good of the Association and the ritual, in exchange for an ordinary salary. More 
importantly, this strategy was less about immediate financial gain than about securing 
one’s work legacy, ensuring it would not be destroyed but cared for and carried into the 
future. Why else did the Association not employ outsiders – at least not in their inner 
circle – through a job application process but chose their own offspring to work for the 
Association? Familial loyalty and loyalty to the cause of Jugendweihe were here 
intertwined. In other words, for the older Association members who were about to take 
a back seat, their trust in their offspring went hand in hand with the trust that their 
offspring would care enough to continue their work in their spirit. The choosing of one’s 
own offspring was not simply due to their closer relationship, or even for the benefit of 
their kin. Rather, because of the hardships experienced during the post-Wende times, they 
felt beleaguered by state institutions and individuals not well-disposed toward 
Jugendweihe, such as church representatives (see Chapter 2). They felt they could not risk 
employing an outside person because whether they would be fully dedicated to the cause 
of Jugendweihe could not be established in a job interview.  
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The lines between family members and Association members were blurred in one 
direction through the incorporation of kin, who helped out by volunteering for the 
Association or were employed in the hope that they would secure Jugendweihe into the 
future. Similarly, it was blurred in the other direction through the kinning of the 
Association: its members cared for and related to each other like kin because of their 
shared experience of critical time periods, which they had mastered together. Who was to 
be included or excluded as kin within the Association was based on their dedication to 
the cause of Jugendweihe. What kin are perceived to share here is not simply amity or 
loyalty, but a moral project to be perpetuated into the future. If such a moral project is 
not sustained, exclusion from the kin group is at least acceptable, if not necessary. In 
short, while such loyalty to the cause should ideally be congruent with one’s loyalty to kin, 
here the former loyalty trumps the latter. At the same time, the use of the kinship idioms 
was not limited to the Association itself, but extended to ritual participants  as well by way 
of negotiating ‘one big family’ of eastern Germans – which I discuss next.    
 
Kinning Eastern German Society  
Because of Association members’ generous use of kinship idioms, it became somewhat 
unclear to me what was actually meant by ‘family’. As stated in the first part of this chapter, 
Association members made use of kinship idioms when referring to the ways they related 
among themselves; but kinship terms were applied to the Association itself as well as to 
the Association’s clientele. In fact, during my entire fieldwork I never heard any 
Association member refer to what were essentially their customers or clients as such. 
Association members always used kin terminology when talking about – but also to – 
their clients. It was common that one member would ask another something along the 
lines of: ‘I still have a Mutti (mum) in Jena, who needs five more tickets for the ceremony 
next Saturday! Any chance?’ Regardless of whether Association members communicated 
with parents or grandparents on the phone or in person at the office, they would also 
frequently address them using kinship terminology instead of the customary formal 
address of Herr/Frau and family name. I also witnessed how they interacted with their 
clientele by asking questions like ‘I see, so your children live in the old federal states, and 
you die Oma (the gran) would like to enrol your granddaughter for Jugendweihe next year?’ 
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or ‘I take it you are the Dad, who wants to pick up the DVD of your child’s Jugendweihe? 
Your wife just called us this morning.’  
Of course this usage of kin terms was a way to simplify matters, for example, when an 
Association member was not aware of a person’s name. However, even in instances when 
they knew the name, it would be followed up with ‘she is the mum of …’.  Arguably, one 
can also interpret this use of kinship idioms as Association members viewing ‘their paying 
clientele’ from the perspective of the initiand as ego. While it is common, for instance, 
among teachers to refer to their pupils’ mums and dads as such, unlike Association 
members, they would usually address them formally as Mrs and Mr Smith. As such, 
deliberately or otherwise, the Association members’ employment of kinship idioms also 
created a sense of familiarity with the people they interacted with, and occasionally led a 
mother or grandmother to remain a little longer than usual in the office in order to share 
stories of family conflicts or money troubles with an Association member. Often either 
Dagmar or Jutta would listen carefully, and although in most cases they could not provide 
tangible resolutions, they enabled a mother or grandmother to get their troubles off their 
chest, which provided some relief or comfort to them. While this aspect of their work 
was almost comparable to the duties of a caring social worker, it seems Association or 
staff viewed it as part of their job description. It reinforced the notion that family mattered 
most, and that the Association members took their work seriously – it was not simply a 
profession but a calling, like family itself. But the expanded usage of the kin idiom also 
evoked two other notions. On the one hand, there was something belittling about it that 
resonated with GDR paternalism. On the other, there was something equalizing about it, 
in which eastern Germans, who were in support of Jugendweihe, became ‘one big family’. 
But these two notions attached to the use of kinship idioms beyond the Association as 
well, as I argue below, mirror actual negotiations over ritual authority within the post-
Wende context, which are embedded in economics and politics.  
 
The reintroduction of Jugendweihe in 1954, as illustrated in Chapter 2, established the 
GDR state as sole authority over the preparation for and the conduct of Jugendweihe 
ceremonies. However, the demise of the GDR state meant that its monopoly over 
Jugendweihe vanished too, so that various associations – for example, Roter Baum (Red 
Tree) in Dresden or the Humanist Association of Germany (HVD) in Berlin – have been 
conducting ceremonies in eastern Germany. Secondly, as parental and grandparental 
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generations frequently commented, Jugendweihe also changed from a free (state-
sponsored) to a fee-charging public ceremony (see Chapter 5). I explore these two 
significant changes further below, in order to make explicit how the extrapolation of the 
kinship idiom is similarly embedded within a moral project that simultaneously re-
negotiates ritual authority as manifested in the Jugendweihe ceremony fee and the ritual 
design. By doing so I illustrate that only those who support Jugendweihe are considered 
kin. 
 
Tensions over Ritual Authority I: The Jugendweihe Ceremony Fee 
The Association, fully aware that their €95 charge would over-stretch at least some family 
budgets, introduced a discount scheme in the early 2000s. Parents who are unemployment 
benefit recipients or heads of low-income families can thus ask for a €35 discount, and 
can also arrange with the Association to pay the remaining €65 in instalments over several 
months. In 2013, 3% of all Jugendweihe participants (or 93 families) made use of the 
discounted rate. The Association usually required an official notification of parents’ 
unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld-Bescheid) or a payslip as proof of their limited 
income. However, Jutta told me that, ‘Generally I ask for some sort of evidence, but 
sometimes you just know, it’s so obvious. So I tell them that they can get a discounted 
rate because they might not be aware of it; and I don’t even bother with the papers.’ While 
Association members were helpful in supporting families overall, there was also a tension 
between their desire to support and the extent of support that they felt might slip into an 
encouragement for people not to take enough responsibility for their own lives. Because 
most parents were used to the Jugendweihe ceremony being organized by the school from 
GDR times – with some parents being flustered that this was no longer the case – 
sometimes they forgot to enrol their children, or did so only at the last minute (see 
Chapter 3). The Association members frequently expressed frustration about parents’ lack 
of initiative in organising the enrolment of their children or informing themselves of the 
correct procedure or payment options. At the same time, they had a strong sense that 
parents’ disorganisation should not disadvantage their children, as it was not the teenager’s 
fault. And while they complained, they simultaneously always tried their hardest to make 
last-minute arrangements possible. 
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In addition, there was a clear recognition that it was not the Association’s sole 
responsibility to support people who were disadvantaged, and they encouraged the public 
to follow suit. In all the ceremonies I observed – most of which were led by Dagmar, the 
vice chairwoman of the Association – she explained at the end to the filled venue that, 
‘since the foundation of our Association, it has always been our concern to enable children 
from ‘socially-weak’ families to participate in the Jugendweihe ceremony.’ She continued 
to explain that thanks to public donations, 
Since 2005 almost 600 adolescents have been able to celebrate 
Jugendweihe together with their classmates. In the coming year we would 
also like to ensure that nobody will be excluded from the ceremony for 
financial reasons. You can support our solidarity project with a donation, 
be it ever so small!  
At the end of each ceremony, volunteers holding a sort of glass bowl were stationed at all 
possible exits, with the hopes that audience members would donate some money as they 
left. Thus, while the Association expressed solidarity, it also promoted and encouraged all 
Jugendweihe supporters to follow suit as a Solidargemeinschaft.51 Public comment about the 
affordability of the ritual was also a moral commentary on what they held to be unfair in 
the post-Wende socio-political context. But the social responsibility that the Association 
promoted among and shared with eastern Germans was transferred back to the new state 
with the introduction of the Bildungs-und Teilehabepaket (‘Education and Participation 
Package’, hereafter education package) in 2011. Initiated by the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, the education package was aimed at providing ‘better future 
prospects for 2.5 million deserving children from low-income families’ (BMAS 2012) as 
a way of tackling increasing child poverty, held to be – at least partly – caused by the social 
reforms of Agenda 2010.  
 
I first heard about this new scheme during the same AGM that I described in the 
introductory vignette, but when I read through its explanation on the Ministry’s website, 
there was no explicit mention of its applicability to the Jugendweihe ceremony fee. Rather, 
this new law was to enable children – through a legal claim of Mitmachen (participating) – 
to participate in school and extra-curricular activities regardless of their families’ income. 
Parents, who are recipients of either unemployment or social welfare benefits (ALG II or 
                                                 
51 Solidargemeinschaft – a community based on the principle of mutual solidarity. 
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Sozialhilfe), can apply for a certain amount of additional support for their children: for 
private lessons (Nachhilfe), school supplies (stationery), school meals, but also membership 
fees for sports clubs or music lessons, travel costs and school trips. Nonetheless, 
Association members had been insistent that people were eligible to make use of this 
scheme for the ceremony fee, and explained to me that some local social authorities, such 
as Altenburg, had granted a certain amount – usually €65 – toward the full cost. In 
contrast, Gera’s social authorities had been more reluctant; more than once during my 
fieldwork, I was told the story of a father who had applied for social benefits via the 
education package, but was denied any support toward the Jugendweihe ceremony of his 
child. He did not budge an inch, the story went, and marched into the social security office 
and insisted that his child deserved this support; if he – as parent – was not given it, he 
threatened to sue them. This threat, I was told, had worked: the social security office had 
authorized a contribution toward the ceremony fee.  
 
The seemingly arbitrary dealings of various local Thuringian authorities in regards to the 
educational package posed a real challenge to the Association, since they could not 
confidently advise parents on payment relief. For example, in October 2013, after the new 
hand-outs with information for the 2014 Jugendweihe had been given out, Nicole 
received an email from the  Greiz  social authority with a request to remove the statement 
that ‘parents could make use of the possibility of subsidy through the education package’ 
for the ceremony fee. The female clerical assistant who wrote the email cited the same 
article of the German Social Security Code for her refusal to provide benefits toward the 
Jugendweihe ceremony fee that other social authorities – including Altenburg and Gera – 
used to justify their decision for granting such benefits. Such decision-making appeared 
to be at the discretion of the local clerical assistant (Sachbearbeiter), rather than based on a 
clear directive of the government agency or even interpretations of such directives at the 
regional level. This inconsistency was confirmed in a conversation with a female public 
servant in charge of the education package in Gera. She explained to me that the 
government had passed the law, but it had not been clear at the regional and local levels 
of administration how to implement it appropriately.  
 
However, Association members viewed these regional differences in dealing with the 
education package less as a matter of the whims of clerical assistants (or their dispositions 
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to Jugendweihe) than as a matter of which political party ruled that particular constituency. 
Illona, the vice-chairwoman of the Erfurt Association, explained to me that they had had 
none of the difficulties Gera had, which she put down to two interdependent factors. 
First, Erfurt was run by an SPD/Left/Greens coalition government with a SPD mayor, 
and thus citizens had greater access to social welfare services. Indeed, in Erfurt there was 
a voucher system in place that did not require the social benefit recipient to make an extra 
request to the social security office. Instead, according to their unemployment/social 
benefit notification, the claimants received half a year’s vouchers automatically, and they 
could spend these accordingly. 13.5% (129) of all participants used the education package 
for the Jugendweihe ceremony fee in the city of Erfurt, while in the far larger region of 
East Thuringia it was just about 1% (28) – despite the latter also having a slightly higher 
unemployment rate.52  
During GDR times it had been taken for granted that the state would provide ceremonies 
for free, but today the payment of fees marked a struggle over ritual authority in which 
the new state no longer laid a claim on Jugendweihe. While the Jugendweihe Association 
claimed to be the proprietor of Jugendweihe, changed socio-economic conditions meant 
it could not provide the ceremony free. The Association distanced itself from these socio-
economic conditions through public commentary and promotion of solidarity, and yet it 
was simultaneously held hostage by them. Many eastern Germans felt that the ritual ought 
to be free, or at least felt entitled to financial state support for it – an expectation that 
echoed the free provision of the GDR Jugendweihe, but also the ways eastern Germans 
related to the state more broadly. With the education package, the new state sought to 
facilitate the same professional chances for children and adolescents from socially 
disadvantaged backgrounds by enabling them to acquire the necessary cultural capital 
through participation in school and extracurricular events. Yet participating in 
Jugendweihe was not seen as cultural capital by the new state because it was not 
institutionalized – nor necessary for the job market. Many eastern Germans, however, felt 
entitled to funds from the education package based on its participation (Teilhabe) aspect. 
This participation aspect was to ensure that adolescents would not be excluded in their 
                                                 
52 According to the Thuringian Statistical Office, the average unemployment rate in 2013 was 
8.6% for Erfurt, in contrast to Gera at 11.9% and the whole of East Thuringia at 8.8%; 
www.statistik.thueringen.de. 
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spare time from activities of sport, play, and culture: and Jugendweihe was viewed as part 
of eastern German culture, conferring cultural capital to adolescents.    
 
Tensions over Ritual Authority II: The Jugendweihe Design  
The local Association held a monopoly over conducting the ritual ceremonies in its 
catchment area.53 This monopoly was not entirely unchallenged, however, because 
Thuringians did not view the Jugendweihe Association as having complete ritual 
authority. I first became aware of this perception at the beginning of July, after the busy 
ritual period was finished, when I scheduled a meeting with Dagmar about the 
Association’s work. She asked for a list of questions so that she could prepare, and we 
agreed on a time the following week. But a few minutes later she came into my office with 
a little stack of twenty-odd printed-out thank you emails, which she handed to me with 
some pride, offering: ‘Well, I wondered whether they are of interest to you. Perhaps they 
would also be useful for your thesis!’ While Association members took pride in their work, 
receiving gratitude from parents also meant that their hard work had received recognition. 
They seldom failed to relay it to everyone when they had had a call, an email or a personal 
conversation in which parents, or sometimes grandparents, expressed gratitude and noted 
how much they had enjoyed the Jugendweihe ceremony. Almost all of the emails Dagmar 
gave me had been written by mothers acting as spokespeople for their entire families, and 
one was written by a parent representative of a school class. While some emails were also 
orders for Jugendweihe DVDs, others were simply thank you notes, praising the 
Association members for their good work and explaining to them how emotional the 
event had been. The emotional aspect and the positive feedback came as no surprise to 
me, as I had regularly witnessed parents looking for tissues and wiping their nose or drying 
their tears during the ceremonies; and I had never come across anyone – regardless from 
which generation – that did not enjoy the event. Yet what intrigued me about some of 
these thank you notes was the tone in which they had been written, casually combining 
gratitude with indications of room for improvement as, for example, this mother did:  
                                                 
53 The German Humanist Association (HVD), the second largest provider of Jugendweihe 
(Jugendfeier) ceremonies, and the German Jugendweihe Association have had a cooperation 
agreement since 2008. At the regional level, they declared that the Humanists would not compete 
over ritual participants in Thuringia. 
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Ceremonial, but well and truly [tailored] for the Jugendweihlinge (initiands). 
Suuuuper! We thought the best were Die Notendealer from Freiburg, but 
also the dancers were super. The only comment: the photos were at times 
very bad (too dark and in addition the name of the child was black… there 
were several pictures [concerned], this could still be improved!) Apart 
from that an all-around successful event. A big ‘gold star’ to the entire 
organisation team. Keep it up! 
Another mother explained her gratitude as follows:   
The Jugendweihe ceremony of our son was again so wonderful! I was 
already very touched three years ago at the ceremony of our daughter and 
again this time. There were moments of reflection, for shedding tears, and 
for laughing. That’s why I felt I must sincerely thank you. Everything is 
always so well organised. The speeches, the Zug des Lebens story, the music, 
and dance performances are of high standard and hit precisely the point 
and speak to parents as well as adolescents. One can see that the team 
invested much thought for such a successful ceremony. One feels 
honoured. I wish you all much continued joy and gratification in your 
work!   
 
These thank you emails demonstrate that the Association’s work of creating ceremonies 
that appealed to both young and old was valued by parents; and both mothers also 
expressed their wish for the Association’s work, and thus for Jugendweihe, to continue. 
But these expressions of gratitude appeared somewhat unique, because sending thank you 
emails to service providers who are paid directly for their services is rather rare. Usually, 
such gratitude is expressed only in cases that involve a certain level of intimacy – for 
example, for services related to healthcare and wellbeing, and/or where such services blur 
the supposedly clearly separated domains of kin and economy. The intimacy that 
Association members evoked through employing the kin idiom in addressing and 
referring to their ‘customers’ was not simply reciprocated by these mothers.  
 
Both the above mothers’ detailed assessments of the ritual, one’s mother criticism, and 
the other mother’s sense of feeling honoured through such a ceremony are also indicative 
of a shared sense among eastern Germans that the Jugendweihe Association had no 
authority over or expertise in Jugendweihe. Compared to the Lutheran Confirmation, 
which requires a Lutheran pastor as the ritual specialist, Jugendweihe was not perceived 
to have such an authority. Of course, pastors might be thanked for a particularly moving 
service or church ceremony, especially when it touched a parishioner, but they would 
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hardly be advised on what they could improve without having asked for such advice. In 
other words, within a legal instead of religious context, Jugendweihe had no ‘copyright’, 
and so any eastern German could organize and perform it. Although the Association had 
a monopoly on organizing Jugendweihe in East Thuringia, there were several concerted 
attempts made by parents over the years to conduct Jugendweihe ceremonies by 
themselves. For example, in 2013, one village in the Association’s catchment area 
organized a ceremony at the local village hall in order to have the ceremony closer to 
home, and in the hope of saving the €95 ceremony fee. The Association was never happy 
about such competition because it lost income, in this case from 23 participants. But 
because the parents’ venture resulted in an unsatisfactory ceremony, the next school 
cohort of the concerned village returned to the Association, and revalidated the 
association’s own quality of work. This tension between the Jugendweihe Association and 
some parents who tried to organize the ceremony by themselves is suggestive of a sense 
of collective ownership over the ritual, in which diverse parties contested the ritual 
authority that used to be held by the GDR state. I would suggest that this tension is also 
pertinent due to Jugendweihe’s fragile future, given that the state no longer promotes or 
financially supports the organization and celebration of the ritual. 
 
Of course, Association members were also interested in improving the ceremony and in 
feedback from guests, in order to satisfy the needs and desires of their ‘customers’ and 
thus ensure future success.  But both mothers’ ways of phrasing their criticism and praise 
– with particular GDR vernacular used for children – and their sense of being honoured 
also reflects, I would suggest, a level of intimacy that ‘links the instability of individual 
lives to the trajectories of the collective’ (Berlant 1998: 283). While I discuss this link 
further in the next chapter, here I am interested in this feeling of collective ownership of 
Jugendweihe. In what follows below, I argue that this sense of collective ownership 
emanates not only from having participated in Jugendweihe but from the GDR state’s 




The GDR Jugendweihe: Decentralising a Ritual in a Centrally Planned 
Economy 
As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, the GDR state not only promoted Jugendweihe, 
but also provided substantial funding for organizing and conducting the ceremonies. The 
Central Committee for Jugendweihe, with its headquarters in Berlin, spread the work that 
Jugendweihe involved among its 14 County Committees across East Germany. These 
County Committees were subdivided into districts, and the districts were subdivided into 
local committees. For example, the County Committee for Jugendweihe in Gera 
comprised 13 district committees, each with varying numbers of local committees over 
the years – in 1983, they totalled 207 (SAG 07). These local committees reported back to 
their districts, and the County Committees relayed total figures to the national Central 
Committee. While I had anticipated, based on my research in 2010, that the Jugendweihe 
committee in Gera kept meticulous statistics on the numbers of Jugendweihe participants 
(see Chapter 2), I was intrigued to find out about their decentralisation efforts. These 
efforts were recorded not only by keeping track of the numbers of Jugendweihe 
ceremonies conducted per year, but also by tracking the numbers of guests that attended 
them.  
For instance, comparative tables of the Jugendweihe ceremonies in 1959 and 1960 
highlighted that the average number of guests per participant had increased from nine to 
ten. This increase was achieved despite a significant drop in students by 25% in 1960. In 
one of the ‘commendable’ districts (Lobenstein) there were only 197 Jugendweihe 
participants in 1960 compared to 271 in 1959. Yet in 1960, four more ceremonies were 
held than in 1959. This increase from eight to twelve ceremonies also allowed an increase 
in the numbers of guests from 3,000 to 3,200, translating to an average number of guests 
per participant of 13 in 1959 compared to 17 in 1960 (SAG 05). To put this increase in 
context, the Jugendweihe handbook states that in the 1980s an average of ten guests per 
initiand attended a Jugendweihe (ZAJ 1986: 139). Although an increase in ceremonies 
incurred higher cost, decentralising such ceremonies was seen as essential, because it went 
hand in hand with an increase in guests – thus allowing Jugendweihe to be known and 
experienced first-hand by a larger part of the population.54 It was particularly important 
                                                 
54 They also often recorded the praise of West German guests present at such ceremonies – often 
as self-congratulatory evidence of East Germany’s moral superiority.   
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to connect as many people as possible to Jugendweihe at a local level in rural areas, where 
strong local church communities still persisted, and where its direct emotional connection 
to home and Heimat (the regional home – see Chapter 4) made it most effective.  
Due to a Politburo resolution, these decentralisation efforts were seen to be crucial, and 
hence ‘an important and necessary Kampfaufgabe’ (task of the struggle) – as the 1961 annual 
report of the Gera district committee explained (SAG 06: 3). However, the incorporation 
of greater parts of the populace as guests was not the sole reason for this approach. 
Rather, decentralising the ceremonies also led to the activation and formation of more 
local Jugendweihe committees. Such local committees in turn meant that more local 
residents and mass organisations could be involved in providing practical support to the 
organisation of the ceremonies on-site; but it was also hoped that they would enrich and 
animate both political-ideological and cultural work at the local level (SAG 06). These 
attempts to incorporate the population did not stop there but, taking a multi-pronged 
approach, also targeted people of all ages through the rallying of support in mass 
organisations and work collectives. For instance, members of the Pioneers became 
increasingly present at ceremonies in order to form guards of honours for the initiands’ 
procession into the venue, and/or to present them with flowers on stage. Their 
involvement also enabled Pioneers to gain a glimpse of their future initiation, and 
encouraged them to look forward to their own Jugendweihe day. Besides professional 
musicians, Free German Youth or company-associated choirs and orchestras also 
performed at Jugendweihe ceremonies, and it became the norm for Pioneers or FDJ 
members to recite poems. Similarly, women of the Democratic Women’s League of 
Germany (DFD) often helped in decorating the venue, while a Patenbrigade (godparent 
work collective) would often send at least one representative to the ceremony of the class 
they ‘sponsored’. Instead of having to pay freelance artists, the employment of members 
of mass organisations as part of the cultural programme of the Jugendweihe ceremony 
also saved costs.  
Decentralisation was thus important and necessary for multifarious reasons, but its 
fundamental aim was the greater involvement of East German society in order to 
persuade everybody at both a rational and an emotional level that working toward 
communism was the right path to follow. In reality, decentralisation and cooperation were 
aimed at increasing people’s political consciousness and deepening their political 
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conviction. Such an aim was not achieved across the population. However, these efforts 
certainly ensured that all eastern Germans can identify Jugendweihe, and that – for many 
of the older generations – they can identify with it. The GDR Jugendweihe was undergone 
by more than seven million East German adolescents, but it was also organised by over 
300,000 volunteers (Chowanski and Dreier 2000: 134), and was attended by almost all 
East Germans at least once in their lifetime, and very likely more often – whether as close 
or distant relative, family friend or colleague, or in their capacities as teacher, guest 
speaker, Pioneer or FDJ member, artist or photographer. In other words, almost all East 
Germans were complicit in Jugendweihe’s success in the GDR; and indeed the great 
majority did not view the ritual first and foremost as state-led, but as a ritual they had 
themselves actively helped in shaping. 
Many eastern Germans feel a sense of collective ownership of Jugendweihe, which was 
fostered under the GDR state. Today, this sharing of responsibility for Jugendweihe was 
highlighted in eastern Germans’ negotiations over the payment of the ceremony fee and 
the ritual design. Kinship here was embedded in political and economic negotiations over 
Jugendweihe participation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Association members’ kin ties were based on a shared 
past, and specifically on the shared hardships of the post-Wende years. Older Association 
members’ work was framed in the trope of the ‘struggle for the cause’ – reminiscent of 
the GDR state’s ideological discourse. Their work, however, was no longer for the cause 
of communism, but toward a different shared moral project: the cause of sustaining 
Jugendweihe into the future. The Association’s work in helping to maintain and reshape 
Jugendweihe in a new socio-political context not only gave older Association members 
meaning to their current life, it also justified their socialist biographies – like Jugendweihe, 
they had survived the political caesura, and they endured like the ritual. 
The members of the Association related to each other ‘like a family’, as they expressed it 
themselves, and they also deliberately incorporated first-degree kin into the Association. 
I argued that this ‘handing down’ of jobs to offspring, however, should not be interpreted 
solely as a matter of economic interests. Rather, due to the changed political context, the 
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older Association members felt a sense of beleaguerment, and they trusted first degree 
kin to continue to work for the cause of Jugendweihe because their familial loyalty made 
them loyal to the moral project. It was essentially kin who shared the moral project of 
sustaining Jugendweihe into the future. And it was the moral project of sustaining 
Jugendweihe into the future that made kin: in cases where kin did not adhere to that moral 
project, it was acceptable to exclude them, as the Association members did with the 
managing director in 2002.  
Association members also used kin idioms beyond the Association – in reference to and 
when addressing their ‘clientele’. I argued that this re-created the intimacy of a shared 
past, exemplified in Jugendweihe. Most eastern Germans of the parental and 
grandparental generations had not only participated in Jugendweihe as initiands, they had 
attended ceremonies as guests, and more importantly, had often helped in organizing and 
conducting these ceremonies. This active involvement of people under the GDR has been 
described by Fulbrook in the notion of  ‘participatory dictatorship’ – ‘to underline the 
ways in which people themselves were at one and the same time both constrained and 
affected by, and yet also actively and often voluntarily carried, the ever changing social 
and political system of the GDR’ (Fulbrook 2005: 12). Having been part of shaping the 
Jugendweihe ceremonies under the GDR provided eastern Germans today with this sense 
of collective ownership over the ritual, but also led to tensions over ritual authority of 
both a political and economic nature in the context of the new state. These tensions 
emerged not least due to the fragility of the current situation in which Jugendweihe 
received no direct financial support from the new state and future funding could not be 
expected, rendering Jugendweihe’s future uncertain. 
In the final chapter, I explore further tensions following the political caesura that stem 
from eastern Germans’ memories colliding with both the historiography of West 
Germany and western Germans’ memories of a past that eastern Germans did not share.  
In this context, Jugendweihe plays an important role in linking grandparental and parental 
generations to their past, but also seeks to produce a harmonious familial continuity with 























   
  237 
Chapter 7 
Ghosts of Cold War Memories 
  
Man…who lives in three places – in the past, in the present, and in the future – can be unhappy, if one 
of these three is worthless. 
– Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799), quoted in the Jugendweihe keepsake book 
Vom Sinn unseres Lebens (1983: 208) 
 
In the decade after the unification, a significant emphasis was placed on telling, rather than asking, East 
Germans how life in the GDR had been. Being on the losing side in the Cold War meant giving up the 
right to define (or influence) how the history of their culture and society (with all its ambiguities and 
contradictions) should be written.  
– Mark Fenemore (2007: xiii) 
 
The Jugendweihe ceremony had officially come to an end. Dagmar – in her role as 
commére – requested the adolescents to go outside for their group photos to be taken, 
while their parents, grandparents and guests were to remain seated. As the freshly initiated 
shuffled past the rows of seats to exit the theatre, Die NotenDealer re-entered the stage; 
and to the adolescents’ dismay, the lead singer jovially remarked that now ‘the adult 
programme’ could finally begin. He chatted jokingly on stage until the initiated had left, 
and then announced to the audience: ‘And now, let us remember the old times!’ 
Beatboxer Paul counted ‘Odin, dwa, tri und vier’ (in Russian one, two, three, adding four in 
German) before the tenor of the group, very slowly and with emotion, broke into a 
Russian love song. Judging by the perplexed looks on many of the faces in the audience, 
I was not the only one who was surprised by this choice of song and the group’s apparent 
proficiency in Russian. We all seemed to have expected something similar to their 
previous renditions of satirical German songs or popular English tunes like Adele’s 
‘Rolling in the Deep’. However, as soon as the speed of the song increased and most of 
the audience recognised it as ‘Katyusha’, hesitation and bafflement were replaced by 
enthusiasm, and everyone clapped cheerfully along.  
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The song lyrics describe the yearning of the girl Katyusha for her love, a soldier, who – 
because he protects his native soil loyally – can rely on Katyusha’s love for him. Written 
in 1938, the song gained popularity after a Muscovite female choir sang it in 1941 for 
troops who were departing to fight Nazi Germany. Although the extent to which the 
audience was aware of the exact lyrics is questionable, the song seemed familiar to 
everyone. As with all the music and dance performances that day, this cover too had been 
selected by the performers themselves, and not by the Association, which only interfered 
in such choices when an act was not well-received by the audience. But this song was a 
new addition to the repertoire of the group, which had performed at Jugendweihe 
ceremonies since 2010, and so we found ourselves assessing it in the car on our way back 
home. Lisa, a seventeen-year-old volunteer, clearly had been flabbergasted by the song’s 
positive reception: ‘Well I thought, am I supposed to know this song?’ We laughed out loud, 
and Dagmar added that during this performance the guest speaker, a Die Linke politician, 
had whispered to her: “Imagine if they played this in Bavaria – chances are that tanks 
would roll in!”  
Our laughter was contained in the car’s interior, but on later reflection, I was uncertain as 
to what exactly we had been laughing at, and I wondered why we had not discussed our 
divergent perceptions of the song in depth. Perhaps it was partly because some of the 
Association members had already discussed the song and Lisa’s reaction to the last 
performance with her. One of them, in her late forties, had volunteered their conclusion 
to me before our departure: ‘It’s clear as daylight, she is just too young – but for us it [the 
song] is a reference point.’ Of course, this common reference point was not just about 
the song itself, but about its origin in the Soviet Union and its performance in Russian; it 
was, of course, compulsory to learn Russian at school during socialist times – the language 
of our ‘socialist brother’, ‘role model’, and ‘our liberator from the Nazi regime’.  
In this last chapter, I am concerned with divergent memories and their ghostly echoes of 
the Iron Curtain, which marked the physical, political, and ideological boundaries between 
East and West Germany for forty years. Such memories intertwine political, familial, 
generational and geographical articulations in the present in complex ways that redraw 
the symbolic boundaries of the Cold War, but also include rewritings of the past. As I 
have illustrated previously, the Wende was a caesura that cut deep into East Germans’ 
individual and familial biographies, which were framed by references to a ‘before and after 
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that inaugurate a present and demarcate a past’ (Feuchtwang 2005: 180). Parental and 
grandparental generations often called this present ‘now’ – although it referred to a time 
span of 25 years – and it was frequently compared with a socialist past the interlocutors 
had themselves experienced, which served as a yardstick for criticisms of the present (see 
Chapter 3). The caesura disrupted family histories in such a way that the young post-
Wende generation, growing up in unified Germany – like Lisa – do not share and cannot 
comprehend the memories of the grandparental and parental generations. As such, the 
socialist generations have to do special work to maintain familial continuity, attempts that 
Feuchtwang calls ‘family repair’ (Feuchtwang 2011: 11). I argue that such efforts of family 
repair comprise subtle rewritings of the past, in which Jugendweihe’s origins in the second 
half of the 19th century are emphasised by way of deflecting from the time periods of the 
two dictatorships, while simultaneously stressing a pan-German tradition. Both the 
Jugendweihe Association and parental and grandparental generations refer not only to a 
longer pre-socialist tradition of Jugendweihe, but also portray family as an explicitly 
politically neutral social group. 
Such efforts need to be understood in the context of a western German-led public 
discourse in which memories of the socialist past clash with those of western Germans 
due to an earlier caesura, emanating from the defeat of the Nazi dictatorship by the Allied 
Forces in 1945. Germany’s occupation resulted in the foundation of West Germany (the 
American, British and French occupation zones) and East Germany (the Soviet 
occupation zone) in 1949. This separation led to divergent historiographies – both 
marking a clear break with the Nazi past – based on different foundation myths in each 
state. In this chapter, I illustrate how eastern Germans grapple with the burden of the 
past of two dictatorships. Given that memories are not simply created through 
experiences in the past, but also shape and are reshaped by our presents, such memories 
become ‘intrinsically linked to identity’ (Lambek and Antze 1996: xii; Assmann 2006: 7). 
In exploring these clashes between the cultural memory of the former East and West 
Germany respectively, I provide some insight into why it is important for families to 




Figure 19: Card in Cyrillic Letters 
The card reads: “Der Wessi möchte jetzt gern mitlachen. Man kann eben nicht alles haben!” 
 (The Westie would now like to join in the laughter. One just cannot have it all!”)  
 
Today the great majority of eastern Germans who grew up in the GDR are not fluent in 
Russian, but most recognize the language and can read the Cyrillic alphabet. In the 1990s, 
satirical postcards emerged that humorously exploited this fact, with sayings in German 
but written in Cyrillic letters (see Figure 19). As with this example, most of these cards 
displayed puns that played into the stereotypes of the Besser-Wessi (‘know-it-all Westie’) 
and the Jammer-Ossi (‘whiny Eastie’) that emerged after the fall of the wall (Berdahl 1999b; 
Boyer 2006). But eastern Germans of the socialist generations were the only ones capable 
of reading these cards; the Cyrillic letters with their German content excluded both 
western Germans and Russians from comprehension, since it had not been compulsory 
for either to learn Russian or German respectively. Thus these cards reversed the relation 
between eastern Germans and that of the former (Soviet Union) and the contemporary 
(West Germany) hegemons. The particular postcard above reclaimed a slogan that eastern 
Germans had faced in the aftermath of German unification from their western fellow-
countrymen. Whenever eastern Germans complained that chancellor Helmut Kohl had 
not kept his promise of the ‘blooming landscapes’ that were to emerge soon after 
unification in the eastern states, or if they criticised a feature of the contemporary social 
order through direct comparison with the socialist system, they were quickly dismissed as 
‘whining’ and reprimanded with the sentence: ‘You just cannot have it all!’ The satirical 
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recovery of this statement in a different context also retrieved for a second some of the 
cultural capital that had been lost with German reunification – in which, according to 
some estimates, approximately 50% of the knowledge that East Germans had acquired 
over their lives had suddenly become useless (Berdahl 1999b: 204). The true irony, 
however, lay in the fact that these postcards were a ‘what if’ proposition – an invitation 
to imagine what it would be like if western Germans had to put themselves ‘in our shoes’, 
or if the roles had been reversed. This proposition, in turn, implied the near-impossible 
question: what if socialism had triumphed over capitalism, instead of the other way 
around? 
Although I have never come across an eastern German who openly posed such an idea, 
what the Katyusha performance and the postcards have in common is that they evoke the 
past, and allow it to be negotiated and dealt with in the present through irony – in ways 
that cannot be grasped by initiands, the younger generation of eastern Germans. What 
was even more exceptional about this final act of Jugendweihe was the explicit request to 
remember the past, and the fact that this encouragement to do so came from eastern 
Germans in their early twenties, who had not experienced GDR life themselves. Such a 
direct reference to the GDR past had been largely absent from the public ceremony, 
though there were other more implicit manifestations (as described in Chapters 2 and 3), 
and during the family celebration (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the dance group 
Bewegungsküche performed a sequence at several Jugendweihe ceremonies involving Italian 
songs from the 1980s and 1990s that were popular in both East and West Germany (not 
least because Italy has been a favourite holiday destination for Germans). However, this 
performance started off with the song ‘Bella Ciao’, an Italian partisan song composed in 
1906, which became one of the most popular songs among the anti-fascist resistance 
movement in the 1940s. That this song featured among other rather apolitical Italian 
songs like ‘Felicita’ or ‘Mamma Mia’ may well be pure coincidence, but the dance group’s 
attire and their dance moves were noticeably modelled on traditional Russian Cossack 
dancers. More importantly, ‘Katyusha’ and ‘Bella Ciao’ had been staples in the anti-fascist 
song repertoire of the GDR; and, intriguingly, both groups had chosen these songs 
independently of each other (and the Association), although they had not been schooled 
during socialist times. While the performers’ call to remember ‘the old times’ was 
ambiguous because they did not explicitly state what old times were being remembered, 
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their choice of song brought to the fore the complex ways in which the socialist past and 
the past of national socialism are intertwined – which I discuss further in this chapter.  
Divergent Historiographies and Family Histories 
In her documentary Zonenmädchen (Zone Girls, Michel 2013), filmmaker Sabine Michel 
reunites with her female friends with whom she found herself at the end of their Abitur 
in 1990 ‘in a new social order they had not been educated for’. The group of friends grew 
up in Dresden (Saxony), which other East Germans had satirically nicknamed the ‘valley 
of the clueless’, because its inhabitants were thought to be less well-informed about the 
political situation due to the lack of reception for West German radio stations and TV 
channels in the region. She traces their friendship, which evolved prior to the caesura, and 
their differently-managed reorientations afterwards – in which, for example, one friend 
suffered from depression. Another friend became a French citizen, who teaches German 
in Paris but who still had not told any of her students that she grew up in the GDR – out 
of shame. While the film questions the extent to which their socialist upbringing has 
shaped them, there are also frequent glimpses into their complex relationships with their 
own parents. Sabine, as she herself explains, was brought up in ‘a well-sheltered socialist 
picture-book family’. Her parents were teachers and her father was true to SED party 
principles, which enabled the family to live in Guinea for three years, where her father 
taught natural sciences. Towards the end of the documentary, she explains that it was 
through preparing for the filming that – at the age of 41 – she learned from her mother 
that her maternal grandfather had been a Nazi and had died in a Soviet internment camp. 
The camera cuts to her and her mother, who sit around a table on which black and white 
family photos are scattered. Sabine reproachfully addresses her mother: ‘I grew up with 
the notion that everyone who lived in the GDR – they were the good guys, and we are 
the anti-fascists; and all the others had left for the West, all the war criminals. Yet we 
could have been a family with a Nazi criminal.’ Her mother responds, referring to herself: 
‘One blocks this, one just doesn’t want it [to be true]’. But her daughter, visibly distraught, 
counters: ‘You never told me this!’ Her mother responds: ‘How would you just stand 
there, then? How’d you exist with this…’; but words fail her: ‘I just wouldn’t have known 
how to deal with it’.   
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After the Second World War and the foundation of the two German states, each 
interpreted the causes for the rise of fascism in Germany differently. West Germany 
limited fascism to the period of 1933-1945, which ‘led to an internalisation of the Third 
Reich, meaning that Nazism had to be explained as a German problem’ (Borneman 
1997b: 103). East Germany identified the roots of fascism in capitalism after the First 
World War, and thus universalised the issue (ibid: 104). Each state partly projected the 
burden of the National Socialist past onto the other by portraying them as continuing the 
Nazi legacy: either in its authoritarian guise in East Germany, or in its imperialist guise in 
West Germany (Borneman 1997b; Boyer 2006). West Germany focussed on European 
integration and economic recovery and upturn, while East Germany declared itself to be 
an anti-fascist state that had been ‘liberated’ by the Soviet Union. The Berlin Wall – the 
most renowned symbol of the Cold War – was interpreted in the West as quintessence of 
German authoritarianism, in which a state oppressed its citizens by ‘walling them in’; while 
East Germany claimed it to be an ‘anti-fascist protection barrier’.  
Yet official history with its clear black and white categories never goes entirely 
uncontested. Alternative accounts are offered by historical subjects who experienced 
particular pasts, and sought by inquiring younger generations who cannot find satisfactory 
answers in the official version of history-making. Such contestations inevitably raise the 
question of which fellow countrymen – in particular, which of one’s own kin – may have 
enabled a dictatorship to emerge and persist, either through direct involvement in or 
conforming to the regime. In West Germany, a public process of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung 
/bewältigung (managing/coming-to-terms with the past) was set in motion in the late 1960s 
by the student movement, which questioned their parental generations – though, as 
Fulbrook notes, not necessarily their own parents – about the Nazi past (Fulbrook 2015: 
45). Although in East Germany Nazi elites were brought to trial and prosecuted to a 
greater degree than in West Germany (ibid), the GDR’s political elite attempted to win 
over former ‘nominal’ NSDAP (Nazi party) members and sympathizers by absorbing 
them into socialist society through mass organisations such as the NDPD and DBD, and 
local heritage societies (Heimatverbände) under the Culture League (Allinson 2000: 25-27; 
Palmowski 2004: 370). Many of the GDR political elite were former anti-fascists who 
truly believed in building a new and better Germany; but GDR historiography also 
exonerated workers and peasants of complicity with the Nazis, and from its rigid Marxist-
Leninist perspective treated ‘virtually all events before the socialist era as a preparatory 
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run at the GDR’ (Rodden 2002: 214). Unlike in West Germany, a public discourse that 
could have posed a challenge to GDR historiography was silenced, both by the political 
elite but also, conveniently, by many older East Germans; younger East Germans, as a 
result, had to deal with questions of shame about Nazism to a far lesser degree than West 
Germans (see Fulbrook 2000: 185-186). 
 
The GDR state’s anti-fascist origin myth was fostered and transmitted through its 
education system (Plum 2015; Rodden 2002). The historian Catherine Plum (2015) 
demonstrates that until the mid-1980s, school syllabi focused on stories of antifascist 
resistance, which emphasised the role and sacrifice of communist resistance fighters and 
victims, and marginalised those of other creeds. Similarly, the tales of Soviet heroes and 
‘liberators’ – which were intended to strengthen a sense of ‘friendship’ with the Soviet 
Union – whitewashed the atrocities perpetrated under Stalin, and downplayed the 
contributions that the Western Allies made in defeating Hitler. This antifascist master 
narrative was transmitted not only in history lessons, but through anti-fascist literature 
and song repertoires as well as a wide range of extra-curricular events, rendering it 
inescapable for school-aged children and adolescents (Plum 2015: 24-77). Jugendweihe 
preparatory lessons were just one of many additional ways in which East Germans’ ‘anti-
fascist descent’ was reinforced, but they were often particularly effective because they 
were conducted outside the classroom and assumed special emotive force (Wegner 1996).  
 
The Jugendweihe youth lesson, ‘We fulfil our revolutionary legacy [of anti-fascism]’ 
usually entailed a visit to the memorial site of the Buchenwald concentration camp. There 
adolescents would often hold a commemorative service next to the memorial plaque near 
the crematorium where Ernst Thälmann, the former Communist Party leader, was shot 
on the spot in 1944 (ZAJ 1974: 105-110; 1986: 103-108). The emphasis on Buchenwald, 
where most of the incarcerated were German and international communists, instead of 
Auschwitz – as the central site of the Holocaust, where most of the incarcerated were 
Jews – meant that ‘Buchenwald usurped Auschwitz in the cultural memory of the GDR’ 
(Emmerich 2009: 247). The visit to the concentration camp Buchenwald was almost 
always remembered in conversations I had with adults, perhaps because of its emotional 
impact at the time (see also Aechtner 2011: 132-134). One mother also recalled to me, 
that an anti-fascist had talked to her class during one youth lesson. However, she waved 
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it away with the comment: ‘Well that’s what they said back then, who knows whether he 
really was one?’55 Her comment is representative of what most East Germans came to 
realize forcefully after the fall of the wall: historiography is ideologically tinted – or as 
Celine’s grandfather put it: ‘It’s all falsified – the history!’ (see Introduction).  
 
While public discourses around the Nazi past clearly diverged in East and West Germany, 
it is much harder to assess the extent to which – and ways in which – families dealt with 
this past. Some studies suggests that despite West Germany’s public discourse and school 
education on the Nazi past,56 family histories have played an important role in dissociating 
one’s own grandparents from the Nazis, casting them as victims of the hardships of 
deprivation and war (Welzer, Moller, and Tschugnall 2002). In the above-mentioned film, 
Sabine is clearly shocked by the revelations of her mother, and appears to have bought 
into the GDR state myth with which she was brought up. Given the state’s efforts in 
disseminating an anti-fascist master-narrative, her attitude is understandable to an extent 
because the GDR’s historiography was also never challenged within her family. Sabine’s 
mother explains that she was politically loyal [to the SED], but she also felt the need to 
reassert her loyalty by presenting an unquestionably ‘clean’ family history to state 
authorities, so that the family’s opportunity to go to Africa was not endangered. In 
unfinished sentences, Sabine’s mother explains that she ‘made a decision’ for ‘the sake of 
harmony’ and to provide her daughter with ‘a happy childhood’; that is, she erased her 
father’s Nazi past in any official documentation by using the ‘right phrases’, with the 
support of her husband. Sabine’s mother rewrote family history in order to match official 
historiography, for her own benefit and also for that of her family. At the same time, it 
was not only her management of this difficult past through denial, but also their family’s 
place of residence and their allegiance to the socialist regime that played a role in silencing 
this part of the family history. This set of factors suggests that not all East German 
families dealt with this past the same way, nor did they subscribe to the official 
historiography entirely.  
                                                 
55 The GDR dissident Jurek Becker ironically stated: ‘There were about 150,000 upright anti-
fascists under the Nazi reign. Of these, only 17 million live on the soil of the GDR today’ (cited 
in Emmerich 2009: 246).   
56 School education after the mid-1960s – since West Germany’s historical texts until then 
downplayed or only sketchily addressed the Nazi regime (Rodden 2002: 217-18). 
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In Thuringia, there was a particular problem with historiography around the ‘Soviet 
liberation’, because older generations who lived through this time experienced it as defeat 
and recalled that American forces had taken over control. One father told me in 
conversation that he had argued with his history teacher, who proclaimed that the ‘Soviet 
forces had liberated Thuringia’, since he knew from his grandfather that the Americans 
had arrived first.  
But some from the older generations also drew comparisons between the GDR and the 
Nazi dictatorship – in private. When I was a teenager, I still remember well the feeling of 
shock I had in response to my father commenting around the kitchen table that ‘the 
communists weren’t any better than the Nazis – these uniforms of the Pioneers and the 
Free German Youth were just like those of the Hitler Youth’. By then, I was used to the 
divergence between the official version of history and my parents’ views; but nevertheless, 
I was appalled by my father’s comparison, because my parents had never made any 
attempts to hinder my entry into these GDR children’s and youth organisations. I was 
even more appalled because I disagreed with his assessment on principle: for me, the 
communists and the fascists were total opposites; after all they had fought against each 
other. Of course, in hindsight, I realise my father had a point: there were parallels between 
the SED and the Nazi regimes, not only in their attempts to win over the youth – and 
thus secure the future of the respective regime – if necessary by means of state repression, 
but also in their projects, based on evolutionary theory, to create a particular type of new 
person for a new future. While these regimes also diverged on many issues, my focus here 
is on the difference in their stances on the role of women and on the ideal family model.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, after the Second World War both German states emphasised 
different family models. West German policy makers viewed the family as a private 
matter, more of a concern to the church than the state, continuing – stripped of racial 
Nazi policies – to promote a patriarchal family model based on ‘housewife marriage’. In 
contrast, for East German legislators, the family was crucial to the political project; as a 
‘basic collective’, it was believed to progress along evolutionary lines, hand in hand with 
society (Borneman 1992: 82-84). The family thus needed to be transformed into a non-
patriarchal entity, which the state hoped to achieve by encouraging women to work 
outside the home (ibid). 
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With the fall of the Wall, West German historiography took precedence. At its basis was 
the perception that West Germany had undergone a process of liberalisation and 
democratisation following the Nazi regime, and that therefore West Germans had come 
to terms with the Nazi past (Herbert 2002) – unlike East Germans. The post-Wall public 
discourse on the GDR past was thus reminiscent of West Germany’s post-WWII 
working-through, which entailed two dominant narratives (Berdahl 1999b; Cooke 2005; 
Ten Dyke 2000). In the first, ordinary citizens are victims of perpetrators leading to a 
representation of the majority of East Germans as innocent but agency-free subjects. The 
second narrative questioned the extent to which East Germans had a ‘cultural (German) 
predisposition to acquiesce to authority’: while the majority did not actively support the 
GDR state, they sustained it by not resisting overtly, thus rendering them complicit (Boyer 
2006; Ten Dyke 2000: 153).   
What is acknowledged to a far lesser degree is that not only did East Germans as 
individuals come increasingly under attack in the post-Wende discourse, but also the East 
German family model. Laypeople and academics alike vilified East German working 
mothers in particular as Rabenmütter (literally ‘raven mothers’, uncaring mothers). 
Rabenmutter is a term of abuse with a long history in Germany. In West Germany it was 
increasingly used to target working mothers, whereas in East Germany – where the 
majority of women were employed – it was used more commonly for mothers who 
abused their offspring. Some academics have suggested that authoritarian and cold child-
rearing practices – exemplified in the use of state institutions for early-age child care – led 
to the aggressive behaviour and lack of self-confidence which were supposedly more 
prevalent among eastern than western German adolescents (see, for example, 
Trommsdorff and Kornadt 1995). Similarly, the hypothesis of the western German 
criminologist Christian Pfeiffer that ‘collective potty training’ in GDR crèches in 
association with a lack of maternal attachment were the root causes for greater right-wing 
violence in eastern compared to western German federal states sparked heated 
controversy (see Pfeiffer 1999a; Pfeiffer 1999b). The epitome of the ‘East German 
Rabenmutter’ was reified in public discourse about higher rates of infanticide in eastern 
over western federal states, in which the reason were surmised to be an East German 
legacy (see analysis by Prickett 2010). In short, these discourses rarely paid attention to 
the effects of the caesura or contemporary social conditions, but were at pains to trace an 
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authoritarian ‘ethno-typical’ German character trait in familial relations which ‘othered’ 
eastern German women in particular.  
The revelations of familial betrayal in the early 1990s – where spouses, parents, or children 
reported on the intimate details of other family members’ lives to GDR state authorities 
as unofficial Stasi collaborators – only fuelled the portrayals of East German family 
relations as cold and unloving, or simply dysfunctional. These representations added 
another layer to the humiliations that many eastern Germans had already suffered, and 
especially those of the contemporary grandparental generation. The western German-led 
public discourse considered East Germans not only as having failed to sufficiently resist 
the so called ‘second German dictatorship’, but they were also viewed as having failed 
fundamentally as workers, and as family members. Especially in the 1990s and 2000s – 
and, to a lesser extent, even today – this public discourse became engrained in many 
eastern Germans’ psyche. For example, whenever my mother receives some sort of good 
news from my brother or me, she expresses joy and pride – perhaps like any parent would. 
But even now, she almost always ends with a self-assessment – not to take away from her 
children’s achievements, but rather to redeem her own and her husband’s good parenting 
skills: ‘Well, I think we must have done something right – after all!’   
It is not my aim to downplay the perfidious practices of the Stasi or right-wing violence 
in eastern Germany; both of these issues are beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather I 
want to draw attention to what these discourses did to easterners, not only as individuals 
but as family members. After re-unification, easterners felt disoriented because they had 
to adapt to a new life in a new country, while also feeling under attack from westerners, 
who felt their own historiography had been reinforced – as the ‘winners’ of the Cold War, 
they continued to view easterners as ‘backward’ and ‘authoritarian’. Eastern Germans 
were thus viewed as simultaneously ‘too German’, being too authoritarian, and as not 
German enough, that is, not like western Germans. These discourses were 
indiscriminately applied to eastern Germans as a whole regardless of their political views, 
their familial relations or their relation to the former state – which inadvertently fostered 
a sense of community among easterners, an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (see Howard 1995). The 
majority of scholars of the GDR share the view that, ironically enough, it was only after 
the demise of the GDR that an eastern German identity developed – a group identity 
which the political elite during GDR times had aimed in vain to create. But the felt attack 
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on every aspect of easterners’ lives led many of them to develop a defence mechanism 
without pausing and reflecting on the past in depth. Instead, many eastern Germans 
retreated to their families, and ‘the family stepped up to play a key role in weathering the 
rough transition’ (Betts 2010: 236). This desire for familial cohesion in turbulent times 
also meant that many of the younger generation did not dare to ask older generations 
questions about the past – to avoid further upset and conflict. Perhaps this reluctance is 
another reason that, in the film described above, Sabine finds out about her family history 
not immediately after the Wende, but only more than 20 years later.    
Bearing the difficulties of the 1990s and these prominent discourses in mind, in what 
follows I argue that the Jugendweihe Association, grandparents and parents attempt to 
create a familial continuity and produce cohesion through either silencing or toning down 
the political aspect of the GDR Jugendweihe. This silencing is undertaken in two ways. 
First, elders and the Association deflect from both periods of dictatorship by emphasising 
the ritual’s origin within the free-religious communities in the second half of the 19th 
century. Secondly, they portray both family and ritual as free from politics or ideology. 
These two intertwined strategies, I suggest, allow the ritual to appeal to family audiences 
across the generations, but they also demonstrate to others – including westerners – the 
importance of the eastern German family, and produce cohesion and continuity. The 
cohesion and continuity of the family, and of a particular eastern German community, is 
achieved by setting both apart from western Germany, but Jugendweihe – and eastern 
Germans by extension – here also claim to be recognized as an equal part of German 
cultural history and society.   
The Jugendweihe Tradition 
It was a March Saturday in 2013, and the fifteenth annual ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ was being 
held in the Goethe Galerie, a shopping mall in Jena, Thuringia’s second largest city. The 
event revolved around the preparation and celebration of Jugendweihe, and was a 
business idea aimed at attracting adolescents and their parents to the shops by providing 
a little something beyond the ordinary shopping experience. Potential consumers could 
enjoy dance and music performances on a big stage that had been erected on the ground 
floor of the four level shopping centre. Two fashion shows, geared to the taste of the 
youth and to the significance of Jugendweihe as a life cycle event, were to inspire the 
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audience to buy things that would facilitate their festive appearance on this special day 
from the shops by which they were surrounded (see Figure 20). There were stalls where 
teenagers could receive practical advice on hairstyles and cosmetic tips, and naturally there 
was a stall run by the Jugendweihe Association, which provided information material on 
Jugendweihe ceremonies. The Association members had also placed their small, red 
popcorn machine on the table in the hope that the sweet smell it effused would draw 
teenagers, who were encouraged to participate in a quiz about Jugendweihe. Before the 
next fashion show started, Dagmar went on stage to talk to the presenter whose job it 
was to guide the audience through the afternoon’s programme. He asked her in a 
flirtatious manner some general questions about Jugendweihe (see Figure 21). Dagmar, 
sporting a youthful outfit, used the opportunity to stress that the Association also offered 
youth work events besides the actual ceremony, and then pointed out: ‘It is a family 
tradition. That is to say Jugendweihe is keine Erfindung der DDR (not an invention of the 
GDR) but has already existed for more than 160 years!’ ‘Did you know that?’, she impishly 
asked him, adding, ‘because most people don’t!’ The presenter shook his head like a little 
schoolboy that had been rebuked by his teacher. ‘And there you go’, Dagmar exclaimed, 
‘you learned something new today!’ 
 
 
     
Figure 20:  Fashion Show at the ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ in Jena. 
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Figure 21: Dagmar Talking to the Presenter at Jena’s ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ 
 
This ‘Day of Jugendweihe’ – which the Association described in their 2012/13 flyer as 
‘the top event for the entire family and a ‘must’ for every Jugendweihe participant!!!’ – was 
not the only kind of Jugendweihe fair I attended prior to the start of the ritual season in 
April. However, it was certainly the best-established and most visited of these events, all 
of which had in common the obvious aim of stimulating consumption around this festive 
occasion. For the Association, such occasions provided an opportunity to promote not 
only the Jugendweihe ceremony but also their youth work events. But here, I am 
interested in exploring another function of these events, in which they have come to serve 
as an educative tool to promote Jugendweihe as a 160-year-old ‘family tradition’.  While 
the ritual’s history is explained on the websites of all Jugendweihe Associations, the annual 
flyer of the local Jugendweihe Association asserts this long tradition as well by greeting 
the teenagers with the words: ‘Hello, dear girls and boys, great that you are interested in 
Jugendweihe. Jugendweihe, this 160-year-old tradition, is for you a symbolic step into the 
adult world.’  
 
The fair-like events, however, diverged from these other promotions in that they allowed 
for direct public engagement in which the ritual’s 160 year-long tradition was brought to 
the fore in various ways. This foregrounding was achieved either through direct 
interaction with Association members, as in the case with Dagmar described above, a 
presentation on Jugendweihe’s history that would run continuously on a TV screen in the 
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background (see Figure 22); and/or a quiz that adolescents were encouraged to partake 
in. Such a quiz was also conducted on the ‘Day of Jugendweihe’, comprising four multiple 
choice questions that tested knowledge on the foundation of the shopping mall, the actual 
event, and Jugendweihe participation numbers for East Thuringia. But the first question 
asked, ‘Since when has there been Jugendweihe in Germany?’, providing three options: A 
for 80 years; B for 161 years; C for 55 years. Although it is unclear to me whether these 
dates had been randomly chosen by an Association member, it seems unlikely because of 
their historical significance. Out of the 50 teenagers that took part in the quiz, 22 answered 
correctly with (B) for 161 years – which dates the ritual to 1852, the year that the term 
‘Jugendweihe’ was recorded for the first time by the free-religious pastor Eduard Baltzer. 
But almost as many participants (18) thought Jugendweihe had only existed since 1958. 
Although the GDR ritual was celebrated for the first time in 1955, 1958/59 was the period 
when the participation rate surged to over 80% from previously low participation rates of 
roughly 18 to 26% (see Chapter 2). More intriguingly, 10 teenagers chose option A – 
suggesting that the ritual had existed since 1933, the year that marked the beginning of 
the Nazi dictatorship.  
 
 
     
           Figure 22: Jugendweihe Stall at the Wedding Fair in Erfurt; on the TV screen runs a  
presentation of the ritual’s history 
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Arguably, Jugendweihe’s origins can be traced back to the second half of the 19th century; 
but the fact that this period – during which the ritual was hardly known and was celebrated 
by only a tiny minority – is emphasised by the Association, I believe, suggests a strategy 
of deflecting from the ritual’s more contested historical periods. By focusing on the ritual’s 
emergence as a progressive force, that is, within the free-religious congregations that 
rebelled against the dogma of the church, a social demand for the ritual that grew 
organically, form the bottom up, is stressed. However, this emphasis stands in stark 
contrast to the top-down enforcement by a state authority that characterised the re-
introduction of it as state ritual in the GDR, where it served to maintain the status quo 
(see Chapter 2). Indeed, asserting the 160-year-old tradition somewhat obscures the fact 
that Jugendweihe today would not be so popular if it had not been for its GDR phase, 
when it went from a ritual of the minority to a ritual of the majority. Yet, this raising of 
public awareness on the ritual’s history at events and through promotion material marks 
a sea-change from the 1990s. During this time, the keepsake books provided by the 
national Jugendweihe Association neither discussed any moral values nor the Jugendweihe 
history, but instead tended to resemble atlases or travel guides. After the fall of the wall, 
Jugendweihe had been fiercely attacked within a western German-led public discourse, 
including by church representatives that viewed the ritual as representing eastern 
Germans’ ‘nostalgic longing for a vanished paternalistic state, that is retrospectively 
glorified’ (Meier 1998: 40). Others had deemed the ritual without any substance or 
purpose because of its lack of a pledge and of an explicit intention to transmit a particular 
worldview or values during a preparatory period (see Wolbert 1998; Döhnert 2002).57 
These criticisms often went hand in hand with descriptions of the ritual’s employment 
under the Nazi and the SED regimes, in an attempt to equate both dictatorships’ sinister 
aims and coercive forces of youth indoctrination (Meier 1998, 2001).   
 
While the German Humanist Association (HVD), which provides similar coming-of-age 
ceremonies, distanced itself from both the ritual’s religious origin and also its GDR legacy 
by renaming the ceremony Jugendfeier (youth celebration) (Groschopp 2010), the German 
Jugendweihe Association could not as easily dissociate itself from the GDR past, given 
that it emanated from the former Central Committee for Jugendweihe in the GDR. As in 
                                                 
57 For an analysis of the public discourse on Jugendweihe, see Gallinat 2002: 36-66. 
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the raising of public awareness at events and in promotion materials, the last two keepsake 
books – Jugendweihe Almanach (2003) and Worldview – Youth Changes the World (2009) – 
therefore discuss not only humanist values but also the long ‘family tradition’ of 
Jugendweihe, its origin in the free-religious parishes and its later appropriation by the 
SED state, in great detail. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the hero of GDR children, Ernst Thälmann – after whom the 
Pioneer organisation was named – is not discussed in the contemporary keepsake book. 
During GDR times, he was frequently mentioned at events held to open the Jugendweihe 
year and at the Jugendweihe ceremony itself; and his impression of his own Jugendweihe 
in 1900 in Hamburg was often read out. By contrast, Clara Zetkin, Karl Liebknecht, and 
Wilhelm Pieck are mentioned – but solely as Jugendweihe festive speakers, without any 
further explanation of their political or ideological affiliation, despite their veneration as 
communists in the GDR (see 2009: 14). The GDR’s appropriation of the ritual is 
acknowledged, but the employment of Jugendweihe by the Deutschgläubigen (German Faith 
Movement) under the Nazi regime is denied: ‘The National Socialists introduced their 
own rites for the entry of adolescents into the circle of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’58 which had 
nothing in common with the tradition of the Jugendweihe movement’ (2009: 15). As I 
argued in Chapter 2, the German Faith Movement conducted Jugendweihe ceremonies 
during the Nazi regime – a fact that is entirely ignored. Arguably the NSDAP created their 
own rituals, but these were clearly inspired by Jugendweihe – and demonstrated continuity 
both with its focus on coming-of-age at fourteen and its initiation aspect, which made the 
ritual mouldable to the interest of various movements. The assertion that the Nazi rituals 
‘had nothing in common’ with Jugendweihe attempts to portray Jugendweihe as an 
explicitly progressive left force. This politically left force is emphasised by the argument 
that all communist and social-democratic Jugendweihe ceremonies were prohibited in 
February 1933 by ‘Order of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State’ 
(ibid.). This order – better known as the Reichstag Fire Decree, as it was issued in response 
to the Reichstag Fire on 27 February 1933, allegedly plotted and executed by communists 
– was directed against any ‘communist seditious acts of violence’. Indeed, while the decree 
                                                 
58 Literally, ethnic/national community but means a ‘pure’ ethnic community of Germans based 
on racial/national-socialist principles.  
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was the basis for Ernst Thälmann’s arrest, it did not directly mention Jugendweihe but 
was left intentionally wide open to interpretation.  
Although Jugendweihe was most popular among proletarian freethinkers prior to the 
foundation of the GDR, the denial of the deutschgläubige Jugendweihe under the Nazis 
appears intentionally to whitewash Jugendweihe’s history, by creating a continuity of 
proletarian tradition that portrays the working class as explicitly left-wing. One day at the 
office, Sonja presented me with an old book on Jugendweihe. It was printed in Sütterlin, 
an old German style, and because it did not include a publishing date, I googled its author: 
Ernst Bergman. When I pointed out to Sonja that he had been a Nazi philosopher 
involved in the German Faith Movement, she was surprised: ‘No, they [the Nazis] really 
did use Jugendweihe, too?’ Sonja’s surprise was genuine, and she later told Dagmar about 
this seemingly new revelation. Sonja and Dagmar had been taught during GDR times that 
Jugendweihe was not simply anti-church but also progressively left-wing, and that was 
what they believed themselves: a tradition that they could identify with.  
Besides the emphasis on the ritual’s origin, Association members also frequently pointed 
out to me that Jugendweihe was just a ‘nice family tradition’, and that it was parents and 
children who demanded its celebration. However, in these repeated remarks on and 
assertions of a ‘family tradition’, ‘family’ became synonymous with ‘neutral’ – that is, free 
of ideology or politics. Although the contemporary keepsake book clearly states that 
Jugendweihe in the GDR was a tool to win over the ‘“hearts and minds of the young 
generation”, but also in the struggle between church and state’ (Krause 2013: 17), the 
previous paragraph deceptively asserts that  
Jugendweihe ceremonies were locally de-ideologized to a large extent, and 
met the expectations of the adolescents and their parents. Jugendweihe 
had developed into a family fest with many guests and presents, and to a 
societal highlight in the schools, cities and municipalities. This also 
explains why it was still in vogue in 1991 after the social change [the 
Wende]: the great majority of the current parental generation has positive 
memories of their own Jugendweihe (ibid.) 
 
Indeed, the reason parents wished their children to celebrate Jugendweihe was because of 
their own participation under the GDR regime. Most parents identified the ritual either 
as a GDR institution or – more often – linked it to the labour movement, when the ritual 
became more widely popular. When I first met Andrea, she asked what had made me 
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choose this topic, and I explained to her that I had engaged with it rather by chance for 
my undergraduate dissertation and then became increasingly interested in it. She 
immediately commented, ‘I can imagine, the history of the labour movement alone must 
be very interesting!’, though I had not mentioned the labour movement to her. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Jugendweihe was first celebrated in Gera 1914, that is, 35 years 
prior to the foundation of the GDR. However, Andrea’s identification of the ritual as 
labour movement tradition very likely harks back to the GDR’s historiography of the 
ritual, portraying it as a progressive event, continuously celebrated by proletarian 
freethinkers, socialists and communists. Andrea’s sixty-nine-year-old father was the only 
one who had celebrated Jugendweihe in 1958, though her mother, who was four years his 
senior, hadn’t, and nor had her husband’s parents. Indeed, because it was often age-
dependent not all of the grandparents had celebrated Jugendweihe. Celine’s grandmother 
had not celebrated Jugendweihe, as shown in Chapter 4, but claimed to have done so in 
order to create a cohesion between her daughter and granddaughters. Families 
nonetheless viewed the ritual as a ‘family tradition’ in which adolescents evidenced this 
‘tradition’ by referring to either siblings’ and/or their parents’ Jugendweihe celebrations, 
while parents and grandparents almost always added that Jugendweihe existed long before 
the GDR.  
 
Certainly most of these parents had fond memories of their own GDR Jugendweihe 
celebrations, but the public ceremony during socialist times was never de-ideologized as 
the aforementioned excerpt claims. The constant features of the GDR Jugendweihe were 
always the national anthem, the national flag, the festive speech by a public – that is, state-
loyal – personality, and the vow to the socialist country. Parents I interviewed in 2010 
almost always acknowledged the ideological features of the GDR Jugendweihe only after 
I had directly asked about these aspects. Often by way of signalling that the ideological 
part did not matter to them, they commonly waved it away or remarked: ‘In one ear, and 
out the other!’ However, to argue that these aspects had been forgotten is an 
oversimplification. Rather, as Binns notes in regards to Soviet life cycle rituals, it was easy 
and often preferable to ignore these ideological aspects, even at the time (Binns 1980: 
176-179). The same holds true for the GDR Jugendweihe, where audiences could pick 
and choose whether they preferred to see the ritual as ideological ceremony or simply a 
family celebration. For example, while Pioneers and FDJ members who attended 
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Jugendweihe as part of the ceremony would wear their organisational uniforms, the 
initiands and their guests would wear (civil) festive adult attire. Because ideology had been 
part and parcel of GDR life, for many ‘it seemed to have rendered itself meaningless’ 
(Gallinat 2005: 299; see also Yurchak 1997, 2006).  
Even in the archival reports of the County Committee for Jugendweihe, a remarkable 
tension is palpable in attempts to strike the right balance between ‘family fest’ and 
‘ideological education’. The difficulties of this balancing act were especially evident in the 
form and content of the cultural programme and the festive speech. On the one hand, it 
was stressed that poems and songs were to be selected based on ideological relevance, 
and that the festive speech required ideological content. On the other, all these features 
also had to appeal to all guests, especially those who still needed convincing that 
communism was the right path to follow. For instance, the 1961 annual report chose the 
speech of a female party functionary of the VEB capacitor plant in Gera as a particularly 
bad example. She not only took the liberty to speak for over an hour, but her speech was 
also too much like ‘a presentation, which could have been given at any residential district 
committee meeting of the National Front’, that is, like a party meeting (SAG 06: 8).59 The 
report argued that parents’ complaints were justified; the speech was deemed 
inappropriate for Jugendweihe because it did not successfully connect reason and 
emotion. This explanation, however, brings to light the Central Committee’s intention to 
draw explicitly on the emotional force of the family to foster identification with the 
ideological aims of the political elite and the GDR state itself.   
While parents were given scope to influence ritual performances during the GDR period, 
and, as I have argued in Chapter 6, had helped in shaping Jugendweihe, this influence was 
limited and never eradicated the ritual’s ideological features. Although the Association 
had a clear interest in dissociating or deflecting from the ritual’s politically dubious 
histories, and benefitted from the continuation of the ritual ceremony, the frequent claims 
that Jugendweihe was a family tradition created a harmonious continuity within the family. 
However, if Jugendweihe was simply a family tradition, why is it today also celebrated in 
a public ceremony? I suggested in Chapter 5 that the public celebration provides an 
opportunity for some families to distinguish themselves from others in terms of social 
                                                 
59 The first Jugendweihe Handbook, published in 1974, clearly set out that the speech was not to 
exceed 20 minutes (ZAJ 1974: 148). 
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class. Families may all well be eastern German, but they have more or less successfully 
adapted to the new social order, and the public ceremony allows them to demonstrate 
their social standing to others. In the remaining part of this chapter, I explore further 
reasons for participating in a public ceremony by turning to political memories, and the 
eastern Germans’ sense of not feeling at home.  
 
Political Affiliations & Not Feeling at Home 
Running alongside changes in dealing with Jugendweihe’s history over the past decade 
was the local Jugendweihe Association’s openness about their fruitful relationship with 
Die Linke (The Left).  The Left – also called Linkspartei (Left Party) – was founded in 2007 
through a merger of the western German WASG (Labour and Social Justice – The 
Electoral Alternative) and the eastern German PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism). The 
latter party was the legal successor to East Germany’s state party, SED (Socialist Unity 
Party). There were many parallels between the party and the Association in terms of their 
aims to survive and re-invent themselves in post-socialist eastern Germany. Yet, in the 
early post-Wall years, it was essential for the Jugendweihe Association to publicly 
dissociate from the then-PDS because of the socialist past. While the Association 
emphasised that it is ‘a party-politically and ideologically independent Association which 
guarantees freedom of faith and conscience, tolerance and acceptance of diverse world 
views’ (JWA 2013), it seemed to have changed its earlier cautious stance, towards guest 
speakers in particular. In the 1990s, the Association seemed to be more careful about 
providing a venue for diverse – often non-politically affiliated – guest speakers; but from 
the sixteen ceremonies I observed in 2013, only two included guest speakers who were 
not members of The Left.  
During discussion of a new promotion clip about the Association, Nicole, the youngest 
staff member of the Association, raised doubts about whether depicting only The Left 
party members would put the Association in a ‘particular corner’. Dagmar assertively 
asked: ‘Who do you want to use then?’. She continued to argue that most guest speakers 
were chosen from The Left because ‘they are reliable and give the best speeches’. Nicole 
countered that people may not know that other public figures do not want to speak at 
Jugendweihe ceremonies, and that all they will see is that the guest speakers are from The 
Left – and this might turn the entire clip into a promotion for this party. Dagmar asserted 
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that she did not care what the public thought, and that for her it was more important to 
be able to rely on guest speakers. Dagmar’s sense of the reliability of The Left seemed to 
stem from her discontent about the fact – as she had explained to me in another 
conversation – that members of other parties had rejected invitations to speak at 
Jugendweihe ceremonies in the 1990s. Some eastern German politicians had also 
attempted to provide a non-religious alternative to Jugendweihe in the early 2000s, by 
founding an organisation called ‘Maiglocke’ ('May Bell'; see also Fincke 2002; Wieland 
2001). Although this venture failed, and members of other political parties have taken on 
roles as guest speakers at the Jugendweihe or Jugendfeier ceremonies of other providers 
since, Dagmar seemed to assess this move as an unforgivable betrayal – especially by 
members of the SPD.    
The Association also made use of The Left for their excursion offers to the Thuringian 
Landtag (federal state parliament) and the Bundestag (German parliament), which were 
sponsored by Left parliamentarians, who would often show adolescents around and 
discuss with them how democratic institutions worked. But the relationship was beneficial 
to The Left too. Jugendweihe ceremonies were a popular venue for political party 
representatives to reach a large audience all at once, especially in an election year – like 
2013 – when they needed their electorate to remember the candidate in a favourable light. 
 At the same time, Association members were also critical of The Left party’s work. They 
often complained about its factional quarrels, which were seen as hindering a common 
goal, and they were wary that Left party members would fall into stereotypical traps of 
‘corrupt politicians’. Indeed, the Association’s apparent scrutiny of The Left party politics 
needs to be understood in the context of The Left’s populist stance, and its claims to 
represent the ‘common man on the street’, as well as campaigns run by its forerunner – 
the PDS – to represent the interests of the eastern German electorate in particular (Hough 
2000; Hough and Koß 2009).  
However, the party’s effectiveness had increasingly come into doubt after its merger with 
the western German left, and with its aspiration to become a national party (Volkspartei). 
This doubt became clear during an Association outing to mark the end of the Jugendweihe 
year 2013, shortly after the general election in September. One Association member 
remarked that he had checked straight away whether ‘our festive speakers are still in the 
Bundestag!’. When I mentioned that they had lost their direct mandate, Dagmar confirmed 
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this, adding: ‘But what can they do, anyway? It’s always easier to talk big when one is in 
opposition, but to actually govern – that’s a different thing! That’s when you have to do 
the real work! In my opinion they should have a red-red-green coalition with Merkel as 
chancellor! 60 After all, she is also child of the East’ (ein Kind des Ostens).’ This ironic remark 
amused many around the dining table as it toyed with the portrayal of eastern and western 
Germans as homogenous along political lines. While Angela Merkel was raised in the 
GDR and had been a secretary of the Free German Youth, her father was a pastor and 
she did not celebrate Jugendweihe. Crucially, her political views were not compatible with 
the left-wing parties Dagmar wished would govern the country. Merkel may have been 
eastern German, but as leader of the Conservative party, she was certainly not left-wing.  
Jutta had voiced similar criticism of The Left prior to the general election in a different 
conversation, in which she volunteered to me that she had not been satisfied with the 
party’s work. She felt disappointed that The Left, for example, had not nominated their 
own candidate for the mayor’s office. When I suggested that surely no one would be keen 
on being the mayor of a city that was so heavily in debt as Gera, she elaborated that it was 
just another manifestation of the party ‘s refusal of responsibility, preferring to remain in 
a ‘cosy oppositional role’. She was at a loss and explained her difficulties in finding a party 
she could actually identify with and trust, and thus vote for, and she felt that Germany 
wasn’t a real democracy. While this dissatisfaction with party politics is a rather widespread 
phenomenon in many democracies and not particular to the eastern German context, in 
her search to explain her views to me, Jutta suddenly continued: ‘I don’t feel at home in 
this state at all, it’s somehow not my state. I don’t have this patriotic feeling, it’s not really 
my country. But, then again, I don’t know, where else would it be?’ Jutta, who was in her 
early thirties at the time of German reunification, was unable to express exactly what the 
issue was – reinforcing this inarticulacy by putting her right hand to her chest – because 
as a feeling it was elusive. But this sensation was not uncommon among eastern Germans 
of both grandparental and parental generations – though I have rarely heard it put into 
words as directly as by Jutta. At first sight, her feeling appears to stem from the change in 
the political landscape that had made previously fairly clear-cut political leanings after the 
caesura much more complex. Yet this obvious complexity was less because she had gained 
                                                 
60 Parties, like political views, are usually referred to in Germany by colour: A red-red-green 
coalition stands here for the SPD, The Left and Alliance ‘90/The Greens.  
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a right to vote with a real choice, than that she felt there was no one left she could trust 
to serve her interests.  
Not feeling at home, as Jutta described it, seems peculiar at first – especially since she had 
never left Thuringia. Berdahl argues that the various nostalgic expressions and practises 
of easterners in the 1990s and 2000s were due to ‘feelings of profound displacement and 
disillusionment following reunification, reflected in the popular saying that we have 
‘“emigrated without leaving home”’(Berdahl 2005: 165). Jutta’s assertion that it was ‘not 
a real democracy’ was her way of underscoring her sense of not being properly 
represented, a disgruntlement that stems in part – as I suggested in Chapter 6 – from the 
fact that the political system and the institutions she found herself in had not been shaped 
by East Germans. Ordinary eastern Germans were not part of the negotiations of 
Germany’s unity treaty, and thus unable to salvage parts of the past they did not want to 
leave behind. But eastern Germans also continue to be underrepresented in Germany’s 
decision-making positions today (see Helbig 2015). Indeed, many eastern Germans 
perceive themselves as second-class citizens in Germany, an issue that has multifarious 
causes, and to which I turn below.  
 
The Ossi and ‘Second-Class’ Citizenship 
Teenagers who participated in Jugendweihe in 2013 seemed largely oblivious of the fact 
that there was a link between the ritual and the GDR, although most of their parents had 
celebrated their own Jugendweihe during socialism. Adolescents generally acknowledged 
that one ‘celebrated the entry to adulthood’ with the ritual, but that one was not yet an 
adult. Of the twenty adolescents I had conversations with about Jugendweihe, only 16-
year-old Sophie pointed out in her definition of Jugendweihe that it was ‘a festivity which 
is celebrated mainly in the East of Germany’. This disconnect among teenagers was partly 
due to the fact that, for them, the GDR was part of history and not their own biography. 
Teenagers were also at an age where they had not yet been exposed to the question ‘Where 
are you from?’ Such a query would only be raised either abroad or when one was in 
another federal state. This issue of ‘home’ or ‘origin’, however, could be a challenge for 
their parents and grandparents. 
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During my fieldwork, one story made its rounds in the village, concerning a local woman’s 
daughter who had moved to Bavaria. She and her husband, who were in their thirties, had 
settled in Munich, largely for work purposes, and they had recently bought a property in 
one of the more rural suburbs of the city. One day, while they were busy renovating their 
newly acquired house, a neighbour came over to fetch his child’s football, which had made 
its way over the fence. They got into a conversation during which the Bavarian neighbour 
inquired where they were from. Their answer, ‘Gera’, did not mean anything to him, so 
they broadened the geographical scope by listing more well-known cities within an hour’s 
driving distance from Gera, ‘Jena, Erfurt, Leipzig…’. The Bavarian was still perplexed, 
and remained so even after they had told him that they came from the federal state of 
Thuringia. The woman, who had grown increasingly impatient, then resorted to a greater 
geographical category, exclaiming: ‘Well, we’re from the East!’ This remark, the story 
went, led the Bavarian neighbour to respond agreeably: ‘Never mind at all! My wife is also 
from the Far East!’  
The story was always accompanied with shaking of heads and sneers about the ignorance 
of ‘the Bavarian’ in particular, and western Germans in general. What made matters worse 
was that the incident occurred just a few years prior to my fieldwork, not in the 1990s. 
Whether this story was genuine in the first place, and to what extent it may have been 
coloured in due course of its retelling, is not so much of interest to me as the fact that it 
circulated at all. When I provocatively pointed out to my mother in a conversation about 
this anecdote that perhaps this particular Bavarian was just a ‘bit provincial’ not unlike the 
villagers of Gera themselves, she responded indignantly: ‘But we do know cities and federal 
states in the West!’ While the issue seemed to focus on western Germans’ ignorance about 
anything related to eastern Germany, in spite of eastern Germans’ knowledge of western 
Germany, what was not properly articulated in this instance, I believe, was what bothered 
the people who recounted it the most. For this grandparental generation of eastern 
Germans, who had felt German all their life, it seemed the greatest affront that after 
German unification they were repeatedly compared and equated to foreigners. Yet, this 
divergence between easterners and westerners in what appears to be simple geographical 
knowledge is a continuation of what had already evolved prior to 1989. Like West 
Germans of the same age, young East Germans had no memories of a united Germany 
(before 1945). However, while most young East Germans had never stopped looking 
westwards, kept up with its popular culture, and compared their quality of life with that 
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of West Germany rather than with other socialist countries, young West Germans had 
largely lost any real interest in East Germany; they no longer upheld a sense of belonging 
to two parts of a divided Germany (Fulbrook 1994: 221; 2000: 187-88). 
Notably, the mother had made her daughter’s incident public by retelling her family story 
at pensioners’ gatherings and meetings of the women’s sport group, where it was 
frequently remarked upon and retold. But it was because of these women in attendance 
that the story spread within and beyond the village, and travelled back to their own and 
other households. It was there, within the family, where it fell on the ears of all generations 
and cut across age differences. The parental generation often empathised and shared 
similar sentiments with their parents, not least because they had greater exposure to 
western Germans both through work and travel, and thus had comparable first-hand 
experiences. The younger generation, which had been born and brought up in unified 
Germany, were often uninterested in such stories, found them awkward or were merely 
bemused by their elders’ resentment. Nevertheless, they were made aware of the existence 
of such a symbolic boundary and its effects on their grandparents and parents. More 
importantly, the older eastern Germans of the post-Wende generation grew, the more 
they became aware of the ongoing distinction-making between eastern and western 
Germany.  
In a conversation I had with Kristin, a female volunteer with the Association, she asserted 
generational differences in attitude to national and regional sentiments. She had far greater 
exposure to non-Thuringian than most of the Thuringians I spent my time with, since she 
was a university student and also travelled regularly throughout Germany for team sports 
competitions. Fully aware of her circumstances, I carefully framed my question of 
whether, because she was ‘meeting more people from other federal states’ she ‘actually 
felt more like a Thuringian or more like a German?’ She quickly answered, ‘German’, 
before she elaborated, 
Well, you meet Bavarians, and they speak Bavarian, and then there are 
others who sächseln (speak in a Saxon dialect, i.e. Upper Saxon) and that’s 
okay. This is more the older generation that says: ‘Oh no, the Bavarians 
sound impossible, and they always talk like ‘East’ and ‘West’. I don’t feel 
that way because I was born in 1990 – when Germany was already one. 
The only thing that I do think is really unfair, for example, is that the care 
personnel here earns less than in the old federal states. For instance, my 
mother works in the nursing services and she must lift as heavy stuff and 
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cares as much for people as a nurse in West Germany, that is, the old 
federal states. This is also not democratic.   
 
Twenty-two-year-old Kristin denied any particularly strong regional attachments. Yet, 
despite my careful phrasing regarding her exposure to ‘people from other federal states’ 
in which she could have easily referred to, for example, more distinct northern federal 
states, she juxtaposed Bavarians and Saxons – the stereotypical epitomes of the Wessi and 
Ossi respectively. Bavarians are held to be particularly conservative, Catholic, and rich, 
even among western Germans. The Saxon dialect, on the other hand, has connotations 
of naivety, and many Germans also associate it with the Stasi, the former GDR state 
security. She herself had interpreted my regional versus national attachment question as 
one between eastern and western Germany, recreating the same demarcation in the 
beginning of her explanation that she subsequently ascribed to older generations. More 
importantly, in the end she conceded that there is some actual unequal treatment, which 
she framed in relation to her mother’s lower earnings compared to western Germans for 
the same work. She raised this as an issue of democracy, as Jutta did; but while Jutta 
seemed to relate this inequality to inadequate political representation, Kristin did so 
because all laws in a democracy should apply equally to all citizens.61 While she sided with 
her mother, she did not deduce that the same could befall her in the future. 
 
However, some members of the post-Wende generation also had direct experiences of 
the symbolic divisions between the former East and West Germany. In December 2013, 
the magazine Der Spiegel published an article by an anonymous 22-year-old female student 
from Brandenburg, who asked for the abandonment of the categories of Ossi and Wessi 
(see anonymous author 2013). She explained that, because she was born in 1991, she had 
never had anything directly to do with the GDR and always felt like a ‘normal German’. 
Yet since she and her boyfriend had moved to Bavaria for her studies, they had been 
treated – to her astonishment – as Ossis. She described experiences in which party 
                                                 
61 According to the Federal Statistical Office the hourly gross income averaged 72% in eastern 
Germany compared to the western federal states in 2012. Although salaries in the public sectors 
have been largely aligned, in the private sector eastern Germans often only earn 60% of the salaries 
in the western federal states. More importantly, in 2013, 25% of eastern Germans earned less than 
the minimum wage compared to 11% in the western federal states (Kaufmann 2013). The public 
discourse on the minimum wage was a main feature of the 2013 electoral campaigns, during which 
some argued that if a minimum wage were to be introduced at all, it should be €1 per hour lower 
in the eastern federal states – a suggestion that caused renewed upset in eastern Germany.  
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conversations suddenly came to a halt as soon as her western German interlocutors 
learned where she was from, and of frequent Ossi jokes and derogatory comments, and 
how they negatively affected her. Arguing that an ‘Ossi is not an Ossi’ because it does not 
denote a geographical region but emanates from a historical context, she finishes her plea,  
Young people, like me, just want to live like any other young Germans as 
well – in the present, not in the past. And we do not want to be further 
humiliated for our parents’ suffered humiliations.  
Both examples of young twenty-somethings illustrate how the young generation seems 
more confident in raising the discriminatory treatment of eastern Germans as an issue, 
perhaps partly because they are better educated than their parents and grandparents. 
Crucially, however, they can do so more easily because they cannot be criticised for any 
GDR state involvement.   
There are not only dissonances in experiences, memories and identifications of the past 
between eastern and western Germans, but also generational ruptures between socialist 
generations and their offspring born into unified Germany. Memories of the past are here 
reproduced on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, in ways that continue to challenge 
eastern Germans’ sense of full acceptance as equal citizens in unified Germany because 
of and despite their different past.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how the political caesura and the incorporation of eastern 
Germans into the Federal Republic of Germany brought to the fore differences in eastern 
and western understandings of the past, based on divergent memories and identifications 
with different historiographies, geographical belongings and political cultures, all of which 
have hindered the formation of a common identity. This lack of common identity as 
‘simply Germans’, and of the ‘growing together’ that many had envisaged but which was 
‘blocked’ by the frequently cited and infamous ‘wall in the heads’ (die Mauer in den Köpfen) 
is maintained on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. Most Germans as well as 
international observers had underestimated that ‘[b]elonging is established more through 
a shared past than an anticipated common future’ (Borneman 1992: 307).  
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This common future continues to be haunted not only by the forty years of different pasts 
in East and West Germany, but also by the Nazi past. In her study of German identity, 
the anthropologist Diana Forsythe (1989) interviewed West Germans in the 1970s and 
1980s, and argues that – despite the commonly held belief that a majority identity is strong 
and secure – West Germans experienced their identity as fragile and ambiguous. The 
reasons, she holds, are to be found in the fact that the history of the German nation is 
fairly recent, and that any conversations about die Vergangenheit (the past) refer almost 
always to the previous fifty years. The past is thus ‘frequently used as a euphemism for 
the Nazi era (1933-45)’ (Forsythe 1989: 138). Forsythe explores how Germanness 
manifests itself in drawing boundaries in two ways. The first is geographical, that is, where 
Germany is – a complicated matter for historical as well as political reasons. Secondly, 
dichotomies between who is German, or a Deutscher, and who is an Ausländer (a foreigner) 
appear. But both geographical and ethnic demarcations are expressed in gradations. The 
territory of the GDR was seen as unclear: an anomalous domestic and foreign territory. 
Likewise, GDR citizens were viewed as German but ambiguously so. After the fall of the 
wall, this ambiguity of the ‘other German(y)’ has continued. I have argued that eastern 
Germans in the first decade after unification were perceived to be a ‘too German’ – that 
is, ‘authoritarian’ because according to West German historiography they continued the 
Nazi past in its authoritarian guise; or similarly, not ‘German enough’, that is, not 
sufficiently like West Germans.  
The West Germans whom Forsythe asked in the 1980s if they felt German would respond 
according to whether they had a nationalist or non-nationalist view of German identity. 
The former would identify as Germans, the latter more likely as European, or in terms of 
local and regional identifications. This dissociating as German was a way of dissociating 
with the Nazi past and its dangerous nationalism (Forsythe 1989: 151-154). Indeed, these 
ways of identifying are also common today, and also among eastern Germans. They are 
not simply about views on nationalism, but are often made along political lines; it is rare 
for a politically left-leaning person to consider themselves ‘German’, other than in 
linguistic terms. Here a common national identity is fraught along political lines and 
understandings of the Nazi past. Nevertheless, eastern Germans are still more likely 
considered to be Ostdeutsche (East Germans) than Germans by westerners.  
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In 2003, the journalist Toralf Staud offered an interesting argument about East Germans 
and unification in the German national paper Die Zeit , under the heading ‘Ossis are Turks’ 
(Ossis sind Türken) (Staud 2003). His article opens with a scene from the film Good Bye 
Lenin! – for the first time after the fall of the wall, the main protagonist, Alex, visits his 
father, who had fled to West Berlin. Alex’s half-siblings ask him his name and where he 
comes from. He answers: ‘I come from a different country.’ Staud points out that Alex 
does not say that he comes from the GDR or from ‘the zone’, nor does he refer to himself 
as ‘one of your poor brothers and sisters’ – as many West German politicians used to 
refer to East Germans. Alex also does not refer to himself as East German. Instead, Staud 
explains, he states the simple truth; and if this truth had been considered, the processes 
of German unification might have been differently managed – and perhaps more 
successfully. He argues that East Germans should have been viewed as immigrants – the 
only difference being that they did not leave their home, but that their new country came 
to them. East Germans – like other immigrants – had high hopes for their lives in the 
new country, but tensions quickly emerged as they were asked to assimilate when they only 
wanted to integrate. This desire to keep something of their own cultural heritage explains 
the wave of nostalgia for the East. Immigrants often feel rejected and bullied, while 
members of the receiving country tend to complain about the cost of migration – all of 
which sounds familiar to any German in post-Wende Germany. As is common among 
immigrants, eastern Germans had not only lost parts of their possessions, they also had 
not acquired the appropriate cultural capital – they had learnt the wrong foreign language, 
they had to learn how to deal with new laws and bureaucracy, their professional degrees 
were not recognized, and so on.   
Gareth Dale (2007) argues that Staud’s thesis provides a useful lens through which to 
view Ostalgia in the 1990s and 2000s: to seek out East products, to watch East 
programmes and listen to East music are all ways to feel at home again. However, he 
rightly points out that equating East Germans and Turks downplays the considerably 
greater challenges non-German immigrants face in integrating into German society. Not 
only is their native language not German, they also ‘suffer institutional discrimination and 
other forms of racism to a far greater extent than do East Germans’ (Dale 2007: 172). He 
notes, too, that easterners’ ‘family networks have, so to speak, accompanied them on their 
journey’ (ibid: 172). I have argued that the family played a major role in the post-Wende 
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period in providing a refuge for eastern Germans. Not unlike during GDR times, 
Jugendweihe served to re-strengthen family ties – in a way that emphasised family over 
any potential conflicts arising from political differences. In 2013, where many of these 
eastern German families had offspring that had been born in the ‘new country’, there was 
also an increasing danger for this familial cohesion – both in the passing of time, which 
allowed people to address the past more critically, but also presented by a young 
generation that attempts to understand a past in a country they themselves have not lived 
in.  
When the a capella band I described in the introductory vignette encouraged the audience 
to ‘remember the past’, it was somewhat unclear what past they referred to nor how this 
past was to be remembered. Their choice of song, a Russian song that belonged to the 
anti-fascist song repertoire of the Eastern Bloc, made clear that it was the socialist past 
parental and grandparental generations had experienced themselves – and a past that 
would not have existed without the Nazi past. The song was performed at a time when 
the adolescents, who do not share this song as a common reference point, were not 
present in the theatre. Yet it was chosen by twentysomethings who directly called upon 
the older generations to remember the past. As Maxim Leo’s excerpt, cited on page i 
illustrates, the GDR is still alive in families – like a ghost that can’t find peace. It is the 
younger generation that is also eager to understand this past, because the past cannot 
simply be shed but needs to be remembered, retold, managed, and worked through across 
the generations. This memory work is an ongoing process and Jugendweihe is part of this 
process of connecting the three generations. The Katyusha song is thus a reminder of the 
presence of a generation that has not experienced this past, which has not lived in the 
country their parents and grandparents grew up in. Yet they are connected through their 
kin to this country and this past – and through Jugendweihe; both are continued into the 
future.  
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Conclusion 
 
What I have, I do not want to lose, but 
Where I am, I do not want to stay, but 
Those I love, I do not want to leave, but 
Those I know, I do not want to see any more, but 
Where I live, I do not want to die, but 
Where I die, I do not want to go to: 
I want to stay where I have never been. 
 
– Poem by GDR dissident Thomas Brasch, written after his coerced emigration from 
East to West Germany in 1976. 
 
It was an autumnal September afternoon, and my mother and I were chatting in the family 
kitchen about nothing in particular when she made a comment about the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
federal states. These were common enough terms, but her usage of ‘new’ federal states – 
that is, the five federal states of the former East Germany – irked me in this instance. 
Perhaps I was just in a grumpy mood. Perhaps fieldwork had taken its toll on me; having 
lived as an adult for such a prolonged time with my parents had made me feel like their 
teenage daughter again. Media reports had been frustrating me throughout my fieldwork 
too, because discriminatory tropes about eastern Germans were still so prevalent – not 
unlike those common in the 1990s. In the run-up to the general elections in September, 
for instance, the SPD candidate for chancellor alleged that Chancellor Angela Merkel 
‘lacked passion for Europe’ because she was ‘socialized in the GDR’. The ongoing debate 
about the introduction of a legal minimum wage, which became a central issue in the 
electoral campaigns, led some western Germans to suggest that if it was to be 
implemented, it should be at least €1 per hour lower for eastern Germans because of their 
‘lower productivity’. 
 
I was uncomfortably aware of how words mattered in the shaping of social relations, and 
of how oblivious my mother seemed to that fact, which only fuelled my irritation. Most 
likely, though, it was the combination of all of these factors – being bad-tempered, a 
daughter, an eastern German, and an anthropologist – that made me snap at her: ‘I just 
can’t believe you are using these terms too. How are the western federal states in any way 
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older than the eastern? ‘New’ is just so belittling; like 1990 was a tabula rasa; like the ‘older 
brother’ helps his ‘younger sister’ because we are so in need of help. And that you use this 
‘old’ and ‘new’ nonsense yourself just makes it all worse!’ My entirely perplexed mother 
tried to defend herself to me, and also to my father, who had just stepped into the quarrel: 
‘I don’t understand what your problem is,’ she said, adding, ‘How else would you say it?’ 
In the hope of receiving support from her husband, she turned to him and asked, ‘Isn’t it 
right? – Everyone says old and new federal states?!’ Her assertion, in turn, struck a chord, 
and I indignantly countered: ‘Only because everyone does it, does not make it right!’ The 
tense situation was only half-heartedly defused by letting the matter rest at that.  
 
Roughly a couple of weeks later, as I returned from work, I had hardly opened the door 
when my father cheerfully welcomed me with a confusing series of news bites. One was 
that Ranga Yogeshwar had won the Goldene Henne (Golden Hen) audience award – an 
annual media prize in memory of the East German entertainer Helga Hahnemann (1937-
1991), whose nickname was ‘Hen’. I was puzzled by this piece of information. I was not 
sure how it was supposed to be of interest to me, nor indeed to my father, who was no 
fan of award ceremonies. I knew that the Luxembourger Yogeshwar was a popular 
presenter of scientific shows on German TV, and that the award was based on votes cast 
by readers of the TV magazine SuperIllu and viewers of MDR and RBB TV channels – in 
other words, a largely eastern German audience. Just as I was about to ask what he was 
actually trying to tell me, my father arrived at his point: the final comment of Yogeshwar’s 
thank you speech. The TV presenter referred to contemporary Germany in an allegory of 
a married couple. It was time, my father reported Yogeshwar to have said, to drop the 
‘new’ from the ‘new federal states’. After all, no husband would introduce his wife of over 
twenty years to anyone as a ‘new wife’. My father repeatedly nodded and laughed with an 
apparent sense of vindication made by the award recipient on his, or indeed on my, and 
our, behalf. But I couldn’t help thinking how inappropriate the marriage metaphor was. 
Marriage, to me, was a union between two consenting equal partners; but the merger of 
the two German states in 1990 had not been a union of equals. The accelerated pace of 
unification was comparable to a marriage of convenience at best, based much more on 
economic reasoning than shared values or love. My father, on the other hand, seemed 
convinced – like Yogeshwar – that it was just a matter of the passing of time and more 
respect for each other that would turn the marriage into a happy one. I kept my doubts 
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to myself, bit my tongue, and smiled at my father, because I knew that his retelling of this 
story was his way of signalling to me that he understood what I had meant a fortnight 
earlier.  
 
These two interrelated incidents brought back memories of the political caesura, the 
Wende, – not only because of their content, but also because they evoked all the 
heightened emotions of the time, alternating between fear, excitement, hope, joy, 
confusion, and disillusionment, and producing intense familial tensions. The Wende was 
not simply a one-off incision through all aspects of East German society, but – as I 
explained in the thesis introduction – a time period marked by two separate, complex 
events: the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9th November 1989, and German unification on 3rd 
October 1990. The fall of the Wall was experienced differently by East Germans, but the 
great majority – and certainly my entire family – found it an unexpected, but moving and 
joyous moment. However, its aftermath also brought into sharp relief intra-and inter-
generational clashes in political views, previously less obvious but now publicly displayed: 
in (West) German national flags, graffiti of Nazi symbols, the changing attire of 
contemporaries along political lines, and often heated debates – both in public and in 
family homes – on the best way forward. In the Wende period and the 1990s, the state 
apparatus in the territory of the former East Germany turned a blind eye to increasing 
right-wing extremism and focussed its attention on the political left. During this time, 
youths with extreme-left and -right political leanings made their views conspicuous 
through the way they presented themselves. Youths associated with right-wing extremist 
views imitated the English Skinhead scene with their hairdos and attire (bomber jackets, 
black boots with white shoelaces, particular clothing brands). The style of youths with 
left-wing extremist views could be characterised as ‘punk’ or ‘hippy’, though many had a 
similar style to the right-wing extremists, but would never use white shoelaces or Nazi 
symbols. Yet the ‘communication’ between these groups was less based on debate than 
marked by violent attacks and counter-attacks.   
 
My parents, and especially my father, had been – like most East Germans, it seemed – in 
favour of speedy unification, and started to take to the streets just before I decided to 
stop participating in these protests. For me, for many of my generational peers, and for 
the GDR dissidents that had brought the citizens’ movement into being, the 
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demonstrations had been about reforms – to shake up an outmoded political elite that, 
despite glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union, rejected any change. Our aspiration was 
a ‘humane socialism’ that, among other much-needed transformations, would first and 
foremost grant proper rights of freedom of speech and movement. Conversely, for the 
great majority, economic aspirations had increasingly taken centre stage after the fall of 
the Wall.  
 
It was after one particular incident during a discussion in the Johannis Church, which 
served as a venue for open debate that always preceded the street protests, that I decided 
to cease participating. In the packed church, a young man, perhaps only a couple of years 
older than me, took to the microphone. He made a call to consider the issues of this 
turbulent time carefully and to ponder over what we, East Germans, had to offer in an 
attempt to caution his listeners ‘to not let us BRDigen’. The latter term was a wordplay 
that consisted of the FRG (West Germany) and the verb ‘to bury’.62 To my shock and 
frustration, he was quickly booed and interrupted by the audience, including the pastor – 
presumably because their desire to become part of the ‘Golden West’ drowned any 
rational discussion on other options. Yet his concern, which so many dismissed at the 
time, was to become a sensation that many East Germans would feel after German 
unification, when – as I have illustrated in this thesis – their focus shifted onto the losses 
they had not anticipated.   
 
Like me, most of these East Germans had pledged allegiance to the GDR state and its 
socialist future at the age of fourteen, in the secular coming-of-age ritual Jugendweihe. 
This ritual was a site where individuals, families and the state were intimately connected, 
and where the political elite fostered its aims of creating ‘socialist personalities’ and 
‘socialist families’ for their greater goal of achieving communism. Many observers in the 
West, but also among the churches in East Germany, had anticipated that with the GDR 
state’s demise, the ritual would vanish as well. But this disappearance did not transpire. In 
this thesis, I have investigated how and why Jugendweihe – which was so closely 
associated with the GDR state – could survive the political caesura. I have explored how 
                                                 
62 BRD – FRG, beerdigen – to bury – A group of his friends later carried a banner with this slogan 
during the protest. 
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the ritual’s continuity and adaptation in a new socio-political environment reflects the 
processes of reordering the relations between the individual, family, and the (new) state 
in unified Germany.  
 
The Wende not only created the temporal designations of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ (see 
Feuchtwang 2005; 2011); it also produced generational differences in which a younger 
generation born in post-Wende eastern Germany cannot share the same reference points 
with their parental and grandparental generations, who have individual, familial, social, 
geographical, and political memories of the past, imbricated in complex ways. It also 
unearthed differences between the parental and grandparental generations, as is evident 
in the clash of opinions between me and my parents. My parents were born under the 
Nazi regime and grew up in the 1940s, experiencing the separation of Germany and the 
socialist regime that followed – political situations that were in many ways foisted upon 
them from outside. They also had memories of the workers’ uprising in 1953, and the 
building of the Wall in 1961 – episodes which informed their attitudes and sustained their 
suspicion toward the GDR state. I was raised to be wary of the state too, but I also grew 
up during a time that was marked by détente. In my family it was clear that we were not 
simply supportive of the state, and this perspective aligned us. Yet with the Wende and 
the possibility of reunification, our political views shifted out of alignment. I only knew 
the GDR. I did not agree with its political elite, but nevertheless the GDR was my country. 
Unlike my parents, I never felt any desire to reunify with the other German state. At the 
same time, after reunification, my parents – and their generation – suffered far more from 
the devaluation of their lives and struggled much more to adapt to the new country than 
I did.  
 
I have argued that the continued celebration of Jugendweihe is an attempt to recuperate 
the losses experienced after reunification, and to transmit a particular set of values to the 
generation of eastern Germans that has no experience of the country their parents and 
grandparents came from. It serves to connect family members across generational divides 
and dissonances, while simultaneously attempting to foster a post-socialist subjectivity 




Chapter 1 set out the interdependency of politics and kinship. Jugendweihe became an 
integral part of the East German lifecourse and served as a site where individuals, families, 
and the state were intimately connected. Today Jugendweihe connects three living 
generations of eastern Germans but also sets them apart from western Germans. I argued 
that the ritual holds special potential for reproducing the family and also eastern German 
society. In Chapter 2 I demonstrated that Jugendweihe played a significant role in the 
secularization process and facilitated families’ move away from the church. Today the 
celebration of Jugendweihe within the context of the German nation-state is also a 
signifier of being non-denominational, in contrast to western Germans’ ‘culture of church 
affiliation’. A secular world view has thus become the basis for family values to be passed 
on to the next generation. In the following three chapters I brought to the fore particular 
moral values parents and grandparents sought to transmit to the adolescent generation, 
and I explored the changes of particular institutions (school, family, economy) due to 
transformations from state socialism to parliamentary democracy. Chapter 3 explored the 
connections between Jugendweihe and the socialist school system and highlighted how 
parents and grandparents sought to imbue collectivity as value to the adolescent 
generation. Chapter 4 focused on the family celebration and illustrated how ties to both 
the familial home and the regional home (Heimat) were strengthened, while parental and 
grandparental generations in various ways also inculcated the importance of work and 
earning one’s own money to the adolescents. Chapter 5 examined how Jugendweihe 
reflected the increasing socio-economic stratification of eastern German society, while 
also serving as site of distinction-making itself. I argued that the shift from consumer 
products to monetary gifts was indicative of a change in socio-economic relations that 
was mediated by the parental and grandparental generations’ moral discourse and 
emphasis on frugality as basis for adolescents’ ability to found their own future household. 
The Jugendweihe Association’s role in sustaining Jugendweihe in post-unification 
Germany was explored in Chapter 6. It highlighted that Association members’ survival 
was inextricably linked to the survival of Jugendweihe and that many eastern Germans 
perceived Jugendweihe not to be a state-designed ritual but one they had actively helped 
shaping, and thus identified with it. Finally, in Chapter 7 I showed how the endurance of 
Jugendweihe is illustrative of the divergent memories of eastern and western Germans 
that symbolically redraw Cold War boundaries. I argued that grandparental and parental 
generations attempted to create familial continuity and cohesion by portraying both the 
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ritual and family as free from politics or ideology. At the same time older generations still 
felt ‘not at home’ in unified Germany.  
As I have shown in this thesis, this sense of being ‘not at home’, or a second-class citizen, 
stems from two interrelated issues regarding the socialist past and the way German 
unification was realized. East Germans, like most people around the world, perceived 
many of their social characteristics and relations as ‘natural’ and taken-for-granted. Yet, 
these social relations had been fostered by the GDR state’s social policies, and were 
promoted and created in a mutual relationship between state and society as part of the 
greater ideological project of historical materialism – aimed at reaching the final stage on 
the evolutionary ladder: communism. When East Germans became citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Germany overnight, many such social relations crumbled; social policies and 
institutions were challenged, altered or vanished, which most – and certainly the East 
Germans featured in this thesis – felt to be profoundly disorientating, and to mark a loss 
of the positive aspects of their lives under socialism.  
 
Secondly, the discourse on the East German dictatorship was not only reminiscent of the 
discourse on the Nazi dictatorship, but in such comparisons both dictatorships were 
frequently equated in a manner that most East Germans felt to be imbalanced – not least 
because their own biographies were not only called into doubt but devalued. Despite the 
GDR dictatorship’s aim to create uniform ‘socialist personalities’, East Germans 
experienced life under the GDR differently (see also Vaizey 2014). While some truly 
believed in the communist project, others opposed it, or opposed solely the means by 
which it was to be achieved, or opposed the distorted form of ‘actually existing socialism’. 
The great majority of East Germans do not fit neatly into the categories of victim (Opfer) 
or perpetrator (Täter), since they made do with the socialist life they were born into, 
without necessarily questioning it; or they refrained from public opposition and made 
compromises, not least because they wanted to keep their ties to both kin and Heimat.   
 
The continuation and adaptation of Jugendweihe after German unification needs to be 
understood in the context of the incorporation or accession of East Germany into West 
Germany, in which much of the GDR past was either eradicated or upheld as a warning 
reminder of the evil of ‘the second German dictatorship’. Western Germans expected 
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eastern Germans to assimilate into West German society, but eastern Germans only 
wanted to integrate. They did not want to deny or forget where they came from, including 
the positive memories of their past lives, and they also did not want to become like West 
Germans. Jugendweihe, then, is part of their cultural heritage, creating a continuity with 
the GDR past amidst turbulent times of change – a way of making them feel at home 
again. Unification was based on the premise that East and West Germans belonged to 
one German nation. Yet Borneman eloquently describes that states make such nations, 
which 
…involves the (re)creation of belonging patterns that form the basis for 
feeling zu Hause, at home, in one place and not another. Being at home is 
essentially being among kin, experiencing a particular set of lifecourse 
meanings that enable the individual to belong to a group demarcated from 
other groups. The state is successful in its nation-building only when it 
can legitimize itself as having (re)created this unique group, whose 
members will, in turn, reciprocate by retelling their histories in terms – 
categories and periods – congruent with those that the state uses in its 
accounts (Borneman 1992: 287). 
 
Because Jugendweihe was part of the lifecourse of almost all East Germans, it became 
and continues to be both a ritual that unites them, and a ritual that sets them apart from 
their western German counterparts. It is kinship, then, that (re)produces the state after its 
demise, through ritual – which is the reason it is crucial to include an investigation of 
family in studies of ritual. However, grandparental and parental generations here do not 
reproduce the socialist state as it actually was; rather, they have reshaped Jugendweihe in 
a way that reflects what they had hoped their socialist life would have been like, retaining 
the positive aspect that had been worthwhile but which were perceived to have been lost 
in the process of unification. 
 
Jugendweihe, then, creates familial continuity through time by marking the coming-of-
age of adolescents, but it also initiates adolescents into a particular moral community. The 
processes by which grandparental and parental generations attempted to imbue the 
younger (post-socialist) generation with certain moral attributes – such as the focus on 
having children, being secular or atheist, stressing the collective over the individual, being 
hard-working, and frugal – are also a way to create a post-socialist subjectivity by salvaging 
parts of the socialist past that they deemed positive. Jugendweihe thus links the present 
with the past, and reproduces familial continuity into the future, while fulfilling a broader 
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social purpose too: the production and reproduction of a distinct eastern German society, 
weaving both a pan-German tradition and a socialist history into the future.  
 
It is difficult to predict whether Jugendweihe will persist in the distant future. We can 
assume that in time socio-economic differences between easterners and westerners will 
further subside, which could render the ritual somewhat unnecessary, and its continuation 
unlikely. However, people are drawn to ritual not least because of its capacity to recreate 
social ties. It is common for generations that have no direct experience of their 
grandparents’ and parents’ country of origin to seek and reassert their roots, which – in 
the case of eastern Germans – may very likely be through Jugendweihe. Many adolescents 
I spoke to after their own Jugendweihe expressed that they wished their future children 
to have such a celebration too. Given Jugendweihe’s adaptability, it may well continue in 
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